Interpersonal Validation in Collective Emotions

Abstract

This article proposes that interpersonal validation in collective emotions depends on a person’s possibility to share emotions with other members of a group. This allows for interpersonal validation of collective emotions in isolation.

To develop the main argument, the article presents two claims:
First, I introduce conceptual distinctions between collective emotions, shared emotions and other group emotions. I argue that collective emotions are different from and cannot be reduced to shared emotions. I further argue that both shared emotions and collective emotions are specific types of group emotions. Finally, I distinguish between collective emotions and other group emotions, such as contagious emotions, in order to finally clarify how collective emotions are structurally related to shared emotions.

Second, I introduce a distinction between what I call objective group membership and intersubjective group membership. To do so, I follow Joona Taipale’s distinction between group identification and group membership (2017), where I continue to distinguish between what I call objective and intersubjective group membership, inspired by Edith Stein’s distinction between community and society (2000). Intersubjective membership relates to Stein’s concept of community and depends on how other possible members of a group recognize a person’s membership in that group.

I argue that interpersonal validation of collective emotions depends on a person’s intersubjective group membership, which in turn depends on how possible others conceive of you as a member of a group. My understanding of possible others is inspired by Dan Zahavi’s reading of Edmund Husserl’s discussions on intersubjectivity (Zahavi 1997; 2017).

The main argument in the article is thus that a collective emotion is interpersonally validated if possible other members of a group would share that emotion with the person having a collective emotion.