The importance of educating global citizens, citizens whose mindset or ‘gaze’ is global rather than national or parochial, has been widely recognized. Despite this, critics have argued that the emphasis on fostering ‘skills, knowledge, attitudes, and values’ reveals the neo-liberal underpinnings of global citizenship education. I argue that this overlooks the transformative nature of global citizenship education, and, drawing on recent work in the intersection between transformative education and Bildung, maintain that educating for global citizenship may be understood as a form of global Bildung in which the professional plays a key role.

Introduction
Over the past decade, calls for the importance of fostering global citizens, citizens whose mindset or ‘gaze’ (UNESCO 2014: 14) is global rather than national or parochial, have become increasingly prominent in international policy and education discourse (UNESCO 2014, 2015, 2018; Sant et al. 2018). This has had a significant impact on national curricula and education policies in a number of countries, and in a string of recent curriculum revisions the international push towards a more globally oriented citizenship education has given way to a greater emphasis on concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘sustainability’, and ‘citizenship’ in primary and secondary education. The topic has also been addressed in the literature on teacher education (Yemini, Tibbitts and Goren 2019), and gradually, although rather more slowly, the notion of the global citizen has begun to have an impact on teacher education programs, with the developments of courses and even whole degrees dedicated to global citizenship in pre-service teacher education (Schugurensky and Wolhuter 2020).

So far, however, the issue has received less attention in the study of professions – and in particular, in examining the role of the teacher; the professional primarily tasked with instilling a global mindset in future citizens. But how are teachers, which traditionally have been understood to receive their mandate from and operate in a specific (national) political-historical context, expected to contribute to bridging the local and the global – what has become known as the glocal – in the endeavour to foster citizens whose mindset is global? Can teachers claim a special professional competency in cultivating global citizens, and if so, what would this be? And should they engage in the venture of educating global citizens, or would this make them complicit in the neo-liberal commodification of education, whose emphasis on global skills and competencies is inimical to the free and liberal Bildung of future citizens?

In this short paper, however, I cannot do more than broach some of these issues and will limit myself to propose, in brief outline, a notion of Bildung conducive to cultivating the global citizen, as well as gesture at a role for the professional in this process. In making my case, I begin, in the first section below, by arguing that global citizenship education must properly be understood as a transformative education, and, drawing on the recent comparison between transformative education and Bildung, that we are justified in thinking of it as a form of global Bildung. In the second section of this paper, I briefly examine what it means to hold that education is transformative. In contrast to much work
in the literature on transformative education, which emphasises the importance of the transformative experience, I argue that undergoing or having undergone an experience is not a necessary requirement for personal transformation. Instead, I suggest that transformation can be the result of what I call a transformative vicarious experience, the kind of experiences one can have by imagining how things appear (or feel) from the perspective of another. In the third and final part of this paper, I briefly explore the role of the professional in this process. While at first sight external to the process, I argue that the professional, by embracing a Gadamerian conception of Bildung as a form of reciprocal learning process, can play an important role in the Bildung of global citizens.

Global citizenship education as global Bildung

Global citizenship education has been described as a ‘framing paradigm’ (UNESCO 2014: 16) and has the potential to be transformative, building the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes that learners need to be able to contribute to a more inclusive, just and peaceful world (UNESCO 2016: 15). These are distributed across a cognitive, a socio-emotional and a behavioral domain, and it is stressed that ‘for education to be transformative, knowledge (cognitive domain) must touch the heart (socio-emotional domain) and turn into action to bring about positive change (behavioural domain)’ (UNESCO 2018: 2).

Despite this, however, not everyone has been convinced about the references to equity and universal human flourishing. Some have asked for whom global citizenship education really is intended, arguing that its primary beneficiary is the affluent Westerner (Pashby 2017). Moreover, believing it to be wedded to neo-liberalism – the ‘attempt to replace political judgement with economic evaluation’ (Davies 2014: 19) – has led some to argue that global citizenship education is ‘not directly about education at all, but about how education can best develop human resources to serve the needs of the globalized economy’ (Angus 2017: 339).

