

# Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi

Årg. 4 Nr. 2 2015

---

## Kosmopolitisme og realisme

Pædagogisk Filosofisk Forening

## Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi

*Studier i pædagogisk filosofi* er et elektronisk online, open access og peer-reviewed tidsskrift, der publicerer artikler inden for den pædagogisk filosofiske tradition i bred forstand. Artiklerne spænder fra klassiske filosofiske undersøgelser af fundamentale emner i relation til det pædagogiske felt til detaljerede og kritiske analyser af dannelse, uddannelse, læring, undervisning etc. i et filosofisk perspektiv. *Studier i pædagogisk filosofi* sigter efter at fremme en levende og kritisk dialog mellem forskere på universiteter og læresteder fra hele Norden. Tidsskriftet repræsenterer ikke én filosofisk eller teoretisk skole eller tradition. Tværtimod er tidsskriftets mål at fremme udveksling og samarbejde mellem filosoffer, pædagogiske filosoffer og filosofisk orienterede forskere inden for uddannelse og pædagogik i Norden. Tidsskriftet stræber derfor efter en bred nordisk spredning af artikelforfattere, fagfællebedømmere og redaktion. Tidsskriftet udgiver desuden en serie pædagogisk filosofiske monografier.

### *Chefredaktør*

Jørgen Huggler, Aarhus Universitet, Danmark

### *Gæsterektor af dette nummer*

Torill Strand, Oslo Universitet, Norge

### *Assisterende chefredaktør*

Merete Wiberg, Aarhus Universitet, Danmark

### *Redaktionssekretær*

Mathias Christensen, Aarhus Universitet,  
Danmark

### *Redaktion for fagfællebedømmelse*

Nanna Duchêne, University College Sjælland,  
Danmark  
Torill Strand, Oslo Universitet, Norge

### *Anmeldelsesredaktion*

Merete Wiberg, Aarhus Universitet, Danmark  
Ingerid S. Straume, Oslo Universitet, Norge

### *Redaktionspanel*

Guðmundur Heiðar Frimannsson, Akureyri  
Universitet, Island  
Hansjörg Hohr, Oslo Universitet, Norge  
Ari Kivelä, Oulu Universitet, Finland  
Søren Harnow Klausen, Syddansk Universitet,  
Danmark

Alexander von Oettingen, University College  
Syd, Danmark

Anne-Marie Eggert Olsen, Aarhus Universitet,  
Danmark

Torill Strand, Oslo Universitet, Norge

Michael Uljens, Aabo Akademi, Finland

### *Adresse:*

Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi /v. Jørgen Huggler  
Aarhus Universitet – DPU  
Tuborgvej 164  
2400 København NV, Danmark  
<http://ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf>.

### *Grafisk opsætning og sats:*

WERKs Grafiske Hus a/s, [www.werk.dk](http://www.werk.dk)

Kopiering sker inden for rammerne af aftaler  
med Copydan.

ISSN-nummer: 22449140

© Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi og forfatterne.

# Torill Strand

## Kosmopolitisme og realisme

På 1960-tallet var pedagogiske filosofer mest opptatt av humanisme, på 1980-tallet diskuterte vi postmodernisme, men nå snakker vi om kosmopolitisme. Nye migrasjonsmønstre, en digitalisert kultur og nedbygging av nasjonalstaten som politisk arena inviterer til nye måter å se, forstå og erfare verden på. Transnasjonale strømninger av folk, ideer, kunnskap og kultur kaster rett og slett om på tidligere ideer om demokrati og dannelse.<sup>1</sup> Artikkelen i dette spesialnummeret diskuterer den «kosmopolitiske vendingen» i pedagogikken.

Den kosmopolitiske vendingen viser seg først og fremst som en felles aspirasjon om å overskride snevre nasjonale forståelsesmåter og fordommer. Men også som en dyp forståelse for at vi er gjensidig avhengig av hverandre i en global målestokk. Den har også manifestert seg i en stor mengde forskningslitteratur og foreskrivende teorier om globalt medborgerskap og kosmopolitisk demokratiteori.

Termen «kosmopolitisme» har opphav i det greske *kosmo politês* (verdensborger). Innenfor dagens menneske- og samfunnsvitenskaper brukes «kosmopolitisme» både om en ny verdensorden og om en ny måte å se verden på. På den ene siden navngir «kosmopolitisme» en framvoksende og ekstremt kompleks sosial realitet. På den andre siden er «kosmopolitisme» en felles mentalitet, en anskuelsesmåte og et framvoksende paradigme for filosofiske og sosiale analyser.

Forholdet mellom kosmopolitisme og realisme representerer derfor en av dagens største utfordringer for akademiske analyser. Våre erfaringer og analyser er tett sammenvevd, betinger hverandre og medierer begge våre ideer om «kosmopolitisme». Kosmopolitisme er ingen objektiv størrelse. Det er heller ikke et kjent fenomen som enkelt kan beskrives eller avdekkes med systematiske analyser. Kosmopolitisme er en flytende betegnelse som vanskelig kan brukes som historisk kategori. Vi bør derfor tenke kosmopolitisme fullstendig åpent, som et tomt begrep som ikke er gitt og som heller ikke bør defineres, verken av et gitt samfunn eller en hegemonisk diskurs.

Temaet for dette spesialnummeret – kosmopolitisme og realisme – er derfor både et aktuelt og samtidig utfordrende tema. Ikke minst fordi kosmopolitisme samtidig kan tenkes som livsstil, som ideal og som perspektiv.

---

1 T. Strand, "The Cosmopolitan Turn: Recasting 'Dialogue' and 'Difference'". *Paideusis. International Journal in Philosophy of Education*, 19:1 (2010), 49-58.

---

Torill Strand, Universitetet i Oslo, Norge  
E-mail: [torill.strand@iped.uio.no](mailto:torill.strand@iped.uio.no)

---

Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi | [www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf](http://www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf) | ISSN nr. 22449140

---

Årgang 4 | Nr. 2 | 2015 | side 1-5

---

## Livsstil

Filosofen bruker ofte «kosmopolitisme» som metafor for en spesifikk måte å være i verden på. Kosmopolitisme beskrives da som en sosial orientering som speiler den type toleranse, fleksibilitet og åpenhet som kjennetegner en sosialt orientert etikk i en verden av fremmede.<sup>2</sup> Noen beskriver kosmopolitten (verdensborgeren) som en person som aldri er fremmed, et individ som enkelt tilpasser seg forskjeller og som setter pris på det kulturelle mangfoldet som oppstår i en globalisert verden. Men hvordan kan en slik livsstil se ut?

En omfattende nederlandsk studie av «ryggsekkurister» – i en alder fra 7 til 70 år – viste hvordan disse turistene, med sine veltrente kropper vaksinert mot sykdom, bokstavelig talt «kroppslig gjorde» en idealisert kosmopolitisme.<sup>3</sup> Ryggsekkuristene framstår som fleksible, tilpassningsdyktige og åpne i møte med fremmede. De dukker opp neste over alt på kloden og gjør det de kan for å passe inn. De skjuler sin provinsialitet, innstiller seg på stadig nye omgivelser, og higer etter en identitet som globale nomader. De er som kameleoner. Ikke nødvendigvis ved å tilpasse seg lokalbefolkningen, men heller ved å tilpasse seg forestillingen om den reisende. Ryggsekkuristene manifesterer slik en idealisert kosmopolitisk livsstil. Det er en privilegert livsstil generert av et kulturelt klima preget av mobilitet, urban sofistikertethet, uavhengighet og transnasjonale relasjoner. Kosmopolitisme blir da en form for kulturell kapital som produseres, opprettholdes og legitimeres av de få som har tilgang til en slik livsstil.

Men over alt i verden erfarer millioner av mennesker globaliseringens stygge bakside. Ulrich Beck setter derfor en idealisert kosmopolitisme i kontrast til det han kaller en «reell kosmopolitisering».<sup>4</sup> Faktum er at i 2015 er over 60 millioner mennesker på flukt.<sup>5</sup> Det er mennesker som er fremmede samme hvor de er i verden. De er prisgitt sin situasjon og har ikke andre muligheter enn å forholde seg til den daglige kampen for tilværelsen. Deres livsstil er ikke på noen måte et privilegert valg, men heller resultat av dypt foruroligende hendelser i en globalisert verden av fremmede: «The choice to become or remain an 'alien' or a 'non-national' is not as a general rule voluntary, but a response to acute need, political repression or the threat of starvation».<sup>6</sup> Det er realiteter som ikke kan overses.

I den første artikkelen i dette spesialnummeret – «*Refugees and Europe*» – diskuterer Helgard Mahrtdt den pågående flyktningkrisen i Europa. Mahrtdt starter med å spørre: «Hva innebærer det å være en flyktning?». Slik utfordrer hun vårt begrep om «flyktningkriser» ved å vise at det ikke minst handler om en pågående «kriser for flyktninger». Med utgangspunkt i Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) sin politiske filosofi utforsker Mahrtdt denne krisen som en eksistensiell, politisk og legal krise: Verden er ikke nødvendigvis menneskelig kun

2 Se for eksempel K.A. Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism. Ethics in a World of Strangers*, (London: Penguin, 2007), P. Kemp, *Verdensborgeren. Pædagogisk og politisk ideal for det 21. århundre*, (Copenhagen: Hans Reitzel, 2013), M. Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).

3 J.G. Molz, „Cosmopolitan Bodies: Fit to Travel and Travelling to Fit”, *Body & Society* 12:3 (2006), 1-21. s. 17.

4 U. Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), s. 19.

5 UNHCR. The UN Refugee Agency: *Populations*. Hentet March 2016 fra <http://reporting.unhcr.org/population>

6 U. Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), s. 19.

fordi det finnes mennesker i verden. Oppfordringen blir derfor å revitalisere det vi kan kalle «menneskelighetens pedagogikk».

Den pågående flyktningkrisen representerer uten tvil et vendepunkt for Europa. Mennesker på flukt gis status som medborgere i et nytt land, med de rettigheter og plikter det innebærer. I sin artikkel «*The Rocky Road of Growth into Contemporary Citizenship*» diskuterer Katariina Holma og Tiina Kontinen hvilke pedagogiske utfordringer vi da møter. Aktivt medborgerskap bygges ikke av pene slagord som deltagelse, engasjement og ytringsfrihet for alle. Det kan være årsaken til at den Nordiske politiske retorikken speiler frustrasjon, usikkerhet og en følelse av utilstrekkelighet i møte med immigranter. Det synes også som om den politiske debatten avslører en mangelfull forståelse for betydningen av immigranternes etisk-politiske engasjement og deltagelse. Holma og Kontinen vender seg derfor til Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) og John Dewey (1859-1952) sin politiske filosofi idet hun spør hvilke perspektiver de tilbyr for dannelse av aktivt medborgerskap i en ny verdensorden. Hvilken pedagogisk modell gir kombinasjonen av Gramsci og Dewey for voksenopplæring og medborgerskapsundervisning i et nytt Europa?

De to første artiklene i dette spesialnummeret tar begge utgangspunkt i det Beck kaller en «reell kosmopolitisering». De utforsker også begge hvorfor og hvordan kosmopolitisme kan og bør tenkes som et pedagogisk ideal.

## Ideal

Som ideal uttrykker «kosmopolitisme» at alle mennesker – uavhengig av nasjonal, religiøs, kulturell eller politisk tilhørighet – inngår i samme fellesskap, og at dette fellesskapet bør dyrkes.<sup>7</sup> Men faren er at vi kan komme til å forfekte et ideal som ikke er noe annet enn en manifestasjon av tenkemåten til en global, kulturell elite som «har mer felles med folk på Manhattan, i Singapore og Hong Kong enn med den delen av lokalbefolkningen som ikke inngår i samme type kontaktnett».<sup>8</sup> Da skapes og opprettholdes en distanse til kulturelle variasjoner, siden idealet blir en type «humanisme» som innebærer å være «venner med hele menneskeheten».

Det er en type kosmopolitisme som blir forfektet av Martha Nussbaum. Hun tar til orde for en stoisk kosmopolitanisme som overskrider lokale lojaliteter og tradisjoner.<sup>9</sup> Det synes som om menneskeheten fort kan få forrang foran lokale forpliktelser og lojaliteter: For Nussbaum er kosmopolitisme en «invitasjon til å gå i eksil». Det er en denne type distanserte kosmopolitisme som Claudia Schumann problematiserer i artikkelen «*Graphic Contaminations: Cosmopolitics of the 'I' in American Born Chinese and Persepolis*». Med bakgrunn i Stanley Cavell gjennomfører Schumann en systematisk og kritisk lesning av de to

7 T. Strand, "The Cosmopolitan Turn: Recasting 'Dialogue' and 'Difference'". *Paideusis. International Journal in Philosophy of Education*, 19:1 (2010), 49-58.

8 M. Ossewaarde, "Cosmopolitanism and the Society of Strangers", *Current Sociology* 55:3 (2007), 367-388, s. 373.

9 M. Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).

tegneseriene. Analysen avdekker hvordan tegneseriene anskueliggjør karakterenes ambivalens overfor, men også direkte «aversjoner mot å tilpasse seg» fellesskapet. Schumann argumenterer derfor for at vi må tenke pedagogikkens kosmopolitiske ideal på nytt: Det er ikke nødvendigvis slik at en smertefri tilpasning til en ny verdensorden er det beste.

Med tanke på kosmopolitisme som ideal kan det også synes å være en tendens til at det vestlige idealet overskygger ikke-vestlige versjoner. Stephen Toulmin (1922-2009) sammenligner det vestlige kosmopolitiske idealet med filosofiens søken etter sannhet. Han mener en innbitt søken etter orden og ryddighet har gjort den vestlige filosofien blind for den uunngåelige kompleksiteten i menneskers levde liv. Toulmin viser hvordan vestlig filosofi bærer med seg en hel kosmogoni, det vil si en dyptliggende ide om det perfekte samfunn.<sup>10</sup> En slik kosmogoni kjennetegnes ved at den har kaos som utgangspunkt og det rasjonelle ordet (ikke leken) som skapende prinsipp. På den måten, mener Toulmin, vil vestlig filosofi formidle et kosmopolitisk ideal som står i skarp kontrast til den kreative livligheten som nødvendigvis preger en globalisert verden.

Hanjörg Hohr argumenterer derfor for at kunst og estetikk bør ha et særlig fortrinn med tanke på oppdragelse til globalt medborgerskap. I første del av artikkelen «*Oppdragelse til verdensborgerskap i kunstnerisk perspektiv*» bruker Hohr fortellingen om Babels tårn som eksempel på hvordan fiksjonen kan åpne opp for og anerkjenne kulturelle forskjeller. Deretter viser han, gjennom perspektiver hentet fra blant annet Aristoteles og Schiller, til kunstens kommunikative muligheter og dannelsespotensiale.

## Perspektiv

Når vi diskuterer forholdet mellom kosmopolitisme og realisme tenker vi kosmopolitisme som livsstil og som ideal. Men kosmopolitisme er i tillegg et perspektiv. Kosmopolitisme er et blikk på verden. Dette perspektivet er på den ene siden produkt av en ny realitet. På den andre siden representerer det et diagnostisk og normativt blikk som kan fange opp noe av dagens ekstremt komplekse sosiale og politiske realiteter.<sup>11</sup>

Nå kan det sies at det ikke er nytt at folk over hele verden – fra Moskva til Paris, Rio til Tokyo – er gjensidig avhengig av hverandre. Det nye er heller den alminnelige forståelsen for dette, og at denne gjensidige avhengigheten både anerkjennes og oppfattes som naturlig innen politikk og vitenskap, i massemedia, og i transnasjonale sosiale og politiske bevegelser. Det betyr at vår felles måte å se, forstå og være i verden på blir stadig mer «kosmopolitisk», samtidig som det er en høyere grad av refleksivitet omkring denne måten å oppfatte verden på.

Med andre ord representerer kosmopolitisme ikke bare en ny måte å se og forstå verden på. Som ide og ideal kan kosmopolitisme også bidra til å legitimere, for eksempel, mor-

10 S. Toulmin. *Cosmopolis: The hidden agenda of modernity*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

11 T. Strand, "The Cosmopolitan Turn: Recasting 'Dialogue' and 'Difference'". *Paideusis. International Journal in Philosophy of Education*, 19:1 (2010), 49-58.

alske valg eller et politisk engasjement. Tradisjonelle anskuelsesformer kan forkastes. Og nye spørsmål genereres. I tillegg har det kosmopolitiske blikket potensial til å gi nye fortolkningsrammer innenfor humaniora og samfunnsvitenskap – noe som igjen kan berøre den pedagogiske filosofien. Det er Rebecca Adamis artikkel «*Paideia and Cosmopolitan Education*» et godt eksempel på. Adami etterspør et nytt rammeverk for kosmopolitisk danning: Oppfordringen er å utvide elever og læreres evne til å forestille seg det lokale fellesskapet, og også de sosiale og etisk-politiske normene som regulerer dette fellesskapet. Slik brukes kosmopolitisme som et diagnostisk og normativt blikk.

Men dilemma er at «kosmopolitanisme» som diagnostisk og normativt blikk uunngåelig er generert av den samme sosiale verden som det diagnostiserer og vurderer. Det er derfor fristende å spørre i hvilken grad et kosmopolitisk blikk kun bidrar til å bekrefte den samme verden som det er et produkt av. Kan det være slik at vi blindt adopterer tradisjonelle ideer om kosmopolitisme uten å reflektere over deres aktualitet og relevans? Spørsmålet danner bakgrunn for Rebecka Lettevalles artikkel: «*En kritikk av det kosmopolitiske fornuftet? Om samtidsrelevansen av Kants kosmopolitisme*». Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) var den som først formulerte en kosmopolitisk visjon som et kategorisk imperativ: «Handle bare etter den maksime gjennom hvilken du samtidig kan ville at det skal kunne gjelde som en allmenn lov ». For Kant har vi en plikt til å utvikle – og også oppdra neste generasjon til – et kosmopolitisk sinnelag slik at den kosmopolitiske visjonen kan nedfelle seg i samfunnets sosiale og politiske organisering. Lettevall peker imidlertid på at om Kants visjon settes opp mot dagens realiteter kan det synes umulig å skape et bedre samfunn slik Kant tok til orde for. Tatt i betraktning at Kant argumenterte inn i sin tid, kan det også synes problematisk å se samtidsrelevansen av hans etisk-politiske blikk. Likevel åpner Lettevall for at Kants visjon, spesielt i en mer generell betydning, kan ha noe for seg når vi nå skal tenke den «rett til gjestfrihet» som bør omslutte stadig nye og større grupper av fremmede i et fremmed land.

# Helgard Mahrtd

## Refugees and Europe: a dilemma or a turning point?

### Abstract

Europe is facing a wave of refugees and migrants. To solve the many inherent problems is primarily a practical political task. However, there are existential experiences, democratic values, human attitudes, and political principles involved, and I am going to look particularly at the following three aspects of the refugee crisis, 1) the existential (I refer to the philosopher Martin Heidegger and to the political thinker Hannah Arendt), 2) the political (I turn to the EU's steps for a common refugee policy), and 3) the legal (I refer to Immanuel Kant's notion of hospitality and Seyla Benhabib's notes on Human Rights). Finally, I will make a concluding remark on education's task (I refer to Hannah Arendt's and Aristotle's notion of *philia*).

### Keywords

Europe refugees, crisis, human rights, space, community, humanitas, friendship

## 1. Preliminary

The world is constantly changing; this is particularly revealed in the realm of politics. The current refugee crisis reminds us of the unpredictability inherent in action. No one can at this moment predict the outcome of the wave of refugees and migrants coming to Europe. We are unable to foresee the magnitude of this event, the extent to which it is changing our world.

It is just too early to come up with final answers. Some see the crisis as a challenge to our self-understanding. They observe that "we are writing history right now" and ask: "[...] do we want to be remembered [...] as xenophobic, rich cowards hiding behind fences?"<sup>1</sup> Others think that Angela Merkel's "open-door" policy is deepening the refugee crisis in Europe.<sup>2</sup> They fear the undermining of our legal and political institutions.

True, we cannot predict the outcome of the current challenges; however, human beings need to understand what is happening. The article tries to make a contribution to this process of understanding. Underlying it are two presumptions: *first*, it is important *how*

---

1 Sabine Karrer on Twitter, 19. September 2015, <https://twitter.com/fraukassandra/status/645330685771780096>

2 "Refugee crisis: German village Sumte shows reality behind open door policy – with 102 residents and 750 refugees, *Independent*, Friday November 6, 2015; <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-german-village-sumte-shows-the-reality-behind-angela-merkel-s-open-door-policy-with-a6724741.html>

---

Helgard Mahrtd, University of Oslo, Norway  
E-mail: [helgard.mahrtd@iped.uio.no](mailto:helgard.mahrtd@iped.uio.no)

---

Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi | [www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf](http://www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf) | ISSN nr. 22449140

---

Årgang 4 | Nr. 2 | 2015 | side 6-23

---

we think about the refugee and migration wave, *second*, our thinking has to start from and stay related to experience.

How we think depends on the special nature of our subject. If one wants to understand what is happening one cannot write in an “objective” manner because one then has renounced the human faculty to respond to what is actually happening. In other words, “the question of style is bound up with the problem of understanding”,<sup>3</sup> as Hannah Arendt declared. She was convinced that “understanding is closely related to that faculty of imagination which Kant called *Einbildungskraft*”. Imagination might prove to be the foundation of everything.

Additionally, understanding is, if we follow Arendt, closely related to the reflection on experiences; understanding thinking is connected with making experiences visible. During a conversation with friends Arendt asked: “What is the object of our thinking?” she answered as follows: “Experience! Nothing else than experience!”<sup>4</sup>

Of course, we all are able to follow the news on the Syrian refugee crisis. But we not only wish to know but also to understand; we not only wish to know what happens or has happened, but also why it happens or has happened. We ask for the meaning of the events. These events take place in the world we share and have in common. According to Hannah Arendt the world discloses its variety in all its aspects only insofar as it is talked over in the presence of others, and so put into the public light. We need to hear the opinions of others because “no one can adequately grasp the objective world in its full reality all on his own, because the world always shows and reveals itself to him from only one perspective, which corresponds to his standpoint in the world and is determined by it”.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, the current migrant and refugee crisis is developing with such rapidity, that it is difficult to make lasting judgments. In late August 2015 Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, made the important statement that the refugee crisis tests Europe’s core ideals. Since then things have developed their own dynamic. In the beginning of September the Swedish Prime Minister met Mrs. Merkel in Berlin and his message was clear: Europe is able to take more refugees and Europe has a moral responsibility to do so.<sup>6</sup> Merkel is right about Europeans’ moral obligations, but not about their attitude: a poll in October last year noted that “Europeans feel a duty to help refugees – but not in their own country”.<sup>7</sup>

---

3 Hannah Arendt, “A Reply to Eric Voegelin”, *Essays in Understanding 1930-54*, ed. by Jerome Kohn, New York: Schocken Books 1994, 404.

4 “On Hannah Arendt”, *Hannah Arendt: the Recovery of the Public World*, ed. by Melvyn Hill, New York: St. Martin’s 1979, 301-339.

5 Hannah Arendt, “Introduction into Politics”, *The Promise of Politics*, ed. by Jerome Kohn, New York: Schocken Books 2005, 128.

6 Anne Marte Vestbakke, “Löfven: Europa har moralsk ansvar”, *msn nyheter*, 08.09. 2015, <http://www.msn.com/nb-no/nyheter/verden/l%C3%B6fven-europa-har-moralsk-ansvar/ar-AAe3z9c>

7 Alberto Nardelli, “Europeans feel a duty to help refugees – but not in their own countries”, *The Guardian*, Friday, 30 October 2015; <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/oct/30/european-attitudes-towards-refugees-poll-eu>

## 2. What does it mean to be a refugee?

Hannah Arendt can help to answer this question, since she by way of her own personal experience of being a refugee, began with an article entitled “We Refugees”, published in 1943 in the *Menorah Journal*, her lifelong reflections on the problems of human rights and statelessness.<sup>8</sup> The article mirrors her experiences of being stateless, of being a refugee, a victim, a foreigner and “an enemy alien”.<sup>9</sup> It is written in an ironic and bitter tone; ironic in her “cartoonlike description of the refugees’ eager efforts to assimilate, to become indistinguishable, to forget the past and solve everything individually”.<sup>10</sup> The following passage speaks for itself: “We did the best to prove to other people that we were just ordinary immigrants. We declared that we had departed of our own free will to countries of our choice, and we denied that our situation had anything to do with ‘so-called Jewish problems’”.<sup>11</sup>

Bitter is the tone because Arendt herself belonged to the “we”, to these refugees who lost their “home, which means the familiarity of daily life”, their “occupation, which means the confidence that [they] are of some use in this world”, their “language, which means the naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings”; they left their “relatives in the Polish ghettos and [their] best friends [who] have been killed in concentration camps” (underlining added).<sup>12</sup>

If this were not enough, the refugees feel “humiliated when they are rescued” and degraded when they are helped. They “fight like madmen for private existences with individual destinies (underlining added)”. “To give their new insecure existence some form of stability they refer to the marvelous existence they once had and lost”.<sup>13</sup>

At the end of her article she described Mr. Cohn “who had always been a 150 percent German” (WR, 271), who in “1933 [...] found refuge in Prague and very quickly became a convinced Czech patriot” (WR, 271), who then, in 1937 went to Vienna where “a definite Austrian patriotism was required”, who was forced “out of that country” by the German invasion and who “arrived in Paris”, where he, “seriously convinced that he would spend his future life in France [...] prepared his adjustment to the French nation” (WR, 271), however, he “must bitterly realize in the end that ‘on ne parvient pas deux fois’” (WR, 274).<sup>14</sup>

What are we going to make of this? Refugees today have not lost all rights, so why should we turn to the experience described in 1943? There is good reason, I think, because Arendt turned the condition of homeless refugee – a condition that was her own – “upside

8 Serena Parekh, *Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of Modernity. A Phenomenology of Human Rights*, Oxford: Routledge 2008, 8.

9 Hannah Arendt, “We Refugees”, *The Jewish Writings*, ed. by Jerome Kohn & Ron Feldman, New York: Schocken Books 2007, 266.

10 Wolfgang Heuer, “Europe and Its Refugees: Arendt on the Politicization of Minorities”, *Social Research*, 2007, 74(4), Hannah Arendt’s Centenary: Political and Philosophical Perspectives, Part II, 1164.

11 Hannah Arendt, “We Refugees”, *The Jewish Writings*, 264.

12 *Ibid.*, 264f.

13 Wolfgang Heuer, “Europe and Its Refugees: Arendt on the Politicization of Minorities”, 1165.

14 Giorgio Agamben, “Beyond Human Rights” (1993), *Means without End*, Notes on Politics, Minneapolis/ London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000, 16.1. Originally: Hannah Arendt, “We Refugees”, *The Jewish Writings*, 274.

down in order to present it as a paradigm of a new historical consciousness".<sup>15</sup> The refugees who lost everything and who "no longer want to be assimilated at all cost to a new national identity"<sup>16</sup> received a new insight which Arendt expresses in the following way:

History is no longer a closed book to them and politics is no longer the privilege of Gentiles. They know that the outlawing of the Jewish people of Europe has been followed closely by the outlawing of most European nations. Refugees driven from country to country represent the vanguard of their peoples – if they keep their identity (WR, 274).<sup>17</sup>

Seventy years later this analysis has not lost its relevance. However, there are profound differences. First of all, now the refugees "come from countries outside Europe. It is no longer an inner-European but a global phenomenon".<sup>18</sup> Second, and possibly more relevant, contrary to the specific situation after World War I, the member states of the European Union "are aware of the importance of the right to have rights".<sup>19</sup> Our contemporary experience is that sovereign power within liberal democracies is limited: "[...] liberal states are in fact constrained in their dealings with irregular migrants by constitutional law, international human rights treaties, and the political bargaining processes that unfold as states attempt to share the burden of migration and border control."<sup>20</sup> In other words, the situation in Europe today differs from the situation after World War I when the "exclusively stateless people were declared 'undesirable'".<sup>21</sup>

Today member states of the EU cannot act without assuming that refugees have rights. The European Convention on Human Rights includes the right of refugees to be reunited with their families. However, the Danish parliament is planning a bill to "defer family reunification for three years for people with temporary protection status".<sup>22</sup> Craig French noticed another form of violating human rights: "the detention and deportation system",<sup>23</sup> she argued inflicts harm on the asylum seekers and refugees. According to her, psychological and existential aspects of detention are neglected. To make visible "what kind of injustice"

---

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 16.6.

17 Ibid.

18 Wolfgang Heuer, "Europe and Its Refugees: Arendt on the Politicization of Minorities", 1169; The UN's Refugee Agency (UNHCR) report states that, by the end of 2012, 45.2 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution. 10.5 million are refugees and 27.5 million are internally displaced persons. UNHCR, Global Trends 2012. Displacement. The New 21st Century Challenge.

19 Wolfgang Heuer, 1161.

20 Craig French, "To lose one's home in the world: The injustice of immigrant detention", *Journal of International Political Theory*, 2015, 11(3), 356.

21 Wolfgang Heuer, "Europe and Its Refugees: Arendt on the Politicization of Minorities", 1162.

22 "Three-year waiting period violates human rights", *The Danish Institute for Human Rights. News*, 6 January 2016; <http://www.humanrights.dk/news/three-year-waiting-period-violates-human-rights>; downloaded on January 18, 2016.

23 Craig French, 352.

is done, she reconstructs Martin Heidegger's thoughts on "the *spatiality of being*".<sup>24</sup> Heidegger thought "that the prospects of successful being in the world depended, in important ways, on the proper constitution of the spaces and places in which individuals dwell".<sup>25</sup> "If the place of being should collapse or be destroyed", French argues, "[...] then the individual is thrown into a highly deficient mode of being that in Heideggerian terms we might characterize as *anxiety*, caused by the deprivation of a home in the world".<sup>26</sup>

In 1951 Heidegger presented to the Darmstadt Symposium on *Man and Space* the lecture "Building Dwelling Thinking". Here he developed the relation of "building" to "dwelling" and the way of thinking that derives from this relation. He recovered from "The Old High German word for building, *buan*",<sup>27</sup> the original meaning of building is dwelling: "Where the word *bauen* still speaks in its original sense it also says *how far* the essence of dwelling reaches. That is *bauen*, *buan*, *bhu*, *beo* are our word *bin* in the versions: *ich bin*, I am, *du bist*, you are, the imperative form *bis*, be".<sup>28</sup> Heidegger explained: "The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans *are* on the earth, is *buan*, dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell".<sup>29</sup> True, "we do not merely dwell – that would be virtual inactivity – we practice a profession, we do business, we travel and find shelter on the way, now here, now there", true, building can take on different forms, the form of constructing or the form of cultivating, but what we tend to forget is that the original meaning of the word building is dwelling. Dwelling, Heidegger argues, "remains for man's everyday experience that which is from the outset 'habitual' – we inhabit it, as our language says so beautifully: it is the *Gewohnte*".<sup>30</sup>

"If we listen to what language says in the word *bauen*," Heidegger argues, "we hear three things: 1. Building is really dwelling. 2. Dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth. 3. Building as dwelling unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things and the building that erects buildings."<sup>31</sup> Heidegger goes on, "To say that mortals *are* is to say that in *dwelling* they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locales".<sup>32</sup> The word *Raum*, space by its ancient meaning is "place that is freed for settlement and lodging. A space is something that has been made room for, something that has been freed; [...] space is in essence that for which room has been made, [...] that is gathered by virtue of a locale".<sup>33</sup> Such a locale is for instance the bridge, "[...] the bridge contains

24 Ibid., 356.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 I follow Craig French and Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking", *Martin Heidegger. Basic Writings*, ed. by David Farrell Krell, London & New York: Routledge 2011, 244.

28 Martin Heidegger, 245.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 251.

33 Ibid., 250.

many places variously near or far from the bridge”.<sup>34</sup> Consequently, “spaces, and with them space as such – ‘space – are always provided for already within the stay of mortals. Spaces open up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man”.<sup>35</sup> For Heidegger *Dasein* is existential *spatial*; accordingly,

Being-in-the-world means to live among *things* with which one is ordinarily and proximally familiar, to dwell in places that afford possibilities for being and involvement with others, to see one’s self thrown and projected (a potentiality to be), and to stay in a place that one cultivates by making *space* for things, projects, and beings and safeguarding them or showing care toward them. These are the structural features of being-in-the-world in its *average everydayness*, that is, the conditions that are necessary for the enjoyment of being in the normal course of things.<sup>36</sup>

We find this idea of human being’s spatial existence in Hannah Arendt’s work. “Living beings, men and animals”, Arendt writes, “are not just in the world, they are *of the world*, and this is precisely because they are subjects and objects – perceiving and being perceived – at the same time”.<sup>37</sup>

Both thinkers, Heidegger and Arendt, are aware of the essential loss once human beings lose the space they exist in. If we follow Heidegger it will be impossible for them to *dwell* in the sense that he indicates is centrally important to the human experience.<sup>38</sup> This loss leads to “what Heidegger called *anxiety*”. Anxiety is a “pathological state”, it is

a state in which one can no longer see oneself as a being with a potentiality projected into the future. [...] When *dasein* is consumed by anxiety, it is no longer at home in the world as it should be. The world has become strange, hostile, inhospitable, and alien, no longer able to offer a framework of intelligibility of the sort that previously made being possible.<sup>39</sup>

---

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., 251.

36 Craig French, 364.

37 Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, One Volume Edition. San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt, Inc., 1981, 20.

38 The philosopher Else Wiestad writes in her book *Stedene som former deg*: Steder er nødvendige for at vi skal kunne leve, bo, reise, dyrke og være virksomme. Vi forbinder steder, stedsord og stedsfortellinger med ulike typer virkelighets oppfatninger, praksisformer, meningsverk og myter. Ved hjelp av stedsord og deres overførte betydninger gir vi uttrykk for hvordan vi orienterer oss, sanser, regulerer og forstår den verden vi lever i. Else Wiestad, *Stedene som former deg. Om rom og subjektivitet*, Oslo: Fagbokforlaget 2014, 29.

