Hvorfor stemmer folk ikke altid på krigsherrer? En simpel model over free-riding-problemet i valg med voldelige kandidater
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7146/politica.v48i1.131422Abstract
I litteraturen om post-konfliktvalg er det et udbredt fund, at væbnede grupper, som ikke får tilstrækkeligt med stemmer, ofte genoptager konflikten. Det er imidlertid uklart, hvorfor denne situation overhovedet opstår: Hvorfor stemmer rationelle vælgere ikke altid på truende kandidater for dermed at undgå konflikt? Dette opstiller jeg et teoretisk svar på. I et spil med en enkelt periode vælger borgerne mellem en civil kandidat og en ”krigsherre”, som udøver vold mod dem i omvendt proportion med antallet af stemmer, han eller hun modtager. Modellen viser, at hvis vælgerne individuelt opnår ekspressiv nytte ved at stemme på den civile kandidat, vil de alle ende med at gøre dette, selvom de foretrækker, at krigsherren bliver valgt, og volden afsluttes. I ligevægten udøves den maksimale mængde vold.
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