These are not isolated attacks, and the critique of what is perceived to be the neo-liberal underpinnings of global citizenship education seems to have become increasingly vocal over the past years. However, while there is ample reason to take seriously the more general critique of the neo-liberalisation of education (Robertson and Nestore 2021), and while particular attempts to educate for global citizenship may be said to be poorly masked attempts to capitalise on this notion of the global citizen, one does not undermine the framework of a global citizenship education. If clear is that however faulty some initiatives and programmes appear, the notion of educating for global citizenship is intended to be transformative. What is it for global citizenship education to be transformative? What is it for the (cognitive) skills to ‘touch the heart’, and, as a result, ‘turn into action’?

Over the past forty-odd years, much work in transformative education has sought to explain the transformative process; the change and development in our ‘frames of reference’ (Meadow 1978: 104) by which we structure our beliefs, values, self-image and behaviour. In recent years, this has led to a comparison between transformative education and the much older concept of Bildung – a philosophical concept, as Thomas Fuhr argues, ‘that refers to processes of cultivation of human capacities as well as to the end state of this process, the state of being educated, cultivated, or erudite’ (Fuhr 2017: 3). While there are some significant differences between transformative education and Bildung in terms of research methods, stages of life covered, as well as their theoretical and philosophical foundations, ‘both approaches’, Fuhr, Larsen and Taylor argue, ‘analyze complex, prolonged learning processes in which learners reconstruct basic assumptions and expectations that frame their thinking, feeling and acting’ (2017: ix).

While Bildung and transformative education may seem to overlap, there remains the question whether the former can happily be conceived with the term ‘global’ so as to give rise to the notion of global Bildung. As Philip Gonon notes, ‘Bildung is based originally on a specific cultural context’ (2017: 289) and so have to be ‘adapted’ to fit an increasingly globalized world. The concept, in its original formulation, was closely associated with Enlightenment philosophy, sprang out of a social and economic context that no longer exist, and – in the latter half of the 19th century – was often given a nationalistic gloss, asserting the supremacy of the German culture over those of other European nation-states (Fuhr 2017: 9).

The problem of ‘adaptation’ the concept of Bildung to a globalized world, however, seems to pertain primarily to the classical conception of Bildung. On this conception, as Hans-Christoph Koller (2021) argues, Bildung was conceived as an interplay between the self and a fairly stable world. However, given the pace of change in contemporary society, he argues, Bildung ‘can no longer be thought of as a progressive appropriation of this world, but must be newly and differently determined in light of the increasing speed at which knowledge, normative orientations of action, and cultural norms become outdated’ (Koller 2021: 635). Today, Bildung must be understood as a self-reflexive or higher order change in which not only the self is amenable to change, but where ‘how people act toward and relate to the world, other people, and themselves is subject to radical transformation’ (Koller 2021: 636). In this process, fixed ideological, political or religious identities can become unhinged, and interpreting Bildung as a process in which the cultural context of which we are a part is itself subject to change thus seems to support the conclusion that Bildung can be transposed from a ‘limited national or Western tradition and [give rise to] an understanding of what we might mean by a global form of bildung’ (Gustavson 2014: 110). Still, a question seems to remain: How do these changes come about? What initiatives, as Koller (2021: 635) rhetorically asks, this transformation or Bildungsproces?

Transformation and the transformative experience

Despite a certain cultural and psychological resistance, we clearly are capable of change. Even if it may not happen very often, a piece of art, a new acquaintance, or a new perspective, may thrust us onto a new path that up until now may have been ‘either unfeasible or seemingly unfeasible for us’ (Yacek, Rödel, and Karcher 2021: 529).

These transformations, however, may seem perplexing. ‘One of the most enduring mysteries of the human experience’, as Yacek, Rödel, and Karcher notes (2021: 529), ‘is our capacity to undergo profound changes in the values, modes of thought, self-conceptions, and guiding ideals that have given shape to our lives.’ However, while there is a long tradition in philosophy, literature and the arts of exploring these transformative process, it has become increasingly difficult, they argue, to define and delimit education that seeks to be transformative from other pedagogical approaches and practices. Addressing the issue in a recent special volume on transformative education, Yacek, Rödel, and Karcher claim that without a way of distinguishing transformative from non-transformative education, the concept is in danger of meaning ‘just about anything under the pedagogical sun’ (2021: 532).