39 Craig French, 365.

Heidegger's description of being's spatial existence and his description of anxiety caused by the loss of a guaranteed place reveals the undermining experience refugees and immigrants are exposed to.

And so does Hannah Arendt. However, she puts the emphasis on the right to belong to a political community. True, spatial existence, is important, however, being deprived of one's place in the world includes losing "a framework where one is judged by one's actions and opinions" (OT, 297). To be seen and heard by one's fellowmen presupposes a political community. No longer being member of a community, this "entails the loss of the relevance of speech" (OT, 297). Since "man, since Aristotle, has been defined as a being commanding the power of speech and thought" (OT, 297), the loss means that one loses "some of the most essential characteristics of human life" (OT, 297).

At first sight the above presentation of Heidegger's emphasis of place for human beings and Arendt's emphasis on speech may give the impression that a dwelling place and language are separated. However, neither for Heidegger nor for Arendt is there such a gap. For Heidegger, every human dwelling space is always linguistically and intelligibly and so humanly charged. Every human situation, *Dasein*, is from childhood on a hermeneutic situation. Human life itself lays itself out (*legt sich aus*), interprets itself, articulates itself. For Arendt, the disclosure of the "who", "the unique and distinct identity of the agent" (HC, 180) through speech and action is possible only when he or she has a distinct place in the world.

### 3. The situation today: "Humanity washed ashore"?

Arendt's point of reference is on the one hand her own experience. But understanding the experience of being a refugee – an experience she shared with millions of people – led her to widen the scale and integrate the period when the refugee as a mass phenomenon occurred for the first time. Of course, here is not the place for history. However, since the refugee crisis of today is presented in the media as Europe's worst since the Second World War I will simply mention that the first appearance of refugee as a mass phenomenon was at the end of World War One. The "fall of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires, along with the new order created by the peace treaties, upset profoundly the demographic and territorial constitution of central Eastern Europe."<sup>40</sup> It led to the situation that 30% of the population had to be safeguarded by so-called Minority Treaties. Minority Treaties demonstrated "that only nationals could be citizens, only people of the same national origin could enjoy the full protection of legal institutions, that persons of different nationalities needed some law of exception until or unless they were completely assimilated and divorced from their origin" (OT, 275). In Arendt's words: "A secret conflict between state and nation came to light at the very birth of the modern nation-state, when

40 Giorgio Agamben, "Beyond Human Rights", 16.6.

the French Revolution combined the declaration of the Rights of Man with the demand for national sovereignty” (OT, 230).

Back in Arendt’s time, refugees were deprived of rights. Their’ “freedom of movement”, Arendt wrote, “gives them no right to residence [...], and their freedom of opinion is a fool’s freedom, for nothing they think matters anyhow” (OT, 296).<sup>41</sup> It was her opinion that “something much more fundamental than freedom and justice, which are the rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to the community into which one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging no longer a matter of choice. [...] This extremity, and nothing else,” she stated, “is the situation of people deprived of human rights. They are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion” (OT, 296). Following Aristotle, she argued that the loss of the relevance of speech and the loss of all human relationships is “the loss [...] of some of the most essential characteristics of human life” (OT, 297). Her conclusion therefore was that there is only one right, this is “a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and the right to belong to some kind of organized community” (OT, 296-7). Hannah Arendt anticipated that “refugees have become a major issue of our time – a test for the nation-states as well as for human rights”.<sup>42</sup>

Today, Europe has a high number of refugees, most of them coming from Syria. Turkey has taken 2 million refugees of Syria’s estimated 4 million and has built 22 refugee camps, and several more are under construction. And yet, only about 400,000 find refuge in one of the camps while the majority are on their own. Bad living conditions cause health problems. The camps were originally meant as short-term places, yet many families are now in their fourth year there.<sup>43</sup>

For the last four and a half years a civil war is going on in Syria, which began with all the hope that the 2011 Arab Spring protests promised. We all remember the successful overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak and the events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and in particular the 18 days of *Tahrir* Square in Cairo 2011. However, the uprisings have not brought the desired new beginning. We can relate “the revolutionary moment of the so-called Arab spring [...] to Arendt’s warning that liberation from oppression alone is not enough to establish the reign of freedom”.<sup>44</sup> She distinguished “between liberation and freedom” (OR, 142).<sup>45</sup> While liberation, “the desire to be free from oppression” (OR, 33), does not require a transformation of the political order, freedom “necessitates the forma-

41 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York: Harcourt Brace 1951, cited as OT.

42 Didier Fassin, “Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries. The Governmentality of Immigration in Dark Times”, *The Annual Review of Anthropology*, 2011(40), 220. Downloaded from [www.annualreviews.org](http://www.annualreviews.org) on 07/21/2015

43 See UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html>; see also: CBC News, “Syrian civil war enters 5th year, no end in sight”, March 15, 2011; <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/syrian-civil-war-enters-5th-year-no-end-in-sight-1.2996122>

44 Jens Hanssen, “Translating Revolution: Hannah Arendt in Arab Political Culture”, *HannahArendt.net*, Ausgabe 1, Band 7, November 2013, 2.

45 Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*, New York: Viking/ London: Faber & Faber 1963, cited as OR.

tion of a new, or rather rediscovered, form of government” (OR, 33). In other words, “we need to distinguish between two forms of political action, the one that releases and the one that binds, or hedges. It is only the latter which results in a democratic form”.<sup>46</sup> Jens Hanssen remarks, “it is this freedom that has proven so elusive since the overthrow of the old regimes in Tunisia, Libya and Yemen and the counter-revolutions, especially in Egypt, while in countries like Syria and Bahrain, the liberation struggle is still on-going”.<sup>47</sup>

In Syria the dictator Bashar al-Assad has refused to step down. The civil war has shown incredible violence, including torturing children and using chemical weapons against the oppressed people. The war in Syria is going into its fifth year; and one may ask how it is possible that the world for such a long time has ignored the refugee crisis. One possible answer may be that the people fleeing war or persecution were not seen as people but reported as sheer numbers, and numbers are part of statistics.

But then the three year old Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi drowned in a failed attempt to sail to the Greek island of Kos. On September 2, a picture showed him wearing a red-T-shirt and shorts, washed up on a beach, lying face down in the surf not far from Turkey’s fashionable resort town of Bodrum; a second image shows a policeman carrying the tiny body away. Within hours this picture became the top trending picture on Twitter under the headline: “Humanity washed ashore”.<sup>48</sup> The image of the drowned Aylan Kurdi, I think, re-humanized the refugee crisis by turning from sheer numbers and giving the general disaster a face. Across the world it initiated a shift in the countries’ response to the refugee crisis. Still, one may ask whether the emotional outcry is politically relevant.

The world may look inhospitable for many refugees today, and for the Syrians it may be of little comfort that “what men can produce can in turn be destroyed by men; what they destroy can be rebuilt”.<sup>49</sup> However, once the war in Syria is over Syrians will have to rebuild their world. Will they, then, return to their country and help building it? Should there be steps taken by the international community in planning and helping for a return? These questions, of course, do not stand in opposition to Europe’s legal and moral obligations to give shelter to the refugees as long as Syria is at war. With the battle still ongoing, should we ask how to bring a destroyed country back to life? At the end of World War II Germany got help from the Marshall Plan. Is there a Syrian Marshall Plan, a plan for post-conflict reconstruction in the Syrian Arab Republic?<sup>50</sup>

46 Sofia Näsström, “The Right to have Rights: democratic, not political”, *Political Theory* 2014, 42(5), 555.

47 Jens Hanssen, 2.

48 “Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees”, *The Guardian*, 2 September, 2015; <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-of-drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees>

49 Hannah Arendt, “Introduction into Politics”, *The Promise of Politics*, ed. by Jerome Kohn, New York: Schocken Books 2005, 154.

50 “Assessing the Impact of the Conflict on the Syrian Economy and looking beyond”, by Abdallah al-Dardari, Mohamed Hedi Behir, United Nations New York, 2014; [http://www.escwa.un.org/information/publications/edit/upload/E\\_ESCWA\\_EDGD\\_14\\_WP-2\\_E.pdf](http://www.escwa.un.org/information/publications/edit/upload/E_ESCWA_EDGD_14_WP-2_E.pdf)

#### 4. “Let’s do it right”:

##### Europe’s values and its capacity to respond to the refugee crisis

The wave of refugees will hardly stop any time soon. Neither will the number of immigrants. Consequently, we may ask, if the increasing number of refugees is a fact, shouldn’t we then accept it as a reality? Shouldn’t we think of a response that avoids both undermining Europe’s identity as a union of democratic states as well as the right of everyone to be treated with dignity?

This requires a nation-state as a legal institution whose “supreme function” is the “protection of all inhabitants in its territory”. Let me briefly recall an observation Hannah Arendt made about the nation-state system in the middle of the last century. She observed “that the modern idea of the nation–state rests on a fundamental contradiction between the ‘openness’ of the state [...] through enforcing the rule of law and the exclusivity of the nation as a closed community whose solidarity is based on shared characteristics of genealogy, history and culture”.<sup>51</sup> This has changed since 1945. The European states are no longer asked to “express the collective will, but rather to ensure our personal safety and the right of each of us to act as he or she sees fit”.<sup>52</sup> Tzvetan Todorov for example thinks “Europeans of today believe in the spirit of liberal democracy”.<sup>53</sup> That means, “the ‘power of the people’ and the ‘freedom of persons’, that is, attention to the common good and the protection of the individual”.<sup>54</sup> He goes on, stating that “the majority decides in a democracy, but the majority of citizens are not enlightened. The individual has his own concerns, and doesn’t understand public affairs – which are very often quite complex – very well”.<sup>55</sup>

##### a) European leaders: a variety of voices

Another aspect of the current situation is that the EU, despite the efforts it has undertaken, does not share a common answer. While Germany welcomes refugees, Hungary closed its borders with non-EU Serbia in mid-September, with non-Schengen Croatia last week and “is not going to open any corridor for asylum seekers to enter the Schengen zone from the south”.<sup>56</sup> “Slovenia, with a population of just two million, has already received over 20,000 migrants since Saturday; the Slovenian government has plans to ask the EU for help in dealing with financial and security concerns”.<sup>57</sup> Poland has agreed to accept 5,000 refugees in addition to the 2,000 it has already made allowances for.<sup>58</sup> In Central Europe, and in particular in Slovakia, solidarity in sharing the burden equally is weak. Moreover, and perhaps

51 Douglas Klusmeyer, “Hannah Arendt’s Case for Federalism”, *The Journal of Federalism*, 2009, 40(1), 37.

52 Tzvetan Todorov & John Anzalone, “European Values”, *Salmagundi*, 2005/2006, 148/149, 18.

53 *Ibid.*, 17.

54 *Ibid.*

55 *Ibid.*, 18.

56 “Hungary won’t open ‘corridors’ for refugees on its southern borders”, *RT*, Published 21 October, 2015; <https://www.rt.com/news/319314-hungary-refugee-crisis-borders/>

57 *Ibid.*

58 “Poland to accept 5,000 refugees: A summary of events”, *Krakow Post*, 24 September, 2015; <http://www.krakow-post.com/10477/2015/09/poland-to-accept-5000-refugees>; downloaded October 22.

worse, is that “Slovakia will only accept ‘Christian refugees.’” It says Muslims would not feel at home there.<sup>59</sup> But not every central European member state shares this attitude, for instance the Prime Minister from the Czech Republic Bohuslav Sobotka: “Even though I don’t like the use of the quotas, I don’t agree with them and we voted against them, Europe must not fall apart over solving the migrant crisis.”<sup>60</sup>

In the face of an ongoing tragedy that has claimed 2,500 lives during 2015, the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, put it bluntly: “If Europe fails on the question of refugees, its close connection with universal civil rights will be destroyed and it won’t be the Europe we want”.<sup>61</sup> In practice this meant that she revoked the return orders for Dublin transfers to other countries and changed the rule for Syrian refugees that asylum seekers must claim asylum in the first EU state they arrive in.

This step caused critical commentaries: For instance, Professor Anthony Glee, a prominent commentator on European affairs, described Germany as “a hippie state, being led by its emotions”. In his view, “the most serious humanitarian crisis that Europe had to deal with since the end of World War II can only be dealt with by essential policy making and above all by sticking to the rules”,<sup>62</sup> that is, refugees must be taken at the first port of entry into the European Union states.

### **b) A first step of sharing responsibility**

What, then, could a political response be? It needs to be a common response of European refugee policy shared by all EU member states. Germany will not be able to handle the challenge alone. A first step in sharing the responsibility was made on September 23 when the EU leaders met in Brussels and agreed on a list of priorities which included to “assist Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and other countries in dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis”, to expand financial support for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food program”, to gain Turkey’s co-operation in stemming the flow of refugees, to “assist the countries of the Western Balkans in the management of refugee flows”, to increase funding to address the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa”, to “tackle the dramatic situation at the EU external borders and strengthen their control” and “assist frontline member states in the establishment of hotspots, to ensure a correct identification of migrants and at the same time ensure relocation and returns. They also

59 “Slovakia ‘will only accept Christian refugees,’” *DW*, 20 August, 2015; <http://www.dw.com/en/slovakia-will-only-accept-christian-refugees/a-18659254>

60 “Migrant crisis: EU splits exposed as talks take place”, *BBC News*, 23 September 2015; <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34332759>

61 “Merkel says refugee crisis tests Europe’s core ideals”, 31 August 2015; see also “Merkel will «Normalmodus» für Flüchtlinge beenden”: „Die große Zahl von Flüchtlingen wird die EU in der näheren Zukunft vermutlich mehr beschäftigen als Griechenland und die Stabilität des Euro“. *Die Welt*, 16 August 2015.

62 “Germany a hippie state being led by its emotions”, by Anthony Glee, *BBC World Service*, 9 September 2015; <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03200f8>

called for renewed diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis in Syria and ensure the formation of a government of national unity in Libya".<sup>63</sup>

### c) Legal Obligations

Besides, Germany and all the European member states have a legal obligation to help the refugees. They signed the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees of 1951 into which the principle of "non-refoulement" has been incorporated. In the year 2011 the Refugee convention celebrated its 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary. However, its history is not one of linear progress; not only continue "'physical insecurity, legal insecurity, socio-economic insecurity and environmental insecurity' to be 'commonplace'".<sup>64</sup> The Convention also has to be extended because there are persons such as "'internally displaced persons,' 'environmental refugees,' or other people forced to migrate" who are "currently not covered by the definition of the beneficiaries of that Convention".<sup>65</sup>

But, at least, the Convention contains the important principle of "non-refoulement" which "obliges signatory states not to forcibly return refugees and asylum seekers to their countries of origin if doing so would pose a clear danger to their lives and freedom".<sup>66</sup> In fact, this goes back to Immanuel Kant and his notion of "hospitality". In the Third Article of perpetual peace, he notes that

hospitality is not to be understood as a virtue of sociability, as the kindness and generosity one may show to strangers who come to one's land or who become dependent upon one's act of kindness through circumstances of nature or history; hospitality is a "right" that belongs to all human beings insofar as we view them as potential participants in a world republic.<sup>67</sup>

Here is not the place to look further into the debate about the term hospitality for international relations; I just want to mention Seyla Benhabib's view that "the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human rights and the succeeding era of international rights declarations reflect the learning experiences not only of western humanity but of humanity at large".<sup>68</sup> However, with Arendt's statement in my mind, that "nobody can be a citizen of the world

63 European Union Delegation to the United Nations: Responding to the refugee crisis; [http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article\\_16884\\_en.htm](http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_16884_en.htm); downloaded October 5, 2015.

64 "Introductory Remarks by Tom Syring", *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)*, Vol. 106 (Mar. 28, 2012), 430.

65 *Ibid.*, 429.

66 Seyla Benhabib, "Cosmopolitanism and Democracy: Affinities and Tensions", *Hedgehog Review. Critical Reflections on Contemporary Culture*, 2009, 11(3), 34.

67 Quoted from Benhabib, 33; see also Immanuel Kant, "Dritter Definitivartikel zum Ewigen Frieden", *Immanuel Kant Werke*, Bd. 9, ed. by Wilhelm Weischedel, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt 1975, 213ff, BA 40/BA 41. See also Gideon Baker, "Right to entry or right of refusal? Hospitality in the law of nature and nations", *Review of International Studies*, 2011, 37(3), 1424ff.

68 Seyla Benhabib, 35f.

as he is the citizen of his country”;<sup>69</sup> I would like to invite you to keep in mind that, according to Arendt, “rights are not in the first instance a matter of philosophical or moral ideals, state guarantees or legal declarations, but are created from the bottom up, through practices of communication and interaction”.<sup>70</sup>

#### d) Politics and “mere life”

Legal obligations and the need for political solidarity between the European member states as well as among the EU and countries outside the EU are one side of political action to be taken. However, the refugee crisis confronts us with a further aspect, an aspect that Hannah Arendt characterized as “the dark background of mere givenness, the background formed by our unchangeable and unique nature [...]”.<sup>71</sup> This dark background

breaks into the political scene as the alien which in its all too obvious difference reminds us of the limitations of human activity – which are identical with the limitations of human equality. [...] The ‘alien’ is a frightening symbol of the fact of difference as such, of individuality as such, and indicates those realms in which man cannot change and cannot act and in which, therefore, he has a distinct tendency to destroy.<sup>72</sup>

A man “who by accidents of history is nothing but a man”, Arendt writes, “has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-man”. She goes on:

The great danger arising from the existence of people forced to live outside the common world is that they are thrown back, in the midst of civilization, on their natural givenness, on their mere differentiation. They lack the tremendous equalizing of differences which comes from being citizens of some commonwealth and yet, since they are no longer allowed to partake in the human artifice, they begin to belong to the human race in much the same way as animals belong to a specific animal species. The paradox involved in the loss of human rights is that such a loss coincides with the instant when a person becomes a human being in general – without a profession, without a citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and specify himself – and different in general, representing nothing but his own absolutely unique individuality which, deprived of expression within and action upon a common world, loses all significance.<sup>73</sup>

69 Hannah Arendt, “Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World”? *Men in Dark Times*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World 1968, 81.

70 James D. Ingram, „What Is a “Right to Have Rights“? Three Images of the Politics of Human Rights”, *American Political Science Review*, 2008, 102(4), 410.

71 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 301.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., 302. See also Eric Santner, “What’s left after Rights?” *Law and Critique* 2015, 26(2), 105-115.

Arendt detects a deep Western resentment of the given, of mere life, that is relegated to the private realm, the realm of need and necessity. When the media show the human beings in their status as a refugee, what becomes visible is “an ‘unqualified’ alien who is left with only her mere existence as a human being and who, as a consequence, must flee for her life”<sup>74</sup>.

Angela Merkel by taking the decision to welcome more refugees expressed an understanding of the vulnerable ‘alien’ fleeing for her life. Her decision was not as Judy Dempsey noticed, “based on tactics. [...] It was not based on strategy. Germany was not prepared for such an influx and was not ready to integrate so many tens of thousands of newcomers. She did not inform her EU partners. It was as unilateral a decision as her move to phase out nuclear power. Why?”<sup>75</sup>

There are different answers, one of them by Elmar Brok, a prominent Christian Democrat and chairman of the European Parliament’s foreign affairs committee, who thought Merkel did it out of compassion. Another one, Helge Høibraaten, a Norwegian philosopher, wondered whether Angela Merkel’s decision has to do with a lack of self-criticism, a virtue he attributes politicians and intellectuals such as Helmut Schmidt, Jürgen Habermas, and Joschka Fischer.<sup>76</sup> Another explication may be that Angela Merkel remembers the last century’s disaster when the system of nation-states didn’t solve the fate of minorities, refugees, and stateless people in a humane manner. I will argue that Merkel acted not in accordance with humanitarianism or compassion but in accordance with an Arendtian notion of humaneness.

There is nothing wrong with compassion, but it is a kind of humaneness that, according to Arendt, is the great privilege of “pariah peoples, a privilege that is dearly bought (because) it is often accompanied by so radical a loss of the world [...] that in extreme cases [...] we can speak of real worldlessness”.<sup>77</sup> There are limits of a natural creature affect when it comes to political action, because “compassion abolishes the distance, the worldly space between men where politics matters” (OR, 86).

In Arendt’s view, wherever “human beings come together” they generate “a space [...] that simultaneously gathers them into it and separates them from one another”.<sup>78</sup> This space between men which is the world lies at the center of politics, and “it is within this world [of things] that human beings act and are themselves conditioned, and because they are conditioned by it, every catastrophe that occurs within it strikes back at them, affects them” (IP, 107).

<sup>74</sup> Peg Birmingham, *Hannah Arendt and Human Rights. The Predicament of Common Responsibility*, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006, 74.

<sup>75</sup> Judy Dempsey, “Merkel’s Refugee Crisis”, *Carnegie Europe*, September 14, 2015; <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=61268>

<sup>76</sup> Helge Høibraaten, “Nestekjærleikens Bismarck?” *Dag og Tid*, 23 October 2015, 12.

<sup>77</sup> Hannah Arendt, “On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about Lessing”, *Men in Dark Times*, 13, cited as MDT.

<sup>78</sup> Hannah Arendt, “Introduction into Politics”, *The Promise of Politics. Hannah Arendt*, ed. by Jerome Kohn, New York: Schocken Books 2005, 106, cited as IP.

We might, therefore, assume compassion “as an ideal basis for a feeling that reaching out to all mankind would establish a society in which men might really become brothers” (MDT, 14). It is Arendt’s opinion that “humanitarianism of brotherhood” is valuable since “it makes insult and injury endurable” (MDT, 16), however, “in political terms it is absolutely irrelevant” (MDT, 17). It is irrelevant because compassion cannot “reach out farther than what is suffered by one person and still remain what it is supposed to be, co-suffering” (OR, 85); furthermore compassion politicized becomes the sentiment of pity, and pity may even “be the perversion of compassion” (OR, 88).

The humaneness Arendt then has in mind is not the humanitarianism of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, warmth of human relationships at cost of the world that lies between them, but a humaneness that contains an “openness to others” (MDT, 15). This openness, the “willing to risk the disclosure” (HC, 180), to reveal oneself in deed or word is only possible “where people are *with* others and neither for nor against them, that is in sheer human togetherness” (HC, 180).

Classical antiquity thought, that humaneness “should be sober and cool rather than sentimental; that humanity is exemplified not in fraternity but in friendship; that friendship is not intimately personal but makes political demands and preserves reference to the world” (MDT, 25). It turned with the Romans into “*humanitas*” and became a political background, i.e., “in Rome people of widely different ethnic origins and descent could acquire Roman citizenship and thus enter into the discourse among cultivated Romans, could discuss the world and life with them” (MDT, 25).

It is this “readiness to share the world with other men” (MDT, 25), that is expressed in Angela Merkel’s welcoming and open door policy. True, all started with citizens opening “the heart to the sufferings of others [...]” (OR, 81), however, it was Angela Merkel who turned the response to the refugee crisis into a political response in the best tradition of humaneness, a humaneness which the ancient Greeks called *philantropia*, ‘love of man’.

### e) The refugee crisis, globalization and the effect on political thinking

Merkel also said that the refugee crisis is going to change Germany.<sup>79</sup> Underlying is the understanding that refugees are not a temporary phenomenon and that we in Europe cannot in a short time return to “business as usual. Globalization is not a one-way traffic, from Europe out into the world, but it works in the other direction too, i.e., from the world into Europe. Since the end of the Cold War the world is in motion. Several states have been left to their own devices, and without strong governmental structures some of them have turned into so-called ‘failed states’ suffering from the erosion of legitimate authority and unable to provide public services.<sup>80</sup> States in the Middle East have artificial frontiers, “drawn by statesmen with rulers on maps – statesmen who were not Arab, not Persian,

79 Angela Merkel: „Flüchtlingskrise wird Deutschland verändern“, 7 September 2015; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HNUQW0Q5FLU>

80 “Failed state”, *Wikipedia*; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failed\\_state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failed_state); see also: Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy* by Noam Chomsky, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006.

not Turkish, but British or French or occasionally Italian”.<sup>81</sup> No one would have expected people from this region could cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe in mass. These events are changing our reality, including our terms when orienting ourselves in the world, as for instance in how we use words such as “close” and “distant”. Syria is no longer distant, the Syrian refugees are no longer strangers but changing into our neighbors.

Half a century ago, Hannah Arendt reflected on the enormous difficulty which she related to the fact that we are living in One World, and this means, that

[...] for the first time in history all peoples on earth have a common present: No event of any importance in the history of one country can remain a marginal accident in the history of any other. Every country has become the almost immediate neighbor of every other country, and every man feels the shock of events which take place on the other side of the globe.<sup>82</sup>

The common factual present implies the task to guarantee every human being a place in the world. This is not at all an easy task, since, as Arendt remarked, our “common factual present is not based on a common past and does not in the least guarantee a common future”.<sup>83</sup> “Everything”, Arendt argues, “seems to depend upon the possibility of bringing the national pasts, in their original disparateness, into communication with each other”.<sup>84</sup>

Her reflections are part of her article “Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World?” (1958). Here she made the statement that Karl Jaspers “agreed with the widespread feeling that our time somehow has come to an end”.<sup>85</sup> Arendt on her part joined in: “Our present is emphatically, and not merely logically, the suspense between a no-longer and a not-yet”. In Karl Jaspers’ words, “We live as though we stand knocking at doors which are still closed to us”.<sup>86</sup>

Today those doors are open and what becomes visible is that a guaranteed place for everyone in this world is more urgent than ever. True, “a framework of universal mutual agreements, which eventually would lead into a world-wide federated structure”<sup>87</sup> is still ahead, but Europe needs to find human solutions of the refugee crisis. Nothing indicates it will be an easy way to go, but there is some hope since “both in their laws and their rhetoric, many European politicians are categorically against exclusiveness and discriminatory practices”.<sup>88</sup> Furthermore, “Europe today can draw from this history positive effect in the

---

81 Bernard Lewis, *From Babel to Dragomans. Interpreting the Middle East*, New York: Oxford University Press 2004, 334.

82 Hannah Arendt, „Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World“?, 83.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid., 87.

85 Ibid., 90.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid., 93.

88 Rashmee Roshan Lall, “Europe’s refugee policy is tainted by fear of the other”, *The National*, October 14, 2015, downloaded October 20, 2015; <http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/europes-refugee-policy-is-tainted-by-fear-of-the-other>

recognition of human diversity, the tolerance for customs and opinions one does not share and the refusal to treat all differences in terms of “friends” or “enemies”, good or evil”.<sup>89</sup>

Hannah Arendt believed that human beings are able to build a world that will be humane for everybody. To approach this goal, a particular mode of thinking *and* acting would be needed. “Political philosophy”, she writes, “can hardly do more than describe and prescribe a new principle of political action”.<sup>90</sup> A new principle of political action would be one whose validity must comprehend the whole humanity. More than half a century ago, in 1958, Arendt remarked that “mankind [...] has become something of an urgent reality”.<sup>91</sup> However, mankind has never really played a significant role in political thinking, and yet, we need to think mankind as a political notion if we want to make human rights real, that is, guarantee every single human being a place in this world.<sup>92</sup> It seems, Angela Merkel has made an important move in this direction.

## 5. Education’s task

Refugees are continuing to come to Europe. Human rights have to be practiced locally; mankind – hopefully – will turn into a political notion. Dreams, hopes, losses and new beginnings may be translated into such stories and pictures that are understandable and recognizable to the others. “The world”, Hannah Arendt reminds us, “is not humane just because it is made by human beings, and it does not become humane just because the human voice sounds in it, but only when it has become the object of discourse”.<sup>93</sup> She emphasized the importance of communication for the process of becoming human and added: “We humanize what is going on in the world and in ourselves only by speaking of it, and in the course of speaking of it we learn to be human”.<sup>94</sup> She was convinced that “the openness to others [...] is the precondition for ‘humanity’ in every sense of this word”.<sup>95</sup> When she spoke of humaneness or humanity she didn’t refer to its manifestation in humanitarianism or compassion but to the Roman understanding of *humanitas*.

The ancient Greeks too, had an understanding about the close connection between speech and politics; this is expressed in that they highly valued *philia*, i.e., “friendship among citizens”.<sup>96</sup> If we follow Hannah Arendt’s reading of the Greeks, then, humanness is achieved “in the discourse of friendship” because this discourse manifests “a readiness to share the

---

89 Ibid.

90 Hannah Arendt, „Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World”? 93.

91 Ibid., 82.

92 I follow Christian Volk’s argument in „Überlegungen zu einer freiheitlichen Weltordnung im Anschluss an Arendt und Montesquieu”, *Renovatio* 3-4, 2009, 16-17.

93 Hannah Arendt, “On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about Lessing”, *Men in Dark Times*, 24.

94 Ibid., 25.

95 Ibid., 15.

96 Ibid., 24.

world with other men”.<sup>97</sup> “Friendship [...] appears to be the bond of communities”.<sup>98</sup> When friends “become equal partners,” they learn, “how and in what specific articulateness the common world appears to the other, who as a person is forever unequal or different.”<sup>99</sup> What friends exercise is “seeing the world [...] from the other fellow’s point of view”, at the same time they communicate “their opinions so that the common-ness of this world becomes apparent”.<sup>100</sup>

What, then, are the implications for education under the current refugee and migrant crisis? The answer can only be manifold and needs a further discussion. However, to indicate the direction in which the discussion might go, I think, Education should encourage young persons to believe that they can make a change in the world. Therefore, it should strengthen students’ openness to different perspectives which reveal when friends talk together. Teachers should “engage students in understanding and taking into account the perspectives of others”,<sup>101</sup> and this requires to really listening to each other. Moreover, education should encourage and help students to “develop their own perspectives on the ‘world’”<sup>102</sup> and reveal it to others as in friendship. The opposite of this kind of communication is misanthropy, and “misanthropy means simply that the misanthrope finds no one with whom he cares to share the world, that he regards nobody as worthy of rejoicing with him in the world”.<sup>103</sup>

Today we are faced with neoliberalism which produces “citizens as individual entrepreneurs and consumers whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for ‘self-care’”.<sup>104</sup> If we wish to include ‘newcomers’ we need to turn away from neoliberalism and recover solidarity. Education should more than ever focus on teaching students to practice “friendship among citizens”; an attitude deeply needed to envision a world where every human being has a guaranteed place. As Hannah Arendt so well expressed it, “a crisis becomes a disaster only when we respond to it with preformed judgments”.<sup>105</sup>

So, my answer to the title’s question: “Refugees and Europe: a dilemma or a turning point?” will be, Yes, we are standing at a turning point: “The history of mankind has started”.<sup>106</sup>

---

97 Ibid.

98 Hannah Arendt, “Philosophy and Politics”, *Social Research*, 57(1), 1990, 83.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid., 34.

102 Ibid.

103 Hannah Arendt, “Philosophy and Politics”, *Social Research*, 83.

104 Wendy Brown, “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neo-conservatism, and De-Democratization”, *Political Theory*, 2006, 34(6), 694.

105 Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis in Education”, *Between Past and Future*, 174.

106 For helpful comments I thank the referee for Studies in Philosophy of Education.

# Katariina Holma & Tiina Kontinen

## The Rocky Road of Growth into Contemporary Citizenship: Dewey, Gramsci, and the Method of Democracy<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

Characterized by globalization, increasing pluralism, and new complexities of citizenship, the contemporary world poses challenges to the ways in which we conceptualize of the processes of searching for shared solutions to ever-complicated social problems. While the political rhetoric emphasizes the value of citizens' participation, engagement, and "voices," there are increasing feelings of frustration, incapacity, and disinterest on behalf of the citizens regarding the supposed effects of their political engagement. In order to conceptually grasp the problem of searching for shared solutions and the related challenges to education, we draw on John Dewey's idea of the method of democracy and complement it with some critical perspectives inspired by Antonio Gramsci. We then reflect on the implications of these ideas on contemporary adult education by discussing the notion of competence within the theoretical framework that we develop. On the whole, our work aims to contribute in establishing a framework for understanding the role of adult education in the process of ensuring a functional democratic society.

### Keywords

Citizenship, Dewey, Gramsci, hegemony, method of democracy, pluralism

## Introduction

In contemporary Europe, citizen engagement and participation in the search for solutions to shared social problems and policymaking issues has been increasingly discussed.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, the meaning of democracy has expanded from liberal forms of governance in which citizens exercise their democratic rights by visiting ballot-boxes in free multiparty elections towards including more deliberative forms of democracy,<sup>3</sup> involving citizens'

---

1 This article is a part of a larger research project, *Growth into Citizenship in Civil Society Encounters*, funded by the Academy of Finland. It is a consortium project in collaboration with the University of Eastern Finland (decision no. 2285733-9) and the University of Jyväskylä (decision no. 02458904-7).

2 Andrew Power, "EU Legitimacy and New Forms of Citizen Engagement," *Electronic Journal of e-Government* 8 (2010): 45-54.

3 See, for example, John S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), doi: 10.1093/019925043X.001.0001.

---

*Katariina Holma, University of Eastern Finland, Finland*

*E-mail: katariina.holma@uef.fi*

*Tiina Kontinen, University of Jyväskylä, Finland*

*E-mail: tiina.t.kontinen@jyu.fi*

---

*Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi* | [www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf](http://www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf) | ISSN nr. 22449140

---

Årgang 4 | Nr. 2 | 2015 | side 24-37

---

direct participation in debates concerning social challenges. These challenges, such as economic crises and climate change, are complex and global in scope. Furthermore, European societies face increasing pluralism as a result of secularization on the one hand, and the proliferating movement of people across the globe on the other. This is to say that they are the seats of multiple value systems that should all be considered in political decision making. Especially in the Nordic context with the rapid expansion in the number of immigrants and refugees, current political debates are characterized by a shift from a relatively homogenous value base towards a need to take into account and engage multiple religious, ideological, and cultural groups.

