Hvorfor er sproget så svært at forstå, når det er så let at forstå?

Abstract

In an attempt to unravel the intricate relationships between syntax and meaning, this paper clears a space between entrenched 'formalist' and 'functionalist' positions from which to defend a view of language as a 2nd order representational system. Building on information-theoretic foundations, it introduces a new first clause on top of the two clauses of Dretske’s (1995: xiii) Representational Thesis, thus - All linguistic facts are mental facts (new) - All mental facts are representational facts - All representational facts are facts about informational functions Concentrating on language interpretation, it argues that the proper place to look for the functionality of language is as a property of the Language Faculty as standardly conceived. It distinguishes 1°-representations (of situations) from 2°-representations (of linguistic structure), claiming that the input to the cognitive interface in language interpretation is a 1°-representation converted from a sequence of 2°-representations at an interface created by a default, abstract representation of the utterance situation. It argues for a purely representational, as opposed to derivational, approach. The syntactic area discussed is that of argument structure and selection, with special reference to the status of hidden arguments and their place in syntactic representations. It is argued that argument selection is independent of, and prior to, assignment of category, case and thematic roles to constituents, and is purely a matter of the selectional properties of predicates with respect to a parameter of optionality. Four constituent types are recognized, two argumental (Complements and Arguments), two non-argumental (Satellites and Parasites); two obligatory (Complements and Parasites),two optional (Arguments and Satellites).