In querying the notion of a transformation, considerable attention has been devoted to the transformative experience; the episode that brings about and may be said to be the direct causal explanation of the transformation. In a recent book-length study of the phenomenon, Lauris Ann Paul distinguishes
In line with the terminology above, opening up for this kind of indirect transformative experiences, **we seem justified in speaking of what we may call vicarious transformative experiences.**

between what she calls an epistemically transformative experience, one ‘that teaches you something you could not have learned without having that kind of experience’, and a personally transformative experience, that ‘changes you in some deep and personally fundamental way’ (2015: 761). Appearing together, they constitute what she labels a transformative experience – ‘an experience that is both epistemically and personally transformative’ (Paul 2015: 761).

In many ways this is an appealing account of transformation. It distinguishes ‘more’ epistemic transformation from a full transformative experience, and at the same time explains their relation. Transposed to the domain of formal education, however, it nevertheless seems too demanding, making it a mystery how education can be transformative. This becomes clear when we note that a key claim of Paul’s account, further developed in a paper co-authored with John Quiggin, is that ‘for an experience to be transformative, it needs to involve a type of experience a person hasn’t had before’ (2021: 561). Emphasising that it must be a new kind of experience able to bring about the epistemic transformation, which in turn can lead to a personal transformation, having the experience is described as a ‘psychological necessity’ (Paul and Quiggin 2021: 561). ‘Without having the experience,’ they argue, ‘the individual would not be transformed, that is, they would not have these new capacities or experience these changes in psychological attitudes’ (Paul and Quiggin 2021: 561). Examples of this kind of experience are; giving birth, losing a parent, gaining a new sensory ability, having a traumatic accident, winning an Olympic medal, participating in a revolution, having a religious conversion (Paul 2014: 16). These, and similar experiences however, are not readily available in an educational setting, and so if having these kinds of experiences is a prerequisite for transformation, it seems that no personal transformations can be forthcoming in formal education. Paul and Quiggin, it seems, have set the bar too high by insisting that having the experience is a necessity for undergoing a transformation.

In many ways, however, this seems quintessentially what we mean by a transformative experience. How else could we be brought to experience the kind of deep personal changes characteristic of personal transformation, unless it was through a novel transformative experience? We thus seem to be facing a dilemma; either transformative experiences requires a kind of experiences the person hasn’t before, in which case there can be few or no transformative experiences in formal education, or transformative experiences do not require these kind of new experiences, in which case it is hard to see what distinguishes them from ‘mere’ epistemic transformations.

Perhaps there is a way out of the dilemma however. Experiences are first-personal, and closely connected to experiences, but that does not mean that we are wholly cut off from them unless they are our own. Even if we do not personally undergo an experience, we may – at least to some extent – imagine what it would be like to be in the situation of someone else. This is a common enough phenomenon, and even if we may not be able to imagine everything, that does not mean that we cannot use other, closely related experiences from our own past to approximate the thoughts and feelings of others. In these situations, rather than having the feelings or thoughts ourselves, we would be entertaining a vicarious emotion – an emotion that one person experiences when reflecting on the emotion of another (Prinz 2011: 214).

There are many nuances in the literature on what empathising in this sense would entail, e.g. whether it would entail imagining being myself in another’s situation (Goldie 2011), or being another in that situation (Cozman 2011), or perhaps something else entirely. Each of these will surely impact what we can and will imagine, but even if there are some situations which we cannot fully imagine, why assume that it cannot leave some transformative imprint, some subtle and imperceptible transformation behind? Paul and Quiggin themselves notes how transformative experiences may be sometimes ‘short-lived and intense, [or] perhaps gradual yet substantive’ (2021: 561), and compare transformation to a ‘Kuhnian scientific revolution’ – the slow build-up of experience that, when it becomes too much, topples the existing world view and leads to a radical transformation. ‘Why insist that only personal experiences can do this?’ We do after all sometimes respond with distress and agony to the pain of others or come to see things in a new light by taking the other’s perspective, so why could not this cause a similar change, even if in a more subtle or gradual way? In line with the terminology above, opening up for this kind of indirect transformative experiences, we seem justified in speaking of what we may call vicarious transformative experiences.