Along with the Habermasian theory of communicative action, John Dewey's ideas about "the method of democracy" have been a source of inspiration for those attempting to explain both the theoretical and practical foundations for citizens' participation as well as the ways in which citizenship competencies can be fostered so that such participation would actually occur. In this article, we will offer a new insight to the theoretical discussion on these issues. We first develop a framework derived from the work of two philosophers, John Dewey and Antonio Gramsci, both renowned for their work on democracy, participation, and education. We will then argue that combining the positive aspirations of John Dewey's (1859-1952) method of democracy with Antonio Gramsci's (1891-1937) analysis of hegemony provides a valuable framework for maneuvering along the rocky road of growth into contemporary citizenship.<sup>4</sup>

## Background for Studying Dewey and Gramsci

Our main reason for selecting particularly these two philosophers is, basically, that both philosophers have defined the concept of democracy as extending beyond mere parliamentary structures. For Dewey, according to his often quoted description, "A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience."<sup>5</sup> A Deweyan democracy requires a lot from its citizens, and Dewey specifically emphasized the role of education in fostering democratic success. Alternatively, in his work, Gramsci built upon and revised the communist idea of a party-led democracy by developing it into a conception of a "pluralist grassroots democracy."<sup>6</sup> Emp-

---

4 The philosophical insights of both Dewey and Gramsci have been utilized in a number of approaches to adult education, such as progressive, experiential, critical, and transformative. We do not engage with these traditions *per se*. However, by means of philosophical analysis and the synthesis of the original texts of Dewey and Gramsci, we aim to find new perspectives on contemporary questions concerning adult education in the social and political context. In particular, our pursuit is to combine the positive possibilities of fostering democracy, typical of Deweyan approaches, with the emphasis of critical consciousness, typical of Gramscian approaches.

5 John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), 101.

6 Carlos Nelson Coutinho, *Gramsci's Political Thought* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012), 19, doi: 10.1163/9789004230255. For Gramsci, this means, for example, advocating for factory councils as units of democracy in a critique of a hegemonic liberal democratic system. Along these lines, John Schwarzmantel contends

hasis here is placed on the capacities of each and every citizen in the realization of this new form of democracy, where every citizen can be said to “govern” in some way.<sup>7</sup>

Both Dewey’s and Gramsci’s ideas of democracy interpret citizenship as a process of engagement. Their ideas, although different in many ways, both relate interestingly to the current debates on the concept of citizenship, which is increasingly being understood as involving social membership in communities and networks not restricted within the borders of a particular state.<sup>8</sup> As a result, the citizens’ commitment to solving problems outside of the traditional projects of nation-building requires new possibilities for participation.

At the same time, however, there are continuing trends of “there is no alternative”<sup>9</sup> policymaking, which have been observed as limiting the possibilities of real participation on the part of the citizens. The political objective of actually listening to citizens’ voices is often realized strictly in order to allow for people to select from a set of more or less pre-defined options and to gain public approval for ready-made decisions that merely appear to have been made by the people themselves. For example, in the framework of neoliberal policy, concepts with positive connotations, such as “individual freedom” and “reform,” are used to motivate people’s consent to the implementation of privatization policies that may actually have negative consequences on their lives.<sup>10</sup> As a result, the citizens’ frustration with such policies creates uncertainty and is parasitic upon their motivation to take part in shared problem-solving.

Generally speaking, the complexity of issues, the plurality of participants, and “quasi-democratic” engagement mechanisms now require that citizens have a new set of competencies in order to actively participate in this emerging democratic context. Obtaining such competencies increasingly takes place beyond traditional formal educational systems. For example, various civil society organizations, including associations established by migrants, neighborhood or civic education organizations, have assumed a significant role in developing such competencies by implementing a wide variety of programs in support of empowered and active citizenship. Drawing on Dewey, we suggest that the process of inculcation into fully active citizenship involves a continuous process of participation. However, the road to citizenship is a rocky one, and those very processes involve complex power struggles. The main objective of this article is to provide theoretical sign-posts for the journey along this road.

We employ the method of *rational reconstruction* in our philosophical analysis. Contrary to *historical reconstruction*, which aims at understanding the ideas of a philosopher

---

that the concept of democracy discussed in the “Prison Notebooks” was new and different from the orthodox communism in *The Routledge Guide to Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks* (London: Routledge, 2015), 60.

7 Gramsci, SPN, 40. SPN refers to the *Selection from the Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. 1971. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

8 See, for example, Sian Lazar, *The Anthropology of Citizenship: A Reader* (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).

9 This kind of “TNA policy” in the contemporary era has often been attributed to the neoliberal political regime of Margaret Thatcher. See David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 39-40.

10 Coutinho, *Gramsci’s Political Thought*, 159.

on his or her own terms and as a representative of his or her own particular time and context, rational reconstruction approaches philosophical texts in order to find new insights that may be helpful in answering contemporary questions.<sup>11</sup> The choice of the method of rational reconstruction implies, for example, that we do not read Gramsci primarily as a contributor to the Marxist tradition, or Dewey in relation to the American pragmatism of his time. Rather, we re-interpret the work of these scholars from the viewpoint of contemporary questions and problems. Consequently, we do not engage with the academic debates over the “proper” interpretations of Dewey and Gramsci.<sup>12</sup> In particular, we are interested in the conceptual understanding that we can tease out of the work of these two authors in order to make sense of the gap between the rhetoric of citizens’ participation and the practice of “there is no alternative” decision-making, and between the urgent need to collectively solve social problems and the apparent difficulties in attempting to do so. In other words, we are concerned with providing an adequate understanding of the processes of democratic deliberation while taking into account the power struggles involved and, in particular, how the proposed conceptualization relates to the challenges of contemporary adult citizenship education.

As a result of our analysis, we suggest that Dewey’s method of democracy complemented by Gramsci’s interpretation of hegemony, and in particular, his notions of consent and coherence, provide a valuable conceptual framework for addressing these concerns. In our view, this framework captures the importance of listening to “citizens’ voices” in the context of increasing plurality and complexity. However, this framework is not blind to the real-life problems that arise as a result of the constitution of the voices in the first place. In contrast, it provides conceptual tools for understanding the processes of obtaining consent and assuring a certain level of coherence with respect to the contributing voices so that they can be heard and taken into account in the processes of searching for shared solutions. Drawing on our conceptual work, we propose that citizenship education for adults should be administered as forms of continuous interactive support for effective participation, the construction of a coherent voice, and the ability to understand the ways in which political problems are framed.

---

11 Richard Rorty, “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres,” in *Philosophy in History: Essays on Historiography of Philosophy*, eds. Richard Rorty et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 50-56, doi: 10.1017/cbo9780511625534.006.

12 For example, as Gramsci’s texts are fragmented and at times more like political activism than theoretical elaboration, there are continuous critical debates over the definitions of his concepts, as well as his relation to Marxism and Leninism. In our attempt of rational reconstruction, our views are in line with those of Stuart Hall in his “Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity” (in eds. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, *Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, London: Routledge, 1996), 411-440, where he elaborates on how Gramsci distanced himself from the contemporary orthodox Marxism and further elaborated Marxist concepts in order to understand the “modern” world of his time. He innovatively used many existing theoretical formulations to illustrate the situation in Italy of his time. Since his time, Gramsci’s own concepts have been used and further refined, addressing a number of problems of hegemony such as race and gender, and not only in relation to the class struggle that was a burning issue in the political life of Gramsci’s Europe.

## Dewey's Method of Democracy

*The method of democracy*<sup>13</sup> is Dewey's proposal for a method for solving social problems.<sup>14</sup> With this method, Dewey is not merely referring to general democratic procedures, such as voting or compromising, but to the wider possibilities of facilitating participation and cooperation, or methods that could foster "a mode of associated living."<sup>15</sup> Dewey himself refers to his method as one of "*organized intelligence*," and its basic idea is to bring conflicting situations "out into the open where their special claims can be discussed and judged in the light of more inclusive interests than are represented by either of them separately."<sup>16</sup>

In his philosophy, Dewey emphasizes the social nature of intelligence<sup>17</sup> and argues that interpreting intelligence as an individual possession was a fatal mistake of earlier liberalism.<sup>18</sup> This idea, combined with Dewey's conception of knowledge, having its root in the evolutionary theory, as having evolved through adaptive processes into living circumstances, implies that Dewey rejects the arguments stating that only few human beings can achieve the intelligence sufficient for participating in the processes of solving shared problems.<sup>19</sup> Everyone—or at least every group that has shared experiences—has intelligence regarding his or her own circumstances and situations in life. These local "intelligences" must all be taken into account in solving shared problems.

One important aspect of his method of democracy is that it takes *value pluralism* seriously.<sup>20</sup> The version of value pluralism we are referring here distinguishes itself, on the one

13 Dewey, *LW11*, 56. The numbered volumes of "LW" refer to John Dewey, *The Later Works of John Dewey*, ed., Jo Ann Boydston, 1985. Electronic edition ed. by Larry Hickman, 2003. Retrieved from <http://www.nlx.com/collections/41>.

14 The Deweyan concept of democracy as a whole cannot be considered within the limits of this article. It is therefore sufficient to summarize that the key to understanding Dewey's conception of democracy is to look at the interdependence between the concepts *individual*, *social*, *freedom*, and *participation*; the flourishing of one is dependent of the flourishing of others. Democracy, for Dewey, involves participation in various groups, both narrower and wider than the nation state and, in particular, the genuine contribution of the members of these groups to the common good and welfare. See, for example, Dewey, *LW2*, 326-333. For his view of the social classes of his time as related to a particular historical situation, see Dewey, *LW11*; *LW13*, and on how memberships of various partially separated and partially overlapping groups as characteristic of civil society can be seen as antecedents to some of the contemporary conceptions.

15 John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), 101.

16 Dewey, *LW11*, 56.

17 Dewey uses the concept of intelligence in different contexts. Some of his considerations of intelligence as a method relate to his arguments against using physical force to foster social progress. See Dewey, *LW11*, 46, 60. For example, "Liberalism and Social Action" in Dewey, *LW11*, 6-69 was published in 1935 and was thus Dewey's response to the threat of totalitarianism at the time.

18 Dewey, *LW11*, 35. According to Dewey, this mistake led, for example, to "laissez-faire liberalism." the economic and sociological position that he constantly criticizes (e.g., *LW11*).

19 Dewey, *LW11*, 39, 50-51.

20 Different versions of value pluralism have been defended among others, in Elisabeth Anderson, "Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods," in *Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason*, ed. R. Chang (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); John Kekes, *The Morality of Pluralism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Charles Taylor, "The Diversity of Goods," in *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, eds. B. Williams et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511611964.008; and Bernard Williams, *Moral Luck* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), doi: 10.1017/CBO9781139165860.

hand, from *value relativism* by accepting that there are some *primary values* which are related to basic physiological, psychological, and social needs,<sup>21</sup> and on the other hand, it sets itself apart from value monism by accepting that there are *secondary values* varying fundamentally in relation to each individual person, culture, society, and historical period.<sup>22</sup> The basic idea is to understand disagreements in relation to values as an inevitable consequence of the diverse value systems of the participants in a given problem-solving situation.<sup>23</sup> This version of pluralism, which is in our view compatible with Dewey's method of democracy, allows us to search for shared solutions without the underlying assumption that there might be only one predefined "right" solution to any moral, political, or social problem that we might face.

Another important part of Dewey's philosophy that is relevant to our work here is that it is fallibilist throughout. This is to say that for Dewey, epistemological fallibilism—the position which holds that all of our beliefs and belief systems are susceptible to error—is applicable not only to science but also to social, political, and moral inquiry. This implies that there can be no *a priori* knowledge concerning the best means for achieving goals, or the value of the goals themselves, or even the very methods of determining what these two might be. According to Deweyan fallibilism, everything must in principle be subjected to criticism. Dewey's method of democracy thus involves: (1) the idea of not knowing beforehand the values, political views, etc. on which the future solution should be based; (2) the stipulation that everything is open to discussion; and (3) the perspective that taking different voices into account is of crucial importance in order to find the best available solution.<sup>24</sup>

However, there are two criticisms of Dewey's view that should be discussed if we want to effectively bring Dewey's philosophy into the contemporary discussion of democracy and citizenship. First, Dewey appears to be overly optimistic about his method of democracy; he seems to believe that the same kind of progress that had recently taken place in science and technology could be achieved in the social realm when the right method

---

21 As Kekes (1993) puts it, "Circumstances would have to be exceptional not to count as benefits to satisfy our basic physiological needs, to be loved, or to live in a society in which our endeavors are respected," in Kekes, *The Morality of Pluralism*, 18. Nussbaum, for her part, develops a theory of things that "are so important that we will not count a life as a human life without them" as including such aspects as mortality, the human body, the capacity for pleasure and pain, cognitive capability, early infant development, practical reason, affiliation with other human beings, relatedness to other species and nature, humor and play, and separateness. See Martha Nussbaum, "Human Functioning and Social Justice," *Political Theory* 20 (1992): 216-220; see also Katariina Holma, "Essentialism Regarding Human Nature in the Defense of Gender Equality in Education," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 41 (2007): x, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9752.2007.00543.x.

22 In contemporary academic discussion, there are many different conceptions termed "pluralism," such as political pluralism, value pluralism, and ethical pluralism, and, of course, different views of how these pluralisms should be defined.

23 Kekes, *The Morality of Pluralism*, 23-27.

24 See also Katariina Holma and Tiina Kontinen, "Democratic Knowledge Production as a Contribution to Objectivity in Evaluation of Development NGOs," *Forum for Development Studies*, 39 (2012): 83-103, doi: 10.1080/08039410.2011.635379.

was developed and applied to this field of human cooperation.<sup>25</sup> As he writes about the method: “[i]t has not been tried at any time with use of all the resources that scientific material and the experimental method now put at our disposal.”<sup>26</sup> Today, we cannot hold such an optimistic view neither in relation to science nor to social and political problems.

Second, the very idea of the method of democracy can be questioned by the *inequality argument*, which claims that due to power relations in the real world, diverse opinions and value systems do not carry equal weight in negotiations.<sup>27</sup> Even though Dewey is concerned about the “inchoate public,”<sup>28</sup> he does not pay much attention to this strategic aspect of negotiations.<sup>29</sup>

It is here that the Gramscian interpretation of hegemony and, in particular, Gramsci’s concepts of *consent* and *coherence*, become useful. These concepts, in our view, help us to understand more adequately the process of constituting a “voice” as well as the process of marginalizing some other voices.

## Gramsci and the Coherence and Consent in Constituting a “Voice”

In this section, we will focus on two issues that appear to be problematic for Dewey’s method: first, the difficulties of the marginalized voices in producing contributions that would be coherent enough to be listened to and taken into account, and second, the need for conceptualizing the power-related processes that determine the very formulation of potential solutions.<sup>30</sup> In order to draw attention to these limitations, we derive our conceptual tools from Gramsci’s philosophy and his ideas on hegemony.<sup>31</sup>

25 See, for example, Dewey, *LW11*, 65.

26 Dewey, *LW11*, 38.

27 See also Roudy W. Hildreth, “Reconstructing Dewey of Power,” *Political Theory*, 37 (2009), doi: 10.1177/0090591709345454.

28 Dewey, *LW2*, 314-328.

29 This criticism has been presented by many scholars, not only regarding Dewey’s philosophy but also regarding philosophical pragmatism in general. Hildreth, however, has formulated an argument responding to these critiques. Accordingly, “power is an integral but implicit element of Dewey’s conception of human experience.” See Hildreth, “Reconstructing Dewey of Power,” 780.

30 Leona M. English and Peter Mayo (eds.), *Learning with Adults. A Critical Pedagogic Introduction* (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2012); see also Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*.

31 Gramsci’s theoretical legacy is fragmented and is mainly presented in the letters and unfinished notebooks from his imprisonment. The concept of hegemony has Greek origins in reference to leadership. For Gramsci, two sources of the concept were of central relevance. First, he discussed the theory of the ethico-political history of the Italian idealist philosopher Croce. Second, the Russian debate over the *gegemoniya* in the proletarian revolution, in contrast to the proletarian dictatorship, was an important source of inspiration. See Perry Anderson, “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci,” *New Left Review* 1 (100) (1976), retrieved from <http://newleftreview.org>. The concept of hegemony as a leading role of the proletariat in revolution was further extended to refer to the hegemony of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat, which was exercised in the sphere of ideology and culture rather than economy (Anderson, 18). This interpretation of hegemony and dictatorship as being an *alternative strategy* is challenged by Peter D. Thomas, *The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism* (Leiden: Brill, 2009): 163, doi: 10.1163/ej.9789004167711.i-478. Here Thomas argues that consent attached to the characteristics of hegemony and coercion in a dictatorship in Gramsci’s analysis are in a *dialectical* relationship rather than posited as alternatives.

Gramsci's formulation of the concept of hegemony continues to be appropriated and debated in contemporary political and social research. While its definition is still being contested, in this article we base our argument on the interpretation of the Gramscian notion of hegemony as a way of maintaining the power of a certain group through "intellectual and moral leadership."<sup>32</sup> Therefore, hegemony as a form of power is not based only on economic relations but also includes the cultural means of gaining and maintaining hegemony. We consider the notions of coherence characteristic to hegemony as being necessary to supplementing the Deweyan method of democracy.

Our first question concerns the quality and origin of the different voices participating in democratic problem-solving. Here, we are inspired by Gramsci's notion of *coherence*. In regard to hegemony, Gramsci is concerned about the ability of the subaltern groups to take part in social debate, and maintains that in order for their voices to constitute a real challenge to the prevailing hegemony, they should be based on a critical and coherent " ". While "being heard" is a cornerstone of the method of democracy, we suggest that in order for a "voice" to be heard, let alone motivating some sort of action, it should possess some degree of coherence, as well as a critical understanding of the rules of the game. According to Gramsci, such a critical achievement requires realization and reflection upon one's historical situation and the limitations provided by the language used in framing the problems. Gramsci argues that our conception of the world is often mechanically imposed by the social environment or reflects the ideology of the ruling groups, which is disseminated, for example, through education.<sup>33</sup> Creating one's own critical and coherent conception of the world therefore requires acknowledgement and critical analysis of one's own historical position.

With respect to the idea of intelligence, following Gramsci, we should keep in mind that the conceptions concerning societal problems and their societal contexts held by the commonly marginalized groups are usually fragmentary and incoherent. In Gramscian terms, such knowledge is practical and spontaneous, and based on direct experience.<sup>34</sup> It is not powerful enough for participation and contributions to struggles over hegemony. Consequently, it can be claimed that such knowledge does not constitute a "voice" that is coherent enough to be intelligently included in the framework of the method of democracy.

How, then, could it be possible to improve the coherence of the voice of a marginalized group whereby it could be used in arguments in a democratic context? The Gramscian suggestion of producing coherence into what he refers as the *common sense* provides a potential way of conceptualizing of such a process. For Gramsci, the common sense of people refers to the "diffuse, uncoordinated features of generic form of thought common

---

32 Gramsci, SPN, 57.

33 Ibid., 324-325.

34 Ibid., 198-199.

to a particular period and a particular popular environment.”<sup>35</sup> Thus, the main problem with common sense is its lack of unity and coherence in allowing for concise articulation and further advocacy.

As a way out of this problem, Gramsci suggests focusing on the positive and innovative aspects of common sense in order to foster the emergence of unity and coherence, that is, *good sense*.<sup>36</sup> The process of establishing coherence is at the core of Gramsci’s idea of the *philosophy of praxis* as a dialectical process of critical engagement with common sense and the particular problems raised by the masses, in conjunction with a critique of the existing philosophy of traditional intellectuals.<sup>37</sup> In this way, it would be possible to produce knowledge that is “superior to common sense” while ensuring that this knowledge is still in contact with practical activity and organic to the experiences of the masses.<sup>38</sup> This process, according to Gramsci, would require the leadership of *organic intellectuals* who originate from the subaltern groups themselves.<sup>39</sup>

For Gramsci, the coherence of knowledge should lead to political action, and in his particular historical context, into societal hegemony earned by the proletariat. If Dewey’s experimental method opposes the *a priori* goals of negotiation, a Gramscian perspective would lead us to set goals in relation to changes in social power relations while considering the voices of the subaltern classes to be of the utmost importance.<sup>40</sup> In other words, if the inclusion of multiple voices for Dewey is more of an epistemological question, for Gramsci, the production of a coherent voice for the marginalized is merely a strategy in the struggle for the hegemony of the proletariat and the peasants, two of the main subaltern groups discussed in his work.

We now turn to discussing the notion of *consent* in gaining hegemony in the context of the Deweyan idea of intelligence. Consent, in contrast to coercion, is the main way through which power is exercised. Hegemonic power works by establishing consent to a certain world view and existing social power relations through various institutions in society. . For Gramsci, an example of how hegemonic power works is the prevailing and unquestioned

---

35 Ibid., 330.

36 Steven Jones, *Antonio Gramsci* (London: Routledge, 2006), 54-55.

37 Ibid., 330-335.

38 Ibid., 330.

39 Ibid., 6, 15-16.

40 The question of predefined ends is, of course, a broad philosophical question which cannot be discussed within the limits of this article (see, for example, Katariina Holma, “The Critical Spirit: Emotional and Moral Dimensions of Critical Thinking,” *Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi* 4 no. 1 (2015): 26-27. The idea of focusing on marginalized voices is not, however, in contradiction with Dewey’s philosophy. Rather, he should be interpreted as being reluctant to postulate any ends as *a priori* in the process of negotiation and critical thinking. Another difference from Gramsci is related to Gramsci’s commitment to the primary (epistemological) importance of marginalized voices. Dewey, again, would not assume *a priori* epistemological importance to any voice. Yet another difference is related to the definition of the marginalized, which Gramsci articulates in Marxist vocabulary, whereas Dewey’s notion is more open to the contextual variety of “marginalized.” In the later use of Gramscian thinking in post-colonial studies, discourse analysis, subaltern studies, feminist studies, and the like, the notion of “hegemonic” and “subaltern” groups has occupied increasing variety.

consent of the population to the leading position of the current dominant group.<sup>41</sup> Such consent, in turn, may be given as a result of the economic position of the ruling group or the cultural and political leadership exercised by it.<sup>42</sup> Educational institutions, mass media and civil society associations are especially central to the production of cultural hegemony. When certain views and perspectives of the world are continuously represented and repeated in the workings of these institutions, people will consent to these views as taken-for-granted state of affairs. Therefore, being reflective of different strategies of producing consent becomes central for constituting a “voice”.<sup>43</sup>

Returning to the method of democracy, both the strategies of gaining hegemony and the mechanisms for maintaining it are important. The main question, though, concerns the kinds of strategies used to enable some voices to become hegemonic in the process of Dewey’s idea of experimentation, and more specifically, how these voices obtain consent from other groups in order to arrive at a shared solution. Gramsci identifies a number of strategies for obtaining such consent.<sup>44</sup> First, he mentions alliance building,<sup>45</sup> which includes transcending particular interests and adopting the interests of other groups,<sup>46</sup> as well as contributing to the increased coherence of the “voice” of the group in order to reach a solution.<sup>47</sup> Second, there is a strategy of gradual absorption and recruitment of the leaders of critical groups for them to adapt to the interests of the hegemonic groups.<sup>48</sup> Third, the divisions and positions of expertise established by the education system facilitates the provision of consent to the particular voices presented by the “specialists” as defined by the forces in control of bourgeois education.<sup>49</sup> Even today, positions requiring a certain kind of academic education are typically valued more in terms of prestige and salary than, for example, positions requiring technical expertise.

As a result of this interpretation, we suggest that in applying the democratic method to solving social problems, an analysis of the dynamics of alliance building, persuading the voices of other groups to fit with the group’s own voice, and the weight of certain kinds of expert knowledge, among other factors, should be acknowledged. When these are not paid

---

41 Gramsci, SPN, 12-13.

42 Gramsci, SPN, 12-13.

43 Originally, Gramsci was interested in strategies for gaining proletarian hegemony. Later, he also analyzed the mechanisms for gaining and maintaining existing bourgeois hegemony in order to better understand the dynamics by which such hegemony is established, Thomas, *The Gramscian Moment*.

44 Gramsci discussed these strategies in relation to a variety of phenomena in his time, such as the question of the gap between the modern North and the agrarian South in Italy (SPW), the question of the Moderate Party gaining hegemony over the Action Party in the period of the *Risorgimento* (SPN), and the role of education and other cultural institutions in maintaining the hegemony of the ruling group (SPN). Gramsci, SPW II refers to *Selection from Political Writings 1921-1926*. (1978) Translated and edited by Quintin Hoare. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

45 Gramsci, SPW II, 441-462.

46 Benedetto Fontana, “Hegemony and Rhetoric: Political Education,” in *Gramsci and Education*, eds. Carmel Borg, Joseph A. Buttigieg, Peter Mayo (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 28–29.

47 Wolfgang F. Haug, “Philosophizing with Marx, Gramsci, and Brecht,” *Boundary*, 2 (2007): 151-153.

48 Gramsci, SPN, 58-59, doi: 10.1215/01903659-2007-019.

49 Carmel Borg et al. eds., *Gramsci and Education* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 8-9. See also Gramsci, SPN, 40.

attention to, the participation processes might turn out to be democratic only on surface. However, acknowledging such hidden hegemonic processes require specific competencies from those who participate in the democratic problem solving and decision making

## The Question of Adult Education: Citizens' competencies

We will now reflect on the implications of our philosophical analysis in the previous section on contemporary adult education in the pursuit of citizens' competencies. On the basis of our synthesis of the Deweyan method of democracy and the Gramscian interpretation of the notions of coherence and consent, we stress three ways in which competencies can be developed among citizens: (1) education outside of the classroom and learning from participation in societal activities; (2) the employment of strategies to learn a shared language and establish a coherent voice for democratic participation; and (3) learning to identify and apply strategies for the process of obtaining and establishing consent.

As philosophers of education, Dewey and Gramsci did not only recommend changes for school systems and educational practices; they also saw the importance of education and learning in the informal sphere through participation and activism in everyday life, including work. Today, the increased social division of labor and professionalization has led to a reduction in the average citizen's capabilities to participate in debates on a number of social problems.<sup>50</sup> Simultaneously, the increasing complexity of these problems, such as climate change and global economic crises, has resulted in new demands with respect to citizens' capacities. As a consequence, the problems confronted by contemporary societies indicate that the competencies facilitated by formal education do not of themselves suffice in allowing citizens to exercise active citizenship during their entire life-span. In contrast, these competencies are gradually acquired through the processes of participating in work places, communities, and society in general.<sup>51</sup> Thus, continuous learning by participating in multiple arenas of society is a necessity for meaningful citizen participation.

Both Dewey and Gramsci, in their own ways, were preoccupied with the connection between education and the possibilities for democracy. Despite their theoretical differences, both thought that genuine democracy necessitated widespread participation, and they firmly believed in peoples' capabilities to participate in democratic institutions and practices. Dewey's idea of the intelligence of all and Gramsci's claim that every man is a philosopher together place a common man— instead of an elite expert—at the center of social problem-solving.

However, the Deweyan notion of people's everyday intelligence in relation to their living circumstances can be challenged by Gramsci's understanding of common sense. For Gramsci, the common sense of the people is not sufficient for analyzing political problems

---

50 Joseph A. Buttigieg, "Education, the Role of Intellectuals, and Democracy: A Gramscian Reflection," in *Gramsci and Education*, eds. Carmel Borg et al. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 132.

51 See also Leona English and Peter Mayo, *Learning with Adults*.

and changing social situations; instead, it is in need of further development and refinement into a more coherent form of knowledge. Furthermore, according to Gramsci, not everyone has the natural capacities for the cultural and political leadership required for changing hegemonic relations; these capacities therefore need to be improved in those who possess them.<sup>52</sup> Dewey was not blind to the problem of “the inchoate public” either; he believed that the different cultural, religious, and linguistic groups who share the same political space need education in order to learn the language of “experimentalese,” which was necessary for participating in the processes of solving shared problems.<sup>53</sup>

Following Gramsci, we propose that one important aspect of learning “experimentalese” and achieving a collective voice that is able to participate in shared decision making relates to the competencies for building the very coherence that is needed for such a voice to emerge. For Gramsci, the most relevant competencies include an ability to critically analyze the conditions of the situation and the effects of hegemony in defining the problem and proposed set of solutions; for Dewey, such competency mainly includes the ability to engage in meaningful interaction and joint experimentation in pluralist contexts. All in all, the implication for adult education is that learning certain strategies to gain a shared language and a coherent voice for democratic participation must be fostered. This entails encouraging, mobilizing, and facilitating groups to participate with each other, engage in coherence building, and further the learning of “experimentalese” in interaction with other groups.

Whereas Dewey is mainly preoccupied with the individual and group level competencies for participation in shared problem solving, Gramsci pays more attention to the social and economic power relations both enabling and hindering participation. As the ultimate goal for learning and participation for Gramsci was the transformation of class relations, the central citizenship competencies therefore include the ability to analyze the functions of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. In Gramsci’s view, a change in the social power relations requires increasing theoretical and practical consciousness in order to contest the prevailing common sense.<sup>54</sup> In contemporary Western societies, where the complex set of power relations cannot be reduced only to class, and where the explicit use of state power in form of coercion is relatively rare, the ability to identify cultural and political hegemonies has become increasingly important. Learning both to identify the ways in which consent has been produced in the context of framing the problems to be discussed and to facilitate consent in favor of the group’s coherent voice are essential processes. Citizens should be able to identify how the problems have been framed, how the society-level consent has

---

52 Harold Entwistle, *Antonio Gramsci. Conservative Schooling for Radical Politics* (London: Routledge, 1979), 112, 125.

53 Dewey, *LW2*, 314-328; see also Leonard J. Waks, “Post-Experimentalist Pragmatism,” *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 17 (1997): 17, doi: 10.1023/A:1004937320174.

54 Stanley Aronowitz, “Gramsci’s Theory of Education: Schooling and Beyond,” in *Gramsci and Education*, eds. C. Borg et al. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 115.

been obtained, and be alert to the potential “there is no alternative” policies behind the perceived set of solutions.

In real life situations, the Deweyan ideals of everything being open to discussion and the best solution being found via the process of discussion and experimentation are often hampered by pre-existing political and economic interests that pre-define what is and is not open to discussion. Furthermore, in situations where a group’s voice has gained sufficient coherence to enter into democratic problem solving negotiations, citizens should have the competencies to generate consent in relation to their concerns, for example, by being able to build alliances. In the context of plurality, Gramsci’s original suggestion of the need for the working class to gain the consent of the peasants, another subaltern group in Italy in Gramsci’s time, is applicable to a wide variety of groups such as people of different genders, sexual orientations, ethnic origins, disabilities, or long-term unemployed. His idea of the main means of alliance building as learning others’ worldviews and languages is especially relevant today.<sup>55</sup> In today’s societies, the ability to perceive problems from the viewpoint of other value systems is a necessary condition for effective alliance building to solve shared problems.

## Conclusions

Democratic participation is challenged by the increasing amount of various cultural, ethnic, and religious groups having different value systems and varying educational backgrounds. At the same time, the increasing complexity of social and political problems enables political elites to make decisions without any real process of democratic decision-making. The voices of different groups are rarely included in solving shared problems, let alone in the processes of defining those problems. In the current policy environment, marginalization does not only apply to the “traditional” marginalized groups, but also the so-called elites, such as academics and middle-class employees struggling to participate due to the ways in which such problems have started to directly affect them, for example as results from the economic crisis or austerity measures especially effecting labor in information and knowledge industry. The lack of coherence in their voice implies that the particular views, interests, and concerns of many members and groups within our democracies never enter the arenas where the method of democracy is exercised. Without coherence, their voices remain scattered and are articulated mainly in everyday conversations at home or at work, or in discussion forums on the internet. Therefore, the process of “growth into citizenship” in the contemporary era is an ongoing effort of learning by experimenting and participating in the continuous efforts of coherence building and the establishment of consent.

In this article, we have focused on two philosophers who have developed conceptions of democracy as participation, and, in particular, educational theories related to the com-

---

55 Gramsci, SPW II.

petences of citizens in such democracies. We have constructed a synthesis of the Deweyan conception of the method of democracy, based on the philosophical background of pluralism and fallibilism, and the Gramscian conception of hegemony as a form of power based on consent, having its background in Marxist philosophy. In our view, this synthesis provides a fruitful departure point for reconsidering the relationship between democracy and education in today's societies.

We have discussed the implications of our synthesis in the context of informal adult education. In our view, many of the competencies required of the citizen of a contemporary pluralist democracy are learned by participating in the processes of shared problem-solving in workplaces, communities, associations, and society in general. We suggested, in a Gramscian spirit, that adult education should focus on facilitating the learning of strategies to establish a coherent voice, and in a Deweyan fashion, the learning of "experimentalese" for general productive interaction and listening to other groups.

We have also discussed the challenge faced by educational institutions based on the way in which social power relations affect the possibilities of participation. Borrowing from Gramsci, we suggest that education should focus on identifying how the so-called shared problems have been framed in order to obtain the critical tools required for challenging "there is no alternative" policies.

Proposing a detailed outline for adult education capable of providing competencies for citizenship in today's complex societies is a challenging task. Our synthesis of Deweyan and Gramscian philosophies aims to contribute to the task of ultimately constructing a theoretical approach to adult education, which could include both the Deweyan optimism in the possibilities of genuine democracy and the Gramscian emphasis on critical consciousness as a necessary condition for substantive participation.

