Hellmut Toftdahl: Kierkegaard først - og Grundtvig så.

Resumé

Hellmut Toftdahl, Kierkegaard først - og Grundtvig så. ( “First K. - and then G.”) Sammenligning og vurdering (København 1969)

Reviewed by William Michelsen.

The contrast between Søren Kierkegaard and N. F. S. Grundtvig is well known. But there is a tendency to forget the important similarity that both of them opposed that reconciliation of idealistic philosophy with Christian theology which in their age prevented a realistic conception of Christianity. Grundtvig’s reaction differs from that of Kierkegaard, however, inasmuch as it does not formulate any philosophical alternative in the usual sense. Instead Grundtvig gives a series of critical presentations of world history, which express his outlook on life in a way that differs widely from the dominant contemporary philosophy.

The author of the present work now asks himself the following question: What does Grundtvig look like if seen from Kierkegaard’s point of view? His answer to this question is characterized by a combination of sobriety and engagement which will make it no easy matter to ignore his treatment of the question. In addition, the work places Grundtvig where he belongs in the cultural debate of today. By modern man Grundtvig will naturally be approached via Kierkegaard. Toftdahl’s final result, however—as expressed in the title of the book—connects with the self-criticism which may be deduced from the work of Kierkegaard: he confines the individual in the task of finding an ego thereby tearing it away from the community with other human beings.

Thus Kierkegaard abandons humanism, according to Toftdahl. In view of this conclusion one lacks a closer confrontation with K. E. Løgstrup (Opgør med Kierkegaard, Kbh. 1967) and G. Malantschuk (Dialektik og eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, Kbh. 1968). Toftdahl follows Kierkegaard a long way; even to the extent of tentatively considering Grundtvig’s psyche from the point of view described in Begrebet Angest. - There is no doubt that “demonization” played a great part also in Grundtvig’s outlook on man, only in a quite different sense. Even during his attacks of mental disease (especially in 1810 and 1867) Grundtvig’s realization of his own condition was so clear and pronounced that it seems unreasonable to regard him as a victim of the kind of psychic confinement delineated in Begrebet Angest.

In his draft of Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift Kierkegaard has limited his disagreement with Grundtvig to the argument that he is unable to think dialectically. Kierkegaard is probably right here. On the other hand, Grundtvig’s biblical view of history which subjected the imperfectibility of human knowledge to a paradoxical belief in God’s omnipotence seems to be confused by Kierkegaard with the contemporary historical outlook on the Bible which undermined the basis of traditional Christianity. But as addressed to Grundtvigianism the sharp formulation in Kierkegaard’s Philosophiske Smuler was nevertheless called for, and Toftdahl’s treatment of this principal work is in my opinion admirable.

The characterization of Kierkegaard’s “aesthetic stage” makes fascinating reading, but one would hardly find anything similar in Grundtvig or the first Grundtvigians. It is a chief motif in Danish literature, however, that the Grundtvigians of later generations were attacked by this “romantic disease”. But one cannot infer that this starting-point is common to all mankind. If despair was known by Grundtvig and the authors who came within his sphere, they did not know the tedium vitae which characterizes modern man. But when the invalidity of all proofs of God’s existence was revealed by Kant, Grundtvig held on to Voltaire’s standpoint, deism. An atheist he never was. Accordingly, his basic problem was no “to choose or not to choose”, Toftdahl’s precise formulation of Kierkegaard’s fundamental problem. For the free choice (liberum arbitrium) was no illusion to Grundtvig. According to him man was left free, through his creation by God, to choose from among many possibilities (Kort Begreb af Verdens Krønike I ( 1814), pp. 14- 17). At this point Grundtvig follows Augustine, who is rejected by Luther. Kierkegaard describes the view as “rubbish”, thereby rejecting not only Grundtvig, but also Leibniz.

Toftdahl demonstrates—especially in a chapter about Martin A. Hansen— how essential answers may be provided to meet the criticism advanced against Grundtvig by Kierkegaard. More answers might be added, however. Grundtvig’s religious crisis of 1810 had been preceded by an aesthetic as well as an ethical stage in his life. And apart from the religious “leap” the crisis was followed by a practical life as a clergyman, hymn writer, and educationalist. In Grundtvig “Religiousness A” came after “Religiousness B” which goes some way to explain the irritation of Kierkegaard. He blamed Grundtvig especially for remaining within the State Church. But it appears from Toftdahl’s book that Kierkegaard was the owner of Grundtvig’s Udsigt over Verdens-Krøniken ( 1817), where Wesley is severely criticized for maintaining to have been expelled from the English State Church. Grundtvig here declares it to be the duty of a Christian preacher to remain within the Church “until one is expelled”, if the preaching is to remain “the work of God”. There is no doubt that this historical example—as a contrast to that of Luther—meant a warning to Grundtvig throughout his life.