The end of the story is what equates the present with the past, the actual with the potential. The hero is who he was.²

INTRODUCTION
The Norwegian electorate’s ‘no’ to entry into the European Community (EC), September 1972, was a kick in the teeth for the established political, economic and administrative elites of Norway.¹ In fact, the two biggest parties (Labour and the Conservatives), most of the parliament (Storting), the big export oriented economic sectors and the shipping industry, the majority of the leading national newspapers, and almost all of the administrative elite were in favour of membership. Yet, it did not happen. Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined the EC in January 1973, while Norway negotiated a trade agreement with the newly enlarged Community.⁴

The blow was particularly hard for a small group of multilateral economic diplomats – simply called the Europeans – who had worked continuously with the EC-case for 12 years.⁵ Through their work they became professionally, and later

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¹ I would like to thank Giles Scott-Smith, Karen Gram-Skjoldager, Dino Knudsen, Michael Andersen, Johann Leitz, Pernille Østergaard Hansen and the ‘Nyt Diplomati’-workshop, Saxo-Institute, Copenhagen University, March 13, 2014 for valuable comments and good discussions. I would also like to thank the diplomats interviewed, who have shared their life, work and thoughts with me – I am very grateful. Last I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers who have given me many useful tips and corrections. Any mistakes and omissions, of course, remain mine.


³ 53.5% of the electorate voted against membership. The young, the lower social stratum and the periphery were overrepresented on the no-side.


⁵ Haakon A. Ikonomou: Europeans – Norwegian Diplomats and the Enlargement of the European Community, 1960-1972, Unpublished PhD thesis, Florence: EUI 2015. The name European is both a category that I use to capture this group of diplomats analytically, and a name they used to describe themselves in the interviews. It is also an adaptation of historian Robin Allers’ term ‘Europa-experten’ denoting a more emotional connection with the cause. Interview 18.12.2012 “Eivinn Berg”; Robin Allers: Besondere Beziehungen – Deutschland, Norwegen und Europa in der Ära Brandt (1966-1974), Bonn: Dietz Verlag 2009. It is unclear when exactly they started to use this term to describe themselves, but the term ‘a good European’ or ‘a committed European’ was used about them by other diplomats in the 1960s. British Foreign Office Archives 30/1026 – 8 July 1971, Oslo (British Embassy) – G.A. Crossley – Dear Norman;
personally, convinced of the attributes of membership. Moreover, they came to fundamentally believe in the EC as a vehicle of peace. The Norwegian ‘no’ was not only experienced as ‘an institutional shock’ for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), but was also experienced as a professional and personal defeat for the *Europeans*. Indeed, many of them left the service following the referendum. They had failed to deliver the necessary result in the negotiations, and they had been unable to convince the electorate of the, in their eyes, inherent righteousness of the endeavour.

The fundamental question of this article is: How did and do these diplomats create a meaningful narrative from the professional and personal failure of the negative referendum? As will be argued, the *Europeans* have reconciled the ingrained and institutionalized understanding of ‘the diplomat’ as a heroic character with the traumatic experience of the Norwegian ‘no’, by recasting themselves as martyrs professionally sacrificed for a just cause. Memories of the Second World War, their role as diplomats, the membership issue, and the failed referendum, all form part of the same narration. Peace in Europe, an important component of their belief in the European cause in the 1960s was elevated to something morally unassailable. Martyrdom became a transmuted version of their earlier visions of themselves as heroic diplomats and believers in the European cause. As heroic believers that professionally sacrificed themselves for a (higher) cause they now came to narrate themselves as symbolic martyrs.

It is unsurprising that the Second World War and notions of European integration as a peace project were prominent in the minds of the *Europeans* in the 1960s, following the negative referendum, and today. After all the devastating experiences of the Second World War was at the heart of why the six original member states of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) chose to pool sovereignty. ‘Peace’, and the aim to overcome old nationalist rivalries, was explicitly linked to integration in the preamble of the Treaty of Paris that established the ECSC. It is perhaps equally unsurprising that the professional stories of the diplomat had a heroic streak to them. What is interesting however, is how memories, events and professional stories were reconfigured – or re-emplotted – at different times: the importance and meaning of the different ‘components’ changed according to where in time we enter and try to disentangle them. And it is the emplotment and re-employment before and after the negative referendum in 1972 and up until today that is the key interest of this article.

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6 Iver B. Neumann: “Norway. The Foreign Ministry: Bracketing Interdependence”, in Brian Hocking (ed.): *Foreign Ministries – Change and Adaptation*, Basingstoke 1999, pp. 152-169. It was an institutional shock because the MFA discovered that it could not negotiate and ‘talk’ on behalf of Norway on this issue.

What is gained from studying how the Europeans remembered themselves? There is a broad literature on collective memories, European and national identity\(^8\), also in relation to European integration.\(^9\) There are also studies covering how diplomats narrate their successes in relation to the European Community (EC). And as Thomas Raineau has argued in the case of Britain, diplomats, as part of a country’s administrative elite, and their memories (often in the form of memoirs) play a significant part in shaping historical narratives of past political events.\(^10\) However, there are very few studies that try to investigate memories of diplomats centred on failures. Likewise, there are none, to this author’s knowledge, that try to incorporate the professional role of the diplomat to make sense of these memories. To this is added the broader significance of exploring the memories of pro-European actors in a non-joining country, which goes to break down the progressive narrative – and the distinction between inside and outside – so dominant in European integration historiography.\(^11\)

**APPROACH – MAKING SENSE OF MEMORY**

The analysis builds on interviews with several of the former diplomats who were at the heart of the negotiations between the EC and Norway, and who played a central part in the referendum of September 1972 in combination with a wide range of written sources.\(^12\) The methodological challenge is to analytically cap-

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8 When the works of Maurice Halbwachs were revived in the late 1970s and 1980s a plethora of works with this focus emerged. One classic is the seven volume collaborative project headed by Pierre Nora: *Les Lieux de Mémoire*, Paris: Galimard, published between 1981 and 1992. Two journals also saw the light of day: *History and Memory*, Indiana: Indiana University Press, a journal founded in the late 1980s with focuses on the collective memories of Nazism, Fascism and the Holocaust. And the more recent (2008) *Memory Studies* London: Sage Publications which brings together an (almost too) broad palette of approaches.

9 See for example the collaborative work: Klaus Eder and Willfried Spohn (eds.): *Collective Memory and European Identity. The Effects of Integration and Enlargement*, Aldershot: Ashgate 2005.


12 The former diplomats were between the age of 77 and 92 at the time the interviews were conducted. All of the interviews were semi-structured and open-ended, and conducted at their homes. The seven interviewed are: Eivinn Berg, Arild Holland, Arne Langeland, Håkon W. Freihow, Tancred Ibsen Jr., Terje Johannessen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. The rest of the core Multilateral Economic Diplomats (MEDs) and Europeans were: Jahn Halvorsen, Wil-
ture the Europeans’ memories while connecting these with their historical experience of the EC-case in a way that gives a greater understanding of both. This article attempts to do this through a two-pronged approach.