# Claudia Schumann

## Graphic Contaminations: Cosmopolitics of the 'I' in *American Born Chinese* and *Persepolis*

### Abstract

*The article explores the demands that the critical and conflictual dimension of globalization poses for a cosmopolitan education. Such an emphasis seems necessary in times where the populations who undertake inter- and intra-national border crossings are increasingly those who are forced to: those trying to escape unbearable poverty, atrocious wars, the disenfranchised and victims of racist, sexist or religious persecution. Reflecting on the experiences articulated in the two graphic novels, Persepolis and American Born Chinese, the dimension of the globalizing world and its impact and demands on its future world citizens which comes to the fore is one that highlights the necessity for learning how to take a critical and political stance rather than the search for how education can facilitate a smooth adaptation to a new mobile order. Stanley Cavell's examination of the relationship between autobiography, philosophy, and the founding of a self-reliant voice will be reconsidered in light of its contribution to re-thinking the meaning of a cosmopolitan education between critical self-appropriation and developing a transformative political vision of a new societal order.*

### Keywords

*Cosmopolitanism, education, graphic novels, American Born Chinese, Persepolis, Stanley Cavell*

## Introduction

One of the most pervasive educational debates in recent decades, from mainstream media to educational policy, research and philosophy, has been shaped by a concern with an apparently radical shift in the conception of public education from a primarily national to a global outlook. Often, what authors mean by the "globalizing world" to which contemporary educational institutions are supposed to adjust comes in highly diverse colours and shapes. It ranges from the emergence of new powerful supranational actors on the educational scene such as IMF, World Bank or the OECD, to globalizing economic structures, neoliberal policies, global cultural changes, to more flexible, mobile and diverse populations as well as to the increase of world-wide communication due to the fast spreading of new media and technologies. The revival of the old ideal of the cosmopolitan and an education for world citizenship can in this context be understood as an attempt to articulate an adequate response to the (perceived) demands that these new social, political,

---

*Claudia Schumann, Stockholms University, Sweden*  
*E-mail: [claudia.schumann@edu.su.se](mailto:claudia.schumann@edu.su.se)*

---

*Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi* | [www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf](http://www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf) | ISSN nr. 22449140

---

Årgang 4 | Nr. 2 | 2015 | side 38-53

---

economic and cultural developments make on future citizens and hence on educational institutions, actors and practices in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Cosmopolitanism is often felt “to resolve some of the more troublesome antitheses that currently plague cultural interpretation at a global scale – local/global, tradition/modernity, ordinary culture/high culture.”<sup>1</sup> Comics are interestingly placed at similar junctions. The comics medium as such has qualities which might justify considering it as almost uniquely apt to articulate and portray cosmopolitan conditions. When Michael A. Chaney emphasizes “the uniquely supple procedures the comics form makes possible for the representation of multiple yet simultaneous timescapes and competing yet coincident ways of knowing, seeing, and being,”<sup>2</sup> he names key features which make it possible to broach central issues pertaining to a cosmopolitan attitude. The joyful as well as the conflictual negotiations, intersections and tensions involved in the simultaneous presence of a multiplicity of cultural, social and political affiliations and commitments can co-exist on the comics page in their temporal variability and their diverse modes of expression.

I will take the emphasis on the critical and conflictual dimension of cosmopolitanism as my starting point in the following analysis. Without underestimating the pleasures of and the desire for transgression, such an emphasis seems necessary in times where the populations who undertake these inter- and intra-national border crossings are increasingly those who are forced to: those trying to escape unbearable poverty, atrocious wars, the disenfranchised and victims of racist, sexist or religious persecution. Reflecting on the experiences articulated in the two graphic novels, *Persepolis* and *American Born Chinese*, the dimension of the globalizing world and its impact and demands on its future world citizens which comes to the fore is one that highlights the necessity for learning how to take a critical and political stance rather than the search for how education can facilitate a smooth adaptation to a new mobile order. Stanley Cavell’s examination of the relationship between autobiography, philosophy, and the founding of a self-reliant voice will be reconsidered in light of its contribution to re-thinking the meaning of a cosmopolitan education between critical self-appropriation and developing a transformative political vision of a new societal order.

## The Promise of Cosmopolitanism and Challenges to the Celebration of Contamination

The first explicit use of the notion of cosmopolitanism is commonly traced back to an alleged encounter between Diogenes and Alexander the Great, in which Diogenes is said to have replied “I am a citizen of the world” when Alexander asked him where he came

1 Bruce Robbins, “Cosmopolitanism: New and Newer,” *boundary* 2.34-3 (2007): 49.

2 Michael A. Chaney, ed., *Graphic Subjects: Critical Essays on Autobiography and Graphic Novels* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 5.

from.<sup>3</sup> Instead of revealing his native polis, which was taken to be a chief formative factor of one's identity at the time, Diogenes announced himself as *a kosmopolitês*, a citizen of the world. Ever since, the notion has been rearticulated and re-appropriated throughout time in manifold ways. Since the early 1990s, a variety of "new cosmopolitanisms" have emerged, and the notion has since regained so much momentum that Seyla Benhabib called cosmopolitanism "one of the keywords of our times."<sup>4</sup> The question I want to raise is in which sense we are to read the rejection of local affiliation and the claim to world citizenship. Cosmopolitanism in its classic form, as defended today by a variety of authors,<sup>5</sup> frequently appeals to universal principles of justice or universal ideas of humanity. Articulated as a clearly normative project, it urges us to take our primary obligation to be towards humanity as such, rather than engage in any forms of classism, sexism, racism, nationalism, or regionalism. Martha Nussbaum, for example, prominently took a distinctive stance against communitarianism in her defense of a Stoic-Kantian cosmopolitanism, for "we have great power over racism, sexism and other divisive passions that militate against cosmopolitan humanism, if we will only devote enough attention to the cognitive moral development of the young."<sup>6</sup> The appeal to reason in Nussbaum's case, as well as the commitment to certain democratic meta-principles like autonomy in other cases, has led to the habitual dismissal of these forms of cosmopolitanism for being just further forms of universalism. Many critics felt that nobody can reasonably expect our care for strangers to exceed our care for our closest family and friends, and that the appeal to certain typically Western ideals of liberalism seemed to be put to work again here in yet another version of western imperialism.<sup>7</sup>

The "new cosmopolitanisms"<sup>8</sup> in contrast try to take our various particular attachments into more serious account so that the universal humanism becomes inflected by socio-historical particularisms. However, in distinction from communitarian, particularist, or more strictly culturalist approaches, and in reaction to "certain excesses of identity politics"<sup>9</sup> these cosmopolitanisms recuperate from the classical cosmopolitanism outlined above fleeting fragments of its normative dimension, but at the same time they promise

3 Diogenes Laertius, Book VI: 63 quoted in ed. Pauline Kleingeld, and Eric Brown, "Cosmopolitanism," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall 2014 Edition.

4 Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 17, doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183221.001.0001.

5 E.g. Martha C. Nussbaum and Joshua Cohen, *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996); Martha C. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 5 (2002), doi: 10.1111/1467-9760.00021; David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Daniele Archibugi, *Debating Cosmopolitics* (London: Verso, 2003).

6 Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," 23.

7 Cf. Robbins, "Cosmopolitanism: New and Newer," 53.

8 Cf. e.g. Amanda Anderson, "Cosmopolitanism, Universalism, and the Divided Legacies of Modernity," in ed. Pheng Cheah et al., *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Robbins, "Cosmopolitanism: New and Newer."

9 Anderson, "Cosmopolitanism, Universalism," 265.

that particular affiliations need not be incompatible with a cosmopolitan orientation – that, on the contrary, they might be necessary pre-requisites. The hope which Anderson connects with the new cosmopolitanisms lies in their potential to develop “a more complex conception of detachment, which is often too reductively opposed to a valorized conception of situatedness or, alternatively, too easily celebrated as negative freedom.”<sup>10</sup> Kwame Anthony Appiah’s “rooted cosmopolitanism”<sup>11</sup> presents a prominent example for this type of theoretical hybrid between universalism and particularism which “tempers a respect for difference with a respect for actual human beings.”<sup>12</sup> Similarly, Seyla Benhabib in her argument for *Another Cosmopolitanism* undertakes to take into account “the significance of membership within bounded communities”<sup>13</sup> while arguing that our moral and political obligations and commitments extend also “to those who do not reside within nationally recognized boundaries.”<sup>14</sup> In both Benhabib’s and Appiah’s view, while the particularism put forth in certain types of multiculturalism or identity politics overemphasizes the respect for otherness to the extent that it might be read to turn into sheer indifference towards the other, universalist endeavors have frequently neglected our particularist boundedness and the reality of present-day pluralism. Whereas Benhabib tries to resolve this tension through the mediation between the moral and the political in terms of a “dialogic universalism,”<sup>15</sup> Appiah chooses a more pragmatic approach in focusing on the multifarious possibilities of connecting with concrete others in a pragmatic realm and urges to let go of the fixation on trying to reach agreement on the deep level of values necessarily shared amongst all human beings.

Following Salman Rushdie, Appiah propounds the “ideal of contamination”<sup>16</sup> which, in opposition to purist ideals of culture, “celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs.”<sup>17</sup> While Appiah admits that “there can be an easy and spurious utopianism of ‘mixture,’ as there is of ‘purity,’”<sup>18</sup> he nevertheless considers the cosmopolitan “praise of contamination” to be on the side of “the larger human truth.”<sup>19</sup> Even though Appiah works with examples from a very different background and despite his insistence on the compatibility of cosmopolitanism with particular bounds, his pragmatic, easily accessible cosmopolitanism bears significant resemblance to Jeremy Waldron’s “lifestyle cosmopolitanism,” and it invites similar criticisms. Waldron’s cosmopolitan, “a

10 Anderson, “Cosmopolitanism, Universalism,” 265.

11 Kwame Anthony Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 213ff.; Cf. also Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (New York: W.W.Norton, 2006).

12 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 113.

13 Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, 2.

14 Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, 14.

15 Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, 20.

16 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 112.

17 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 112.

18 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 113.

19 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 113.

creature of modernity, conscious, even proud, of living in a mixed-up world and having a mixed-up self,"<sup>20</sup> was described chiefly by examples and features that applied exclusively to a certain privileged class. As Kymlicka rightfully pointed out, cosmopolitanism thus understood seems to boil down to the enjoyment of "the opportunities provided by the diverse societal culture which characterizes the Anglophone society of the United States."<sup>21</sup> In this way, Waldron's cosmopolitan is not rootless, but uncomfortably rooted in an elitist culture accessible to only few, and it is this which Derrida warns us of when he writes that "no one is more cosmopolitan than the one, than this 'we,' who is speaking to you."<sup>22</sup>

Appiah's cosmopolitan is meant to be rooted in various forms of ordinary culture. But since the whole point of much of Appiah's argument is that there does not have to be a conflict between our particular affiliations and a simultaneous cosmopolitan orientation, he equally comes to describe cosmopolitanism in terms of the enjoyment of mixing, thus disregarding those cases of conflict where the oxymoron of a "rooted cosmopolitanism" would show itself in its paradoxical structure, and reveal the uncomfortable normative demands that a cosmopolitan orientation might make on us in opposition to our particularist inclinations. Cosmopolitanism in Appiah then becomes much more a descriptor of already existing ways of life under conditions of ever increasing global interconnectedness, rather than a challenge that poses itself again and again in concrete – and equally quotidian – situations of conflict. As Bruce Robbins cautions, "celebrations of cosmopolitan diversity have largely been uninterrupted by the issues of economic equality or geo-political justice."<sup>23</sup> Against such a "depoliticization"<sup>24</sup> I would like to follow Robbins and others in emphasizing the critical core of cosmopolitanism.

Cosmopolitanism should indeed offer an alternative between the two pathological tendencies "to reify local identities or construct universal ones."<sup>25</sup> Therefore, firstly, I think that the term "cosmopolitan" should be reserved for Diogenes rather than for Alexander the Great, who is more adequately described as emperor. This implies that those forms of moral, political or economic cosmopolitanism which become indistinguishable from a mere factual description of the (positive or negative) consequences of globalization are not of interest to me in the present context. Rather, the kind of cosmopolitics in question is concerned with "cosmopolitan resistances to globalization."<sup>26</sup> Secondly, I believe that Diogenes did not wish to affirm another substantive, cosmopolitan identity, but that his declaration "I am a citizen of the world" should be read as resisting an acknowledgment of conventional identifications with a critical intent. As I have argued in earlier work, the

---

20 Jeremy Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 8.2 (2000): 228, 10.1111/1467-9760.00100.

21 Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 85.

22 Jacques Derrida, *The Other Heading* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 48.

23 Robbins, "Cosmopolitanism: New and Newer," 51.

24 Robbins, "Cosmopolitanism: New and Newer," 55.

25 Paul Rabinow, "Representations are Social Facts: Modernity and Post-Modernity in Anthropology," in ed. James Clifford et al., *Writing Culture*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 258.

26 Gerard Delanty, "The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory," *The British Journal of Sociology* 57.1 (2006): 31, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2006.00092.x.

“critical cosmopolitanism” suggested by Gerard Delanty provides a useful corrective in this regard and the primary concern of cosmopolitan education should be with “*resisting being bound by reified entities, and with finding, founding and finding back to non-reifying ways of boundedness.*”<sup>27</sup> Gerard Delanty similarly claims that cosmopolitanism “does not arise merely in situations of cultural diversity or taking the perspective of the other,”<sup>28</sup> and that it “is not an identity as such that can be contrasted with national identity or other kinds of identity.”<sup>29</sup> I share Delanty’s conviction that the “key aspect of cosmopolitanism” is “the transformative vision of an alternative society.”<sup>30</sup>

### Visualizing the Cosmopolitan Condition: Graphic Novels as a Cosmopolitan Medium?

In the tradition of Art Spiegelman’s *Maus* both Marjane Satrapi’s *Persepolis* and Gene Luen Yang’s *American Born Chinese* reference the authors’ real lived experiences. Yet, they complicate traditional notions of autobiographical authority not just in their joyful “commingling [...] of verbal and visual modes of expression”,<sup>31</sup> but also by placing at the center of the narrative characters who are trying to first establish a voice that could rightfully count as speaking with such authority while “situated at the crossing of boundaries.”<sup>32</sup> *Persepolis*<sup>33</sup> was originally published in France in four volumes between 2000 and 2003, but the references in the following will refer to the later two-volume English translation. In the graphic novel Satrapi explores her early childhood and teenage years in Iran, the time of her exile in Austria, where she slowly grows into an adult, her temporary return to Iran, and her eventual final departure for France. In the course of the story we become witness to the Islamic revolution and the ensuing conservative backlash and see young Marji get into trouble with rigid fundamentalism in Iran. Afraid of the consequences, her parents decide to send her to Austria, where she again speaks her mind in the Christian convent she lives in during her first arrival, subsequently being evicted. We see her befriend a group of anarchist punks in the French-speaking boarding school she attends, and even in this group of outsiders Marji becomes the one who questions their norms, conformism and elitism. After a dramatic end of a love affair, she turns back to Iran to the safety of her family, fully aware of the compromises this will require. After a period of adaptation, the political pressure and the social strictures finally become unbearable. The book ends at the airport with her leaving Iran for good this time, knowing she will never see her grandmother again: “freedom had a price”.

27 Claudia Schumann, “Boundedness beyond reification: cosmopolitan teacher education as critique,” *Ethics and Global Politics* 5.4 (2012): 230.

28 Delanty, “The Cosmopolitan Imagination,” 40.

29 Delanty, “The Cosmopolitan Imagination,” 40.

30 Delanty, “The Cosmopolitan Imagination,” 40.

31 Chaney, *Graphic Subjects*, 5.

32 Julia Kristeva, *Nations without Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 16.

33 Marjane Satrapi, *Persepolis* (London: Vintage, 2008).

Gene Luen Yang's *American Born Chinese*<sup>34</sup> deals with comparatively less violent topics and is directed at a younger audience, but the main character, loosely based on the author's own childhood experiences in an American high school, is confronted with situations which similarly require him to struggle for founding his own voice. Being a less confrontational and courageous person than Marji, the main character nevertheless equally has to find his path through rigidly erected national and cultural boundaries as well as he has to ethically position himself. The story combines three different tales which only towards the end are revealed to be related to each other. One story arc follows the monkey king's rebellion against the gods based on the 16th's century Chinese novel *Journey to the West*. Despite having superpowers and being a king, the monkey king is not welcome to join the party of the deities because he has no shoes and he smells of monkey. Another story arc follows Jin Wang, a second-generation Chinese immigrant who struggles to blend in into a mostly white American high school, and is insecure whether to befriend a newly arrived Asian immigrant classmate or not. The third storyline, drawn in the style of a sit-com, is about a white American boy named Danny who is disturbed by the occasional visits of his Chinese cousin Chin-Kee. In proper sitcom manner, Chin-Kee embodies all negative racial stereotypes and becomes a constant embarrassment to Danny, causing him not only physical disgust, but also threatening his social status at school. The different characters of the three story arcs are all haunted by the threats and external ascriptions of a racist society, but they are also haunted by their cultural roots with which they have to come to terms in order to overcome the terror of the repressed, but inescapable ghosts.

When turning to *Persepolis* and *American Born Chinese*, what might first strike one to consider them as visualizations of a cosmopolitan condition might be the playful ease and pleasure with which the authors draw from and blend most diverse traditions in creating their own visual style. In *American Born Chinese* Gene Luen Yang not only interweaves three different story lines, but his appropriation of the form of the *bildungsroman*, the sit-com, and the legend to the comics medium leads to a visual "amalgam of Eastern and Western stories and drawing techniques"; while the drawing style throughout employs a bright and full variety of colors, "the drawing style of Yang's central story line – Disney-type realistic characters – differs from his representation of Chin-Kee, which mimics early nineteenth-century cartoons."<sup>35</sup> *Persepolis* similarly disrupts visual purisms. While strongly influenced by Persian miniature painting and its typical flatness, the visual style of Satrapi's work at the same time rejects the "color-rich classic tradition of Persian art"<sup>36</sup> when employing the "minimalist play of black and white" typical of expressionistic "avant-garde, black-and-white-cinema,"<sup>37</sup> or when she lets herself get inspired by the simplicity and nai-

34 Gene Luen Yang, *American Born Chinese* (New York: Square Fish, 2006).

35 Roció G. Davis, "American Born Chinese. Challenging the Stereotype," in ed. Michael A. Chaney, *Graphic Subjects: Critical Essays on Autobiography and Graphic Novels*, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 281.

36 Hillary Chute, "The Texture of Retracing in Marjane Satrapi's *Persepolis*," *Women's Studies Quarterly* 36.1-2 (2008): 11.

37 Chute, "The Texture," 11.

vety of the abstract woodcut prints by Swiss born French artist Félix Vallotton.<sup>38</sup> In both works, *Persepolis* and *American Born Chinese*, one of the most transparent examples for their cosmopolitan openness and embrace of contamination can be found in their handling of religious motifs. Satrapi and Yang align and assimilate various religious traditions and world views with playful ease and little concern for fundamentalist strictures, as when the portraits of Marx and God are juxtaposed and Marji realizes “how much Marx and God looked like each other,”<sup>39</sup> or when the monkey king completes the classical Chinese *Journey to the West* in a portrayal of the Virgin Mary and a happy baby Jesus reaching for the monkey king’s hand.<sup>40</sup> Moving on from these first superficial indications for taking the visual space Satrapi and Yang unfold as a cosmopolitan space, I want to take a closer look at the way in which the tensions and contradictions between the universal and the particular are drawn out in both graphic novels.

Comic theorist Scott McCloud has ascribed a universal dimension to cartoon imagery which is now often-cited in the critical discussion on graphic novels dealing with issues of intercultural translation. By “cartooning”<sup>41</sup> culturally bound stories, they are raised to a level of abstraction which removes them from their original context and makes the story available beyond it: “When you look at a photo or realistic drawing of a face, you see it as the face of another. But when you enter the world of the cartoon, you see yourself”<sup>42</sup>. In a way, the cartoon images seem to be able to go where language can’t. Leigh Gilmore connects this potential of the image even with representations of trauma. While trauma studies have shown that “language fails to adequately convey trauma,” “representations of trauma abound,”<sup>43</sup> particularly in newly emerging artistic forms such as “visual autobiography and memoir.”<sup>44</sup> Maybe it is not coincidental that stories about migration and cultural uprooting, largely shaped by experiences of the crossing of linguistic barriers and experiences of alienation, strangeness and isolation which seem to escape a shared, common language, turn to the comics medium to narrate these stories.

Many reviews have lauded *Persepolis* for presenting a universally accessible story because it places a child at the center of the narrative.<sup>45</sup> But to which extent is it true that the child’s perspective is a universal perspective? Do we see a universal picture when we look at the world of growing up through Marji’s and Jin’s eyes? The idea of the universality of childhood or the child’s perspective derives from the perception of the child as yet to be

38 Cf. Chute, “The Texture,” 11.

39 Satrapi, *Persepolis*, 13.

40 Yang, *American Born Chinese*, 215.

41 Scott McCloud, *Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art* (New York: Harpercollins, 1993).

42 McCloud, *Understanding Comics*, 36.

43 Leigh Gilmore, “Witnessing Persepolis: Comics, Trauma, and Childhood Testimony,” in ed. Michael A. Chaney, *Graphic Subjects: Critical Essays on Autobiography and Graphic Novels*, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 158.

44 Gilmore, “Witnessing Persepolis,” 158.

45 Cf. Chute, “The Texture,” 4; Nima Naghibi and Andrew O’Malley, “Estranging the Familiar: ‘East’ and ‘West’ in Satrapi’s *Persepolis*,” *ESC* 31.2-3 (2005): 226.

cultured, as yet having to acquire those traits which would then differentiate it as belonging to a particular community. But it is exactly this understanding of childhood which both Satrapi and Yang complicate. Furthermore, they equally undermine and subvert the corresponding idea of the immigrant. The immigrant does not leave one self-contained cultural realm in order to then enter a new, equally closed, cultural world to which she has yet to become accustomed just as the child has to learn the ways of the adult world. Rather, in both books, despite the universal appeal of “cartooning” discussed above, particularity is introduced and visualized in a way that creates precarious tensions with the universal aspirations and appears to counteract the appeal to an underlying (or superficially) shared sameness. However, I think it would be a misreading of both stories if one were to conclude, as Naghibi/O’Malley do with regard to *Persepolis*, that the child as the autobiographical subject, as well as the juvenile medium and the simplistic drawing style “effectively ‘camouflage’ the complex politics of identity and nation [...] in the guise of simplicity and universal accessibility.”<sup>46</sup> On the contrary, I believe that the medium, the style, and the child as the narrative’s subject should be taken more seriously, and can be taken more seriously from a critical cosmopolitan perspective. Because then it can be shown that Yang and Satrapi not only complicate simplistic universalisms, but equally complicate the narrow rigidity of certain forms of particularism. This is a claim which requires taking the authors’ formal choices clearly into account in the interpretation of their way of visualizing cross-cultural experiences, rather than reducing the comic form and the child as autobiographic subject to a mere marketing asset. From such an approach a different picture can emerge of where Satrapi and Yang stand with regard to universalism and particularism. In the picture I want to offer here, they are both as wary and critical of “the limitations and dangers involved in a too-protectionist approach to assertions of identity or primary affiliation”<sup>47</sup> as they are of abstract universalism.

Interestingly, Michael A. Chaney describes the effects of cartooning as almost in opposition to the universalizing quality that McCloud, and the others discussed above, pointed to, when he emphasizes that autobiographic comics as “realistic fictions of the self prod us to reconsider [not only] what is at stake in telling our life stories in pictures, [but also] how it is that we have come to visualize identity in particular ways and according to particular sociohistorical contexts.”<sup>48</sup> This appears to me to be pointing to the way in which the comics form also lends itself to depict particular identities rather than just invite universal identification. While the stylization of the autobiographic ‘I’ as a cartoon necessarily leads to a departure from realistic depictions of the autobiographic subjects, in this way universalizing it, the cartoon image is at the same time very effective in iconographically picking out the visual stereotypes we have come to associate with specific socio-cultural identities, in this way particularizing the subjects and their contexts. The character of Chin-Kee in *Ame-*

---

46 Naghibi/O’Malley, “Estranging the Familiar,” 234.

47 Anderson, “Cosmopolitanism, Universalism,” 266.

48 Chaney, *Graphic Subjects*, 7.

*American Born Chinese* embodies a glaring example of such stereotypical representation in the comics form: the pale yellow skin, his slanted eyes and the oversized front teeth protruding over his lower lip<sup>49</sup> quote all the features which together constitute the visual caricature of the Asian 'other' in US society. But even if the sit-com character Chin-Kee visually embodies the negatively connoted Asian stereotype in a particularly overdrawn and radically exaggerated way, also the children in the more realistically presented coming-of-age storyline of Jin Wang are drawn in a clearly racializing manner. The pale skin color, black hair, and slightly slanted eyes of the isolated Asian children explicitly contrast with the pink skin color and lighter hair of their fellow students,<sup>50</sup> and the visual stereotype is quoted again when Danny catches some of his classmates ridiculing Chinese identity by making slit-eyes.<sup>51</sup> In *Persepolis* the iconography of the veil is interesting to look at in order to illustrate this particularizing potential of the comics form when it cites visual socio-cultural stereotypes. The distinction between "the two images of Eastern Marji and Western Marji"<sup>52</sup> is visualized first and foremost by the protagonist's wearing of the veil or the omission of the veil. Of course, neither *Persepolis* nor *American Born Chinese* content themselves with the depiction of the stereotypes. However, I think it is important to keep in mind this potential of comics for an uncomfortably easy and straightforward depiction of difference through the portrayal or quotation of visual stereotypes, alongside its potential for universalizing abstraction discussed above, as well as its potential to undermine, transgress and transform these stereotypes on the page.

### Transformation and (Un-)veiling: Stories of Self-appropriation and Arrogation of Voice

As the social philosopher Rahel Jaeggi<sup>53</sup> has argued, both an understanding of the self as a (hidden) thinglike, given object which we passively experience and can discover as well as an understanding of the self as something that is constructed at will or could be produced instrumentally represent distorted, alienating forms of self-relation. Similarly, the Wittgenstein scholar David Finkelstein<sup>54</sup> has rejected what he calls "detectivist" and "constitutivist" conceptions of the self. It is important for the following discussion of the development of the self-relations in graphic novels that neither Finkelstein's expressivism nor Jaeggi's concept of self-appropriation presuppose a pre-existent 'true' self, just as in Stanley Cavell's Emersonian account of the self, there is no 'real me' apart from its continuous founding in language between inheritance and transgression. When Cavell reads Emerson's "self-reli-

49 Cf. Yang, *American Born Chinese*, 43.

50 Cf. Yang, *American Born Chinese*, 36.

51 Yang, *American Born Chinese*, 121.

52 Naghibi/O'Malley, "Estranging the Familiar," 231.

53 Rahel Jaeggi, *Entfremdung – Zur Aktualität eines sozialphilosophischen Problems* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 2005).

54 David Finkelstein, *Expression and the Inner* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).

ance” as an aversion to conformity, this implies aversion to our own individual old beliefs and habits, not just to averse ourselves to conforming to the norms of others. Self-reliance means acknowledging the fact that “the soul becomes” on an individual and societal level.<sup>55</sup> For Jaeggi, the idea of self-appropriation is based on a non-essentialist definition of forms of self-relation which are not alienating. It suggests a structural formal analysis of whether further experiences and new forms of appropriation are made possible or inhibited by it, rather than an ultimate core identity which can be detected or should be constructed. One’s own wishes, intentions, emotions, and perceptions cannot be assumed unproblematically given as one’s own, but they nevertheless require to be considered as worthy of critical exploration, appropriation and articulation. In the following I will now discuss with the help of some examples from both graphic novels how the main characters’ self- and world-relations are transformed in a process of continual appropriation of the cultural environments they move in. I will look at the theme of transformation pervading *American Born Chinese* and the theme of (un-)veiling in *Persepolis* respectively. Against purist ideas of cultural identity just as much as against too facile abstract universalisms, the symbols of the transformer toy and the veil retain a doubleness in evoking sameness *as well as* difference and provoking our thinking at the limits of both.

The topic of transformation is broached rather innocuously in the first chapter of *American Born Chinese* when the monkey king is shown to be able to change his form in typical comic superhero manner.<sup>56</sup> However, the “thick smell of monkey fur”<sup>57</sup> follows him and prevents him from being accepted as a deity. The rejection of the monkey king despite his deity-like powers of transgressing his given physical form is paralleled shortly after in the storyline of Jin. Following his mother to a herbalist, Jin sitting in the waiting room receives a warning from the herbalist’s wife. Jin is fascinated with his transformer toy and tells the herbalist’s wife that he would love to be a transformer himself once he grows up to which she responds, “It is easy to become anything you wish ... as long as you are willing to forfeit your soul.”<sup>58</sup> The endless possibilities of constructing one’s own image in the cartoon form as opposed to the limits of transforming one’s physical appearance in real life are discussed further when Jin admits to her that the transformer toy in the cartoon becomes a truck with a trailer, but the real toy only becomes a truck and the trailer comes in a separate piece.<sup>59</sup> The motif of the unlimited possibilities of transforming one’s image on the comic page as opposed to the limits and ludicrous consequences of such attempts at self-construction in real life is repeated throughout the book at various stages and in various forms.

When the storylines of Jin Wang and Danny are first introduced, they are perceived as parallel to each other, but not connected. The reader has no way of “seeing” that Jin and

---

55 Cf. Claudia Schumann, “The self as onwardness: reading Emerson’s self-reliance and experience,” *Foro de Educación* 11.15 (2013), doi: 10.14516/fde.2013.011.015.001.

56 Cf. Yang, *American Born Chinese*, 10-11 and 58.

57 Yang, *American Born Chinese*, 20.

58 Yang, *American Born Chinese*, 29.

59 Cf. Yang, *American Born Chinese*, 28.

Danny are one and the same character because their visual portrayal is not linked until the last chapter of the book.<sup>60</sup> The protagonist's image shifts from the racialized portrayal of the young Jin to the split depiction of his identity in the form of the white, attractive high school hero Danny and the caricature of Chin-Kee in the sit-com storyline. The conflict between Chin-Kee and Danny, between the racist stereotypes of Chinese identity and Jin's inner picture of himself, increases continuously throughout the story. His imagined identity as a blond American teenager smoothly fitting into the mainstream is visually constructed on the comic page in convincing realistic detail. Finally the conflict escalates in a physical fight between Jin's two self-images to the point where Danny cuts Chin-Kee's head off in order to eradicate this picture of himself.

Once Chin-Kee has been beheaded he reveals his "true form"<sup>61</sup> and shows himself as the monkey king. Consequently, Danny's face also transforms back into Jin Wang's. The exaggerated negative stereotype of Chineseness transforms into the monkey king, "the legendary trickster figure [...] a source of cultural strength, a symbol of subversion and resistance,"<sup>62</sup> in this way allowing for Jin to come to terms with and regain pride in his Chinese heritage because he finds a way of self-appropriation in the trickster figure that goes beyond the dichotomy of either constructing his identity in conformity with American mainstream ideals or accepting his Chineseness and conforming to the limited stereotypical identity others have assigned to him. The 'transformation' of one's physical appearance in the sense of constructing your looks to conform to the mainstream is doomed to failure and requires the willingness to "forfeit your soul." But in a positive sense, 'transformation' entails the possibilities of self-appropriation by aversion to the conformity of the mainstream as well as of the minority stereotype. The intertextual reference on the very last page of the book adequately symbolizes this double aversion. In this last image Jin re-enacts a YouTube video meme by two Asian teenagers lip-synching to a song by the Backstreet Boys. The original video had gained wide popularity on the internet as a site for racist ridicule. The transformation on the last page stands as a reminder of the power of the trickster figure, of the possibilities of self-appropriation also through the subversive powers of sarcasm and mockery, of the possibility of aversion to the stereotype and transforming it into something you can own.

In *Persepolis* we find a similar exploration of the possibilities and limits of self-acceptance, self-construction, and self-appropriation, but its violent and brutally traumatic themes push this exploration to further edges. In contrast to the Disney colors and the youthful style of *American Born Chinese*, we find a "radical disjuncture between the often-gorgeous minimalism of Satrapi's drawings and the infinitely complicated traumatic events they depict: harassment, torture, execution, bombings, mass murder."<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, the

60 Cf. Yang, *American Born Chinese*, 214.

61 Yang, *American Born Chinese*, 213.

62 Fu quoted in Davis, "American Born Chinese," 280.

63 Chute, "The Texture," 12.

visualization of particular identity in *Persepolis* not only relates to the problematic of physical appearance as a site of racism, but further extends to questions of class, gender, and the symbolization of culturally specific ideas of freedom which are played out in an exemplary manner within *Persepolis*' multi-layered engagement with the iconography of the veil. The story of the veil opens the book as the first chapter of *Persepolis I*. Maybe surprising for some western readers, the veil is introduced as something relatively new to Marji's world. We see her somewhat grumpily wearing a veil sitting in a school bench, and then tearing it off and appropriating it for silly play in the schoolyard. Later the veil is shown in relation to the beginning of the separation of boys and girls in schools, and women in veil demonstrate for "the veil" while unveiled women demonstrate for "freedom" in the streets of Teheran.<sup>64</sup> However, the veil never reduces to the symbol of the religious backlash of the "cultural revolution" in Satrapi's story. The child character of Marji herself is drawn as split between her spiritual, veiled half against a background of Persian ornaments, and her unveiled, avant-garde half against the background of multiple technical instruments.<sup>65</sup> The split, cutting clearly through the middle of the figure, suggests that the two traditions of the unveiled secular modern and the newly re-introduced, veiled religious tradition constitute a disjuncture within the character's identity and stand in unmediated contrast to each other. Later on in the story Satrapi also shows how the veil is adapted in order to visually demonstrate political affiliation.<sup>66</sup> She not only juxtaposes women's "modern" vs. "fundamentalist" styles of appropriating the veil, but complements this image with a contrastive look at the "modern" vs. the "progressive" man.<sup>67</sup> Under the growing pressure of state legislation and violence, the opposition "veiled – unveiled" no longer coincides with the opposition of "religious – modern," but has shifted to a point where the contrast is now expressed within oppositional modes of wearing the veil. In this way Satrapi's images of Iranian women introduce first nuances to the stereotypical association of the veil with Islamist fundamentalism in the West, and she further complicates this notion in drawing out that similar distinctions apply in clothing for men. Satrapi sensitizes the readers' seeing to how, with the increasing brutality of political oppression by the state, the possibilities for visual aversion to the dictates of the ruling norms become smaller, but they remain no less visible.

