Intuisjoner i politisk teori: problemer og alternativer
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7146/politica.v58i1-2.165055Nøgleord:
intuisjoner, reflektert likevekt, metode i politisk teori, veloverveide normative dommer, argumentet fra evolusjonsteorien, metaetisk subjektivismeResumé
Hvordan kan man besvare normative spørsmål i politisk teori? Et vanlig svar i analytisk politisk teori er: ved å søke ei reflektert likevekt basert på normative intuisjoner (eller ”veloverveide normative dommer”). Er den en god metode? Denne artikkelen presenterer ei etablert innvending mot intuisjonismen som kjennetegner denne metoden: Våre normative intuisjoners opphav i vår arts evolusjonshistorie er vanskelig å forene med at disse er interessante som utgangpunkt for normativ refleksjon. Normativ politisk teori bør derfor ikke baseres på intuisjoner. Et vanlig motsvar er at det ikke finnes alternativer. Artikkelen viser at dette er et dårlig argument ved å presentere tre alternativer: først et fra Rawls, deretter konsekvensialisme som alternativ, og til slutt skisserer den et nytt alternativ basert på metaetisk subjektivisme.
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