First, it builds on French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of meaning and narratives, and combines it with new insights on memory and interviews from the field of oral history. Ricoeur’s conceptual framework offers two benefits in relation to collective memory studies and oral history. Maurice Halbwachs, upon which much collective memory studies build, saw memory as inherently social and collective, as something that moved beyond memories of lived experiences (historical memory), and as a process through which social cohesion was achieved.13 Ricoeur, on the other hand, bids a crisp analytical tool to understand narration as it creates meaning for the individual, but does not exclude the collective cohesion that could come from sharing such narratives. Oral history does give heed to individual memory. Some adhere to the postmodernist or post-structuralist notion that language and discourse do not reflect the social and material world, they construct it, while others are more concerned with giving voice to the voiceless.14 In this landscape, Ricoeur offers a hermeneutical middle way: for while there is certainly a ‘fictionalizing’ or creative element to remembering, there is a bond to the social reality of lived experiences of the past.15

Ricoeur viewed self-understanding as constantly interpreted and defined through a hermeneutical narration of the self.16 Things that happen to us, Ricoeur argues, are given meaning through a narrative ‘emplotment’ in which events are ordered to uphold the plot. Thus, narratives do not necessarily operate with a linear understanding of time – instead events are connected to create a meaningful ‘self’ in the present. Or, as ethnologist Michael Andersen reflects: “The narra-
tive portrays how things ‘had to happen’ for the plot to be as it is and, in doing so, meaning is created”.17 This ‘emplotment’ twirls important life events, such as experiences of war or death, major victories or defeats, together: Such emotionally charged memories, though temporally disconnected, might be narrated together and given “a shared significance”.18 Starting with the interviews with the Europeans, this article distinguishes two such life events – the Second World War and the EC-case – and explores how they are narrated together to make sense of the negative referendum.

As famous poet and novelist Emanuel Litvinoff noted, memory is a literary exercise that “shapes our yesterdays into narrative form, an inevitably fictionalizing process”.19 In an interview situation therefore, the historian must be aware that memory is not “a passive depository of facts, but an active process of creation of meanings”.20 This ‘fictionalizing process’ is continuous: As one moves forward, the past is continuously altered to fit one’s new ‘location’. Accordingly, this article understands the Europeans’ narratives from the point of view of the conclusion, and the ‘chain of meaningful events’ as being narrated and pushed ‘back in time’.21 At the same time it tries to incorporate the fact that this creation of meaning has happened continuously through their lived life. Memories of the Second World War were structured and structuring for the Europeans in the 1960s as well as today. Their thoughts on war, peace and integration are ‘put into play’ in different ways depending on time and context. Therefore, we need to grasp how it shaped their worldview and self-understanding at the time, and how this in turn is interpreted in the present. It is here that the combination of oral history and archive-based history is of value: Narratives evident in the interviews – that link up events in a manner shaped by their current ‘location’ – tease out important aspects of their thoughts and ideas otherwise hard to spot in the archival material of the 1960s. And opposite, the archival material helps trace how narratives, ideas, and chronologies have been constructed over time, have changed, are riddled with ‘inconsistencies’, and shape their present views.22

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22 I’m aware of the methodological hazards here, for one runs the risk of reading things into documents from the past, simply because this is something the interviewed person emphasises today. There is no easy way around this, the historian must read both sources carefully, and be aware of the weaknesses and strengths of both.
Second, the article builds on social anthropologist and political scientist Iver B. Neumann’s notion of diplomats adhering to three ingrained, professional ‘stories’: the bureaucratic, heroic and mediator story. In his 2012 study of contemporary Norwegian diplomats, Neumann argued that when entering the Norwegian Foreign Service, young and promising aspirants are “exposed to a diplomatic discourse that offers various stories of how to be a diplomat”. These stories of what makes up a good (and bad) diplomat, are embedded in the discourses and practices of the diplomatic field and the MFA as an institution. Diplomats acquire, adhere to, and interpret these stories through diplomatic practice – this way they subscribe to the stories ‘to which they are supposed to subscribe’. As opposed to roles, which are context specific, Neumann argues that stories are relevant and meaningful in several contexts, and make up truly ingrained and internalized understandings of self. Thus, stories, could be understood as collectively accessible, and institutionalized, diplomatic narratives. Or, put differently, stories are ‘templates’ of the core of what it means to be a good diplomat. Using Neumann’s stories as ideal types, we may explore the Europeans’ understanding of what made a good (and bad) diplomat, and how they redefined their professional self post-referendum. Equipped with these analytical tools, the article considers how the Europeans remember and narrate themselves and the experience of working with the Norwegian bid for membership in the EC.

First, the article looks into how the victorious anti-marketeers’ critique of the Europeans in the early 1970s fundamentally challenged their understanding of themselves as heroic diplomats. Second, it investigates how the Europeans retell their experiences of the Second World War, the quest for peace through international co-operation and their support of Norway joining the EC as a connected story. Last, the article explores how the martyr-narrative, born out of the negative referendum, is enforced by the Europeans’ present existence in the margins of Norwegian political discourse.

THE EUROPEANS AND THE EC-CASE
A handful of diplomats, most of them educated economists, and most of them specialised in multilateral diplomacy, worked with the EC-case through three rounds of applications and negotiations – 1960-1963; 1967; and 1970-1972. The French

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24 Neumann: At home with the Diplomats, p. 99.
25 Raymond Boudon: The Logic of Social Action: An introduction to Sociological Analysis, London: Routledge 1979, p. 40. This is a twist of Boudon’s definition of what a role is.
26 Of the 15 Multilateral Economic Diplomats (MEDs) that constituted the core of the Europeans, 2/3s were educated after war, nearly 50 % were economists, 20 % educated in the social sciences, and only 33 % were lawyers. This was a major shift, away from lawyers dominating the Foreign Service, as the young war generation entered the service.
President, General Charles de Gaulle denied Britain’s two first bids for membership in the Community – and effectively shut the door on Denmark, Ireland and Norway too, as neither the EC nor the smaller applicant countries envisioned a membership without the UK. The third round, following the retirement of de Gaulle and the relance of Europe at the Summit of The Hague in December 1969, was, after long and strenuous negotiations, successful. Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway all signed the accession treaties in January 1972.  

However, in Norway the negotiation result had to be approved by ¾ of the parliament (Storting), and, de facto, the majority of the people through a consultative referendum. From January, until the referendum, September 25, 1972, a divisive, bitter and unusually heated political struggle between the ‘yes’-side and the ‘no’-side began in earnest. As MFA state secretary at the time Thorvald Stoltenberg later noted, tongue-firmly-in-cheek: “It was the closest modern time Norway has been to an outright civil war”.  

As I have argued elsewhere, the Europeans were forged together, networked and politicised, through their work with the EC-case. By the early 1970s, they were both professionally and personally convinced that Norway needed to become a member of the EC. At this point, the Europeans were more or less willingly thrown into the pro-European referendum campaign of the Labour Government in 1972. They toured the country to inform the public about the negotiation result, and helped set up call-centres and automatic answering machines to answer questions from the public. The MFA, in close cooperation with the European Movement in Norway and the ‘Yes to the EC’-campaign, printed pamphlets, posters and other material. This, bordering on political, engagement of the Europeans, with the Norwegian electorate was unprecedented.  

However, the anti-marketeers with their effective grassroot movements won the hearts of the undecided. One reason was their ability to successfully ‘tap into’ historically and culturally loaded discourses of ‘Europe’ being something different than ‘Norway’. Membership would entail a loss of Norway’s hard-won sowe-

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29 Ikonomou: Europeans.


reignty, they argued, and was therefore a threat to Norway’s future existence. The referendum in September 1972 was cast as this generation’s opportunity to protect the right to self-determination. The choice was effectively portrayed as a struggle between binary oppositions: ‘State’ vs. ‘People’, ‘Bureaucracy’ vs. ‘Parliament’, ‘Constitution’ vs. ‘Treaty of Rome’, ‘Sovereignty’ vs. ‘Union’, ‘Norway’ vs. ‘Europe’. It was a linear and rhetorically powerful interpretation of history, already well developed in the first no-campaign in 1961:

When big decisions were taken in our country’s history – in 1814, 1905 and 1940 – a united people stood behind the choices. These decisions form the basis for our country’s social, economic and cultural progress in recent times and obliges our generation to lead in the same direction.