The expressive distinctions between modernist and religious men and women, while contaminated by state violence, still remain stable, but gain a further twist with the transition from *Persepolis I* to *Persepolis II* and Marji's departure for Austria. The overbearing black of the silhouettes in the tragic good-bye scene at Teheran airport is picked up again on the first page of *Persepolis II* where Marjane finds herself again surrounded by black veils; veils of the catholic Austrian nuns in the convent. The imagery is only slightly altered

64 Satrapi, *Persepolis*, 5.

65 Satrapi, *Persepolis*, 6.

66 Cf. Satrapi, *Persepolis*, 75.

67 Satrapi, *Persepolis*, 75.

through the contrastive white of the crosses hanging from their necks. Even though veils then remain absent for the remainder of Marjane's years in Austria, they do not disappear completely, but are inverted – with the topic of *unveiling* gaining stronger presence. During the time in Austria, we are shown how Marjane first sees naked bodies<sup>68</sup> and is affected by the bodily changes of puberty, to which she reacts by constructing a new identity for this new body, adorning it with the accessories that would define her as part of her newly-found group of punk friends.<sup>69</sup> But when her body becomes the site of racism, there is no escape from these attacks. Her face unveils her as what she is in the eyes of many Austrians – an Iranian immigrant, an “Ausländer” not worthy of being their brother's or son's girlfriend, or even of sitting next to them on the bus.<sup>70</sup> Faced with the ridicule of some Austrian girls for her attempt at disguising her Iranian roots, Marjane realizes that she is not free to invent herself anew, but that when attacked as an Iranian, she has to defend herself as an Iranian. Screaming, “I am Iranian and proud of it!”<sup>71</sup> in all capital letters on the page, Marjane appropriates something which she could neither abandon at will nor reconstruct as something other and more fitting with the norm.

The logic of multiple aversions to conformity underpins the journey of self-appropriation in both *American Born Chinese* and *Persepolis*. Laying claim to one's particular history and cultural identity beyond merely accepting rigid pre-defined givens and continuously negotiating the limits and desirability of constructing oneself in accordance to norms set by others, the characters' struggle for founding a self-reliant voice that can rightfully count as their own is portrayed as a struggle with many pitfalls, a struggle against many odds with the constant potential for failure, in which we ultimately cannot definitely know if we succeeded or failed and which is nevertheless deemed worthy fighting.

There is a special connection between the critical cosmopolitics I have in mind and auto(bio)graphy because putting forth one's issues for the world to hear and consider requires a certain arrogance, or as Stanley Cavell says an “arrogation of voice.”<sup>72</sup> He describes Thoreau's and Emerson's “philosophy of immigrancy, of the human as stranger” as “beginning no doubt with the strangeness of oneself.”<sup>73</sup> It is this investigation into the strangeness of oneself that further aligns the two autobiographical comics with the “current manifestations of cosmopolitanism” which according to Anderson “all tend to be highly self-reflexive about the problem of elitism.”<sup>74</sup> Satrapi and Yang are both highly self-reflexive in regard to the characters' social position. Despite being positioned in the margins of their respective immediate communities, with Marji's parents being part of the political opposition

68 Satrapi, *Persepolis*, 189.

69 Satrapi, *Persepolis*, 191f.

70 Satrapi, *Persepolis*, 197f., 222.

71 Satrapi, *Persepolis*, 199.

72 Cf. chapter 1 in Stanley Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy. Autobiographical Exercises* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

73 Cavell, *A Pitch*, xv.

74 Anderson, “Cosmopolitanism, Universalism,” 285.

and later due to her immigrant status, and Jin because of racial prejudices, they both also acknowledge the impact of their relatively privileged backgrounds, with their families placing high importance on a good education, encouraging setting ambitious goals for oneself, as well as fostering an ethical uprightness. In this way they both openly discuss the privileged conditions under which they can dare to found their own voice.

At the same time, however, there is also a poverty and humility in such an arrogation of voice in this cosmopolitics of the 'I'. For what I am putting forth is what I find to be important, and what I can stand for. I am not claiming to speak for everybody. I am not claiming that my life experiences and the political issues of importance to me should necessarily and universally be the same issues for everybody else. But, in a cosmopolitan stance, I am claiming not merely to speak from a particular category of identity (as a woman, as a Muslim, as a German, etc.). Cosmopolitics as the arrogation of independent judgment, as the arrogation of resistance against being determined by reified particular conditions as well as against being consumed by universals constructed by others, becomes the insistence on continuing the strive for founding a self-reliant voice against all odds, and believing that this voice is worth being heard by the world. At the same time such a cosmopolitics naturally implies an openness for being impacted and transformed by potentially any other voice in the world – not just respective local, particular, or self-proclaimed universal authorities. Satrapi and Yang both interestingly show another side to cosmopolitanism than the joyful and pleasurable. Both stories involve traumatic experiences and make explicit the enormous risks involved in looking back and in founding a voice. In this way the ethical dimension of cosmopolitanism is put to the forefront and we arrive at a more complex, nuanced and intense picture of what is required for the founding of a self-reliant voice.

Cavell states that some might perceive his interpretations of the topic of strangeness in Thoreau and Emerson "as a clinical issue, with more bearing on myself than on those I claim to perceive",<sup>75</sup> and he wishes to be "excused for seeing it also as a critical issue, enabling genuine perceptions that might otherwise go unwon".<sup>76</sup> This two-way path is available to a reading of the texts in question, too. I hope to have shown that the stories give expression to more than to the effects certain devastating and violent experiences, as in the case of *Persepolis*, and certain quotidian experiences of prejudice towards perceived strangers, as in *American Born Chinese*, have on the individual psyches of the author-narrator. They are also not just extended clinical analyses in the sense of claiming that this effect would take a hold on any human being, not just a human being with a similar psychological condition as the author-narrators. By putting too much emphasis on the psychological, many interpreters run the danger of placing the stories too close to the clinical, thus overlooking the critical. It is important for understanding the stories, in my view, to look very closely at how they exceed the clinical and voice a critical perspective, how they articulate a transformative vision of society through critical self-investigation. This is where their political dimen-

---

75 Cavell, *A Pitch*, xv.

76 Cavell, *A Pitch*, xv.

sion opens up. Through their portrayal of the visual aversions on the page both Yang and Satrapi show that the authorial self is not there as one to be “detected”, and they also show the limits and pitfalls of “constructing” a self for the purpose of fitting conventional expectations, rather the authorial self co-exists in a multiplicity of forms simultaneously on the page and requires work in order to be appropriated again and again in the everyday. In a democracy that is to amount to more than mass conformism such social critique through “ordinary” self-appropriations is integral to any democratic politics.

# Hansjörg Hohr

## Oppdragelsen til verdensborgerskap i kunstnerisk perspektiv

### Abstract

*In this text, features of fiction are discussed as to their ability for handling cultural diversity in cosmopolitan education. The argument is developed in two steps. First, the biblical story about the construction of the tower of Babel is analyzed and discussed with respect to what it says about diversity and how it says it. In a second step, aspects of art are gathered from various sources, Aristotle, Cassirer, Gadamer, Langer, Kant, Rorty, in order to define the communicative possibilities of art with respect to cosmopolitan education.*

### Keywords

*Verdensborgerskap, kosmopolitisme, kunst, estetikk*

Begrepet verdensborgerskap eller kosmopolitisme har en lang tradisjon,<sup>1</sup> og den pedagogiske refleksjonen om den rommer mange perspektiver og tilnærminger.<sup>2</sup> Aktualiteten av begrepet innenfor pedagogikken skyldes forhold som dannelsen av overnasjonale institusjoner, etableringen av verdensborgerlige rettsnormer og framveksten av et verdensborgerlig sivilsamfunn.<sup>3</sup> Til det kommer innsikten fra opplysningstiden i at oppdragelsen bør fremme universelle normer og ikke kan nøye seg med lokale tradisjoner som moralsk og etisk ramme. Endelig kan interessen for verdensborgerlig oppdragelse også være en kritisk reaksjon på tendensen til en økonomistisk innsnevring av oppdragelse og undervisning.

Asger Sørensen<sup>4</sup> har i det siste og med utgangspunkt i Immanuel Kant skilt mellom verdensborgerskap og kosmopolitisme. Førstnevnte begrep sikter ifølge ham til evig fred innenfor en rettslig og politisk forståelsesramme, mens sistnevnte refererer utelukkende til

---

1 Peter Kemp, *Verdensborgeren: Pædagogisk og politisk ideal for den 21. århundrede*, 2.utg. (København: Hans Reitzel, 2013).

2 David T. Hansen et al. «Education, Values, and Valuing in Cosmopolitan Perspective,» *Curriculum Inquiry* 39 (2009): 587-612, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-873X.2009.00461.x. Matthew J. Hayden, «Cosmopolitan Education and Moral Education: Forging Moral Beings Under Conditions of Global Uncertainty» (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2012). Pauline Kleingeld, «Six varieties of cosmopolitanism in late eighteenth-century Germany,» *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60 (1999): 505-524, doi: 10.1353/jhi.1999.0025.

3 Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, (Oxford University Press, 2006), doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183221.001.0001.

4 Asger Sørensen, «Cosmopolitanism – not a “major ideology”, but still an ideology,» *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 42 (2016): 200-224, nedlastet 17.3.2015, doi: 10.1177/0191453714566483.

---

*Hansjörg Hohr, Universitetet i Oslo, Norge*  
*E-mail: [hansjorg.hohr@iped.uio.no](mailto:hansjorg.hohr@iped.uio.no)*

---

*Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi* | [www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf](http://www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf) | ISSN nr. 22449140

---

Årgang 4 | Nr. 2 | 2015 | side 54-67

---

det moralske aspektet ved verdensborgerskap og griper dermed for kort. Sørensens advarsel mot en reduksjonistisk forståelse kan her fungere som et minne om begrensningen i den følgende refleksjonen om kunstens muligheter i verdensborgerlig oppdragelse. Imidlertid er det vanskelig å se hvorfor *kosmopolitisme* ikke skulle kunne favne om rettslige og politiske aspekter. Med det for øye bruker jeg kosmopolitisme og verdensborgerskap som synonymmer og nøyer meg med å støtte meg til Hansen og medarbeidere:

Cosmopolitanism is a name for an orientation toward self, others, and world. In this orientation, a person or community juxtaposes reflective openness to new influences with reflective loyalty toward the tried and the known. Put another way, cosmopolitanism is a name for an outlook toward the challenges and opportunities of being a person or community dwelling in a world of ongoing social transformation.<sup>5</sup>

En nyanseforskjell finnes hos Hansen som ett år tidligere foreslår at kosmopolitisme handler om "critical openness to the world" sammen med "a critical loyalty toward the local".<sup>6</sup> Sistnevnte definisjon viser klarere skillet og sammenhengen mellom det nære og det fjerne. I tillegg bør en ta hensyn til skillet mellom det epistemologiske og det praktiske. Epistemologisk kan den kritiske åpenheten overfor verden gå hånd i hånd med den kritiske oppslutningen om egen kultur. Oppgaven er nok krevende, men den rommer ingen prinsipiell motsigelse. Praktisk er imidlertid forholdet mellom der nære og fjerne mer problematisk fordi det er urimelig å gå ut fra at forpliktelsene overfor en selv, slekt, venner, lokalsamfunn, nasjonalt fellesskap og verdenssamfunn er av samme art. Jeg må vel kunne unne meg et konsertbesøk selv om det dertil brukte pengebeløp ville vært en betydelig hjelp for en medborger i nød et sted i verden?

Prinsippet man skal legge til grunn for en praktisk differensiering er imidlertid ikke opplagt. I det enkelte tilfelle kan det være greit å gjøre seg opp en mening, men det er vanskelig å identifisere regler som kan legges til grunn for slike avgjørelser.<sup>7</sup>

Ser en bort fra mangelen på en tydelig distinksjon mellom det epistemiske og praktiske i Hansens definisjon kan en fastslå at tilnærmingen i hvert fall motarbeider noen nærliggende misforståelser. En av dem er at kosmopolitisme betyr løsrivelse fra det lokale slik en finner det i skikkelsen av en *globetrotter*. Det er en person som bruker verdenen utelukkende som ressurs, som slår seg ned her og der uten å inngå noen form for forpliktelse. En annen misforståelse er å bruke kulturelt mangfold som målestokk for kosmopolitisme. Når det for eksempel i London i dag tales ca. 300 ulike språk betyr ikke det at byen er kosmopolitisk. Det forfatterne kaller «orientation» eller «outlook», bør tolkes som en kvalitet ved

5 Hansen et al. Education, «Education, Values, and Valuing in Cosmopolitan Perspective,» 587.

6 David T. Hansen, «Education Viewed Through a Cosmopolitan Prism,» *Philosophy of Education* (2008): 206-214.

7 Kwame A. Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (New York: Norton, 2007): 155-162.

kommunikasjonen på ulike sosiale nivåer, og det er i det perspektivet jeg vil argumentere for at det kunstneriske kan bidra til en verdensborgerlig oppdragelse.

Jeg begynner med en kort avklaring av begrepet kunst og foreslår tre kriterier:

A) *Medium – presentativ symbolikk*: Kunst er definert ved sitt medium, nemlig *presentativ symbolikk*, en term som er inspirert av Ernst Cassirer<sup>8</sup> og skapt av Susanne K. Langer.<sup>9</sup> Presentativ symbolikk består av strukturer og mønstre slik som visuelle i et bilde, motoriske i gester og dans, akustiske i musikk og språklige i tale og litteratur. Det dreier seg om en tilsiktet og betydningsfull, dvs. kommunikativ *form*. Termene struktur og mønster brukes her i hovedsak synonymt i det de refererer til en viss regularitet i et objekt og står i motsetning til det kaotiske. De framviser imidlertid også nyanseforskjeller idet *struktur* griper det enestående i en formytring, mens *mønster* refererer til en felles egenskap og en konvensjon siden et mønster alltid er et mønster av noe. Slik betegner termene to sider ved kunstgjenstanden. Den er en gjenstand som kan erfares som sådan, og den er samtidig et symbol om noe annet. Slik Hans-Georg Gadamer<sup>10</sup> påpeker presenterer kunstgjenstanden seg som et objekt som vil bli forstått og derfor har «hermeneutisk identitet».

Den betydningsfulle formen skiller seg således fra former som ikke er tilsiktet eller som ikke oppfattes som sådan. Snøen på bakken for eksempel er et atmosfærisk fenomen og ikke en tilsiktet form. Men den kan også tillegges symbolsk betydning og blir da til presentativ symbolikk. Den betydningsfulle formen kan også skilles fra det en kan kalle formstøy, dvs. tilfeldige former som for eksempel trafikkduren i en by eller en forsøplet gate. De er, selv om de er menneskeskapt, manifestasjoner, symptomatiske ytringer, utilsiktede spor av hendelser.

Til slutt må en presisere at *presentativ symbolikk* er et analytisk begrep – her avviker jeg fra Langer – og betegner med termen et aspekt ved symbolsk interaksjon og ikke denne selv. Aspektet kan være mer eller mindre framtreddende. Mens det dominerer i musikken vil den være svakere i diktning og litteratur som bygger på et ordspråk, dets syntaks og semantikk, dvs. betydningsbærere med relativt stabil semantisk kjerne. Det presentative aspektet fins imidlertid også i den foreliggende teksten ved dens komposisjon, stil og ordvalg, selv om teksten vil være så entydig som mulig. Utover det vil enhver ytring også inneholde noe utilsikket, uforløst, røtter som ender i sinnets mørke.

Den presentative symbolikken konstituerer den estetiske kommunikasjonen som omfatter all betydningsfull form – reklame, kles- og matstil, geografiske kart, blomsterdekorasjon mm. Det dreier seg altså om en stor familie som dekker mange kommunikative funksjoner. Derfor er det hensiktsmessig, ja nødvendig med en ytterligere avgrensning av kunsten.

8 Ernst Cassirer, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Band 1. Die Sprache* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2010).

9 Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a new key: a study in the symbolism of reason, rite, and art* (New York: New American Library, 1942).

10 Hans-Georg Gadamer, «Die Aktualität des Schönen,» i *Gesammelte Werke 8. Kunst als Aussage*. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1993), 116.

B) *Gnostisk orientering*: Kunsten skiller seg fra annen estetisk kommunikasjon ved sin konsentrasjon om erkjennelse. Den fornyer erfaringen og utvider grensen av det til ethvert historisk tidspunkt erfarbare.

C) *Kulturelt perspektiv*: Et tredje kriterium skal avgrense kunsten fra oppdragelsen siden begge tar sikte på utvidelsen av erfaringen. Oppdragelsen utvider den enkeltes erfaringshorisont og vurderes i forhold til dette, kunsten derimot utvider den kulturelle horisonten og har det som gyldighetskriterium. Riktignok er enhver individuell nyvinning også en kulturell nyvinning, men kunsten refererer altså til den kulturelle utviklingen og ikke til den personlige. Kunstkritikken er med andre ord ikke interessert i kunstneren som person (eller bør ikke være det), men vurderer kunstverket i forhold til andre kunstverk og den historiske situasjonen det har oppstått i. Derfor forutsetter kunstnerisk arbeid en fortrolighet med tradisjonen, langvarig øvelse og arbeid og ofte også en formell skolering.

Sammenfattende kan en si at kunst er forskning i mediet av presentativ symbolikk. Selvsagt kan en slik definisjon ikke håpe på allmenn tilslutning. Estetiske standpunkter er nemlig kronisk kontroversielle. I den pedagogiske sammenhengen veier tyngre at den foreslåtte definisjonen synes å utelukke barn fra kunstnerisk produksjon. Det er imidlertid ikke tilfelle. Selvsagt kan barns estetiske arbeid ses i et kulturelt perspektiv og visst holder barn på med estetiske aktiviteter med sikte på utforskning av verden. Men i en pedagogisk sammenheng er det kulturelle perspektivet irrelevant som målestoll og sannsynligvis destruktivt. Der er det barnets utvikling og framskritt det kommer an på, ikke kulturens. I hvert fall håper jeg at min definisjon av kunst beskriver det teoretiske utgangspunktet med tilstrekkelig klarhet slik at en unngår pseudo-konflikter.

## Narrative overveielser om forskjellighet

Jeg nærmer meg mitt spørsmål om den kunstneriske kommunikasjonens muligheter i to skritt. Først analyserer jeg et konkret kunstverk og viser de refleksive mulighetene i det. I neste skritt stiller jeg sammen kunstfilosofiske observasjoner fra ulike filosofer og således kretser inn mulighetene til den kunstneriske kommunikasjonen på et mer generelt plan.

Analysen tar utgangspunkt i «Tårnet i Babel» fra Bibelens skapelsesberetning.

11.

<sup>1</sup> Hele jorden hadde ett språk og én tale.

<sup>2</sup> Det skjedde da de var på reise fra østa, at de fant en slette i Sinear-landet og slo seg ned der.

<sup>3</sup> Så sa til hverandre: «Kom, la oss lage teglstein og brenne dem godt!» De brukte tegl som stein og jordbek som mørtel.

<sup>4</sup> Så sa de: «Kom, la oss bygge oss en by og et tårn som rekker helt opp til himmelen! La oss gjøre oss selv et navn så vi ikke blir spredt ut over hele jorden!»

<sup>5</sup> Men Herren kom ned for å se på byen og tårnet som menneskenes barn hadde bygd.

<sup>6</sup> Herren sa: «Se, folket er ett, og de har alle ett og samme språk. Dette er hva de begynner å gjøre! Nå blir ingen ting umulig for dem av alt de vil sette seg fore å gjøre.

<sup>7</sup> Kom, la Oss gå ned og forvirre språket deres så den ene ikke kan forstå språket til den andre!»

<sup>8</sup> Så spredte Herren dem derfra og ut over hele jorden, og de sluttet å bygge på byen.

<sup>9</sup> Derfor blir den kalt Babel, for der forvirret Herren språket for hele verden. Og derfra spredte Herren dem ut over hele jorden. (Første Mosebok)

Jeg leser fortellingen som en poetisk refleksjon over hvordan den kulturelle forskjelligheten i verden har oppstått og hva den skyldes. Samtidig er jeg klar over at min diskusjon er en del av en flere tusen år gammel tolkningstradisjon.<sup>11</sup>

Det første en kan merke seg, er tanken om en opprinnelig sosial og kulturell enhet – alle taler til å begynne det samme språk. En opprinnelig enhet er som topos riktignok ikke uvanlig i den antikke verden. Den er for eksempel å finne hos Platon i en erotisk vending i *Gjestebud*. Der presenterer Aristofanes *eros* som en trang til å gjenopprette den opprinnelige fysiske enheten mellom mann og kvinne som Zevs etter gudenes rådsmøte har kløvet fordi den truet gudenes makt.

Tanken om en opprinnelig enhet er interessant i dag ikke minst fordi den står i kontrast til den aktuelle verdenssituasjonen der ethvert felles grunnlag for kommunikasjon synes tapt. Også teoretisk er det stemmer som den til Gert Biesta<sup>12</sup> som avviser begrepet mangfold fordi det impliserer et felles grunnlag, og som i stedet foreslår å gå ut fra en radikal forskjellighet. I den forbindelse spinner han videre på Alphonso Lingis<sup>13</sup> som skrev en bok med tittelen “The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common”. Hvis en aksepterer premissen til en radikal forskjellighet og inkommensurabel fremmedhet synes en oppdragelse til verdensborgerskap ikke mulig. Da måtte en gi opp håpet på gjensidig forståelse, felles erfaring og samhandling og nøye seg med en systemisk homeostase. En kan tenke seg da en viss samordning av atferd, men ikke et felles formål.

Det er imidlertid vanskelig å avgjøre spørsmålet empirisk. Erfaringsmessig vil en støte på mange situasjoner der meddelelsen mislykkes, noe som peker i retning av absolutt fremmedhet. Men det fins også overraskende øyeblikk av et møte som kan tas som tegn på et felles erfaringsgrunnlag.

Biesta støtter seg i sine overveielser fram for alt til Hannah Arendts begreper<sup>14</sup> handling og nativitet. Arendt påpeker menneskets evne til handling dvs. til å begynne noe nytt. Den enkelte er således ikke fastlagt på forhånd. Hver og en av oss er noe nytt i verden og en ny mulighet. Hvem jeg er, viser seg først i handlingen og er dermed prinsipielt åpent. I det ser

11 Konrad Bach, *Der Turmbau zu Babel* (GRIN-Verlag, 2005). Arno Borst, *Der Turmbau von Babel. Geschichte der Meinungen über Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Völker*, 4 Bände (München: dtv, 1995).

12 Gert J.J. Biesta, *Beyond Learning. Democratic Education for a Human Future* (London: Paradigm, 2006).

13 Alphonso Lingis, *The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

14 Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1958).

jeg eksistensialismens viktige bidrag til vår selvforståelse. Det enestående og ubestemte ved mennesket kan imidlertid neppe tas til inntekt for tesen om en radikal forskjellighet. Det fastholder snarere en prinsipiell mulighet til kommunikasjon. Handling bygger på kommunikasjon som bokstavelig betyr å skape noe felles, en felles forståelse.

Det som i et kulturhistorisk perspektiv gjør inntrykk ved den bibelske fortellingen, er det universelle perspektivet. Den løftes herved ut av den mytiske verden som er preget av dikotomier der guder star mot titaner, mennesker mot guder, og vi mot barbarer. I fortellingen finner vi en bevissthet om forskjellighet der alle er fremmede for hverandre. Det er den første skriftlige teksten jeg vet om, som hevder forskjellighet som et faktum og opererer med en forteller som kunne være hvor som helst i verden.

For den verdensborgerlige oppdragelsen kan en her fastholde to ideer. Den ene er den moralske ideen om et globalt fellesskap, en opprinnelig enhet av menneskeheten. Skjønt, jeg er ikke den første å påpeke at fellesskapstanken må utvides til å gjelde alt liv og kanskje verdenen som sådan. I så henseende fins et den slående analogi i Harry Martinsons roman *Aniara* fra 1956. Den beskriver et svært romskip, «Aniara», et navn hentet fra gammelgresk som betyr fortvilelse. Skipet skulle dra til Mars etter at Jorden er blitt ubeboelig. Det har kommet ut av kurs og kretser nå hjelpeløst rundt Jorden. Romanen kan leses som en invitasjon til et globalt perspektiv på Jorden. Satelittbilder viser denne som et romskip innhyllet av et tynt luftlag og omgitt av et umåtelig tomrom som er absolutt livsfjendtlig.

I hvert fall har tesen om opprinnelig enhet og fellesskap radikale konsekvenser for den verdensborgerlige oppdragelsen. Den betyr at oppdragelsen kan ta sikte på å gjenforene det som er spredd og splittet, og på å gjenopprette det tapte fellesskapet. Dens siste oppgave ville bety en kulturell rekonstruksjon, sosial formidling og forsoning, fred.

Den andre ideen handler om språket som medium for fellesskap og splittelse. Når en er konfrontert med konflikter hører man ofte si at partene ikke taler samme språk. De kan bruke de samme ordene, men mener ulike ting, og de involverte behøver ikke engang være oppmerksomme på det. I fortellingen bryter den språklige splittelsen opp fellesskapet. Språk og kommunikasjon er dermed den kritiske faktoren i en verdensborgerlig oppdragelse.

En konsekvens er å lære ett eller flere fremmedspråk. Det er riktignok uansett nyttig, men betyr også en desentrering. Den pragmatiske språkfilosofien hos Wittgenstein<sup>15</sup> antyder at å tale et språk er å delta i en bestemt praksis. Å lære et fremmedspråk betyr derfor å gå inn i en ny verden som viser seg å være like fornuftig som den en kommer fra.

Et annet aspekt ved språket er å tilegne seg et verdensborgerlig syn, dvs. å utvikle et refleksivt forhold til sitt første språk. Så snart en begynner å reflektere over ens eget språk er en nødt til å oppgi et skille som går tilbake til antikken, der grekerne skjelnet mellom språket talt av de greske stammene og barbarenes uforståelige «bra-bra». Morsmålet som er grunnen en står på, og luften en puster i, slutter i det refleksive lyset å være noe naturlig

15 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2001).

og selvfølgelig og blir noe en taler fordi man tilfeldigvis er født på et bestemt sted og tidspunkt. Det blir til et kommunikasjonsmedium blant talløse og dramatisk forskjellige andre. Det viser seg å være resultat av en overenskomst og noe som ikke tilhører en personlig men fellesskapet. Jeg kan ikke gjøre med det som jeg vil, men har en forpliktelse til å ta vare og utvikle det, desto mer i det jeg får øye på dets sårbarhet og vitale verdi.

Denne denaturaliseringen av morsmålet er i beste fall ubekvem, ofte opplevd som nar-sissistisk fornærmelse eller til og med som trussel. Ubekvem er den fordi tilegnelsen av et fremmedspråk koster betydelig tid og kraft, mens belønningen lar vente på seg. Den kan også oppleves som en nar-sissistisk fornærmelse fordi kravet synes å implisere at det er et eller annet galt med mitt eget språk eller mine kommunikative ferdigheter eller begge deler. En føler seg dum, hjelpeløs og innesperret i det nye språket lenge før en kan nyte strevets frukter. En kan til og med oppleve kravet som en trussel mot sin identitet før en opplever at det fremmede språket framhever verdien av sitt eget og bekrefter det som kilde til glede og stolthet.

Hva er så omstendigheten som fortellingen identifiserer som kilde til språklig forskjellighet og forvirring? Tegsteinbakerne og by- og tårnbyggerne går i gang med sine prosjekter for å gjøre seg et navn, for å framstille noe som de kan identifisere seg med, for å skape samhold og for å unngå å bli spredd for alle vinder. I sentrum av fortellingen står et paradoks idet tiltakene fører til resultater de var ment å forhindre. Fortellingen legger fingeren på identitetsarbeidets ambivalente om ikke paradoksale funksjon.

På den bakgrunnen er det tankevekkende at fortellingen skulle bli forstått som en eksemplarisk framstilling av menneskelig hybris og dens følger. En slik lesning synes å forutsette fortellerens tilsløring av de sanne motivene. Da skulle det ikke dreie seg om et ønske om samhold, men om overmøt og vilje til makt. Selv i lys av mistenksomhetens hermeneutikk finner hybris-tesen svak støtte i fortellingen og bare i den forstand at hensikten er å bygge et tårn som rekker opp til himmelen.

Sammenlignet med Arendts (1958) distinksjoner mellom arbeid, tilvirkning og handling (labor, work, action) ser vi at fortelleren identifiserer tilvirkningen (work) som middel og medium for identitetsarbeidet. Det er kanskje ikke helt i samsvar med Arendts tese om at det er handlingen dvs. kommunikasjonen som viser *hvem* vi er. Likevel løfter Arendt tilvirkningen av bruksgjenstander fram som den aktiviteten som skaper verdenen av ting og dermed gir den stabilitet. Derfra er det ikke langt til den bibelske fortellingen som foreslår at mennesker kjenner seg igjen og gjenkjennes av andre i gjenstandene de lager, og at de bruker disse gjenstandene som fysiske bevis på sin samhörighet.

Det er vanskelig å tenke seg at fortelleren med det tar sikte på konkrete pedagogiske konsekvenser som at vi skulle slutte å være *homines fabri* og således slutte med å lage oss et navn. Imidlertid kan en skimte en advarsel mot det kontra-produktive ved søken om identitet. Identitetsarbeidet er ikke bare noe som fører mennesker sammen, men også noe som splitter og setter folk opp mot hverandre. Ideen om kulturell renhet må i siste konsekvens føre til oppløsning av enhver identitet. Den fører logisk til en progressiv kulturell avgrensning og strider mot kulturens logikk. Den består jo i kulturens varige utvikling som

bygger på motsigelser og konflikter. Innflytelse utenfra er derfor ikke bare uunngåelig men nødvendig.

Å slå fast identitetens paradoksale funksjon betyr ikke å argumentere mot identitetsarbeid, men snarere for størst mulig kompleksitet i identiteten som strekker seg fra pleien av individuell egenart til identifikasjon med verden som helhet. Det betyr i grunnen et kontinuerlig arbeid med betydninger slik Hansens begrep om *curriculum som verdensborgerlig arv* innebærer.<sup>16</sup>

Fortellingen kan leses ut fra ulike perspektiver. Forstått som systemisk refleksjon tilbyr den en narrativ forklaring av språklig differensiering og global spredning av arten. Fortellingen begynner og slutter med en vandring og reflekterer slik sett overgangen fra en nomadisk til en urban livsform. Det endelige målet med urbaniseringen synes å være samholdet: anstrengelser er rettet mot å forhindre at folket skal spres for alle vinder. Midlene er å danne seg et navn, en identitet, mens evnen til å framstille en verden av ting, av murstein, by, tårn, framstår som menneskeartens særskilte kjennetegn.

Lest i den videre konteksten av Genesis der kulturhistorien begynner med oppvåkningen av bevisstheten i paradiset, fortsetter med konflikten mellom to grunnleggende tilpassingsformer nomadisk avl og bofast jordbruk (Kain og Abel), tematiserer fortellingen om Babels tårn urbanisering og tilvirkning av bruksgjenstander.

Gudeskikkelsen kan i denne sammenhengen forstås som *deus ex machina*, dvs. som den paradoksale logikken i urbanisering og samvirke. Hva er det ved produksjonen av bruksgjenstander som fører til at mennesker ikke lenger forstår hverandre og kanskje ikke seg selv heller? Ligger i denne evnen en spire til tingliggjøring og fremmedgjøring? I hvert fall reiser fortellingen spørsmålet og innbyr til videre refleksjon.

Bakenfor en slik systemisk lesning dukker det opp to andre spenningsforhold og gjør fortellingen til en undersøkelse av begjær og moral. I det første tilfelle får man øye på et overdrevent ønske om samhold, et ønske som ytrer seg i hybris på sin gruppes vegne, i søken etter berømmhet, etter en framhevet posisjon vis a vis andre. Ærgjerrigheten bygger på den produktive evnen til å framstille ting, en evne som bærer på spiren til sitt eget fall i den forstand at har en først begitt seg ut på veien til å være best, eller i hvert fall bedre enn den andre vil til sist også de individuelle båndene bli ødelagt. Det er ikke godt å si hvor den sosialpsykologiske refleksjonen slutter og den moralske begynner.

Men fortellingen går enda dypere. Som religiøs refleksjon er den egnet til å forundre. Der framstår hendelsen i beste fall som en maktkamp, i verste viser den en forbausende dårlig informert, engstelig, misunnelig og smålig, ja muligens beint fram barnslig Gud som ikke tåler at noen andre skal være i stand til å skape noe vakkert og fint. Hvordan det enn er, møter vi en Gud som kommer stigende ned fra himmelen, overrasket fastslår at menneskene taler samme språk og på grunnlag av dette vil være i stand til å nå alle mål de måtte sette seg. Det truer hans maktposisjon. Interessant nok fører denne tilsynelatende religi-

16 David T. Hansen, *The Teacher and the World: A Study of Cosmopolitanism as Education. Teacher quality and school development* (Routledge, 2011), 92-96.

øse refleksjonen tilbake til systemiske utsagn, nemlig at mestring forutsetter et samvirke som igjen forutsetter et felles språk. Handlet utdrivelsen fra Paradiset om kunnskapens og bevissthetens fremmedgjørende virkning, handler tårnbyggingen om en tilsvarende funksjon ved framstilling av gjenstander og bruksting.

