Forskelsbehandling op til valg? Sammenhængen mellem den elektorale cyklus og deservingness-heuristikken
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7146/politica.v56i1.142993Keywords:
elektoral cyklus, deservingness, Danmark, politiske beslutningerAbstract
Denne artikel undersøger, om den elektorale cyklus – det fænomen at politikere indfører mere generøs policy tæt på et parlamentsvalg – betinges af modtagergruppers status som deserving. Vi argumenterer for, at strategiske politikere vil time generøs policy op til valg, men kun for deserving modtagergrupper, hvis velfærdsbehov ikke opfattes som selvforskyldte. For at undersøge argumentet har vi kodet et nyt datasæt over alle Folketingets vedtagne lov- og beslutningsforslag fra 1975 til 2019 indenfor fem policyområder. Gennem lineære sandsynlighedsmodeller finder vi, at politikere begynder at indføre yderligere generøs policy for deserving grupper tæt på valg, mens sammenhængen ikke findes for undeserving modtagergrupper. Vores fund peger i retning af en mere disaggregeret tilgang til studiet af den elektorale cyklus.
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