The Europeans could not escape this discourse – they were submerged in its language and were acutely aware of how problematic it was with regard to the EC-case. Furthermore, the Europeans – a bureaucratic elite with historical ties to the unions with Denmark and Sweden – were constrained by how they were perceived. For example, the Christian People’s Party parliamentarian, Asbjørn Haugstvedt, could argue: “As far as I can tell, full membership in the EC represents an open break with traditional Norwegian democracy (folkestyre). Ever since 1814, we have fought for the people’s right to govern the country, often against the civil servant regime”. And Bjørn Unneberg of the Agrarian Party could maintain:

If we look at our history, we see that pro-union parties existed both 1814 and 1905, which argued that Norway was best served by joining bigger [political] entities. Tho-

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33 Denmark-Norway was a union between the two kingdoms Denmark and Norway which lasted from 1380 to 1814, when Norway entered into a personal union, under the Swedish king, which lasted until 1905.
35 Neumann: *Norge – en kritikk*.
37 Ikonomou: *Europeans*.
38 As Neumann notes, out of a heterogeneous group of immigrant families grew – from the 1600s onwards – a self-aware, self-recruiting class with both the will and ability to administer the state. These families constituted the state, societal and economic elite of the 1600-1800s. Making up about one per cent of the population living on Norwegian territory, they were the undisputed ‘aristocracy’ of Denmark-Norway. Many of the diplomats in postwar Norway hailed from these old civil servant families. Neumann: *Norge – en kritikk*, p. 44. See also: Øystein Rian: ”Hva og hvem var staten i Norge?”, in Erling Ladewig Petersen (ed.): *Magstaten i Norden i 1600-tallet og dens sociale konsekvenser*, Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag 1984, pp. 73-98.
se days it was the right side in Norwegian politics and the civil servants. Today it is the Federation of Norwegian Industries, Norwegian Bankers’ Association, civil servants and party officials.40

The diplomat – the quintessential civil servant – was in this discourse a foreign element, in cahoots with continental capitalists and great powers. Leftist writer, political activist and anti-marketeer Sigbjørn Hølmebakk eloquently captured this when he spoke about the MFA’s information campaign at an anti-marketeer rally in 1972:

I thought it would be best to begin with the MFA’s brochures. I don’t know if i did this because I had helped to pay for them, or because I still held on to the childish, innocent belief that the MFA wouldn’t lie. So, I sat down and read, as the lilies of the valley blossomed and the mackerel started to seep into the Lista fjord. It was the stupidest thing I could have done. Because slowly I realised that this was not information. It was propaganda. It was not clarifying, it was concealing. There was no attempt to shed light on dark and unknown places. The lighting was muted and soft, so as to make it intimate and pleasant, in order to create sweet music about cooperation and community in our hearts. This was the elegant rape in morning dress and pin stripes. So, I put the brochures down and went on the fjord.41

The elegant, smooth-talking and well-dressed MFA-men were contrasted with the pure, unspoiled and innocent fjord: Civilised Europe versus Natural Norway. In this dichotomy ‘the diplomat’ was an agent of Civilised Europe.

Throughout the EC-debacle, the anti-marketeers continuously accused the Europeans of propagating for membership. Already during the first round, the EC sceptic newspaper Dagbladet claimed that full membership would mean “the gradual dismantlement of the Norwegian nation state”, and that the MFA tried to conceal this.42 The MFA’s propaganda in favour of membership in the EC was “discouraging, immoral and excessive”, the newspaper concluded.43 Shortly before the referendum in 1972, parliamentary leader for the Liberal Party Gunnar Garbo claimed the parliament’s appropriations to the MFA’s information campaign had been squandered away on “spreading shallow, unreliable and unfounded information”, and claimed that “the Ministry’s statements [were] clearly misleading”.44

40 Bjørn Unneberg, Stortingstidende (St.t.) (1972), p. 3291. My translation.
42 Dagbladet 04.04.1962, 28.10.1962.
43 Dagbladet 21.03.1963.
44 UD 44.36/6.84 Informasjon – Arbeiderbladet 31.07.1972, “Spørsmål og svar”. 
Certain journalists went so far as to openly question the loyalty and honesty of specific diplomats.45

This condemnation climaxed in the immediate aftermath of the referendum, and was given a quasi-academic foundation when three young social scientists and anti-marketeers published: *The Unfaithful Servants – The Civil Service in the EC-struggle*. They argued that the civil service, and especially the diplomats, went beyond the established administrative norms. The ‘centre’ and social elites were overrepresented in the MFA, and the diplomats were both personally and professionally invested in the case: “Central parts of the foreign policy oriented civil service, such as the MFA and the Ministry of Commerce and Shipping (MoCS), can be said to have entered the EEC already in the early 1960s.”46

Whether the *Europeans* in fact had overstepped the boundaries of diplomatic norms or not was at this point irrelevant. Shortly after the negative referendum, many of the *Europeans* went to the unusual step of either leaving the diplomatic service, or transferring to remote places.47 Two main motivations stood out: Bitter disappointment with the end result; and/or a feeling of being discredited or questioned to such a degree that it rendered them unable to work with European matters at least for a while.48 Ambassador to Brussels Jahn Halvorsen probably summed up what many of the *Europeans* thought, in a personal letter to Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli right after the negative referendum:

Dear Trygve! (...) The room for manoeuvre that the Government has bestowed on its civil servants is in reality a necessity for our entire system and our political debate. With Norway having such a small milieu, we would loose something essential if the civil servants could not present and explain the Government’s policies. We now run the risk of civil servants not daring to give their opinion, not even internally, if it should run counter to the opinion of shifting Governments. Partly because they may feel that they become unpopular, partly because leaks and other channels to the press might be used. Then we’re truly in danger.49

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46 Gleditsch, Østerud and Elster (red.): *De Utro Tjenere*, p. 79. My translation.
47 Eivinn Berg left the service for many years, and worked as a director in the Norwegian Shipping Association; Arild Holland was asked to stay on for a while, to negotiate the trade agreement, but left the service afterwards, in 1974, to become head of the Association of Pulp and Paper Industries; Asbjørn Skarstein was transferred to Ottawa; Tim Greve became director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute in 1974.
With the end of the EC-struggle, then, the Europeans had challenged the traditional norms of diplomacy through political agitation fuelled by personal conviction. Moreover, they had been challenged by the anti-marketeers who effectively condemned them to an existence outside the Norwegian political discourse as a foreign (European) element. It was this dual challenge to their professional selves, combined with the shock of the negative referendum that would lead to a reinterpretation of the ingrained understanding of themselves as heroic diplomats.

THE HEROIC DIPLOMAT

In his study of Norwegian diplomats, Neumann distinguishes a bureaucratic, a heroic and a mediator story, and argues that juggling them successfully is what constitutes a good diplomat. The three stories, Neumann argues, resemble Western society’s stories of what it means to be a good human in general. Philosopher Charles Taylor identified (at least) two such scripts or stories: One concerns the decency of everyday life: “[D]oing all the little things that are expected of you in a wide range of different contexts (...) This story celebrates low-key, monotonous labouring life. It has no place for heroics in the sense of exceptionalism”, Neumann explains. Rather, it is heroism in the shape of endurance. The image is the silent and admirable suffering of Christ. This makes up the bureaucratic story of the diplomat.

The other story Taylor unveils concerns the good deed. “This is a hero story”, Neumann assesses, involving exceptional individual feats and spurs of creative genius. Here we are dealing with warrior ethics and turning water into wine. Such imagery underlies the heroic career diplomat. The face of the hero diplomat when at home is that of an adviser, “as close to the action as possible”, thriving in pulsating secretariats and mixing strictly diplomatic work with political actions. The face of the hero diplomat when stationed abroad is that of the field diplomat. “The deed may be to found a new station in conditions of particular hardship, to undertake a particular arduous fact-finding mission, or to mastermind and stage a political fait accompli such as a conference against the opposition of rival diplomats”.