## Noen særtrekk ved kunstnerisk kommunikasjon

Jeg forlater nå analysen av det konkrete kunstverket og prøver å identifisere kommunika- tive muligheter i kunsten på et mer allment plan. Det gjør jeg ved å sammenstille noen kunstfilosofiske refleksjoner som synes relevante for en verdensborgerlig oppdragelse.

En første pekepinn er å finne hos Hansen i uttrykket «curriculum som verdensborger- lig arv». Det sikter til at kunstnerisk kommunikasjon representerer dokumenter av men- neskets søken etter mening (quest of meaning) og handler om verk som „continuously yield insight and understanding to those who dwell with them“ og som er „edifying, they deepen, broaden, and enrich the person’s outlook“.<sup>17</sup> En kunne her se en parallell til Wolf- gang Klafkis begrep om klassisk danning som er definert som et didaktisk utvalgsprinsipp. Undervisningen skal konsentrere seg om innhold som «gjør bestemte menneskelige kva- liteter transparente på en måte som overbeviser, griper og oppfordrer til etterfølgelse».<sup>18</sup>

For den kunstneriske fiksjonen gjør Richard Rorty<sup>19</sup> en beslektet egenskap gjeldende. I møtet med skjønnlitteraturen ser han en mulighet til å bryte ut av sin selvopptatthet (egotism). Når en innlater seg på en fortelling går en inn i fortellerens verden og ser på hendelser og handlinger gjennom dennes og de litterære figurenes øyne. Slik sett er å lese skjønnlitteratur en kontinuerlig øvelse i å ta en annens perspektiv, og det fins vel knapt et mer sentralt aspekt for en verdensborgerlig oppdragelse enn denne evnen til desentrering.

Hans-Georg Gadamer har grepet fenomenet på en kanskje enda mer radikal måte. I sin studie av forvandlingen av lek til skuespill taler han om en «Verwandlung ins Gebilde», en forvandling til verket. Det dreier seg ikke om en endring som forutsetter og innebærer kontinuitet, men om et brudd, om at «noe på en gang og i sin helhet er noe annet».<sup>20</sup> Det Gadamer sikter til er at det i kunstytringen oppstår det et allment gyldighetskriterium. Men allerede leken som sådan betyr en overskridelse, en øvelse i å våge å utsette seg for det fremmede, finne glede og berikelse i det og overskride seg selv i retning av noe allment.

Mens Gadamers *forvandling* griper det transformative i møtet med kunst og fiksjon holder Aristotels’ *mimesis* fast det representative. Aristoteles hevder i sin *Poetik* at dramaet representerer handlinger og personer og derved fører til en transformativ rekonstruksjon av erfaring. I kunstverkets re-presentasjon endres, utvikles og avklares erfaringen. Innhol-

17 Hansen, *The Teacher and the World: A Study of Cosmopolitanism as Education. Teacher quality and school develop- ment*, 96.

18 Wolfgang Klafki, *Studien zur Bildungstheorie und Didaktik* (Weinheim: Beltz, 1975), 30.

19 Richard Rorty, «Redemption from Egotism: James and Proust as Spiritual Exercises,» *Telos* 3 (2001): 243-63.

20 Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, 116.

det i denne representasjonen bestemmer Aristoteles med *mythos* og *ethos* der den første termen betegner handlingens tids- og romstruktur, mens den siste betegner den handlen- des mentale struktur, dens emosjoner, tanker og hensikter. Sett fra et slikt perspektiv dis- kuterer den bibelske fortellingen framstillingen av gjenstander og arbeidet med identitet.

Aristoteles' sammenligning mellom historikeren og poeten utdyper det objektive og subjektive perspektivet i kunsten. Forskjellen mellom historikeren og poeten ligger, ifølge Aristoteles, ikke i at den ene skriver prosa og den andre vers, men i at førstnevnte «gjen- gir det som har hendt, mens sistnevnte framstiller det som kan hende. Derfor er diktning en mer filosofisk og mer alvorlig ting enn historieskriving. Diktning tenderer til å tale om universelle saker, historiografien om partikulære».<sup>21</sup> Jeg foreslår her en fortolkning i to ret- ninger. Den ene er at det i diktningen dukker opp nye, hittil uoppdagede og urealiserte muligheter i det faktiske. Diktningen overskrider altså en aktuell tilstand og undersøker dens ideale muligheter. Den andre retningen er at diktning rekonstruerer allmenne struk- turer i handling og sinn. Kunsten bygger med andre ord på en abstraksjonsprosess som gjør at hverdagens erfaringer frigjøres av tilfeldigheter og støy slik at allmenne mønstre kan tre fram i det partikulære.

Leser man den bibelske fortellingen med Aristoteles' distinksjon mellom historieskriving og diktning for øye, ser en straks at fortolkningen må velge mellom to svært forskjellige objekter. Lest som en faktisk beretning er vi konfrontert med rapporterte hendelser og må vurdere om rapporten taler sant, om utviklingen skjedde slik den er skildret. En av de prak- tiske konsekvensene av slik lesning kunne være at en ikke skal lære seg et fremmed språk fordi en dermed prøver å motsette eller unndra seg Guds vilje eller straff. I siste konsekvens måtte en avstå fra kunnskap og fra å produsere ting overhodet. Da er det tale om å oppgi den menneskelige livsform som sådan.

Leser vi fortellingen derimot som poetisk framstilling ser vi oss ikke konfrontert med fakta, men med fortellerens tanker og refleksjoner. Da kan vi gå i samtale med det poetiske. Jeg om hva fortellingen betyr, hvordan den kan tolkes og hvor holdbare dens antydninger er. En forutsetter da at fortelleren rekonstruerer handlinger og karakterer på en slik måte at de framhever bestemte mønstre og strukturer i fortellerens erfaring. Slik blir handlinger og personer mer forståelige og åpne for den normative refleksjonen. Fiksjon blir således en innbydelse til etisk refleksjon og dialog.

Egenskapen ved den estetiske kommunikasjonsmodus blir enda klarere hvis en trekker inn Immanuel Kants<sup>22</sup> distinksjon mellom bestemmende og reflekterende dømmekraft. Mens den bestemmende dømmekraften gir muligheten til å forstå verdenen ved hjelp av foreliggende begreper, dvs. «sette ord på ting» eller også å illustrere et begrep ved hjelp av konkrete eksempler, gir den reflekterende dømmekraften muligheten til å utvikle begreper på grunnlag av enkeltfenomener. Det estetiske bygger på en særskilt form for reflekterende dømmekraft, nemlig en refleksjon som aldri når fram til begrep eller regel. Med dette iden-

21 Aristotle, *Poet.* I.9, 1451b4-8.

22 Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Werkausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000).

tifiserer Kant kunsten som en ikke-proposisjonell kommunikasjons- og refleksjonsmodus. Det dreier seg med andre ord om en kommunikasjon som ikke påstår og bare setter fram tanker. Uten å måtte gå god for Kants metodologiske premisser kan en dermed forstå kunsten som en innbydelse til lekende refleksjoner om alle sider ved livet og verdenen og som et vell av forslag til å forstå dem. Den pedagogiske betydningen av denne observasjonen kan knapt overvurderes. Med denne egenskapen kan kunsten bidra til en kommunikativ kultur som ikke er påståelig, men istedenfor undrende, spørrende og foreslående.

Foreligger med Kants skillet mellom bestemmende og reflekterende dømmekraft allerede en grenseoppgang mellom regelstyrt diskurs og estetisk kommunikasjon, kan den klargjøres ytterligere ved hjelp Langers<sup>23</sup> nykantianske tilnærming. Hun skjeler mellom presentativ og diskursiv symbolikk på grunnlag av måten symbolikken projiserer sine tanker på. Den diskursive symbolikken danner utsagn ved å sette ett begrep etter det andre. Den bygger på et leksikon der ord defineres ved hjelp av andre, og på en syntaks som kombinerer begreper til setninger. Langer sammenligner setningen med en tørkeline som det festes tøyestykker på. Mens en ellers bærer dem opp på hverandre er de tydelig atskilt på tørkelinen. Styrken ved projeksjonsformen er at den tillater høy presisjon. Prisen er en dramatisk forenkling slik at den ikke egner seg for framstilling av kompleksitet eller subtilitet. Den presentative symbolikken derimot benytter seg av mønstre og strukturer som tilbyr uendelig variabilitet, kompleksitet og subtilitet. Dens styrke er å formulere subtile og komplekse saksforhold. Dens svakhet, hvis det er en svakhet, er at den ikke kan danne påstander og i stedet nøyer seg med å framsette tanker.

Mht. den verdensborgerlige oppdragelsen supplerer Langer Kants tanke om den estetiske kommunikasjonens lekende kvalitet med dens evne til å representere det komplekse og subtile ved følelser og sosiale relasjoner.

Så langt handlet det i hovedsak om aspekter ved den estetiske kommunikasjonen generelt. For en teori som behandler kunst som særskilt estetisk fenomen, vil jeg trekke inn Friedrich Schillers<sup>24</sup> litteraturteori. Dikteren og filosofen definerer kunsten i spenningsforholdet mellom empirisk og moralsk orientering og som syntesen av disse i kunstverket. Imidlertid vil det, ifølge ham, ikke engang i kunsten være mulig å finne en fullstendig balanse eller syntese, og det konkrete verket vil alltid helle enten til den empiriske eller den moralske siden. Det fins således en litteratur, satiren som er mer empirisk og teoretisk interessert, mer interessert i fakta, og en litteratur, elegien, som er mer interessert i moral og idealer. I satiren skjeler Schiller mellom komedie og tragedie der komedien er mer faktaorientert, dvs. ønsker å identifisere verdens skjevheter og utlevere dem til latteren. Men denne teoretiske interessen må knyttes til idealer ellers produserer komedien bare en kald latter og

23 Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a new key: a study in the symbolism of reason, rite, and art* (New York: New American Library, 1942).

24 Friedrich Schiller, «Ueber naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung,» i *Philosophische Schriften. Schillers Werke: Nationalausgabe. Bd. 20-21* (Weimar: Böhlau Nachfolger, 1962).

er av liten estetisk verdi. Tragediens oppgave derimot er å vise heltens uunngåelige fysiske undergang og i denne framheve heltens moralske seier.

Elegien er på en måte satirens speilbilde og mest moralsk interessert. Den skaper fiksjonen av en fjern fortid hvor idealet ennå var realisert. Formålet med projeksjonen er ikke historisk sannhet, men å vise at idealet lar seg realisere og å holde liv i håpet om at det en gang i framtiden skal bli realisert igjen. Slik sett svarer den bibelske fortellingen til en viss grad til elegien i Schillers betydning siden den forespeiler en prinsipiell mulighet til felles språk og felles formål og hensikter. Fortellingen gjør en verdensborgerlig tilstand tenkbar. Men den har også en tragisk side ved at fortellingen viser at den sosiale splittelsen er forankret i artens særskilte egenskaper – språk, bofast livsform og tilvirkning.

Den høyeste formen for litteratur finner Schiller imidlertid i idyllen som han forstår som en syntese av det teoretiske og moralske, av fakta og ideal. Idyllen tar utgangspunkt i samtidens komplekse virkelighet og viser hvordan idealene – rettferdighet, vennskap, kjærlighet – lar seg realisere under komplekse og motsigelsesfulle forhold. Idyllen er altså ikke en virkelighetsflukt men studerer muligheten til et bedre samfunn. Her ligger litteraturens utopiske mulighet. Jeg tar med idyllen selv om den ikke treffer den bibelske fortellingen. Men den viser fiksjonens trefoldige funksjon: den må identifisere vesentlige mønstre og strukturer i det aktuelle samfunnet, den må ha en substansiell moralsk refleksjon og den må skape en plausibel linje fra faktum til ideal. Med det mener jeg er den sentrale oppgaven i en verdensborgerlig oppdragelse satt ord på.

Avslutningsvis trekker jeg fram en egenskap ved den estetiske kommunikasjonen som Sigmund Freud<sup>25</sup> har belyst gjennom sine drømmeanalyser og som har blitt til en vanlig erfaring i kunstkritikken. Det handler om evnen til å kommunisere det forbudte og ekskommuniserte. Analyser av eventyr<sup>26</sup> (Hohr 2000, 2012) kan illustrere kritikken på maktmisbruk og undertrykkelse i en litterær sjanger, når andre kanaler for å fremme kritikken synes å være stengt. Drømmen som estetisk kommunikasjon (med seg selv) er i så måte interessant. Den illustrerer muligheten hos den presentative symbolikken til å gjenkalle og artikulere det fortrenge (ønsker) og benektete (fakta), men viser også dens mulighet til forfall. Drømmen kan nemlig ikke bare framstille det forbudte, men samtidig også selve forbudet slik at den avsporer og forvrenger den opprinnelige impulsen. Det betyr at det oppstår et sprik mellom et latent og manifest drømmeinnhold som derved tilslører impulsen. Med det er også forvrengningsmuligheter antydnet som truer den estetiske kommunikasjonen. Det er nemlig slik at også anti-verdensborgerlige orienteringer benytter seg av estetisk kommunikasjon slik vi kjenner den fra nazi-estetikken, sen-industriell konsumisme og radikal islamisme.

25 Sigmund Freud, *Die Traumdeutung. Über den Traum. Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 2/3* (Fischer: Frankfurt am Main, 1976).

26 Hansjörg Hohr, «Dynamic Aspects of Fairy Tales: Social and emotional competence through fairy tales,» *Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research* 44 (2000): 89-103, doi: 10.1080/713696665. Hansjörg Hohr, *Das Märchen – zwischen Kunst, Mythos und Spiel* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), doi: 10.3726/978-3-653-01862-2.

## Avsluttende bemerkninger

Med perspektivet på kunsten som ikke-proposisjonell oppstår et visst spenningsforhold til diskursbegrepet hos Jürgen Habermas.<sup>27</sup> Hans tanke om en argumentativ kultur synes ved første øyekast å stå i skarp kontrast til kunstens fleksible flertydighet. Men en kan også se den estetiske kommunikasjonen som et nødvendig supplement til diskursen og kanskje som dens forutsetning. Kunsten kan gjennom sin framgangsmåte skape grunnlaget for argumenter. Diskursens ideal og styrke er abstraksjon, presisjon og entydighet. Derimot er den ikke egnet til å produsere nye ideer. Her gir den presentative symbolikken med sin fleksibilitet, kompleksitet og flertydighet langt bedre muligheter. Dernest er den estetiske kommunikasjonen grunnleggende i forhandling av sosiale relasjoner. Diskursen føres jo ikke av abstrakte og logiske subjekter, men av mennesker som må utvikle tillit og anerkjennelse<sup>28</sup> for å kunne innlate seg på diskursen. Anerkjennelsen av det «bedre argument»<sup>29</sup> forutsetter åpenhet og tillit – og kanskje lekens distanse. Er de fraværende blir argumentasjon et spørsmål om styrke, retorisk skoloring og til syvende og sist om symbolsk vold. Argumenter kan nemlig ikke bare overbevise, men også overkjøre.

Sammenlignet med den diskursive kommunikasjonen viser kunsten betydelige fordeler i en verdensborgerlig oppdragelse. Den er relativt tolerant når det gjelder flertydighet, og er motstandsdyktig når det gjelder konfliktfylte temaer, eller sagt med andre ord, den er særlig egnet til å artikulere motsigelser og løfte konflikter inn i kommunikasjonen. Den har sin styrke i å artikulere kompleksitet og subtilitet som gjør den særlig egnet til å kommunisere emosjoner og forhandle sosiale relasjoner. Den forener virkelighetsoppfatning med moralsk refleksjon, utforsker handlingsmønstre og motivstrukturer og fremmer sine tanker ikke som påstander eller påbud men snarere som forslag og spørsmål.

En må kunne si at kunsten fremmer fornuften, og det er vanskelig å se hvordan en oppdragelse til fornuft kunne klare seg uten kunst og estetisk kommunikasjon i videre betydning. Slik sett er kunsten grunnleggende for rasjonalisering av livsverdenen som er den verdensborgerlige oppdragelsens formål.

I det jeg løfter fram disse aspektene ved kunstnerisk kommunikasjon vil jeg på ingen måte devaluere diskursens betydning i en verdensborgerlig oppdragelse. Argumenter er verdifulle og grunnleggende redskaper når en skal ta informerte og overveiede beslutninger. I argumenter fins en ambisjon og forventning om universalisering som en ikke kan være foruten i handling. Derfor kan jeg ikke se for meg en verdensborgerlig oppdragelse uten oppdragelse til argumentasjon og diskurs i Habermas' forstand.<sup>30</sup> Samtidig må en se diskursens begrensninger vis a vis praksis som en helhet, dens kompleksitet, emosjonalitet og motsigelser.

27 Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981).

28 Axel Honneth, *Kampf um Anerkennung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2010).

29 Lars Løvlie, *Det pedagogiske argument* (Oslo: Cappelen, 1984).

30 Tomas Englund, «The Potential of Education for Creating Mutual Trust: Schools as sites for deliberation», *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 43 (2011): 236-248, doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2009.00594.x.

Jeg må samtidig melde en viss dissens til Biesta som i *Beyond Learning. Democratic Education for a Human Future* kontrasterer det «rasjonelle fellesskapet» med «det andre fellesskapet» som konstitueres i kommunikasjonen av det som ikke kan sies. Oppstillingen bygger på antakelsen om at rasjonalisering betyr uniformering og tilpasning. I denne sfæren må gjelde at  $2+2=4$ . Jeg kan ikke slutte meg til en slik rasjonalitetsforståelse som setter fornuft lik formallogikk. Går en som Biesta ut fra Arendts handlingsbegrep og dermed ut fra det enestående ved individet, ville en likhetsskapende fornuft være i konflikt med et antropologisk faktum. Av samme grunn kan jeg ikke slutte meg til Adolpho Lingis som ser for seg „a community of those who have nothing in common”. Fornuft betyr ikke «Gleichschaltung». Den krever riktignok anerkjennelse av argumentets logikk, men også åpenhet overfor motstridende perspektiver, følelser og interesser. Det fornuftige møtet med forskjellighet betyr et stadig arbeid med konflikter og en resulterende transformasjon. Kunsten er underlagt like strenge krav på rasjonalitet som diskursen. Hvem for eksempel skulle benekte rasjonaliteten i den bibelske fortellingen? Og hvordan skulle en kunne gå ut fra en radikal sosial og kulturell forskjellighet når en står overfor en fortelling som taler til oss gjennom årtusener?

# Rebecca Adami

## Paideia and Cosmopolitan Education: On Subjectification, Politics and Justice

### Abstract

Can human rights in education be read as not empty words but as a critical framework in order to enhance students and teachers capacity to reimagine their local community and to rethink the rules and laws that support such a social community? This paper examines constraints with human rights in cosmopolitan education, drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt, Cornelius Castoriadis and Adriana Cavarero. By placing learning at the center of political community, as Castoriadis through the notion of *paideia*, the aims of such an education become a focal point in discussing the tensions between local and global ethical concerns. According to Castoriadis, society exists only insofar as it is embodied in its social individuals. Society and its individuals are in a constant process toward relational autonomy that implies a moral self-limitation. At the core of this inquiry into moral subjectification is the need to re-think human rights and the pedagogical subject in relational terms that imply self-limitation and political engagement in social community.

### Keywords

Human rights, education, justice, Cornelius Castoriadis

## Introduction

The tensions between global and local concerns are actualized in justice education. A premise in this paper is that political subjectification is both moral and relational.<sup>1</sup> How learners are to develop a sense of responsibility in a world of difference has been explored both from a nationalistic terminology in patriotic education<sup>1</sup> and citizenship education<sup>2</sup> as well

---

1 Martha Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," In *For Love of Country*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996). Martha Nussbaum, "Toward a Globally Sensitive Patriotism," *Daedalus* 137 (2008), doi: 10.1162/daed.2008.137.3.78. Marianna Papastephanou, "Cosmopolitanism Discarded: Martha Nussbaum's Patriotic Education and the Inward-Outward Distinction," *Ethics and Education* 8 (2013). Claudia Schumann, "Which Love of Country? Tensions, Questions, and Contexts for Cosmopolitanism and Patriotism in Education," presented at the *Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain PESGB*, New College, Oxford, March 26, 2015.

2 Cf. James A. Banks, "Citizenship Education and Diversity Implications for Teacher Education," *Journal of Teacher Education* 52, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 5-16; Fred M. Newmann, "Citizenship Education in the United States: A Statement of Needs," May 1987.

---

Rebecca Adami, Södertörn University, Sweden  
E-mail: [rebecca.adami@sh.se](mailto:rebecca.adami@sh.se)

---

Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi | [www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf](http://www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf) | ISSN nr. 22449140

---

Årgang 4 | Nr. 2 | 2015 | side 68-80

---

as from a universalistic terminology in cosmopolitan education<sup>3</sup> and human rights education.<sup>4</sup> The division between patriotic<sup>5</sup> and cosmopolitan<sup>6</sup> explorations on justice education sheds light on a presumed dichotomy between national/global belonging and rights. I have elsewhere<sup>7</sup> argued that we need to move beyond this dichotomy as politics is not confined to spaces determined by a local/global terminology and human rights as universal principles can be voiced through local concerns.

There is a theoretical vantage point of developing the term of critical cosmopolitanism as it is situated between the ‘tensions within modernity’,<sup>8</sup> between universalism and globalization on the one hand, and particularism and plurality on the other hand.<sup>9</sup> A critical cosmopolitanism is meant to ‘pick out those processes which might not equally well be discussed under the heading of globalization’.<sup>10</sup> But there is still the need to explore how interactions between universalistic, idealizing aspirations and particularist commitments can be understood in education.

Questions dealing with social justice in education today have given way to time-consuming measurement of effectiveness stirred in contemporary educational discourses on neoliberalism. The notion of the learning subject as an autonomous individual, responsible for her/his own learning is being continuously articulated through educational policies such as the *No Child Left Behind Act*. This policy focuses on improving ‘individual outcome’ in education through standard testing and suggests that learning is a sovereign endeavor. Responsibility is thus seen as individual, not relational. Frank Margonis<sup>11</sup> raises a post-colonial critique against such individualistic views of responsibility in education, arguing that when students are expelled from school, as a punishment for not taking responsibility for ‘their learning’, something more fundamental is at stake than merely proving a moral point.<sup>12</sup> The relational dynamics of responsibility, of acting ethical in pedagogical relations, loses its

3 Cf. David T. Hansen, *Exploring the Moral Heart of Teaching* (New York & London: Teachers College Press, 2001); Casey E. George-Jackson, “The Cosmopolitan University: The Medium toward Global Citizenship and Justice.” *Policy Futures in Education* 8, no. 2 (2010).

4 George J. Andreopoulos and Richard Pierre Claude, *Human Rights Education for the Twenty-First Century*, (Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); Cornelia, Roux, *Safe Spaces Human Rights Education in Diverse Contexts*, (Rotterdam; Boston: Sense, 2012).

5 Nussbaum, “Toward a Globally Sensitive Patriotism.”

6 Marianna Papastephanou, “Cosmopolitanism Discarded: Martha Nussbaum’s Patriotic Education and the Inward-Outward Distinction,” *Ethics and Education* 8, no. 2 (2013).

7 Rebecca Adami, “Human Rights For More Than One Voice: Re-Thinking Political Space Beyond the Local/Global Divide,” *Ethics & Global Politics* 7, no. 4 (2014): 163-80.

8 G. Delanty “The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 57, no. 1 (2006): 8.

9 Claudia Schumann and Rebecca Adami, “Towards a Critical Cosmopolitanism in Human Rights Learning: The Vienna Conference in 1993,” In ed. Marianna Papastephanou, Torill Strand and Anne Pirrie, *Philosophy as Lived Experience. Navigating through Dichotomies of Thought and Action*, (Berlin: VDM Verlag, 2014).

10 *Ibid.*, 274.

11 Frank Margonis in a talk at Teachers College, Program for Philosophy of Education Colloquium, Sep 2014, ‘Holding Students Responsible (and the Resulting Relational Pathologies)’, at Columbia University, New York.

12 *ibid.*

validity when learners are left outside the notion of belonging. As Gert Biesta<sup>13</sup> notes, learning should be seen primarily as a relational activity in a given social environment, through communication with others. What a notion of the learning subject as relational, drawing on John Dewey's notion of learning as communication implies, is an understanding that learning does not take place in a social vacuum, rather the ethics in pedagogical relations and the commitment to the social community play primary roles in learning with others. David Hansen<sup>14</sup> amongst others has stressed the importance of understanding how teachers and students create relations that exceed the classroom, encompassing their social and political community in which education is not seen as isolated from one's lived reality but becomes a way of life.

Drawing on this earlier research I articulate a notion of a relational learning on human rights and I will focus in the following more on the political dimensions. The problem with human rights learning is that there is a general lack of looking at its connection to the local politics and social community in which it is discussed. Human rights are generally discussed in relation to others, who are in need of rights, as a kind of charity, but this learning, I will argue, needs to take place *with* those who have no rights, and/or as enhancing pedagogical relations through critical and creative communication on the legislative and political community in which learners are situated.

## The Pedagogical Subject as Relational

Education and learning is at the center of the notion of human rights. There were two aims with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), the explicit aim was for everyone to learn their human rights in relation to its implicit aim, for everyone to claim human rights legally within a political community. The knowledge about human rights when acted upon can thus turn the articles of a declaration into actual legal and political entitlements but this requires adequate legal and political institutions in society – available to all. The realization of human rights is hindered by a lack of such institutions and hindered as well by people violating each others rights. Human rights is hence a web of conflicting claims and can be fully realized only (and this is an utopia) when individuals respect others rights as their own. If learning about human rights is an acknowledgement of its relational dimensions, as acted knowledge, then we can visualize this learning process as one that is in constant relation to others. There are different degrees of dependence in how we read the notion relationality. Thinkers who draw on Emmanuel Levinas tend to understand human dependence as almost being determined by others; that others actions are inflicted upon

---

13 Gert Biesta, "Of All Affairs, Communication Is the Most Wonderful: The Communicative Turn in Dewey's Democracy and Education," In ed. David T. Hansen, *John Dewey and Our Educational Prospect*, 23-38, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2006).

14 Hansen, *Exploring the Moral Heart of Teaching*.

oneself. Sharon Todd<sup>15</sup> for one has conceptualized learning *from* the other as this relational dependency, where the subject is called by the other's presence to listen.

I want to differentiate here between being relationally dependent and relationally determined by others, where I lean against the former notion in this paper. For example, one is dependent on others to communicate, but others do not determine how one chooses to respond to difference and agonistic standpoints. One is dependent on others for the realization of human rights; there is a dependency between the individual in relation to her/his community in which political, social, economic and cultural rights can flourish. Human rights are per definition a notion that concerns and sets limits for human relations, and relations between the individual and her/his society. However, one is not determined by the rules and laws given in a society or by the discriminatory practices between human beings, for an individual can initiate a thought, an imagination, an act, which is dissonant in a community, and this staging of dissensus can create a web of unforeseen relations and politics. As with the civil rights movement, overruling and questioning the '*status quo*' was initiated through speech and acts that went against the human-created-laws that individuals were supposed to be 'determined by'.

Both Hannah Arendt<sup>16</sup> and Adriana Cavarero<sup>17</sup> argue that it is in relation to others that politics is created, we get a glimpse of ourselves through our actions and words, which are relational, hence we are dependent on others for acknowledging our uniqueness, as distinct in relation to others. According to Cavarero,<sup>18</sup> the self is totally external and relational. I follow Cavarero<sup>19</sup> to the point of understanding uniqueness as distinct in relation to others, although her radical view of the self as totally external I see only if reading Cavarero as expressing here what is exposed to the self and others through narration (as narration is external).<sup>20</sup> Hence, what we can know of our self is external, but this does not take away the possibility that there is more, unseen, unspoken, inside. Arendt<sup>21</sup> and Cavarero<sup>22</sup> are interested in the external, in the relational dynamics of narration, since it bears the potential of having political significance.

The concept of 'uniqueness' according to Arendt, is ontologically coupled with plurality. Human beings make up a plurality in the world and through our words and deeds (which are relationally shared and given their political meaning) we expose our uniqueness in relation to others. We voice, not our particularity, but our uniqueness in relation to others,

---

15 Sharon Todd, *Learning from the Other: Levinas, Psychoanalysis, and Ethical Possibilities in Education*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).

16 Hannah Arendt, *Men in Dark Times*, (New York: Paperback, 1968); Hannah Arendt *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).

17 Adriana Cavarero, *Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood*, (New York: Routledge, 2000).

18 Cavarero, *Relating Narratives*.

19 Cavarero, *Relating Narratives*.

20 See further Rebecca Adami, *Human Rights Learning: The Significance of Narratives, Relationality and Uniqueness*. (Stockholm: Stockholm University Press, 2014).

21 Arendt, *Men in Dark Times*.

22 Cavarero, *Relating Narratives*.

in the plurality that human beings create in inhabiting the world. By this, the notion of uniqueness in relation to learning does not mean that learning is a solitary process that only involves the 'learning subject' who is sovereign as a rational individual. Rather, uniqueness indicates here that we learn *about* ourselves, and others *only* in concrete relations, between 'you' and 'me', seen as a process of becoming.

Drawing on this notion of relationality, that Arendt and Cavarero sees as an ontological condition for uniqueness and for acting and speaking in the world, we can conceptualize learning as a constant process of becoming, in relation to others. This shifts the focus, as Biesta<sup>23</sup> also argues in his reading of education as communication, to relations in education (the hidden curriculum) that concern the ethics and moral dimension of human interactions, both between individuals, and between the individual and her/his political community.

In order to explore this relational dimension as in relation to the political community and the transformative potential that education has when seen as central to political participation in community, I turn to Cornelius Castoriadis<sup>24</sup> and his notion of *paideia*. Following Castoriadis we find a conceptualization of the pedagogical subject as a relational project, who is in a constant movement towards freeing her/his capacity of doing and acting in the world together with others.<sup>25</sup> Castoriadis talks about pedagogy or *paideia*, which is aimed at subjectivity. Castoriadis argues that the most human quality is our ability for radical imagination, an imagination that has the ability to create something new. The pedagogical subject, drawing on Castoriadis, is a project; a process aimed at a certain autonomy, which for Castoriadis is always *both* individual and collective, as a coming into self-reflexivity. Castoriadis use the term 'social individual' to denote individual as reading 'sovereign and autonomous' but rather as in social community. Autonomy is hence created in relations with others, on a level of social community and according to Castoriadis this autonomy implies self-limitation.

## Re-claiming Politics as Relational Subjectification

The notion of politics that I am sketching out here in relation to human rights is broader than the general view of the political, concerning party politics, national politics and administrative governmental institutions in representative political systems. Both Arendt and Castoriadis are very inspired by the Greek *polis* in their understandings of politics. *What* makes up this public space and *how* do peoples actions and deeds receive their political significance in such a space? Both Arendt<sup>26</sup> and Castoriadis<sup>27</sup> center human relations at the

23 Biesta, "The Communicative Turn in Dewey's Democracy and Education."

24 Cornelius Castoriadis and David Ames Curtis, *World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination*. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997).

25 Castoriadis and Curtis, *World in Fragments*.

26 Hannah Arendt, *The Promise of Politics*, (New York: Schocken Books, 2005).

27 Cornelius Castoriadis, *Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

core of politics. Arendt sees politics as occurring when others receive words and actions that create a web of relations through reactions. Castoriadis, on the other hand, stresses the capacity of the human imagination in creating and recreating the society and the laws in our social communities. For Arendt,<sup>28</sup> the human being becomes distinct in relation to others when she speaks and acts in the world, it is only through our deeds that we get a glimpse of *who* we are on a public arena. For Castoriadis, politics is a process of subjectification, where he does not want to draw a distinct line between the social individual and society, since these constitute each other. In a sense, Arendt is as radical on this point, stating that the premise for politics is the ontological condition of plurality in the world.<sup>29</sup> We speak and act in a world with others, who are different.

The notion of politics that Arendt and Castoriadis offer in my reading is a radical reclaiming of the relational condition of politics, where human relations, words and deeds on a public arena are crucial, and where the political institutions of representative 'democracy' has little to do with politics in its 'true' sense. Politics, in this radical view, concerns everyone, and demands of everyone to care about our common world and to critically question the legal and political institutions of society, in order to create and recreate our political reality. Living in community with others is a condition for the possibility of acting political. Without a proper polis, a social community in which everyone has a moral obligation to speak their mind, there is no politics.

Instead of talking about a 'political subject' or defining politics as a certain set of 'acts' and 'formal processes', Arendt,<sup>30</sup> Castoriadis<sup>31</sup> and Cavarero<sup>32</sup> base politics on the condition of plurality and relationality. Hence, we cannot talk of a political subject who is a 'sovereign' individual who is 'political' or of a national system that is 'democratic', but we need to acknowledge the social individual as dependent on others to create politics, and to acknowledge our deeds and actions as reciprocal, created in relations and dependent on the responses they provoke in others. Castoriadis criticizes the understanding that there can be 'experts' in democracy or that 'representative democracy' is actually democratic. Following this line of thought, politics is nothing one can leave to the hand of 'politicians', but politics is created in the hands of people, acting together for change.

If human beings are dependent on others in this notion of politics and if there cannot be a clear line between individuals and society, then the *polis*, the political community in which peoples deeds and actions are counted as political, becomes crucial for understanding the radicality of politics.

---

28 Hannah Arendt, *Rahel Varnhagen, the Life of a Jewess*, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997); Lisa Jane Disch, *Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy: With a New Preface*, Cornell Paperbacks. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).

