Unity and Diversity in Ancient Greek Law

Abstract

In the twentieth century there were several works that assumed the essential unity of Greek Law: Griechisches Bürgschaftsrecht by J. Partsch, Griechisches Privatrecht auf rechtsvergleichender Grundlage by E. Weiss, and The Greek Law of Sale by F. Pringsheim. In a review of Pringsheim’s book, and in an essay on the topic, however, M.I. Finley challenged the notion of the unity of Greek Law. Finley observed that the Greek world was divided into hundreds of different city-states, each with its own political institutions, laws, and legal procedures. According to Finley, there was just too much diversity in the laws of the Greek city-states to justify any discussion of ‘Ancient Greek Law’ as a unified body of statutes and legal concepts. He did however allow that there might have been some unity in commercial law. More recently, M. Gagarin has claimed in the Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law that there was unity in the laws of the Greek poleis in respect to procedure but not in respect to substantive provisions. This essay revisits this issue and shows that there was a considerable amount of unity in the laws of the Greek poleis in substantive and constitutional matters. The article examines several areas of unity: marriage law, contracts, real security, the status of freed persons, the accountability of officials, and the relationship between Council and Assembly. It will also examine the unity of Greek law in regard to legal terminology. On the other hand, it will show that there was considerable diversity in legal procedures, which often varied according to the political constitution of a state.