Strong Emergence

Authors

  • Ida Skovhus Hansen Filosofi Kandidat KU

Keywords:

Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Emergence, Reduction

Abstract

This paper attempts to answer the question of whether strong emergence is a tenable concept and examine how it relates to philosophy of mind. Strong emergence is the idea that truths about a given high-level phenomenon are not reducible, even in principle, to the low-level phenomenon on which it depends. This article advances the position that strong emergence, though a tenable concept, cannot present any convincing and unproblematic instantiations in nature. Furthermore, strong emergence might imply counterintuitive conse-quences for causational structures and philosophy of mind.

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Published

2021-10-28

How to Cite

Hansen, I. S. (2021). Strong Emergence. Journal of Media, Cognition and Communication, 9(1), 69–87. Retrieved from https://tidsskrift.dk/mef-journal/article/view/121779