29 Arendt, *The Human Condition*.

30 Ibid.

31 Castoriadis, *Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy*.

32 Cavarero, *Relating Narratives*.

The notion of a *polis* is simultaneously a questioning of the political borders and even legal spaces that we are used to. The nation state as the natural space in which politics takes place and in which human beings are seen as equal before the law as citizens hence no longer becomes the natural way of conceptualizing political territory and space<sup>33</sup>. The political community, the *polis*, is not the same as a state. Both Arendt<sup>34</sup> and Castoriadis<sup>35</sup> spend time in their respective works on differentiating their notion of the *polis* and a notion of the state. At the center of this political space is communication, of acting and speaking in relation to others. The *ethos* of such a community, as Castoriadis argues, is developed through an ongoing process of moral subjectification through the notion of *paideia*.

### ***Paideia* at the Core of Political Community**

Castoriadis places not rationality but creative imagination as the 'core component of nontrivial thinking'.<sup>36</sup> His view of the social individuals' capacity for imagining and reimagining society and its laws is central for how he perceives *paideia* as at the core of political community. The aim of political community is to reach autonomy, but this autonomy is relational and it implies self-limitation. Castoriadis draws up a notion of freedom as autonomy, but he is more interested in how this freedom is used by the individuals in society, than freedom per se.

The existence of a public space is not just a matter of legal provisions guaranteeing rights of free speech, etc. such provisions are but conditions for a public space to exist. The important question is: What are the people actually doing with these rights?<sup>37</sup>

Rights and freedoms, according to Castoriadis, are conditions for a public space, and he is intrigued by the question of what comes next, how do people use these rights and freedoms? The active participation of social individuals in community becomes central for his inquiry, where he argues that the degree of freedom, or autonomy, in a society (the actual existence of rights and freedoms) is always in relation to the degree individuals' use these provisions in a way that does not limit the rights and freedoms of others. Hence Castoriadis' notion of a kind of moral self-limitation as coupled with autonomy. Again, we need to be aware that Castoriadis is not using 'autonomy' here in a traditional understanding of 'rational beings who are individually sovereign', rather, he defines autonomy in relational terms. Autonomy according to Castoriadis is to be dependent on others, in a *polis*, of using

---

33 Adami, *Human Rights Learning*

34 Hannah Arendt, *The Promise of Politics*.

35 Castoriadis, *Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy*.

36 *Ibid.*, 85.

37 *Ibid.*, 113.

one's capacity for imagination in recreating the society that constitutes its social individuals. In order for people to be able to reimagine their political community and the laws that abide in a society, people need to critically examine and question the laws and rules of their social world, and be utopian enough to think beyond the current existing ideas of rights and freedoms.

What Castoriadis offers us here, is a notion of education as the center of political community, of creating the possibility for people to use their rights and freedoms, to rethink the current laws in place and to reimagine society. According to Castoriadis 'only the education (*paideia*) of the citizens as citizens can give valuable, substantive content to the 'public space''.<sup>38</sup> *Paideia* is education 'from birth to death'<sup>39</sup> and Castoriadis views *paideia* as a central dimension of any politics of autonomy.

Becoming conscious that each and every individual constitutes the society in which she/he lives implies great moral obligation towards our fellow human beings. The notion of human rights, receives its meaning through reciprocal communication, through the words and actions that constitute the political dimension of having a public space together with others who are different and at the same time unique. As Castoriadis argues, each individual in a *polis* has the freedom of speech and is under a moral obligation to speak her/his mind on matters of political concern. This moral dimension of politics is simultaneously creating a revolutionary potential in how people can use their imagination in order to speak, act and create new ways of living together. The act of philosophizing in this sense does not become a lonely business of inwardness, but a social moral obligation to think beyond the current frames of rules and boundaries for togetherness in the *polis*. According to Castoriadis 'the Athenian citizen is not a 'private philosopher', or a 'private artist', he is a citizen for whom philosophy and art have become ways of life'.<sup>40</sup>

## Re-Imagining and Re-Creating Laws and the *Polis*

In order to keep *paideia* open for imagination and the recreation of laws and rights, we, as educators, need to be cautious of conflating citizen rights with the notion of human rights, since the former belongs to notions of political space as limited to the state, and the latter is an utopian imaginary of political and legal inclusion of everyone through notions of human dignity rather than national citizenship and legal status based on the human creation of national borders and territories.

Arendt<sup>41</sup> argues that in education, 'there is always a temptation to believe that we are dealing with specific problems confined within historical and national boundaries and of

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., 173.

40 Ibid., 123.

41 Arendt, Hannah, *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).

importance only to those immediately affected',<sup>42</sup> when in fact, Arendt continues, problems that arises in one part of the world are equally possible in other places. I read this argument as a cosmopolitan awareness in education to deal with problems and human challenges, not as confined within national borders, but as equally acute everywhere since human crisis's effect us all in different ways. In order to create a better preparation for crises we need to be aware and learn from the way challenges occur in different historical, political and legal contexts.

Brian Orend<sup>43</sup> criticizes a Western conception of human rights education as limited to a nationalistic perspective on rights. As educationalists, do we want to 'teach' students rights as referred to in the constitution as the application of laws drafted by laymen, politicians and legal experts – as *fait accompli*? In philosophy of law the legal justifications based on concepts of justice and morals in relation to the application of laws are under constant scrutiny. Roscoe Pound<sup>44</sup> for one questions the moral perfection of laws and distinguishes between the aim of justice and the limitations of jurisdiction. As legal systems are created in societies that uphold discriminatory practices; a justice oriented learning on rights may include a process of re-imagining rights into broader, more utopian ways. Arendt<sup>45</sup> criticizes in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* the notion of human rights as non-existent for stateless people after the World War Two as the political power of rights were (and still continues to be) useless for non-citizens. Arendt<sup>46</sup> argues that human beings 'are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights'.<sup>47</sup> Notions of rights that exceed national borders may include people who are excluded today, due to territorial borders, which challenges our understanding of what we today define as a political community and *who* we see as included legally in such a *polis*? Arendt<sup>48</sup> distinguishes between law, politics and the drawing up of national borders in her discussion on the Greeks and Romans and how they perceived law-making<sup>49</sup> as laying down the rules for citizens within a polis, or as creating ties with people. The former is descriptive of national jurisdiction whereas the former description can be linked to the international legal system today.<sup>50</sup>

Within a human rights discourse, there is a possibility to critically question the laws that abide in a given society, and also to question the current legal definitions of *who* is regarded as equal before the law, and *who* is included to participate in the *polis*.

42 Ibid., 171.

43 Brian Orend, "Human Rights Education: Form, Content and Controversy," *Encounters on Education* 5 (2008): 61-80.

44 Roscoe Pound, *Social Control Through Law*, (New Brunswick, N.J. and London: Transaction Publishers, 1997).

45 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (New York: Harcourt Inc, 1973).

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., 301.

48 Hannah Arendt, *The Promise of Politics*.

49 Ibid., 179-187.

50 There is a crucial difference between the tie binding nature of Roman laws and the international law system of human rights, that may not need further explanation, as the Romans as an empire dominated their contracting partners in colonial ways by force and oppression. See further Adami, *Human Rights Learning*.

The inclusion and exclusion of individuals in these respective notions of rights today can be traced to the inclusion and exclusion of plurality in the creation of human rights versus citizens' rights in declarative texts historically. There is a great difference in the process of how rights were drafted in 1789 as part of the process of uniting the states of America in an attempt to avoid future civil war under a common constitution that would guarantee the rights of its citizens and the drafting of human rights in 1948 after the Second World War as a way to create limitations for the sovereignty of states and avoid a second Holocaust.

The drafting of the American Constitution was behind closed doors. No media or outside people were being let in to observe the process and all the notes taken by James Madison (1751-1836) from the drafting was sent later directly to the government. These notes became public years later. There were 55 delegates taking part in the process, all white, all men and almost all, except for Benjamin Franklin who was then 81, were in the age between 30-40. Slavery was a controversial topic during the discussions and it was decided that it was up to the individual states to decide about slavery. 'For the purposes of taxation and determining how many representatives a state could send to Congress, it was decided that slaves would be counted as three-fifths of a person.'<sup>51</sup> In 1789, Madison wrote ten amendments to the constitution, these ten amendments are today known collectively as the Bill of Rights and include the right to bare arms and to own property.

If we only look at who was included in the drafting of the American Constitution we can agree that the Bill of Rights, the ten amendments to the constitution, by Madison, were the rights of the white, privileged, protestant Man who owned property, others where counted as third of a person, or not regarded at all as having rights. Still these declarative texts are being reinterpreted and read by thousands of people who reimagine the notions of rights initially drafted, which is part of a relational process of moral subjectification in a *polis* that grows or changes demographically.

The Civil Rights Movement provides an example of how people who were initially excluded from the term of rights in the American Constitution have reclaimed civil rights to become more inclusive. The strategy of questioning segregating laws was a strategic endeavor where calculations of the cost to upgrade the conditions at schools for Afro American pupils was being presented to politicians – a cost they were not willing to pay. When the Afro American lawyer Constance Baker Motely wrote the initial complaint 1950 in the case of *Brown versus Board of Education* she had strategically criticized the segregating laws in Southern schools, busses and public spaces denied to blacks – a process that lead to a recreation of segregating laws that initially was argued based on a racist discourse as having support in the American Constitution, to become more just. Baker Motley succeeded in winning a case *Meredith versus Fair* to get the first Afro American student enrolled at the University of Mississippi in 1962.

---

51 [http://www.history.com/topics/constitution#section\\_1](http://www.history.com/topics/constitution#section_1)

The United Nations Human Rights Commission was created in 1946 in order to draft a Universal Declaration on Human Rights (initially referred to as a declaration on the Rights of Man). The delegates to the commission were appointed on personal merit, as lawyers, diplomats, academics and human rights activists, and their aim was to create a notion of rights that exceeded a notion of citizen rights, so that people, as a last resort, could use revolutionary means to overrule any government that oppressed its inhabitants. With the Second World War, the demography in Europe had changed, leaving thousands of people without their former rights (either because they had been deprived their rights from totalitarian regimes, or because they had fled from their countries of origin and where now staying in a country as aliens lacking legal status).

The notion of 'human rights' then became a social imaginary for the future, in a present when so many people found themselves deprived of a *polis*, becoming completely rights-less. We find this challenge still today, with Mexican citizens staying without legal status in the US, being deprived of their right to vote, without freedom of speech and press, since their very existence in the country denies them the legal safety to question and critically examine the limits of civil rights. Voicing another imaginary of such rights would challenge their silent existence in exile.

## Rights – by whom and for whom?

The American Bill of Rights and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are not isolated texts without authors, they were not created in a political vacuum, rather, these declarations were drafted in respective historical contexts. The drafters of declarations have 'a face, a name and a life story'.<sup>52</sup> These texts carry a political weight when acted on in social communities, in human relations. It matters *who* is included and who is not when notions of rights and freedoms are claimed and reclaimed.<sup>53</sup> The composition of individuals behind legal texts on rights and freedoms indicates the inclusive or exclusive character of the rights therein based on the intent of the drafters. In the drafting of the UDHR, women and non-western individuals were present and had a voice during the process<sup>54</sup> amounting pressure on the colonial powers. These non-western delegates were both male and female Communists, Muslims and Catholics.<sup>55</sup> The value conflicts that arose during the UN sessions created politics, agonistic politics, through which the inclusion of economic and social

52 Adriana Cavarero, *For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression*, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 193.

53 Rebecca Adami, "Intersectional Dialogue – A Cosmopolitical Dialogue of Ethics." *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 5, no. 2 (August 14, 2013): 45-62. doi:10.5130/ccs.v5i2.3179.

54 Rebecca Adami, "Counter Narratives as Political Contestation: Universality, Particularity and Uniqueness," *The Equal Rights Review* 15 (2015): 13-24.

55 Rebecca Adami, "Reconciling Universality and Particularity through a Cosmopolitan Outlook on Human Rights," *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 4, no. 2 (August 27, 2012): 22-37.

rights due to pressure from communist and socialist countries, and the formulation of 'every human being' rather than 'Man' was being used.<sup>56</sup>

The drafting of the UDHR included delegates from over sixty countries, representing different and sometimes agonistic religious and non-religious belief systems.<sup>57</sup> The over two hundred UN sessions where the declaration was being debated and discussed were open for media coverage and hundreds of NGOs were present to lobby (for example for the inclusion of womens' human rights). The wording in the UDHR was being stripped down through the drafting process, taking away all direct or indirect cultural, religious and ethnic references to God and particular beliefs – so that the delegates, coming from agonistic belief systems, could agree on the same text.<sup>58</sup> The text includes a long non-discrimination list, so as to make it inclusive for everyone, regardless of ethnicity, gender, economic and social status, but at the same time keeping it open for interpretation, to be able to claim and understand such rights on conflicting moral and political grounds.<sup>59</sup>

Jurisdiction is about applying laws, whereas what Castoriadis examines is the pedagogical subjects capacity for re-imagining laws and hence of changing what may seem as '*fait accompli*'. In order to make this process a possibility in education there is a need to offer teachers rights-dilemmas in larger social communities, valuable in making and creating ethical considerations that may lay the ground for a human rights-based judgment in different classroom situations.<sup>60</sup> For example the study of historical movements like the Civil Rights Movement or the Indian Movement of Independence, where people have claimed the right to have rights and ultimately reached more inclusive communities of justice. Todd Jennings,<sup>61</sup> amongst others suggests that human rights in education can 'provide a framework to critique any contemporary standardization movement that might undermine the rights of children, teachers, or the communities in which they teach and learn'.<sup>62</sup> In other words, human rights in education can hence be seen as 'part of a cosmopolitan, rather than globalization-oriented education, driven by ethical considerations in relation to internationalization trends',<sup>63</sup> rather than driven by economic imperatives. What the notion of human rights in education points to is the actual right to have rights, and especially the right to belong in a legal and political community.

---

56 Adami, "Counter Narratives".

57 Joe Hoover, "Rereading the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Plurality and Contestation, Not Consensus," *Journal of Human Rights* 12, no. 2 (2013): 4-40.

58 Adami, "Reconciling Universality and Particularity"; Johannes Morsink, *Inherent Human Rights: Philosophical Roots of the Universal Declaration*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).

59 Rebecca Adami, "Re-Thinking Relations in Human Rights Education: The Politics of Narratives." *Journal of Philosophy of Education* in press (2014).

60 Cf. Rebecca Adami, "Towards Cosmopolitan Ethics in Teacher Education: An Ontological Dimension of Learning Human Rights," *Ethics and Education* 9, no. 1 (2014): 29-38.

61 "Human Rights Education Standards for Teachers and Teacher Education."

62 *Ibid.*, 289.

63 Adami, "Towards Cosmopolitan Ethics," 34.

## Concluding remarks

Challenges of globalization have become local concerns, such as solidarity in relation to migration and local responsibility for global environmental risks of human consumerist ignorance. These challenges call education to grasp the intermediate between the national legislative and political constrains that need to be updated in a globalized world of international dependence. There is hence a need for re-conceptualizing and developing notions of ethical and moral aspects of education, where I have argued that *paideia* is a fruitful conceptual path for such future explorations. Countering a neo liberal discourse on learning as an individualistic task of acquiring knowledge by a sovereign subject who is responsible for her/his own education, I reclaim a notion of learning *in* relations that encompasses the broader relations the social individual has with her/his social and political community and her/his active participation in it.

The paper challenges Castoriadis claim that notions of education as the core of political philosophy died with the French Revolution, (his own work shows that it did not) by drawing an argument with the help of Hannah Arendt and Adriana Cavarero to rethink the political dimension of learning human rights as a way to enhance learners critical capacity for reimagining the laws in their community.

I would like to think that this argument sets the earlier work made by Frank Margois, Gert Biesta and David T Hansen in relation to some of the global and at the same time local concerns that education is faced with today when politics concern broader notions of justice and equality.

Rebecka Lettevall

## En kritik av det kosmopolitiska förnuftet?

### Om samtidsrelevansen av Kants kosmopolitism

#### Abstract

*Cosmopolitanism is a value-loaded concept that seems to become popular in intervals. The latest cosmopolitan period started after the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the Soviet Union and concentrated mostly on aspects such as "a new world order", and often with reference to Kant. It might be questioned if the cosmopolitan period still exists. Here it is suggested that a historical understanding of cosmopolitanism together with experience from later social and political experiences might give a new perspective on the difficulties of creating a better world in a Kantian sense, including cosmopolitan education. Considering its history and taking concern of experience Kant's cosmopolitanism still is relevant, not least in its broader sense.*

#### Keywords

*Critical cosmopolitanism, education, human rights, subjectification, paideia, justice, political community*

Mot slutet av 1900-talet, då Kalla krigets slut och upplösningen av Sovjetunionen ledde till vad som ibland kallats en ny global världsordning, blev det åter aktuellt inte minst i akademiska sammanhang diskutera, analysera och propagera för ett kosmopolitiskt ideal, en världsmedborgarskapstanke. Flera engagerade röster höjdes i diskussionerna, och definitionerna av kosmopolitism var snart lika många som dess förespråkare.<sup>1</sup> Ofta hänvisades också till filosofen Immanuel Kants (1724-1804) kosmopolitism som formulerats ungefär tvåhundra år tidigare med starkt inflytande från såväl antika tänkare som den samtida diskussionen. Kants kosmopolitism angavs ofta som en startpunkt för kosmopolitismen. Ett par decennier efter kosmopolitismens senaste eufori är den globala situationen återigen annorlunda. I en värld där motsättningar mellan nationer, stater eller olika grupper blivit allt mer framträdande verkar det angeläget att försöka hitta övergripande och gemensamma lösningar på globala problem. Samtidigt förefaller det ofta som om problemen inte går att lösa på detta sätt. De teoretiska diskussionerna om kosmopolitism har liksom dess empiriska förutsättningar förändrats.

Frågan är hur relevant Kants kosmopolitism är idag. Kan vi via den finna stöd för att utveckla möjligheten att lösa vår tids stora frågor? För att resonera kring dessa frågor behö-

---

1 Till de som varit som varit särskilt tongivande hör Sheila Benhabib, Georg Cavallar, Frances Cheneval, David Held, Jürgen Habermas, Pauline Kleingeld, Martha Nussbaum, Steven Vertovec, etc.

---

*Rebecka Lettevall, Södertörn University, Sweden*

*E-mail: rebecka.lettevall@sh.se*

---

*Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi* | [www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf](http://www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf) | ISSN nr. 22449140

---

Årgang 4 | Nr. 2 | 2015 | side 81-93

---

ver vi enas om en definition av kosmopolitism, vilket inte är det enklaste. Begreppet har en form som leder tanken till att det rör sig om en -ism, en ideologi eller ett sammanhängande tankesystem. Så är dock inte fallet: Snarare är det ett kärn som kan fyllas med allt möjligt innehåll och som kan stå i olika relationer till liknande begrepp som internationalism, transnationalism, globalism och globalisering. Begreppet rör sig över vida fält – det kan handla om exempelvis sociologi, kulturteori, pedagogik och filosofi. Det används ibland även som begrepp synonymt med global rättvisa, internationell rättvisa eller universell moral.<sup>2</sup> I anknytning till detta vida fält blir det relevant att ställa frågan: Kan vi finna en kritik av det kosmopolitiska förnuftet? Om den frågan kan besvaras så bör vi också kunna avgöra hur relevant Kants kosmopolitism är idag.

### Kants kosmopolitism och upplysningens nyckelbegrepp

Det är inte många filosofer förunnat att ha utövat lika stort inflytande över den västerländska filosofiska traditionen som Immanuel Kant. Genom sin kritiska filosofi där han utforskat gränserna för människans förmåga till kunskap förändrade han grundförutsättningarna på ett sådant sätt att det efter Kant knappast går att ägna sig åt filosofi utan att känna till honom. Hans filosofi liknas ofta vid ett arkitektoniskt system där delarna och helheten är ömsesidigt beroende av varandra. De delar av denna arkitektoniska byggnad som ofta erkänts som minst färdigkonstruerad är de smärre skrifter där frågor om samhällets utveckling och historiens gång behandlas. Det har hävdats att dessa frågor inte var så angelägna för Kant eftersom de inte utsatts för någon omfattande kritisk undersökning av honom. Men oavsett hur betydelsefulla de var för Kant så har de varit inflytelserika inom idéhistorien, och nu senast i det sena 1900-talets och tidiga 2000-talets diskussioner om kosmopolitism och världens organisering.

Att kosmopolitism uppfattas som vagt, inte minst hos Kant, hänger delvis samman med den språkliga konstruktionen som lätt leder till en för-förståelse av kosmopolitismen som ett sammanhängande teoretiskt system. Men liksom fred är kosmopolitism ett begrepp som använts på så många sätt över tid och över rum att det knappast går att definiera på ett tillfredsställande sätt. I stället ligger dess styrka i att vara ett öppet begrepp. Även Kant använder begreppet på olika sätt och förändrar dessutom delvis sin position över tid. I boken *Kant and cosmopolitanism* visar Pauline Kleingeld på de många olika aspekter av kosmopolitism som Kant hade att förhålla sig till i det sena 1700-talets Tyskland och hur de på olika sätt medverkade till att utveckla hans teori. Hon hävdar att Kant modifierar sin ståndpunkt i flera frågor i samband med att han utvecklar den kritiska filosofin.<sup>3</sup> Den bestod av såväl moraliska, politiska och rättsliga aspekter som ekonomiska, kulturella och

2 T.ex. Charles Jones, *Global Justice: Defending cosmopolitanism* (Oxford: Oxford UP 2001).

3 Pauline Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The philosophical ideal of world citizenship*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012). Kleingeld har sedan 1990-talet i ett flertal artiklar behandlat frågorna, men jag väljer här att referera endast till den senare boken.

psykologiska perspektiv. Kleingeld visar hur den centreras kring en universell moralisk kosmopolitisk gemenskap, som tillåter kulturell mångfald vilken hon anses grundas i att Kant betraktar alla subjekt som likvärdiga medlemmar, eller medborgare, oavsett exempelvis nationalitet, religion eller språk.<sup>4</sup> Hon visar också hur Kant byter ståndpunkt i flera frågor i samband med utvecklingen av den kritiska filosofin.

I sin omfattande undersökning *Kant's Embedded Cosmopolitanism* (2015) har Georg Cavallar visat på komplexiteten i Kants kosmopolitism liksom att den förekommer i olika former i flera delar av hans arkitektoniska filosofi.<sup>5</sup> Cavallar har föreslagit att Kants kosmopolitism är ett omfattande system där begreppet är dynamiskt och inbäddat i den övriga filosofin. Cavallar hävdar att den politisk-rättsliga och moraliska kosmopolitism som vanligen är den som lyfts fram av samtida uttolkare bör förstås utifrån det dynamiska kosmopolitismbegrepp som Kant utarbetar och som är en komplicerad väv omfattande inte bara rätt och etik, utan även exempelvis kultur, samhälle och utbildning. Människan har en plikt att utveckla sitt kosmopolitiska sinne så att det avspeglar sig i samhällets organisering. En viktig del i detta framkommer i synen på uppfostran, utbildning och bildning, där Kant ju menar att människan är kultiverad och civiliserad men ännu inte moraliserad. När hon blir det så blir det också möjligt att organisera samhället enligt kosmopolitiska ideal.<sup>6</sup>

Kants kosmopolitism kan således, liksom mycket annan kosmopolitism, verka lite undflyende och vag. Men det ligger i själva kosmopolitismens idé ända sedan kyniker och stoiker började använda begreppet: redan där förekom en mångfacetterad betydelse. Detta innebär dock inte att begreppet i sig är förvirrat, utan snarare att det verkar omöjligt att ge en tydlig och uttömmande definition av kosmopolitism, trots att kosmopolitism ibland behandlas på detta sett. Ett sådant analytiskt tillvägagångssätt för definition skulle antagligen ta död på många av de förhållningssätt som kallas för kosmopolitiska, så att de därmed skulle bortdefinieras. Dagens användning av begreppet måste även det kunna förstås som svårt och kanske till och med olämpligt att tillskriva en fixerad definition eftersom det förändras kontinuerligt beroende på kontexten. Det som först kan missförstås som vaghet i Kants kosmopolitism kan i stället visa sig vara en nyanserad innebörd av begreppet.

Eftersom Kants kosmopolitism fortfarande, eller snarare återigen, är en del av den aktuella debatten så är det meningsfullt att känna till hur han positionerade sig liksom den kontext i vilken han verkade. Kants kosmopolitism var en produkt av 1700-talskosmopolitismen. Det har hävdats att kosmopolitismen under 1700-talet var ett nyckelbegrepp och att världsmedborgare blev ett av upplysningens slagord.<sup>7</sup> Till denna epoks syn på kosmo-

4 Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism*, 14. Det finns naturligtvis mycket att säga om detta, exempelvis om hur ett subjekt definieras, men det är inte ämnet för denna artikel.

5 Georg Cavallar, *Kant's embedded cosmopolitanism: History, philosophy and education for world citizens*, (Boston: De Gruyter, 2015).

6 Georg Cavallar, "Cosmopolitanisms in Kant's philosophy", *Ethics & Global Politics*, 5:2 (2012), 95-118, doi: 10.3402/egp.v5i2.14924.

7 A. Horstmann, "Kosmopolit, Kosmopolitismus", in J. Ritter, K. Gründer (red.) *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, bd 4:1159, (Basel, 1972).

politiken hörde oftast uppfattningen att en världsmedborgare också var en europé, och att dessa världsmedborgare hade en gemensam historia och berättelse.<sup>8</sup> Under upplysningen formuleras således bilden av kosmopoliten som en europé, en föreställning som frodas starkt även under 2000-talet. Detta ingår i en kritik av det kosmopolitiska förnuftet.

I Kants 1790-talskontext ingick även det antika arvet som en väsentlig och levande del. Kants kosmopolitism har starka naturrättsliga drag och innehåller element av stoicistiskt naturrättsligt tankegods. Det första kända tillfälle där kosmopolitbegreppet användes var av kynikern Diogenes från Sinope i antikens Grekland. Som svar på frågan om var han hörde hemma lär han ha utbrustit att han var världsmedborgare, kosmopolit, och att hela världen var hans hem. Hans uttalande har tolkats som, eller kanske snarare travesterats till, att en kosmopolit är en person som befinner sig bortom världsliga tillfälliga politiska gränser, som stadsstater i detta fall. Oavsett om Diogenes är skyldig till detta uttalande eller ej så utgör det en del av kosmopolitismens idéhistoria. Källan nedtecknades först flera hundra år senare av Diogenes Laertius.<sup>9</sup> Diogenes från Sinope sägs också ha ignorerat samhällets moraliska överenskommelser och därigenom chockerat omvärlden, vilket kan förstås som en arrogans gentemot andra människors integritet. Redan från början verkar kosmopolitbegreppet således omfatta det vida spektrum som det fortfarande gör. Det första exemplet ovan visar hur en människa står utanför den allmänna politiska överenskommelsen och samtidigt har ett värde som människa bortom dem, ett förhållningssätt som är naturrättsligt grundat på samma sätt som mänskliga rättigheter är det. Det andra exemplet påminner å andra sidan om 1700-talets kosmopolit eller världsman, som kunde resa jorden runt och överlägset cyniskt anse sig vara förmer än andra och även strunta i medmänniskors integritet, preferenser, traditioner och dolda koder och ständigt framhäva sig själv och sina egna nycker. Idén levde vidare bland grekiska och romerska stoiker och framträdde som en etisk idé med universella naturrättsliga anspråk, en tolkning som varit betydelsefull för kosmopolitismen.<sup>10</sup>

Den cyniske 1700-talskosmopoliten kunde vara en person som Fougeret de Monbron, en resenär som benämnde sig själv kosmopolit och som i första hand var intresserad av sina egna upplevelser och erfarenheter, även när de skedde på bekostnad av andra människor, och med kyniska drag.<sup>11</sup> Figuren har mycket gemensamt med Zygmund Baumanns turist, en person som ständigt är i rörelse och aldrig kommer fram, en person som lever sitt liv som i en bubbla där endast det sipprar in som turisten väljer att låta sippra in.<sup>12</sup> Hela hållningen innebär ett avståndstagande från tid och rum, ett postmodernt tillstånd utan riktning, men även ett amoraliskt förhållningssätt till världen. 1700-talskosmopolitismen omfattade även bildningsresor och andra former av resande. Men kosmopoliten under upplysningen

8 Karen O'Brian, *Narratives of the Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan history from Voltaire to Gibbon*, (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1997) 1-21, doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511519079.

9 Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of eminent philosophers*, Vol II, trans. R.D. Hicks, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1925).

10 Se t.ex. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism" i *Journal of Political philosophy*, 5: 1 (1997), 1-25.

11 Fougeret de Monbron, *Le cosmopolite ou le citoyen de monde*, (London, 1761).

12 Zygmund Baumann, *Globalization: The human consequences* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

var inte enbart en självcentrerad rotlös individ med distanserat och kyligt förhållningssätt till omvärlden.

Kosmopolitismen omfattade ett mer stoicistiskt förhållningssätt enligt vilket mänskligheten var en helhet där delarna var beroende av varandra och där det främmande och avvikande sågs som olika uttryck av denna mänsklighet. Denna humanistiska hållning värderade således människan som något särskilt. I kraft av att vara människa fick individen en unik plats och vissa rättigheter som ofta utgick från ett naturrättsligt resonemang, ett synsätt med rötter i antiken enligt vilket människan har en naturlig värdighet och vissa okränkbara rättigheter vars grund ofta förklaras vara att människan med sitt förnuft har erhållit denna särställning. Genom att på detta sätt se det universella i människan blev humanismen och kosmopolitismen nära förbundna.

Det kan hävdas att Kants kosmopolitism försåg 1700-talskosmopolitismen med en teoretisk grund.<sup>13</sup> Enligt Kant är kosmopolitismen i slutändan ett förhållningssätt, eller en inställning, som medför att människor vill, och har den moraliska skyldigheten att, verka för en kosmopolitisk värld i uttryckets vidaste bemärkelse, omfattande ett intresse för det främmande men också ett moraliskt ställningstagande och en rättighetstanke som påminner om universella mänskliga rättigheter.<sup>14</sup> Det är just den tredje definitivartikeln i *Om den eviga freden* (1795) som här är särskilt intressant för att uttolka Kants kosmopolitism. Som en del av planen för den eviga freden introducerar Kant vad han kallar en kosmopolitisk rätt. Den lyder: "Världsmedborgarskapsrätten ska vara begränsad till vad som gäller för den allmänna gästvänskapen".<sup>15</sup> Han utvecklar med att förklara ett den allmänna gästvänskapen snarare är att betrakta som en besöksrätt, eller rätten för en främmande besökare att inte bli behandlad fientligt när hen besöker någon annans territorium, åtminstone så länge som hen själv förhåller sig fredligt. Hen kan till och med avvisas, så länge som det inte sker med någon omedelbar fara för hens liv. Detta är som synes en ganska svagt definierad kosmopolitism, och ett av Kants syften verkar ha varit att skydda icke-europeiska områden från alltför exploaterande kolonialism. Kan avslutar den tredje definitivartikeln med en kraftfull utveckling av besöksrätten:

Jordens folk har nu nått så långt (i trängre och vidare mening) i sin samhörighet, att en rättskränkning på en plats på jorden upplevs av alla. Därför är idén om ett världsmedborgarskap ingen fantastisk eller bisarr rättsföreställning utan en nödvändig komplettering av såväl stats- som folkrättens oskrivna lagar. Den blir på så sätt en universell människorätt. Det är blott under denna betingelse, som vi kan smickra oss med att vi bit för bit närmar oss den eviga freden.<sup>16</sup>

13 Francis Cheneval: *Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung: Über die Entstehung und die philosophischen Grundlagen des supranationalen und kosmopolitischen Denkens der Moderne* (Basel: Schwabe, 2002).

14 Cavallar, "Cosmopolitanisms".

15 Immanuel Kant *Om den eviga freden*: Övers. Alf W. Johansson, (Stockholm: Rabén Prisma, 1996 [1795]), 69.

16 Kant, *eviga freden*, 72.

Kant tillskriver här kosmopolitismen en rättslig status genom att koppla den till stats- och folkrätten, och det måste betraktas som ett tydligt ställningstagande för universella mänskliga rättigheter liksom av hävdandet av mänskligheten som en enhet, där alla delar är lika viktiga. Denna universella människorätt kompletterar de oskrivna lagarna och bör således förstås som morallagen. Samtidigt som Kant lyfter fram kosmopolitismens rättsliga nödvändighet, tillskriver han den också den universella människorätt som bör vara ungefär detsamma som morallagen. För att kunna leva upp till den behöver människorna som individer formeras, utbildas, bildas.

Den kosmopolitism Kant företräder framstår således som i grunden en etisk sådan, med rättighetsanspråk. Men han förespråkar även en federation mellan fria stater. Denna federation har ibland tolkats som en världsfederation, men den ska enligt Kant inte uppfattas som en universell folkstat. Federationen krävs för att staterna inte ska befinna sig i samma laglösa förhållande till varandra som individerna i ett naturtillstånd. Den politiska kosmopolitismen kräver världsomspännande politiska institutioner, och här är Kant inte tydlig med hur en sådan skulle kunna se ut. Möjligen beror oklarheten i Kants syn på detta på att han nyanserade sin uppfattning över tid då han i *Om den eviga freden* presenterar idén om ett förbund mellan stater.<sup>17</sup> Enligt Kleingeld var Kant stark motståndare till en universell världstat för att försvara federationstanken där federationen består av flera stater. En sådan utveckling bör inledas med ett lösare förbund av stater som med tiden övergår till en internationell federation.<sup>18</sup> Det är denna politisk-rättsliga läsning av Kant som dominerar vår tids syn på hans kosmopolitism.

