Russiske påvirkningsoperationer i Ukrainekrigen i 2014 og 2022 – aktive foranstaltninger og maskirovka
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7146/politica.v55i2.137156Keywords:
aktive foranstaltninger, maskirovka, Rusland, Ukraine, påvirkningsoperationerAbstract
Hvordan tænker den russiske sikkerhedspolitiske og militære elite påvirkningsoperationer? Og hvordan har man brugt påvirkningsoperationer i praksis i de to krige i Ukraine, i 2014 og 2022? Dette undersøger vi ved at søge at indfange den russiske forståelse af påvirkningsoperationer ved hjælp af begreberne ”aktive foranstaltninger” og ”maskirovka”. Og som man måske kunne forvente, er aktive foranstaltninger og maskirovka blevet anvendt aktivt af Rusland i krigene mod Ukraine. Størst succes havde man i 2014, hvor Ukraine og Vesten stort set blev taget på sengen og Krim erobret nærmest uden kamp. Under invasionen i 2022 har de russiske påvirkningsoperationer dog også haft succes. Først og fremmest i forhold til at vildlede Ukraine om, hvor hovedangrebet blev sat ind. En vildledning, der kunne have haft fatale konsekvenser for Ukraine.
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