Epiphenomenalism and knowledge
Defending Robinson’s Reply to the Self-Stultification Objection
Keywords:
mind, consciousness, epiphenomenalism, knowledgeAbstract
Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events have no causal impact on physical events. One of the most potent objections to this view is the self-stultification objection, which aims to show that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with knowledge about our own experience. William Robinson (2006) argues that epiphenomenalism can escape charges of self-stultification by appealing to the common underlying cause between mental events and our reports of mental events. In this paper, I defend Robinson’s proposal against several objections raised by Dwayne Moore (2012). I conclude that Moore’s argu-ments fail to undermine Robinson’s solution to the self-stultification objection.
References
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