Lovgivning i krigens skygge – dansk boligregulering fra 1939 til 1945

Resumé

Under besættelsen opstod der en omfattende bolignød. I den historiske tradition er årsagen angivet som en uheldig kombination af fald i nybyggeriet og den demografiske udvikling. En alternativ forklaring er, at boligmanglen skyldtes lovindgreb i efteråret 1939, hvor der indførtes et lejeloft, som blev fastholdt konsekvent under hele krigen. 

Når man tager hensyn til såvel husleje som varmeudgifterne viser det sig, at udsving i efterspørgslen kan forklares ud fra økonomiske standardteori. Det nominelle huslejeloft var indledningsvis uden virkning, da stærkt stigende energipriser straks efter krigens udbrud drev efterspørgslen ned og førte til flere ledige boliger. Da lønningerne dernæst begyndte at indhente prisinflationen førte det til stigende efterspørgsel efter boliger fra foråret 1942, hvor antallet af ledige boliger var faldet betydeligt. Nedgangen fortsatte og fra slutningen af 1943 begyndte omfanget af husvilde at stige – en udvikling, der vedblev indtil efter befrielsen. Dette indikerer, at når markedet ikke var i stand til at tilpasse priserne på grund af lejeloftet, så steg efterspørgslen astronomisk.

For værdien af boligmassen medførte stigninger i de løbende driftsomkostninger sammenholdt med det lovbestemte loft over bruttoindtjeningen, at rentabiliteten i boligudlejning som erhverv forsvandt.

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Rent control in Denmark during WW II

The article re-tells the story of the housing market and rent control legislation in Denmark during the Second World War. By looking at housing cost as the sum of rent paid to landlords and heating it is possible to explain the fluctuations in demand in conformity with standard economic theory. This may also be used to explain the continuing amendments to the legislation. While a nominal rent control was in place from September 1939 the reality was that spiralling energy prices drove down demand leading to excess housing. When salaries started catching up with price inflation increasing housing demand was felt, probably from early spring ’42, and by then the available number of leaseholds was significantly reduced. By late ’42 the number was insignificant and by the end of ’43 the number of persons relying on the emergency housing provided by the local councils was increasing and continued to increase beyond the liberation in May ’45, a clear sign that since the market was unable to react with higher prices due to rent controls the demand went through the roof.

Looking at the capital value of the housing stock it is self-evident that running costs increased significantly and with gross incomes fixed by law the profits of the sector evaporated. This must have had severe implications for the capital value of housing although the temporary character of the legislation probably postponed the effect.