Den dansk-norske hær i det 18. århundrede OPTIMERING, MODERNISERING OG PROFESSIONALISERING

Resumé

Traditionally, Danish military historians have had a markedly negative view of the long peace period in the 18th century. This article systematically compares the army of Denmark-Norway with conditions in contemporary Europe. Four fields are examined: the relative size of the army and the resources used; the varying principles of recruiting and organizing manpower; the change in the modes of fighting; and the professionalization of the officer corps.

The conclusions do not confirm the traditional view. Compared with the population, the army was always one of the three largest in Europe, periodically the largest. This was mainly made possible by skillful optimization of the use of resources; and the optimization was the result of original systems of recruiting and organization, adapted to the social and economic structure. The tactical forms were commonly not original, but the new developments in the warring states were followed with little delay. The professionalization of the officer corps was the most distinguishing trait of all, even compared with Prussia.

It has long been known that the reforms of the last years of the century resulted in a very modern army, with the first compulsory examination for all officers (1799), the first truly modern, permanent conscription system (1803) etc. The present study now makes it clear that the reform period was not an abrupt departure. It was, in faet, only a more visible continuation of an older trend, which - paradoxically - has been obscured by those very members of the officer corps who embodied the spirit of the reforms. These were the new 'professional' officers typical of the modernized 18th century army: well read, enlightened, impatient of abuse and irrationality, spirited patriots and hostile towards civilian influence. The figure was already conspicuous quite early in the century; by the end of the century it was entirely predominant, at least among military planners and writers. For men such as these no improvement was good enough or fast enough. Their dissatisfaction is reflected in their written works, which deliberately exaggerate current and recent defects while downplaying and thus obscuring real improvements and actual trends. Their writings, so readily accessible, became the main sources of traditional military historians - and their critical spirit the main source of a misleading history.