Er ministrenes brug af spinstrategier effektiv?

Authors

  • Søren Bøllingtoft Knudsen

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7146/politica.v48i3.131397

Abstract

Hvis en regering ønsker genvalg, er det afgørende, at dens ministre forstår det politiske spil. En central del af dette spil er spillet om skyldsunddragelse. Her kan ministre benytte forskellige spinstrategier. Spørgsmålet er, hvilke spinstrategier ministrene anvender, samt hvor effektive strategierne er. Dette undersøges ved at sammenligne seks danske ministres anvendelse af spinstrategier baseret på indholdskodning af 1412 artikler fra Politiken. Analyserne viser, at trods ændringer i hvilke strategier ministrene benytter, er anvendelsen af spinstrategier ikke øget de seneste tyve år. Mest effektiv er anvendelsen af én spinstrategi, næstmest effektivt er passivitet, og værst er det at kombinere flere spinstrategier. Endelig er hurtig respons hverken mere eller mindre effektiv end langsom.

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Published

2016-09-01

How to Cite

Knudsen, S. B. (2016). Er ministrenes brug af spinstrategier effektiv?. Politica. Tidsskrift for Politisk Videnskab, 48(3). https://doi.org/10.7146/politica.v48i3.131397