The last story, which Neumann educes from his studies of the Norwegian MFA, is the self-effacing mediator. This story is specific for diplomacy, he argues, and is central to their understanding of what constitutes a good diplomat. For example, the diplomat always speaks on behalf of someone, not in his/her own capacity. One of the most important tasks of a diplomat is to successfully prepare

50 Neumann: At home with the Diplomats, p. 125.
51 Iver B. Neumann: “To be a Diplomat”, International Studies Perspectives 6, 2005, p. 73.
53 Neumann: At home with the Diplomats, p. 98.
54 Captured in the way diplomats act as mediums of national interests, and make statements such as “Norway believes ...” or “Norway cannot accept”.
sites (of negotiation) for others. When the negotiations are concluded, politicians—not diplomats—will put their name to the papers.\textsuperscript{55} Diplomacy, Neumann points out, “is about easing communication by turning yourself into an optimally functioning medium between other actors”.\textsuperscript{56}

In a sense, all three stories are heroic, albeit in different ways. The stories call upon different, and sometimes contradictory, requirements from the diplomat. Underpinning these stories are more specific ‘role expectations’, where roles could be understood as “formalised or normalised expectations that define the ideal behaviour of groups of actors”.\textsuperscript{57} Following Weberian standards, Norwegian diplomats—much like British or Danish diplomats—traditionally adhered to the norms of \textit{professional independence} and \textit{political neutrality}.\textsuperscript{58} Just like the three stories, this pair of norms reflected a built-in tension of diplomacy. In his now classic publication, \textit{Diplomacy}, famous British interwar diplomat, Sir Harold Nicolson explains:

> The civil service, of which the diplomatic service is a branch, is supposed to possess to politics. Its duty is to place its experience at the disposal of the Government in power, to tender advice, and if need be to raise objections. Yet, if that advice [is] disregarded by the Minister, as representative of the sovereign people, it is the duty and function of the civil service to execute his instructions without further question.\textsuperscript{59}

One of the \textit{Europeans} working with the EC-case, Terje Johannessen (Member of the Market Committee, 1966-70), thought along similar lines:

> [The] first task is to ensure that the Government’s policies are implemented. And here there are almost no exceptions, you must implement. It is part of the parliamentary system of governance and the division of labour. But, at the same time, it must be equally clear that if you perceive that what the Government is doing is, shall we say, obviously contrary to the interests of the nation, then you must be allowed to speak up—without it having personal consequences.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{56} Neumann: \textit{At home with the Diplomats}, p. 121.
\textsuperscript{58} Dag Ingvar Jacobsen: \textit{Administrasjonens makt – om forholdet mellom politikk og administrasjon}, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget 1997, p. 18-23; Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ottar Hellevik: \textit{Kampen om EF}, Oslo: PAX forlag 1977. Delineating the outer perimeter of these norms, § 62 of the Norwegian Constitution states that civil servants should not be electable to the \textit{Storting}; while § 100 secures the general freedom of expression, which civil servants also enjoy.
\textsuperscript{60} Interview 24.04.2012: “Terje Johannessen”. \textit{My translation}. 
Equally, Eivinn Berg (Industrial Counsellor to Brussels, 1970-72) explained that it was a civil servant’s duty to follow the government’s chosen path “if he feels [that it is right] from a professional point of view, and from the point of view of the environment he works in”.61

The roles pull in opposite directions – one stressing loyalty, the other independence – and echo the bureaucratic and heroic story, respectively.62 Political scientist Knut Dahl Jacobsen, studying Norwegian civil servants in the 1950s and 1960s, argued that the vagueness of role expectations enabled the civil servants to embody contradictory norms. Since both political neutrality and professional independence was needed, and the balance between the two depended on the circumstances, any clear rule would be unsatisfying.63 Also from a functional point of view, then, being a successful diplomat meant balancing contradictory heroic requirements.

THE EUROPEANS AND THE DIPLOMATIC

Through a careful reading of the interviews conducted, using Neumann’s categories, it becomes clear that the Europeans’ understanding of what made a good diplomat was narrated along the lines of the three stories. The bureaucratic story – of the enduring character that does what is expected of him, no matter what – was captured by Håkon W. Freihow (Press Attaché at the Embassy in Brussels, 1971-72), when he told the story of how Jahn Halvorsen, Ambassador to Brussels, reacted to the negative referendum in September 1972:

I remember right before the referendum, I had bought a lot of champagne to the Embassy, we were supposed to give toasts. And then it happened – we did not become members – we were all very surprised. (...) We were, of course, very disappointed. But I remember Jahn Halvorsen, he was a passionate pro-European, had worked for it with his information back home, and through his broad network in the Commission (...) So, when the results were in, he disappeared up to his office, and then he called a meeting, and stated: “The decision has been made, and our task, in these circumstances, is to work to obtain the best terms possible. The decision is made, and we must adhere, as we always do, to the instruction from ‘home’.” He was an exceptional civil servant. The ambassador, and I’ve had many good ones, but I rank him the highest.64

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63 Dahl Jacobsen: “Lojalitet, nøytalitet og faglig uavhengighet”, p. 243; Knut Getz Wold: “Administrasjon og politikk”, in Gleditsch, Østerud and Elster (red.): De Utro Tjenere 1974, p. 29-30. Another reason for the lack of rules was the ambition for a flexible Foreign Service. Too many rules would hamper the institutional elasticity, rendering it unable to adapt to shifting situations.
As can be noticed, Freihow, when referring to Halvorsen’s enduring and loyal characteristics, explicitly labelled him ‘an exceptional civil servant’, thus highlighting the bureaucratic traits of a diplomat. Similarly, both Johannessen and Berg, above, referred to themselves as civil servants when talking about the diplomats’ requirements of neutrality and loyalty.65

The heroic story was also part of the Europeans’ self-perception. The opinion that they as diplomats were practitioners, out in the real world, as opposed to many other experts and civil servants, was fundamental. The heroic story entailed being ‘a man of action’, as captured in this reflection by Arne Langeland: “I just did what I thought to be right. No, I didn’t have any philosophical reflections.”66 The diplomat was not trapped behind a desk, but someone who engaged with people. Arild Holland, member of the Market Committee and the negotiation secretariat (1966-72), clearly made this distinction between being ‘book-smart’ and being a heroic diplomat: "Everything concerning diplomacy, all negotiations, is about personal chemistry, the ability to socialize with people – it’s everything. You can be dumb as a bag of hammers – but if you’re able to win the hearts of those you negotiate with, you can go very far.”67

Arne Langeland also juxtaposed the two when reflecting on how legal expert at the MFA, Einar Løchen – who had written extensively on European integration – differed from career diplomats: “One thing is to have read and written about it. You know when you are in negotiations, when you negotiate, all that, that’s what we know. What should we do now? We should go this way or that way. How should we get there? (...) You don’t get that through reading.”68

Lastly, the Europeans also adhered to the mediating story. The notion of being able to build bridges between people, institutions or negotiating standpoints was an essential part of their professional self. As Neumann notes, it is the “negotiating itself, the doing that is seen to be of key importance”, where the diplomat becomes an “optimally functioning medium” to the point of being self-effacing.69 Terje Johannessen used the same imagery of a medium or channel: “You get, either consciously or subconsciously, a sense of what the receiver wants.”70

Søren Chr. Sommerfelt – head of negotiations at deputy level in 1971-72 – wrote of how he mediated estrangement between Commission President Franco Maria Malfatti and Norwegian nature, by facilitating a site that educated understanding:

66 Langeland was a junior executive officer (1960), executive officer (1961-62) and Head of Office (1962-65) for the 4th/5th Economic Office. Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012. My translation.
68 Interview 01.05.2012: “Arne Langeland”. My translation.
69 Neumann: At home with the Diplomats, p. 120-121.
Yes, Signor and Signora Malfatti experienced our northern winters, with clear weather and cold. One day we were standing on the pier of one of Tromsø’s local dignitaries, Alfons Kræmer, and saw one of his fishing boats coming in from the Arctic Ocean. It had been out in some rough weather, and both the deck and the windows were covered with ice. The boat docked — everything was lifeless until the hatch opened on the front deck, and out crawled a creature that had to be human, as it walked on two. Everything was wrapped in something black, including the hat with long flaps. Inside, behind the scarf one could see a couple of narrow eyes — that’s all. It was a miracle how this creature managed to claw his way from the icy deck down towards the pulpit. It was then that our Italian guests, especially she, understood that fishing in Northern Norway was something special and required special arrangements.71

The meeting was between the harsh Norwegian nature and the Malfattis, Sommerfelt merely made it happen.72

All of these deeply ingrained stories of what it meant to be a good diplomat were templates that the Europeans drew upon when they remembered and narrated themselves in the interviews. Moreover, they were present in their diplomatic practice — how they worked with the EC-case — in the 1960s and early 1970s. Following the negative referendum, the juggling diplomat hero had to be reinvented for the Europeans to remember the EC-debacle in a meaningful way.

