En fænomenologisk helhedsforståelse af intersubjektiviteten – som udlagt af Merleau-Ponty

Abstract

This article deals with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of intersubjectivity. It is central for his account that the relation between human conscious beings cannot be treated as an isolated philosophical problem. Therefore, the first part presents Merleau-Pontys’ understanding of the concepts of the “world” and the “pre-objective life”. The second part presents the basic ideas behind the epistemological problem of the experience of other human conscious beings. The third and last part investigates Merleau-Ponty’s solutions to the problems and aims to link these to the thoughts in part one and other central themes from his thinking – the body, perception, sense, history – which is supposed to tie up the article’s main thesis: Merleau-Ponty’s account of intersubjectivity must be approached as a joint theory of the relations between the subject, the world and the other, that all point to a common denominator – a ubiquitous ambiguity.