Employee representatives at company boards – why do the employees not always use their rights?

Abstract

During the 1970’s changes in the legislation in a number of European countries gave way for employee representatives at company boards. In Norway employees may demand representation if the number of employees exceeds 30. However, almost 40 years after the introduction, recent studies show that the representatives are only found in approximately 50 per cent of the companies. Thus, the main questions in this article are simple: Why do the employees not exercise their right to elect representatives? And in particular; how can we explain that even in companies with collective agreements, approximately 1/3 do not demand representation? However, we also need to ask: When representation is not mandatory, why are the rights exercised in half of the companies? The questions have important strategic implications for the trade unions in countries with – in a comparative context – strong and comprehensive participation and co-determination rights: should the way forward be to fi ght for the expansion of rights or to concentrate on making the best possible use of the existing collective agreements and legislation? Our analysis indicate that the answer is found in strategic consideration among local trade unionists concerning their own resources and secondly; the role and influence of the board and the relationship between the board and the CEO. When resources and man power are scare, the trade unions will prioritize the arrangements found in the collective agreement. And correspondingly: non-representation may be a result of: i) strong trade unionists in close collaboration with management or: ii) weak trade unionists struggling to establish the social dialogue at company level.