Den tilpasningsdygtige småstat. Fire danske krigsbeslutninger i den amerikanske verdensorden

Resumé

The Adaptable Small State. Four Danish War Decisions in the American World Order
In Spring 2016, the Danish Parliament commissioned an independent inquiry to examine why Denmark decided to engage militarily in the conflicts in Kosovo (1998, 1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). In particular, the inquiry was to determine what information Danish authorities gathered about the conflicts prior to decision-making, how Danish authorities made use of this information, and what information successive governments passed on to Parliament. Furthermore, the inquiry committee was asked to formulate a ‘true and fair lesson for the future.’ In November 2016, the government appointed the authors of this essay principal investigators of the inquiry. Together with a research group consisting of historians and political scientists, we commenced in February 2017. Two years later, a four-volume account was published. This essay presents the principal findings of the inquiry in a broader historical perspective, as well as concluding reflections upon future policy challenges to Danish foreign policy.
First, in the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, Denmark’s military engagement was driven primarily by the willingness of Danish policy-makers to accommodate US requests for military contributions, typically before they were communicated as concrete US preferences or demands. Second, Danish decisions were formed over longer time spans, rather than decided upon on at certain meetings. Third, the dialogue between the government and parliament was primarily conducted in unofficial fora and bilaterally. The government followed a minimalist strategy for informing the Foreign Policy Committee: the Foreign Policy Committee was typically briefed immediately prior to the presentation of proposals for a formal decision on Danish military engagement but after an extended dialogue with allies including inputs from the civil service and the armed forces.
With respect to the mandate’s request for ‘true and fair lesson for the future’, four suggestions are presented. First, that the government instigate a survey of the paths of communication between the government and political parties in parliament, in order to assess the functionality and democratic legitimacy of the present state of affairs. Second, that the government introduce a procedure that ensures that all relevant questions are dealt with before future decisions are taken. This seems relevant as the inquiry shows that there had been almost no systematic discussion about goals, means, expected effects, ressources, risks, timeframes, alternatives and consequences of saying no to US requests prior to the presentation of the proposals for at formal decision on Danish military engagement. Third, that the government set up a transverse unit of analysis, in order to advise both government and parliament about previous experiences and lessons. This seems relevant because previous experiences have seldom been reflected upon when decisions on future military engagements were made. Fourth, that the government and parliament discuss the principles behind future decisions on Danish military engagements, as the inquiry shows that during the previous thirty years, Denmark has deployed armed forces abroad 76 times, almost always as a result of a reactive political process that reflects US priorities rather than Danish principles. The fourth suggestion seems particularly relevant in light of recent developments in US foreign policy.