MEMORIES OF WAR

To understand how the diplomat hero was reinvented following the negative referendum, we need to explore how their memories of the Second World War play(ed) an important part in their work with the EC-case, their interpretation of the negative referendum, and their narrative of themselves today. The remaining four sections analyse how the memories of war, concepts of peace and their diplomatic self-perception can be understood at different ‘locations’ in relation to the EC-case and the failed referendum. As will be seen, the Europeans’ understanding of the EC/EU as a peace project has developed since the 1960, and is crucial in order to grasp their narrative of themselves as martyrs.

The Second World War occupied and occupies a vast space in the Europeans’ memories, works, and publications. Being kids, youth or young adults during the war, most of them have unadorned and childish memories of life during the occupation, often free of intricate political analysis.73 Thorvald Stoltenberg, 12 years old in 1943, experienced the war from a cottage north of Oslo. He kept track of the

73 The average age of the Europeans was just shy of 17 years in 1940.
progress of the allied forces through two sisters living nearby delivering illegal news – and made frontlines with needles and threads on a giant map of Europe in his room. Arne Langeland described the German occupation of a small, unnamed town in Norway, in his semi-fictional novel, *My little town* (1988), based partly on his memories from the war:

The 11th of April the Germans marched into the town. They had stayed on the outskirts for twenty-four hours or so – the boys had seen them. A small detachment of Norwegian soldiers was sent towards them but was quickly withdrawn. People fled from the city, they got away in cars, busses and lorries. The farms in the area took them in, all kinds of rumours spread. Young boys and men poured into the police station and the district sheriff's office to be mobilized – to no avail. Nobody knew anything; nobody knew what he or she was supposed to do, or where to enquire. Men cried overtly, they felt debased.

Langeland vividly describes how adults around him reacted to the occupation, seen from a young boy's perspective (Langeland was 12 years old in 1940). Even though they did not take an active part in the war, their experiences of it were often dramatic. Many of the *Europeans* remember, for example, how their fathers were taken prisoners by German troops:

The summer of 1942, the family was on vacation at Hadeland, where his father had rented a cottage at a farm. One day a black car approached on the inroad, stopped outside the cottage and took Emil [the father] with it. He was arrested again. All Norwegian officers were now to be taken. After that day Thorvald disliked black cars.

Those a bit older had more concrete confrontations with, and memories of, war, and perhaps more articulate resentments. Arild Holland, for example, voiced such resentments

I have experienced war: My mother’s home town, Kristiansund, was bombed to the ground in April 1940; my father was severely injured in 1943; two, slightly older, school-mates of mine were tortured to death; my closest friend and neighbour was imprisoned for nearly a year (17 years old) and suffered from it afterwards; and I was on Gestapo’s list, but got away by sheer luck.

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76 Salvesen: *Thorvalds Verden*, p. 15. His father was sent to the concentration camp Luckenwalde, outside of Berlin, in 1943. Similarly, Tacred Ibsen Jr., Asbjørn Skarstein, Arild Holland and Håkon W. Freihow's fathers were imprisoned by the Germans.
14 years of age when the war came to Norway, Arild Holland remembered hiding on the rooftop of a building until night came – afraid to go home – while Gestapo arrested many of his friends. Many years later he thought he was dreaming away the war while he was hiding up there. 78 Asbjørn Skarstein, 21 years old in 1943, had just started studying for his degree in economics in Bergen, when he was tipped off that German troops would arrest students. Skarstein, and some friends of his, fled Bergen on bikes, and crossed the mountains from Western Norway to Eastern Norway. Afraid that Gestapo would find him in his hometown, Oslo, Skarstein sought refuge at his grandfather’s cabin in Southern Norway. While in hiding, Skarstein followed the events of the war via BBC’s radio broadcasting. 79

The youngest Europeans, like Terje Johannessen (5 years old in 1940), had very vague memories of wartime Norway. Growing up during the war he recognised that war “was a bad thing”. Johannessen had, on the other hand, clearer memories of the immediate postwar years, and came to link the years of occupation with Soviet annexations in the early cold war:

Our generation, we will never be entirely free from what we grew up with. First you had the war itself and the occupation of a small, peaceful country, as we were; then, even more significantly, what happened in Eastern Europe, with those countries, especially with Czechoslovakia. It has left a mark that is always a part of our mindset. 80

Only the oldest Europeans took directly part in the war: Jahn Halvorsen, 24 years of age in 1940, participated in the battle of Narvik, where allied forces first pushed back the Germans and then capitulated. 81 Working in London during the war, Søren Chr. Sommerfelt (24 in 1940) recalled how “sometimes, when the bombs were raining down, I volunteered as a fireguard”. Even during the worst times of German bombing, he goes on, the small bottles of milk would be delivered to his doorstep in London – every day. As long as the milk was delivered, he rounds off, “I knew victory would be ours, sooner or later.” 82

Thousands and thousands of contemporary Norwegians and millions of contemporary Europeans shared such experiences. Memories like those of the Europeans were common to a whole generation who had felt the horrors of war first hand. The point here is not the veracity of these experiences and memories, but rather how the Europeans came to explicitly link them with European integration. Through their work with the EC-case, the Europeans’ memories of The Se-

78 Interview 27.04.2012: “Arild Holland”.
79 Interview 08.04.2014: “Tove Skarstein”.
cond World War were given a new meaning. The concept of peace was practiced and narrated into the integration project – and eventually came to serve as an enduring emotionally charged rationale for why membership was necessary.

**PEACE & INTEGRATION**

The *Europeans’* linkage between ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ can be traced back to their work with multilateral diplomacy in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s – and especially their work with the EC-case. In this environment their memories of war were given a new significance. Since then, the relationship between ‘war’, ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ has been an important aspect of the *Europeans’* narrative.