**Transformative education – and the role of the professional?**

The suggestion that we may experience a transformation without first having to undergo a transformative experience should be a welcome one in transformative education. Unlike in everyday life, we are seldom able to reproduce the transformative experiences of life and death in formal educational settings – a feat which in any case does not seem particularly desirable – and so to rely on other pedagogical tools to bring about personal transformation in the classroom. ‘The imagination, aided by the use of historical, literary and cultural sources seems to have this power, and thus seems to provide a good substitute. But what role does the teacher play in this transformation, brought about by vicariously entertaining the beliefs and feelings of another? A partisan view of the significance of the teacher in this process is offered in Reimagining our futures together: A new social contract for education (UNESCO 2021). A key claim in the report is that ‘teachers must be at the centre of their profession revalued and reimagined as a collaborative endeavour which sparks new knowledge to bring about educational and social transformation’ (UNESCO 2021: 80). ‘Teachers’, they are told, ‘are key figures on whom possibilities for transformation rest’ (UNESCO 2021: 80). Traditionally, however, Bildung has been considered to be a form of self-education. It ‘refers to an event’, as Koller notes, ‘that takes place between a self-acting subject and its material and social environment, that is its effect. This understanding is echoed by Thomas Fuhr, who bluntly states that on the classic Humboldtian conception of Bildung, ‘Bildung is an act of the self, the learner, not the educator’ (Fuhr 2017: 7) – even if he seems to qualify this by adding, that ‘since academic freedom – and granted to universities, students and teachers – will join together to mutually promote both their Bildung and the sciences’ (Fuhr 2017: 7). Despite this qualification, however, the emphasis on the self-acting individual seems to compromise the role of the teacher in the Bildungsprozess. If the process is self-driven – and necessarily so – what role can the teacher play in forming global citizens?
It is precisely by acknowledging the need to be part of, rather than an outside authority, that the teacher can contribute to the Bildungsprozess, as a participant in a continuously unfolding enquiry.

Unperturbed by this worry, Paul and Quiggin have argued that the educator plays a crucial role as an aid or guide in the process. ‘[E]ducators’, they argue, ‘have long observed of experiencing and, at least in their aspirations, guiding this process. Their second-person perspective allows them to understand the bounded awareness of their students and to help to expand that awareness’ (Paul and Quiggin 2021: 575). Unlike the teacher as a kind of control figure, herding the pupils towards the correct answer, is not considered a form of participation, but actively encourage the students to contribute to the Bildungsprozess as a participant in a continuously unfolding enquiry. This was a key element of Gadamer’s hermeneutic reinterpretation of Bildung, as a form of global Bildung.

Bohlin has argued, is ‘doubly negative; neither the solutions nor the problems are pre-defined, or at least need not be so’ (2013: 396). This may seem a tall order for the professional and appears, paradoxically, to entail relinquishing some of the expert knowledge often associated with professionals. While teachers are clearly a step ahead when it comes to appreciating the value of the educational process itself, if there is no expert knowledge which can explain their role in educating for global citizenship, it may seem that their claim to privilege as professionals is weakened. On the other hand, however, it is precisely by acknowledging the need to be part of, rather than an outside authority, that the teacher can contribute to the Bildungsprozess; as a participant in a continuously unfolding enquiry. This criteria, however, pertains not only to the pupil or student, but has implications for the role of the teacher, or the professional, in the Bildungsprozess. Contributing to a global form of Bildung, the teacher must, it seems, not only work to undermine existing erroneous or facile beliefs in his or her students, but actively encourage the students to ‘admit as plausible’ – to see the value of – the thoughts and perspectives of far-off Others, as a kind of propaedeutic experience to take place – it is not enough simply to unearth our biases and prejudices. What is required is a more active engagement with the other by imagining what the world would look like from their perspective.

In Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic reinterpretation of Bildung, the Socratic image is taken up and developed to encompass these added dimensions. A key element in Gadamer’s conception of the gebildete, as Jean Grodin argues, is the readiness to ‘admit as plausible (literally, to value) the thoughts of other persons’ (2018: 12). Quoting from Gadamer’s ‘Truth and Method’, this entails, he argues, ‘keeping oneself open to what is other – to other more universal points of view’, and that to ‘distance oneself from oneself and from one’s own private purposes means to look at those in the way others see them’ (Grodin 2018: 11). This seems particularly relevant in the context of a global Bildung; for ‘[w]hen we strive to understand other cultures’, as Grodin rightly notes, ‘we cannot do so assuming our culture is superior’ (2018: 16).

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