Non-Committing Encryption is Too Easy in the Random Oracle Model

Forfattere

  • Jesper Buus Nielsen

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7146/brics.v8i47.21707

Resumé

The non-committing encryption problem arises in the setting of adaptively secure cryptographic protocols, as the task of implementing secure channels. We prove that in the random oracle model, where the parties have oracle access to a uniformly random function, non-committing encryption can be implemented efficiently using any trapdoor permutation.

We also prove that no matter how the oracle is instantiated in practice the resulting scheme will never be non-committing, and we give a short discussion of the random oracle model in light of this.

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Publiceret

2001-12-04

Citation/Eksport

Nielsen, J. B. (2001). Non-Committing Encryption is Too Easy in the Random Oracle Model. BRICS Report Series, 8(47). https://doi.org/10.7146/brics.v8i47.21707

Nummer

Nr. 47 (2001): RS-47 Non-Committing Encryption is Too Easy in the Random Oracle Model

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Artikler

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