Today the *Europeans* inextricably conjoin experiences of war, the quest for peace, and their support of Norway joining the European Community. So much so, that all three aspects often appear in the same sentence. Håkon W. Freihow, for example, explains that the arrest of his father during the war and himself having to go into hiding “contributed significantly in shaping my view of Europe in the future. I became a warm supporter of the EC”. 83 Similarly, Thorvald Stoltenberg links the three:

> What preoccupied me, what preoccupied many of us, was ‘never again war’, and how to build peace. In the 1950s I didn’t know of, and still today I don’t know of, a better way to do it than by making people mutually dependent on each other [...] and the necessity of supranationalism, it’s deeply rooted within me, and has been with me since my days as a student.84

These are clear examples of what Ricoeur called the threefold mimesis, in which the narrative created to order one’s experiences, in turn becomes an integrated part of one’s identity.85

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85 As Michael Andersen explains “the most accessible way to understand the mimesis model is to look at it from the point of view of a literary work, where there is a relation between the Work, the World and the Interpreter”. Accordingly, the threefold mimesis is made up of 1) the *prefiguration* of the world – that is the pre-conceptions humans have ordering our experience of the world 2) the narrative *configuration* of the world, that is how stories arrange events into a ‘plot’ – a meaningful whole with a beginning, middle and end, and 3) the *refiguration*, where the ‘text’, as it is read by the interpreter with abilities mentioned under 1), is connected with the world. With *refiguration* the imaginative perspectives from the ‘emplotment’ is integrated into the lived experience – they become part of one’s identity. Quote: Andersen: *A Question of Location*, p. 91. For a short description, see: Dorthe Gert Simonsen: *Tegnets tid: fortid, historie og historicitet efter den sproglige vending*, Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum 2003, p. 246-247. For the full details, see: Paul Ricoeur: *Time and Narrative (Temps et Récit)*, Vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Chicago: University Press of Chicago 1984 [1983], pp. 54-77.
This mantra of ‘never again war’ is something all of the Europeans uttered during interviews. It makes clear the important link created between peace and integration, but also evidences how many times this link must have been retold as a story. Consider, for example, Arild Holland’s memories of how he, immediately after de Gaulle’s first veto, understood the significance of the EC:

And then I remember that I, one weekend, took all the papers we [the MFA] had on the Communities with me home and sat a Saturday and Sunday late in January 1963 and read and studied, studied and read, and then I understood the whole thing. This wasn’t bloody economy – that was just a means to an end. It was about abolishing war in Europe, just like I had dreamt when I was sitting on the kerb during the war. That’s when I became Norway’s biggest EC advocate.  

Arild Holland’s defining moment is described with literary features (‘read and studied, studied and read’) often found in Norwegian fairy tales. The linearity of his memories is also striking: The dreams from his childhood were about to become a reality. Two major life events have been narrated together.

Arne Langeland also draws a direct line between war, peace and integration: “Yes, because it was after the war (...) and when we spoke with each other, it was about keeping Europe together. It was something fundamental within us. (...) The significant part for me was: Now that the war is over, we shall all live together.”

Equally, Terje Johannessen instinctively link the two: “I saw it as an instrument to create peace, keep in mind it was only 10-12 years since the war, and I had grown up with the war.”

The conjoining of ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ was something that slowly developed through their work with the EC-case in the 1960s and early 1970s. In a Norwegian setting, it came to be their unique ‘take’ on the membership issue. There were many sources to this: large parts of the political and administrative elite involved with the European Communities, and earlier in Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and other organizations, were convinced of the benefits of peaceful multilateral cooperation. This conviction was shared by anyone from hard-boiled federalists to cautious intergovernmentalists. The Europeans, working within the framework of multilateral economic diplomacy, took part in the discourse of integration as an instrument of peace in Paris of the 1950s or

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87 It is a ‘way of speaking’, that clearly gives it a genre quality and also tells us that the story most likely has been told many times over, that draws on the fairy tales of Per Chr. Asbjørnsen and Jørgen Moe Norske Folkeeventyr I-III, Oslo: Aschehoug 2012.
88 Interview 01.05.2012: “Arne Langeland”. My translation.
Brussels of the 1960s. When Langeland recalled that they spoke about ‘keeping Europe together’, for example, he referred to his French, Danish and British colleagues at OEEC in Paris in the mid-1950s. This influence is equally evident from Asbjørn Skarstein dispatch in February 1962, where he tried to remind the politicians back home that the European Economic Community (EEC) was not only about economics: “The Treaty of Rome is therefore – in its consequence – a peace movement that, with its effective measures, could possibly be compared with the League of Nations or the United Nations. This, at least seems to be true if one looks at the movement in a historical perspective.”

Moreover, the Europeans became increasingly involved with the European Movement in Norway (EMN) in the 1960s. The EMN had, since its creation, explicitly linked peace and integration, and the Europeans came to adhere to this language and rationale. Following Britain’s first application, chairman of the EMN Terje Wold, thought Norway’s official attitude to Europe had been “pathetic”. The Government now had to take part in the integration process and understand “what such a Europe can contribute to peace and international coexistence”. Soon after de Gaulle’s first veto, MFA secretary Magne Reed discussing the EMN’s future with European Jahn Halvorsen, proclaimed that: “The basic idea of European cooperation is to clean out the last vestiges of historical conflicts, power struggles and economic troubles in Europe, thus making a new war unthinkable and impossible.”

Furthermore, in negotiating with the Community, the Europeans came to develop and articulate an explicitly political rationale for membership in the EC. This strategy was developed as a possible way to square the domestic demands for specific economic solutions and permanent exemptions from the Treaties of Rome, with the leeway given in the negotiations with the Six in Brussels. Arne Langeland and Jahn Halvorsen were among the first to interpret Norwegian membership of the EEC as a continuation of the Atlantic policy of the Labour Government, followed since 1949. Thus, the tactical considerations of the Europeans

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91 Interview 01.05.2012: “Arne Langeland”.
95 See for example: UD 44.36/6.84 – File 7 – January 17, 1962 – Arne Langeland – Memo. Prospect for discussion about Norways placement in the enlarged European Economic Community. Arne Langeland was perhaps the first European who tried to push the Government to stress the political reasons for a Norwegian membership application during the first round (1960-1963). Followed by Jahn Halvorsen, then William G. Solberg and Asbjørn Skarstein.
linked Atlantic security, and therefore the avoidance of war, with membership in the EC in a Cold War setting. “It was foresight that lay behind the Norwegian London-Government’s Atlantic policy, while country and people lay ridden by the German occupants”, Sommerfelt wrote in his 1997 memoirs, and he continued “[f]or me membership in the EC was a continuation of the economic and political line followed for 25 years since the victory and the peace.”

Last, the Europeans, especially diplomat-turned-parliamentarian Knut Frydenlund, helped facilitate the Labour Party’s social democratic vision of Europe in the mid- to late-1960s. This vision explicitly linked ideas of ‘solidarity’ and ‘world peace’ with the political project of a more socialist Europe. The Labour Party leadership – Party Leader Trygve Bratteli and Party Secretary Haakon Lie – together with a new generation of Labour politicians – Per Kleppe, Knut Frydenlund and Reiulf Steen – developed this vision together with a dense pro-European social democratic network that spanned across Europe. Trygve Bratteli, for example, consistently understood and articulated the membership issue as a matter of perpetuating peace. Young European Terje Johannessen recalled how Bratteli, echoing the lessons of the interwar period, often said: “The day commodities stop crossing the borders, the armies will come instead”.

Already in the 1960s, then, the Europeans drew a rather direct line between their memories of war, European integration, and the prospect of peace. The combination of the Europeans’ generational understanding, education and work with the EC-case, and with it, their connections abroad and at home created a specific link between peace and integration. It was this understanding the Europeans tried to convey to the electorate up until the referendum.

THE INAUGURATED FEW

During their work with the EC-case, the Europeans contrasted their unique understanding of why membership was necessary with what they understood as the lack of knowledge among the Norwegian electorate. The fundamental task was to make the voters understand what they, the Europeans, already did. Successive Governments chose to discuss the membership issue almost exclusively in economic terms, and there was no official information campaign until the

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at the Embassy in Brussels together with Secretary Eivinn Berg at the MFA, and later still Arild Holland.


last months before the referendum. The Europeans, therefore, often displayed a tension, between their wish to bridge the gap between ‘Norway’ and ‘Europe’, and feelings of resignation over what they saw as a misguided debate, and the general ignorance and the inward-looking nature of Norwegians.

During the first round (1960-1963) Langeland stressed that membership of the EEC had to be presented as a continuation of the Labour Government’s foreign and security policy throughout the post-war era. It was in the best interest of Norway to become a full member, not least to avoid exclusion from a dynamic community, which included all the countries that guaranteed Norwegian security, bar the US. Therefore, it was necessary to create an understanding based on political arguments:

It is hardly realistic to try to create a kind of ‘European enthusiasm’ in Norway. It would run contrary to profound traits in the Norwegian mentality. [...] But, we have to be able to create an understanding for the fundamental foreign and security policy interests we have to protect, in this world of which we are a part.

Langeland wanted to convey to the electorate that though they were unenthused, membership was a political necessity. In order to do this it was important to avoid pushing purely economic questions to the fore. To Brussels, on the other hand, it was important to show that one wished to take part “as a loyal member”. He argued for a negotiation tactic based on trust, as he acidiously remarked: “We are, after all, joining a Community.”

His comments on ‘European enthusiasm’, taking part ‘as a loyal member’ and ‘joining a Community’, are riddled with tension. Langeland placed himself on the outside of what he understood as a Norwegian mentality; and simultaneously re-


102 UD 44.36/6.84 – April 18, 1962, Oslo – Arne Langeland – Memo. Norway’s relationship with the European Economic Community. Certain remarks.

vealed that he, as opposed to others, had adopted a Community-thinking. He thus extracted himself from the Norwegian discourse of ‘Europe as the Other’, and spoke of himself as a *European*. But he did not only distance himself from the Norwegian mentality, he juxtaposed it to ‘trust’ in the outside world – the Norwegian mentality was therefore portrayed as myopic.

Similarly, when Otto Kildal retired in 1967, after serving as ambassador to Brussels and The Hague, he felt the need to comment upon what he thought was a derailed and parochial membership debate in the Norwegian Parliament: "The Community is both a common market *and* a political idea of peace and cooperation, and we have to strive towards membership even though there will be obstacles along the way." Asked by the journalist what he thought of the anti-marketeers’ argument that Norway would lose its sovereignty, he answered: "Are there no limits to the small-town mentality and inferiority complexes? Shouldn’t Norway be able to raise its independent voice just as well as the Dutch within the Community, or the Belgians?"\(^{104}\)

Likewise, Egil Winsnes at the Norwegian embassy in Paris, receiving complaints about his lectures on Norway and the EC to visiting Norwegians, wrote back to MFA State Secretary Thorvald Stoltenberg:

> I usually touch upon what I jestingly call the "long live Toten [a part of the agricultural inland in Norway], to hell with Norway"-mentality. A mentality in which the feeling of solidarity stops a few meters past the living room door, and which is the biggest obstacle to building a communitarian solidary Europe.\(^{105}\)

Though it is abundantly clear that the *Europeans* thought Norwegian attitudes towards the Community was a problem, the aim was to overcome this hurdle. Still, even at the time, feelings of being outside, or above, are easy to detect. In 1962, Asbjørn Skarstein, for example, complained – after underlining that the EEC was "a peace movement" – that: "In light of such viewpoints and others, it’s difficult to understand the Norwegian opposition to the European Communities – seen from the outside. It’s almost as if it’s from another time."\(^{106}\)

We are only able to appreciate the significance of these feelings of frustration and resignation in light of the role they played in memories of the *Europeans* after the negative referendum. For it was these feelings of being among the inaugurated few that became cemented after the ‘no’. 50 years later what remained was the divide: “I came to understand it later – Norway was different. First of all we


\(^{105}\) UD 44.36/6.84 Informasjon – August 2, 1972, Paris – Egil Winsnes – Kjære Stoltenberg.

\(^{106}\) UD 44.36/6.84 – File 8 – February 21, 1962, Brussels – N.A. Jørgensen (Asbjørn Skarstein) – Norges stilling til det økonomiske og politiske Fellesskap i Europa.
didn’t know the first thing about the world. Only the seafarers knew anything. Furthermore – how should I say this – we were on the outside, and we had this government led by Gerhardsen, who was negative to everything.”

"In Norway", Langeland continues, "there was a fundamental distrust of Germany; and of France, and the Italians, all these southern Europeans. The level of distrust was immense. (...) Here we touch upon something fundamental: Norwegians didn’t understand the first thing about this. Even the most educated people didn’t understand it. There was a fundamental scepticism, which exists to this day.” When I tried to press him on why they didn’t understand, Langeland replied: “The country is far to the north, middle of nowhere.” He himself, on the other hand, saw it differently: “I reacted the way I did because I didn’t have any objections. It was perfectly fine with me that the world turned out like this. I had no preconceived notions. And I thought it was exciting.”

Arild Holland too gives a tangible example of the difference between being among those who understood and those who didn’t: He recalled being in Geneva during the first round of negotiation (1961-63), when “all the former Stalinists, communists and other radical leftists suddenly appeared [in Norway] and vividly portrayed the EC as a malaise.” Even Holland’s old teacher at the University, famous economist Ragnar Frisch, which he respected deeply, called the EC the ‘unenlightened plutocracy’. “Everybody wrote and spoke of economy”, Holland remembers, “no one – absolutely no one – understood that this was about permanently ending war in Europe.”

By contrast, fellow European, and ambassador to Brussels, Jahn Halvorsen, understood what the EC was about: "We had a common view on things (...) he understood the meaning of this whole thing.” Equally, Arild Holland’s obituary of Asbjørn Skarstein is illuminating:

In Brussels too [1962-63], Asbjørn Skarstein was the right man in the right place. He was one of the first in Norway that understood the background for the EEC-cooperation. Even though it was about economic cooperation, it was also a comprehensive peace initiative – making a new war in Western Europe impossible. EEC’s peace aspect was decisive in Skarstein’s positive attitude towards Norwegian membership.

The inextricable link between ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ defined what it meant to be among the inaugurated few.

107 Interview 01.05.2012: “Arne Langeland”. My translation.
108 Interview 01.05.2012: “Arne Langeland”. My translation.
109 Interview 01.05.2012: “Arne Langeland”. My translation.
Holland, as Langeland, portrays Norway as myopic and provincial, when explaining the enthusiasm among parliamentarians when Denmark suggested a Nordic Economic Union (NORDEC) following de Gaulle's second veto in 1967: "It fit the Norwegian parliamentarians like a glove, most of them do not know any languages, but they loved 'Norden', because then they could speak their mother tongue [said in a broad dialect] you know."\(^\text{113}\)

Tancred Ibsen Jr. makes the same distinction, contrasting himself to the Norwegian mentality, when explaining why he became so invested in the membership issue: "You could say I'm a European. I come from a segment of the people that has had just as many contacts abroad as at home. So, I'm a Norwegian European (...) And I thought that Norway should find its place in Europe..." He remembered talking to Jahn Halvorsen after the negative referendum: "Jahn was distraught and angered. Absolutely. We were distraught. (...) But there was nothing you could do. The Norwegian people didn't want to. We are... Norwegians are isolationists and difficult."\(^\text{114}\) Illustratively, he corrects himself in the last sentence, and places himself outside the discourse.

After the negative referendum the need to bridge the gap disappeared, and the bitter EC-struggle cemented the elements of conflict. The negative referendum thus led to a subtle, but important, shift in the Europeans' narrative: They were among the inaugurated few who understood what the European Community really was – namely a political project to prevent war. To their mind, neither the anti-marketeers nor the broad majority of the people understood this. More fundamentally, however, Norway was, and is, detached and different from Europe. One may note, therefore, that both the Europeans and the anti-marketeers placed 'the diplomat' outside the Norwegian political discourse.

Reading the quotes above, one gets an image of a few heroic diplomats fighting against a dominant force – their memories highlight how they were a discursive minority. Nowhere is this imagery more clear than in Arild Holland's retelling of the day they travelled to the ratification ceremony:

Saturday January 22, 1972 I was, together with some other civil servants, supposed to travel together with [Prime Minister] Bratteli and [Foreign Minister] Cappelen, both with spouses, to Brussels to take part in the ratification ceremony. Already at Fornebu [Airport] the drama started (...) When I arrived in a taxi at Fornebu, a crowd had gathered outside the entry. To my stupefaction I saw Bratteli and his wife surrounded by protesters, preventing them from entering. I was able to get Randi Bratteli under the arm, and together we forced our way through the crowd. At the entry I met a SAS-employee and I asked him to take care of Mrs Bratteli who exclaimed: 'Take care of my husband!' I ran back. Bratteli was still surrounded by squawking protesters, whom he

\(^\text{114}\) Interview 23.11.2013: "Tancred Ibsen Jr.". My translation.
tried to keep away by swirling a couple of travelling bags around. I was able to guide Bratteli out, as his driver came to help as well. Luckily, it didn’t come to violence. When we had broken out of the circle, the protesters began to sing ‘Ja, vi elsker’ [the Norwegian national anthem]. It struck me as rather grotesque, when I thought about what Bratteli had been through as a prisoner in Germany.115

Rather than the diplomat heroically building bridges across landmasses almost impossibly far apart, the story became one of the Europeans being among the few who fought for a morally just cause, but were defeated at the hands of the unknowing and unwilling masses. Widespread misconceived nationalism prevailed over righteous, peace-seeking cosmopolitanism. The personal and professional defeat of loosing the referendum, being discredited by the anti-marketeers and, in some instances, leaving the service, was thus squared with the story of the heroic diplomat in order to create meaning. In this imagery, it is clear that both the warrior-like and the self-effacing mediator hero faded to the background, what was left was the suffering and enduring hero. Thus, a new character rose from the ashes of the EC-struggle: The martyr.116

RETELLING STORIES
Norwegian historian Rolf Tamnes rightly noted that “no two scenarios are alike, but some are more alike than others. The EC/EU-cases, as they developed up until to the critical decisions of 1972 and 1994, have many noticeable similarities.”117 In both instances Norway was forced by external events to apply for membership negotiations before it was politically prepared and the Government was dragging its feet, negotiating a difficult dossier and demanding special treatment. And both times, the primary sector and loss of sovereignty were the two major stumbling blocks in the negotiations, and the whole endeavour ended with the Norwegian electorate voting against membership.118 However, while 1972 was a defining generational experience, a landmark for an entire people, 1994 will first and foremost be remembered for the Winter Olympics in Lillehammer.119 There is no doubt the Europeans today feel the same way: 1994 was a pale repetition of 1972, which confirmed that Norway would continue to be referred to “the sidelines and marginalized from the economic and political integration in Europe” as Eivinn

116 Definition: One who chooses to suffer death rather than renounce religious principles; One who makes great sacrifices or suffers much in order to further a belief, cause, or principle; One who endures great suffering; One who makes a great show of suffering in order to arouse sympathy. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/martyr (29.01.15).
118 53,5 % and 52,2 % voted against entry in 1972 and 1994 respectively.
119 Tamnes: Oljealden, p. 159.
Berg put it. The second negative referendum also strengthened their feeling of belonging to the inaugurated few:

The big mistake of the Borten- and the Bratteli Government both was that they failed to come out and explain why the EU was created: never again war in Europe. I tried time and again, but it fell on deaf ears. And the Brundtland Government repeated this mistake, when the new negotiations started in the 1990s. I warned, but was not he-ard.

Although retired from the MFA, Arild Holland engaged in the membership debate in the 1990s, giving interviews and lectures, but explained that he ‘gave up’ when he understood that the government once again focussed exclusively on economic matters. Terje Johannessen agreed: “Trade policy is security policy, and that is the politics of peace. And that dimension was completely missing – wasn’t even on the horizon in the Norwegian debate, neither in 72’ nor in 94’.”

“Now, finally, the peace perspective is starting to come to the fore with the handing out of the Nobel Peace Prize”, Holland mused in 2013, a year after the European Union had received it, as if to say that the mistakes repeated since the 1960s might still be rectified. “He’s been very preoccupied with the political aspects lately” Eivinn Berg noted about Holland, “he never brings something up in our group – the European Movement’s senior group – without giving a flaming lecture on the Coal and Steel Community and Schuman and all that. Like hearing a new Peace Prize speech. And I fully agree with him, it was neglected.” The argument that the EC/EU has contributed to peace and stability has never had popular appeal or even significantly coloured the Norwegian debate, former editor of the bourgeois newspaper Aftenposten Per Egil Hegge reflected in 2013. And,

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122 Aftenposten 07.04.1992: “EF en stor freds-suksess”, by Einar Solvoll. An interview with Arild Holland, where he makes clear that “Peace in Europe is the most important thing for me. The European Community has been an major success, when it comes to securing peace. The super powers would never allow Germany to be reunited if the EC didn’t stand as a guarantor of peace!”; Aftenposten 29.06.1994: “Ja til ansvar i Europa, trygghet og muligheter for Norge”, petition. Interview 09.01.2014: “Arild Holland”.


Hegge added: “for the ‘yes-people’ the Peace Prize (...) was a just and well founded appreciation”.126

As historian Alistair Thomson notes, in later life the process of ‘life review’ – involving the time and desire to remember one’s life – comes in and strengthens the importance, and sometimes the accuracy, of long-term memory. Such a tendency helps to structure temporally ‘long’ plots, giving a whole meaning of one’s life.127 It is clear that today the Europeans make little distinction between the EC and the EU, or 72’ and 94’ – it is part of the same narrative. When Holland, Berg, Johannessen and other Europeans meet and share these experiences, they retell and remodel the story of themselves and Europe, and it seems that they strengthen the causal link between war, peace and Europe. By ‘reliving’ the experience of 1972, in 1994, they are confirmed in their belief that they are rather alone in understanding what European integration is really about. “Looking back from the conclusion to the episodes leading up to it”, Ricoeur wrote, “we have to be able to say that this ending required these sorts of events and this chain of actions”.128 It is this fictionalizing process that has created a meaningful experience out of the professional and personal failure of the negative referendum.

Today, all of the Europeans are retired, and live in the wealthy and esteemed western outskirts of Oslo. In fact, most of them live within walking distance of each other – a village, so to speak, of former diplomats. With few exceptions, they remain very close friends: They are ‘best friends’, or at least ‘close friends’, they are godfathers to each other’s children and served as ‘best man’ in each other’s weddings.129 Furthermore, many of them meet regularly at the European Movement in Norway’s (EMN) offices, as the so-called senior group130: Alone in sharing this unique experience of working with the EC-case so closely, the Europeans meet, retell, and uphold the narrative of the diplomatic martyr. To this day they refer to themselves as Europeans.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has explored how the Europeans retell the story of their work with the EC-case and the shock of the Norwegian non-joining of the EC in September 1972. It argues that the Europeans have reconciled the traumatic experience of the Norwegian ‘no’ with the ingrained heroic story of ‘the diplomat’, by narrating themselves as the inaugurated few who metaphorically sacrificed themselves for a just cause: Peace in Europe. Through this story of martyrdom, the heroic diplomat, the memories of the Second World War and the purpose of EC membership is

127 Thomson: “Memory and remembering in oral history”, p. 82.
129 Interview 27.04.2012: “Arild Holland”.

recast and reinterpreted to create a meaningful and whole narrative of who the Europeans are in the present.

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ABSTRACT

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To remember like a diplomat

This article investigates how a tight-knit group of multilateral economic diplomats – simply called the Europeans – retell their story of the shock of the Norwegian non-joining of the European Community (EC) in September 1972. Drawing on concepts from Paul Ricoeur and Iver B. Neumann, combining oral and archive-based history, this article argues that the Europeans have reconciled the ingrained heroic story of ‘the diplomat’ with the traumatic experience of the Norwegian ‘no’ by narrating themselves as martyrs metaphorically sacrificing themselves for a just cause. Rather than fundamentally changing their story – for example portraying themselves as failures – they elevate their cause to something unassailably virtuous: Peace in Europe.