Den läsningen av Kant bör i linje med att morallagen lyfts fram i den tredje definitivartikeln kompletteras med ett perspektiv på hur den ska kunna utvecklas eller förtydligas. Enligt den omfattande kosmopolitism som Kant förespråkar och den frihet han tillskriver människan, så behöver hon bildas för att ha möjlighet att förverkliga kosmopolitismen. Förmågan att skilja gott från ont har med människans frihet att göra, och för att den ska utvecklas är pedagogiken avgörande.<sup>19</sup> För att uppnå det högsta goda, behöver människorna enligt Kant sträva efter det goda ur ett perspektiv bortom individens, och det är i detta som det universella mänskliga goda tar sig uttryck.

Kants förhoppning är att människorna, som är långt ifrån att vara perfekta rationella varelser, ska sträva mot att uppnå en moralisk fulländan. Genom historien har människorna enligt Kant utvecklats till att få förmågan att vara kultiverade och civiliserade, men bör fortsätta sträva mot moralisering, vilket är den moraliska fulländan som enligt Kant även kan betraktas som människans slutmål. Människan kan endast bli människa genom uppfostran, menar Kant.<sup>20</sup> Människan äger autonomi och behöver därför ta ansvar för sin

17 Kant, *eviga freden*, 65f.

18 Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism*, 40-71.

19 Immanuel Kant, *Om pedagogik*, övers. Jim Jakobsson, (Göteborg: Daidalos, 2008 [1803]). Cavallar, *Kant's embedded cosmopolitanism*.

20 Kant, *Om pedagogik*, 9.

moraliska utveckling. För att nå denna moraliska fulländan är således formering, fostran och utbildning de medel som står till buds, och den omfattas även av en kosmopolitisk inställning.<sup>21</sup>

Utifrån den förnyade aktualitet Kants kosmopolitism fått på senare år har vi hittills lyft fram delar av den idéhistoriska kontext i vilken han var verksam. Med utgångspunkt i den rättsliga tolkningen i *Om den eviga freden* såg vi hur den är nära förknippad med en människosyn som inte alltid förekommer i diskussionen.

## Kosmopolitismens renässans kring 1990 – och sedan

I anknytning till järnridåns sammanbrott och den eufori som uppstod inför den världsomfattande förändringen så hänvisades det från flera håll till att en ny världsordning uppkommit. Ett slut på Kalla krigets blockpolitik öppnade onekligen för nya möjligheter att se på världen och starka förhoppningar väcktes inför sådant som ett slut på kapprustning och utveckling av massförstörelsevapen liksom en jämnare fördelning av jordens resurser. Det låg nära till hands att utveckla kosmopolitiska teorier. Kosmopolitismens idémässiga koppling till en universalism blev också en del av den förenklade världsbilden. Det sena 1900-talets återuppväckta kosmopolitiska ideal framfördes ofta med hänvisning till Kants filosofi, men inte alltid med någon djupare analys av den. En del betraktade utvecklingen som ett Historiens slut där den ena kraften vunnit över den andra, och i den historiska situationen, som i viss utsträckning även sammanföll med tvåhundraårsjubileet av Kants stundom förtalade lilla fredsskrift blev den i stället en gemensam referenspunkt vars idéer inte längre ansågs akterseglade.<sup>22</sup> Ett fönster mot framtiden tycktes stå öppet, och de västerländska idéerna om mänskliga rättigheter, demokrati och till och med en världsmedborgarskapstanke hamnade på agendan på ett annat sätt än vad som varit möjligt tidigare, vilket märks exempelvis genom den starkare roll som Europarådet fick som rådgivare vid upprättandet, i vissa fall återupprättandet, av författningar till de nya demokratiska staterna i Europa.

Den tyske sociologen Ulrich Beck (1944-2015) utarbetade en inflytelserik teori om risk-samhället redan på 1980-talet. Han menade att globaliseringen var ett faktum som innebar att den nationella politiken inte längre räckte till, och att det därmed uppstått behov av att utveckla en politisk ordning som sträckte sig bortom det egna landets gränser.

Mot bakgrund av risksamhället utvecklade Beck senare en kosmopolitisk teori, vad han kallade en reflexiv eller realistisk kosmopolitism.<sup>23</sup> Beck hävdade att världen nått ett kosmo-

21 Cavallar, "Cosmopolitanisms" och Klas Roth, "A cosmopolitan design of teacher education and a progressive orientation towards the highest good", *Ethics & Global Politics*, 5:4 (2012), 259-279, 268f.

22 Se t.ex. Jürgen Habermas, David Held och andra i James Bohman och Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (red.) *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's cosmopolitan ideal* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997) eller Daniele Archibugi och David Held (red.) *Cosmopolitan democracy: An agenda for a new world order* (Cambridge: Polity press, 1995).

23 Se t.ex. Ulrich Beck, *Den kosmopolitiska blicken, eller: Krig är fred*, övers. Urban Franzén, (Göteborg: Daidalos, 2005) samt U. Beck och Natan Szneider "Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the social sciences", i Beck och Szneider (red.)

politiskt tillstånd som måste förstås med kosmopolitisk metodologi. Han menade att det vuxit fram en global transformering av moderniteten som kräver att humaniora och samhällsvetenskaperna omformas. Samhället och politiken kan inte längre förstås utifrån ett nationalstatsperspektiv, utan kräver en kosmopolitisk blick. En sådan kosmopolitism skulle inte vara normativ utan mer pragmatiskt inriktad. Tillsammans med David Held utvecklade Beck även en teori för ett kosmopolitisk världspolitiskt system där nationalstatens betydelse tonades ner.

Flera samhällsvetare involverades i den kosmopolitiska diskursen, och vad som kom att kallas ny kosmopolitism (*new cosmopolitanism*) utvecklades genom inte bara David Held och Ulrich Beck, utan även Daniele Archibugi, Edgar Grande, Gerard Delanty för att nämna några. Gemensamt för dem är att studera samtiden från ett perspektiv som inte väljer mellan det nationella och det globala utan i stället ser dem som sammantvinnade, eller som söker analysera dem bortom dessa två perspektiv.

Men järnridåns fall och sovjetimperiets sammanbrott innebar inte historiens slut. Krig, konflikter och andra former av antagonism upphörde inte utan blossade upp på nytt i nya skepnader. Några händelser under början av 2000-talet kan tyckas särskilt betydelsefulla för synen på utvecklingen av kosmopolitismen. Följden av attackerna mot USA den 11 september 2001 efter vilka den amerikanske presidenten förklarade krig mot terrorismen har antagligen bidragit till utvecklingen av en ökad global polarisering och fragmentisering. Utvecklingen av sociala medier och användningen av Internet är idag en central del av samhället som inte förutsågs av många, bland annat för att sprida opinion, information och propaganda globalt och omedelbart. Det var inte bara akademien som intresserade sig för kosmopolitismen – många tröstlösa och uthålliga ansträngningar för att skapa en gemensam europeisk identitet inom Europeiska unionen har visat sig relativt fruktlösa.<sup>24</sup> Kosmopolitism har kanske blivit en eurocentrism? Även flyktingsituationen har förändrats genom att stora grupper försöker ta sig över land och hav för att finna asyl i Europa. Det finns de som hävdar att 2015 års flyktingströmmar till Europa för alltid kommer att förändra kontinenten. Samtidigt som det akademiska intresset för kosmopolitismen varit betydande och globaliseringen som en del av varje människas vardag så har även dess motsatser blivit tydligare på flera håll. Parallellt med en strävan efter att finna likheter har andra verkat för att lyfta fram det unika eller särskiljande – och ibland i en sådan utsträckning att militanta nationalismen utvecklas. Nya vågor av intolerans mot det avvikande, främlingsfientlighet och även rasism växer fram, och en eurocentrism verkar paradoxalt nog stärkas utåt samtidigt som den försvagas inåt. Dessa omständigheter leder oss fram till frågan: Vad är relevant i Kants kosmopolitism idag?

---

*British Journal of Sociology* 57 (2006), 1-23, ett specialnummer om kosmopolitism.

24 Johan Fornäs, *Signifying Europe*, (Bristol: Intellect, 2012).

## Relevansen av Kants kosmopolitism idag

Under de senaste decenniernas intresse för kosmopolitism har begreppet utvecklats till att omfatta en global världsordning, ett moraliskt ställningstagande, multikulturalism och elitism lika väl som ett förhållningssätt eller en inskränkt världsbild. Teorier om kosmopolitism kritiserar ofta för att sakna trovärdighet inför hur de ska kunna förverkliga det kosmopolitiska idealet. Det anses vara alltför avlägset för att kunna vara något annat än en dröm. Kant fastslår inledningsvis när han diskuterar den kosmopolitiska rätten att det inte handlar om filantropi utan om rätt. Samtidigt begränsas inte kosmopolitism till att vara ett rättsligt begrepp. Ovan har vi sett hur sociala och politiska omständigheter blir en del av diskussionen om kosmopolitism. Vad får det för konsekvenser för relevansen av Kants kosmopolitism idag?

När nationalism tenderar att ta plats som en allt starkare samhällssyn leder det ofta till att kosmopolitismen erkänns mindre betydelse. Så var fallet efter 1700-talskosmopolitismens glansdagar, som ju följdes av en period då nationalismen växte sig allt starkare inom Europa. De senaste decenniernas utveckling visar att samtidigt som globaliseringen i dess många olika former vunnit terräng så har detsamma skett med nationalism och patriotism. Även under Kants dagar verkar omständigheterna ha varit liknande, men med den skillnaden att under 1700-talet ansågs inte patriotism och kosmopolitism som oförenliga, utan snarare som två sidor av samma mynt där patriotismen eller det partikuljära gav rötter till kosmopolitismen eller det universella.<sup>25</sup>

Det ligger nära till hands att se brister i Kants kosmopolitism vad gäller dess relevans idag. En viktig aspekt gäller just människosynen som Kant lyfter fram i bland annat den pedagogiska aspekten av kosmopolitism. Det råder dessutom osäkerhet kring om Kant tillskriver alla individer samma värde som människor.<sup>26</sup> För att bli medborgare behöver man nämligen uppfylla de naturliga egenskaperna att varken vara barn eller kvinna. Detta krav lämnas utan vidare argumentering, vilket är anmärkningsvärt när det gäller Kant. Detta antyder att Kants tid på många avgörande sätt skiljer sig från vår tid. Det visar också att det Kant anser vara universella sanningar eller värden inte alls är universella utan synnerligen kontextberoende i tid och rum. Ett annat historiskt faktum som Kant inte kunnat erfara gäller nationalstaten, som sedan Kants dagar har utvecklats till den viktigaste politiska enheten där medborgarskapet garanterar rättigheterna, och den är inte identisk med Kants Rousseauinspirerade republik. Enligt inte bara Kant reglerar statsrätten medborgarskapet och folkrätten världsmedborgarskapet. Kan den som inte uppbär medborgarskap trots detta vara världsmedborgare?

En kraftig kritik av världsmedborgarskapet, eller rätten till mänskliga rättigheter, för den som inte innehar ett medborgarskap formuleras av Hannah Arendt (1906-1975):

25 Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Cosmopolitan Patriotism", i *Kant-Studien* 94 (2003), 299-316.

26 Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism*, 181-83.

“If a human being loses his political status, he should, according to the implications of the inborn and inalienable rights of man, come under exactly under the situation for which the declaration of such general rights provided. Actually the opposite is the case.”<sup>27</sup>

Hon kallar formuleringen av deklARATIONERNA om människans rättigheter mot slutet av 1700-talet för en vändpunkt i historien som börjar med att människan själv och inte gud eller historien var rättens ursprung. Men då denna universalism mer eller mindre sammanföll med uppkomsten av nationalstater blev det universella medborgarskapet i mänsklighetens rike olyckligt sammankopplat med ett partikuljärt medborgarskap i en nationalstat, ofta uppkommen som en del av ett folks emancipation och på ett sätt som uteslöt minoriteter. För minoritetsgrupper och andra statslösa visade det levda livet att förlusten av medborgerliga rättigheter också innebar förlusten av mänskliga rättigheter. De olika sätt på vilka man försökte lösa denna situation under mellankrigstiden misslyckades enligt Arendt, på grund av att de inblandade var internationella jurister utan politisk erfarenhet: vad hon kallar för ”professionella filantroper” stöttade av professionella idealister.<sup>28</sup> I stället borde de personer som förlorat sina rättigheter ha varit involverade. Men, hävdar Arendt, även om det verkar råda enighet om att dessa personer förlorat sina mänskliga rättigheter så verkar enighet inte råda kring vilka rättigheter de medborgarskaplösa förlorade då de förlorade sina mänskliga rättigheter. Först förlorade de sina hem, vilket inkluderade även hela den sociala strukturen som omgav dem, särskilt som det därefter föll sig omöjligt för dem att skapa nya hem.

“Nobody had been aware that mankind, for so long a time considered under the image of a family of nations, had reached the stage where whoever was thrown out of one of these tightly organized closed communities found himself thrown out of the family of nations altogether.”<sup>29</sup>

I samband med den förlusten förlorade de också rätten att skyddas av staten, inte bara i det egna landet utan även i alla andra länder. Därmed förlorade de rätten till rättigheter.

Arendt skriver ur ett europeiskt perspektiv efter Andra världskriget. Hon behandlar dock även förhållandena under mellankrigstiden och den situation som uppstod där efter de tre imperiernas sammanbrott då en stor mängd människor utan medborgarskap, statslösa personer, befann sig i Europa i stort sätt utan rättigheter. Hon sätter fingret på det faktum att den intima sammanflätningen mellan rätten till rättigheter och rätten att tillhöra ett organiserat samhälle uppenbarades först när miljoner människor hade förlorat denna rätt på grund av den förändrade politiska globala situationen.

27 Hannah Arendt “The perplexities of the rights of man”, i Peter Baher (ed.) *The portable Hannah Arendt* (New York: Peguin, 2003), 41.

28 Arendt, “The perplexities”, 33.

29 Arendt, “The perplexities”, 34.

Utifrån Arendts perspektiv verkar det svårt att försvara en kantiansk kosmopolitism under 2010-talet, då Europa återigen präglas av migration och flyktingströmmar från konfliktdrabbade delar av världen. Dessa personer befinner sig på sätt och vis rättsligt utanför den civiliserade och organiserade världen, vilket kan kontrasteras mot Arendts uppfattning att även totalitära stater är en företeelse inom civilisationen och inte utanför den. Arendts analys får närmast dystopiska konsekvenser, särskilt som hon som en del av sin argumentering lyfter fram det faktum att människan även utvecklat teknologi med förmåga att utplåna den organiska naturen.

Den nationella gemenskapen är föreställd och kan lätt förändras, det vet vi sedan Benedict Anderson.<sup>30</sup> Även den kosmopolitiska gemenskapen är föreställd. Ett världsmedborgarskap är onekligen för abstrakt för att kunna förstås och uppenbarligen också för att garanteras. Är det möjligt att en kritik av det kosmopolitiska förnuftet kan ge en mer positiv bild?

Om kosmopolitism definieras som närvaron av internationella och övernationella rättsligt grundade organisationer så har utvecklingen med tiden resulterat i att sådana numera existerar. Det är möjligt att dömas för brott mot mänskligheten. Det finns också flera organisationer med mål att skydda och rädda utsatta individer på olika sätt, liksom att förebygga att sådana händelser inträffar. En del av Kants förhoppning verkar ha infriats.

Ett av kosmopolitismens kärnproblem verkar onekligen vara just det som Arendt sätter fingret på: att det inte finns någon garant för rättigheter för den människa som inte tillhör en stat. Å andra sidan garanterar inte heller statstillhörighet att medborgares rättigheter skyddas: Men det finns ett flertal respekterade internationella organisationer som fokuserar på sådana fall genom att uppmärksamma omvärlden på dem.

Den politiska kosmopolitismen har visserligen utvecklats en del sedan Arendt formulerade sin kritik. Erfarenheten sedan dess har givit anledning att utveckla internationella organ. Men grundsituationen kvarstår: Det är fortfarande nationalstaten som är den grundläggande politiska organisationsmodellen. Det har den varit under lång tid, och den nationella suveräniteten medför onekligen en stor mängd problem. Med en pragmatisk inställning verkar det definitivt omständligt att bryta upp denna modell för att ersätta den med något annat. Det verkar orealistiskt att ens försöka förändra denna ordning.

Kosmopolitismen har beskyllts för att, i sin strävan att finna det som förenar, lägga locket på konflikter och spänningar, det vill säga det som splittrar, vilket medför att den medverkar till att lägga grunden för ett postpolitiskt tillstånd. Enligt Chantal Mouffe riskerar kosmopolitism att bidra till ökad populism och terrorism genom att vara alltför konsensusinriktad och därmed indirekt medverka till antagonism, ofta i moraliska termer av gott och ont, vilket väcker en lust att förgöra fienden.<sup>31</sup> Enligt henne riskerar det kosmopolitiska projektet att utmytna i en världshegemoni där en makt medvetet eller omedve-

30 Benedict Anderson, *Den föreställda gemenskapen: Reflektioner kring nationalismens ursprung och spridning* (Göteborg: Daidalos, 1992).

31 Chantal Mouffe *Om det politiska*, (Stockholm: Tankekraft, 2008).

tet identifierar sina egna intressen med hela mänsklighetens. Kritiken att en kosmopolitisk världsordning riskerar leda till att en makt identifierar sina egenintressen med hela mänsklighetens utgör även grunden för den kritik som riktats mot hela upplysningstänkandet och dess universalistiska drag. Enligt samma kritik går det inte att undvika för den som talar i mänsklighetens namn utgår från en position i tid och rum, i värderingar och erfarenheter.

För tvåhundra år sedan var den politiska erfarenheten annorlunda, så Kant kan knappast lastas för bristande erfarenhet inom flera av de områden han skriver om. Varken nationalstaten eller nationalismen hade tillnärmelsevis den styrka och kraft de senare kommit att uppnå. Politiken och demokratin har under de senaste tvåhundra åren utvecklats på ett sätt som Kant inte kunnat förutse. Kosmopolitismen hos Kant är vagt formulerad, även om det går att utläsa vad som kan kallas för kosmopolitiska tankegångar implicit ur hans texter, inte minst då de kontextualiseras med hans samtida.<sup>32</sup> Den nyanserade teori om kosmopolitism som Kleingeld tillskriver Kant är konsekvensen av att upphöja en moralisk kosmopolitism, en moralisk princip som är giltig för alla människor. Enligt Cavallar är den inbäddad i de flesta delar av Kants filosofiska system, och essensen är utbildningen eller att erhålla den kunskap som möjliggör för människan att utveckla sitt moraliska anlag till fullo. Ett sådant mål kan tyckas utopiskt.

Utifrån denna kritik kan det se ut som att det vore dags att dödförklara Kants kosmopolitism. Men låt oss först återgå till vad Kant kallar den kosmopolitiska rätten, det vill säga rätten att en person som kommer till främmande land och betar sig fredligt åtnjuter rätt att var kvar om en avvisning skulle innebära fara för personens liv. Det kan förstås som att flyktingar från krigshärjade länder har rätt att skyddas. Om en människas rätt kränks så är det samtidigt en kränkning av hela mänskligheten. Vem är det då som ska ge den främmande rätten att stanna?

Det är staten som garanterar rätten för medborgarna. I samband med att främlingsfientliga röster och dåd vunnit terräng ibland annat Europa har även ett starkt engagemang i motsatt riktning från individer och organisationer i civilsamhället varit oerhört betydelsefulla i den senaste tidens mottagande av flyktingar i Europa. Ett engagemang där personer ger bort sin tid och sitt överflöd för att bidra till att skapa värdigare mottagande av flyktingar växer fram vid sidan av kritiska röster från motståndare. Är det möjligen detta som är den moraliska kosmopolitismen? Engagemanget har präglats av entusiasm, och just en sådan entusiasm har Kant lyft fram i sin skrift *Streit der Fakulteten* (1798), där han i avsnittet om den filosofiska fakultetens strid med den juridiska ställer frågan om det finns någon tendens till att den moraliska utvecklingen hos mänskligheten som helhet bevisligen utvecklas. För att lösa detta menar han att man behöver söka ett tecken, ett historietecken, som skulle kunna visa denna tendens.<sup>33</sup> Ett sådant tecken tycker han sig själv se i sin egen tid, nämligen i den entusiasm som många åskådare till franska revolutionen ger uttryck för.

32 Detta är vad Kleingeld försöker göra i sin bok.

33 Immanuel Kant "Der Streit der Fakultäten", i Wilhelm Weischedel (red.) *Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik 1* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1977), 261-393, 357 (A 142).

Idag ger många personer uttryck för entusiasm när det gäller att hjälpa flyktingar och *sans-papiers* och där sociala medier spelar en stor roll för att sprida kunskap om situationen. Kanske Kant skulle förstå den entusiasmen som ytterligare ett tecken på människornas moraliska utveckling. Den kosmopolitiska rätten är hos Kant svag, men om den sätts i sammanhang med hur en rättskränkning av en person drabbar hela mänskligheten blir den betydligt starkare. Om nationalstater inte alltid kan garantera statslösa personers mänskliga rättigheter så är entusiastiska människor inom civilsamhället kanske det näst bästa, om vi fortfarande tror på möjligheten att låta människor leva ett värdigt liv. I väntan på utvecklingen av ett rättssystem som omfattar även kosmopolitisk rätt eller som kan garantera mänskliga rättigheter oberoende av medborgarskap, eller för den delen en kosmopolitisk utbildning, kan denna kosmopolitiska kungstanke – kanske först formulerad av Kant – vara en grund att bygga vidare på. Och även om vi inte kan veta om en sådan värld vore möjlig kan vi i kantiansk anda handla *som om* den vore så.

# Torhild Godø Sæther

## Utfordringar i å vere eit forskande kroppssubjekt

### Abstract

Maurice Merleau-Ponty claims that we as body-subjects have an immediate sensational understanding of the world. A body that perceives and experience the world before any thought and word can render it. The words we use describing sensations are interpretations of sense-experiences, and will never render the total bodily understanding of the world. This article gives a brief insight of what an understanding of Merleau-Ponty's body-subject implies for the researcher in body-phenomenological studies of toddlers.

### Nøkkelord

Kroppsfenomenologi, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, sansing, førrefleksivitet, erkjennelsesteori

## Introduksjon

Denne artikkelen er ein kort gjennomgang av Maurice Merleau-Ponty sin kroppsfenomenologi,<sup>1</sup> og skriv seg ut frå masteravhandlinga mi.<sup>2</sup> Føremålet med teksten er å setje lys på kva som skjer med forståinga når eg tek i bruk Merleau-Ponty sine idear om kroppssubjektet for å forstå observasjonar av livsverda til barn under to år. Studia tek i bruk sentrale idear frå hovudverket<sup>3</sup> for å utforske betydinga av det non-verbale og førrefleksive i stabbarkroppen<sup>4</sup> sine sansingar. Avhandlinga tek tak i eit konkret fenomen; nemleg at stabbarar har eit handlingsmønster som er taktilt, og den undrar seg over om dette konkrete også har ein større dimensjon over seg. Merleau-Ponty hevdar at kroppen er eit medvit før tanke og språk, og kallar dette kroppslege medvitet for kroppssubjekt. Med tanke på at stabbaren har lite verbalt språk, har ideen om kroppssubjektet fungert som ei perspektivutvidande og fruktbar forståingsramme for temaet avhandlinga utforskar. Då avhandlinga faktisk brukar

---

1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 2002)

2 Torhild Godø Sæther, "Å vere taktilt i verda - ei eksplorerande kroppsfenomenologisk studie av stabbarar sin taktile omgang med verda." (Mastergradsavhandling, Universitetet i Oslo, 2012).

3 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*

4 Omgrepet refererer til ordet toddler, som vanlegvis blir referert til barn mellom 12 og 36 månadar, og til ein særleg måte å vere på; toddlermåten (Gunvor Løkken, "Toddler peer culture. The social style of one and two year old body-subjects in everyday interaction." (Doktorgradsavhandling, NTNU Trondheim, 2000)). Løkken brukar det engelske omgrepet, men eg har valt å bruke ordet stabbar, då det kan omsetjast til noko slikt som "barn som stabbar.

---

Torhild Godø Sæther, Høgskulen i Volda, Norge

E-mail: [Torhild.Godo.Saether@hivolda.no](mailto:Torhild.Godo.Saether@hivolda.no)

---

Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi | [www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf](http://www.ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf) | ISSN nr. 22449140

---

Årgang 4 | Nr. 2 | 2015 | side 94-102

---

ord på formidle ei forståing av denne non-verbale og førrefleksive dimensjonen i taktile sansingar, er den på mange måtar eit stort paradoks. Den drøftar difor også i kva grad studia kan vere pålitelig og gyldig når den forsøker å setje ord på ei forståing som i stor grad er kroppsleg fundert.

Artikkelen drøftar ikkje det taktile fokuset i studia, sjølv om det var utgangspunktet for studia, men ynskjer likevel å gi innblikk i nokre utfordringar eg støtte på når eg sette kroppssubjektet i sentrum for å forstå verda.

## Å forstå verda som kroppssubjekt

Kroppssubjektet fungerer som ei syntese av alle sansingar og alle kroppslege funksjonar, og av alt det som rører seg i kroppen. Det betyr vidare at den kroppslege sanseerfaringa er der før refleksjonen av den, altså før tanke og språk. Sett slik, er sansing difor ikkje ein intellektuell, men ein kroppsleg aktivitet. Vi forstår såleis verda sanseleg umiddelbart og førrefleksivt *i og med* kroppen, medan den intellektuelle forståinga er ei tolking, og ei refleksiv forståing av verda. Den formidlar vi med ord, men med ord som likevel ikkje vil kunne gjengi det Merleau-Ponty kallar for den sanne erfaringa.<sup>5</sup> Den ligg i kroppen, seier han. I sansingane våre ligg det slik ei førrefleksiv og umiddelbar forståing av verda. Ein non-verbal og kroppsleg manifestasjon av verda som vi med kroppen er *i og med*. I sansingane er mennesket i verda og med verda. Og det er difor det er sansingane, som altså er kroppslege, vi må gå til for å forstå mennesket. I det kroppslege skil ein dermed ikkje mellom fysiologi og intellekt, ande eller sjel. Med kroppssubjektet vil Merleau-Ponty gjere oss merksam på at kroppen er eit medvit fylt av sanseleg kunnskap, og at vi ikkje må avgrense kunnskap berre til aktivitetar som krevjar reflektive artikulerde prosessar.<sup>6</sup> Han peikar på at den kroppssubjektive erfaringsforma også er meningsfull, sjølv om den føregåande for og uavhengig av mi reflektive oppleving av meg sjølv som subjekt.<sup>7</sup>

Kroppsfenomenologien til Merleau-Ponty er ikkje lett å korte ned til eit kort og konsist innhald. Ein kan vel kanskje seie at dette er eitt av hovudpoenga i filosofien hans også; at verda og det som rører i henne vanskeleg let seg redusere til generalitetar. Alt heng saman på eitt eller anna vis, og vi har alle våre erfaringar som gjer at vi oppfattar verda på den eine eller andre måten. Det er erfaringar som vi gjer i våre eigne kroppar. Kroppen min er såleis utgangspunktet for erfaringane mine, og dette er eit viktig poeng hjå Merleau-Ponty. Det er kroppen som er synspunktet, det er den eg erfarer i, og persiperer frå. Han seier: “To be a consciousness or rather to *be an experience* is to hold inner communication with

5 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 247.

6 Russell Keat, “Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of the Body”, unpublished manuscript, University of Edinburgh, 1982, lasta ned 30. juli, 2015, <http://www.russellkeat.net/admin/papers/51.pdf>

7 Dag Nome, “Mobbing – et forsøk på nye teoretiske perspektiv”, *Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi* 3, no. 1 (2014): 49

the world, the body and other people, to be with them instead of being beside them”.<sup>8</sup> Her kjem han inn på den sosiale dimensjonen av kroppssubjektet. I det sosiale får vi også ei intersubjektiv forståing av verda. Menneska er i og med verda, påverkar den, og sansar sjølvsagt også kvarandre, og tek del i, og påverkar også kvarandre sine livsverder.

Stabbaren er i si eiga livsverd, og opplever den frå sitt perspektiv, som er kroppsleg fundert. Men denne livsverda inneheld også i barnehagen andre kroppssubjekt, store og små, som påverkar korleis han forstår og erfarer verda. Slik kan ein seie at livsverdene overlappar kvarandre, vever seg inn i kvarandre og påverkar kvarandre. Verdsforståinga er difor ikkje fullstendig subjektiv, men slik også intersubjektiv. Den intersubjektive non-verbale dimensjonen viser seg til dømes når kroppssubjekta innrettar seg mot, med eller i kvarandre. Når dei små spontant byrjar å springe i lag, flere i lag,<sup>9</sup> danse i lag, kose med kvarandre, smeltar saman med eit vaksenfang<sup>10</sup> og liknande, utan å verbalt uttale at det er noko som skal skje. Det oppstår ein umiddelbar kroppsleg og meningsfull kommunikasjon ut av tilsynelatande ingenting.

Merleau-Ponty tvilar eller avviser aldri, eksistensen av mentale fenomen, men han insisterer på at tanke og sansing berre oppstår mot ein bakgrunn av perseptuell aktivitet som vi alltid og allereie forstår i kroppslege termar, ved å engasjere oss i verda.<sup>11</sup> Teorien han utviklar er, i følgje Bengtsson,<sup>12</sup> like mykje ein kroppsteori som ein subjektteori. Kroppssubjektet er den eigne levde kroppen, og i den finst ingen motsetnad mellom kropp og sjel. Den sameinar kropp og sjel med kvarandre, i staden for å dele dei opp i separate båsar eller redusere dei til ei eller anna vitskapleg forklaring.

## Persepsjon er å vere involvert i verda

Sanseerfaringane av verda er den første kjelda vi har til kunnskapen vi har om verda. Og denne kunnskapen røtar seg kroppsleg, seier Merleau-Ponty. Vi ser, vi høyrer, vi tek på, vi luktar og smakar med kroppen. Vi ser og tek på det som er i verda fordi vi er i verda med kroppen. Sansingane våre er ikkje utanfor oss sjølve. Persepsjon er difor meir omfattande og komplekst enn det ord kan forklare. Og fordi vitskap er avhengig av ein som persiperer verda, hevdar Merleau-Ponty difor at vitskapen aldri har, og aldri vil, i sin natur, bety det same i eigenskap av å vere som verda vi persiperer. Det er av den enkle grunn av at vitskap er ei bestemming eller ei forklaring på den verda. Det må påpeikast at dette var skrive i ei tid der naturvitskaplege metodar var rådande, og at det var denne måten å forstå mennesket på han var i opposisjon mot. Likevel, grunngjevingane hans synast gyldige også i

8 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 111.

9 Gunvor Løkken, “Toddler peer culture. The social style of one and two year old body-subjects in everyday interaction.” (Doktorgradsavhandling, NTNU Trondheim, 2000).

10 Sæther, “Å vere taktilt i verda”

11 Taylor Carman, “The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty”, *Philosophical Topics* 27, no. 2 (1999): 205-225

12 Jan Bengtsson, “En livsvärldsansats för pedagogisk forskning,” i *Med livsvärlden som grund: bidrag till utvecklandet av en livsvärldsfenomenologisk ansats i pedagogisk forskning*, red. Jan Bengtsson. (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1999).

dag, då vi er like mykje kroppssubjekt i 2015 som vi var på 1940-talet. Han seier at eg er den absolutte kjelda til (min) kunnskap om verda. Det betyr at eg er *i* verda, og *med* verda, heile tida. Eksistensen min kan difor ikkje forklarast uavhengig av den. Det betyr også at eg må erkjenne at måten eg forstår stabbaren, ikkje er den fulle og einaste sanninga om fenomenet. Mi forståing og oppleving av stabbaren vil alltid ha rot i kroppen min, og det perspektivet den gir meg som observerande og persiperande, men den er likevel ikkje uavhengig av verda. For det er verda vi persiperer, og denne persepsjonen har, som nemnt, også ein sosial dimensjon i det at vi også erfarer andre menneske, andre kroppssubjekt som sjølvstøtt også påverkar og er involverte i verda. Forståinga mi er heller ikkje ein augneblink i verda, den bevegar seg og utviklar heile tida, fordi verda, og alt som er i den, og eg alltid er i ei eller anna rørsle. Difor hevdar Merleau-Ponty at vitskapelege synspunkt der det følgjer at eksistensen min er ein augneblink i verda, alltid er både naive og uærlige på same tid. "To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always *speaks*, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the country-side in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is."<sup>13</sup> For å forstå oss sjølve og menneska vi omgir oss med, meinte Merleau-Ponty at vi må erkjenne at vitskapen sine forklaringar er reduserte forklaringar (sign-language) av verda, og at vi ikkje må gløyme at det er frå den kroppssubjektive opplevinga av verda (things themselves) kunnskapen har opphavet sitt. Det betyr at ei *kroppsmidviten erfaring* av verda faktisk er det basale grunnlaget vi har for forstå verda og andre menneske på. Det er den kroppslige erfaringa vi må gå til, det er der eksistensen ligg. Men det vil ikkje seie at den er upåverka av verda. For i verda er ein bakgrunn som eksistensen min går i møte. Ein bakgrunn som er sosial, kulturell og historisk, og sidan persepsjon er eit fenomen som er så uendeleg og omfattande, vil vitskapen difor aldri eksakt kunne gjengi dette fenomenet. På den måten er kroppen eit medvit som er så komplekst og samansett, at det difor aldri kan representast som eit fullstendig bilete. Og følgjeleg kan heller ikkje verda kunne representast som eit fullstendig bilete, slik kroppssubjektet erfarer den. Berre kroppssubjektet har den sansemessige og komplette representasjonen i seg. Og fordi sansingar er førrefleksive, kan vi ikkje gjengi dei eksakt. Merleau-Ponty tok med dette avstand frå vitskapar som vil forstå mennesket i målbare einingar. Han kalla denne tenkjemåten for "den objektive tanke", og dette ville han frigjere oss frå ved å endre dei konseptuelle rammeverka våre, som han meinte var farga av denne tenkemåten.

Kva tilgang har så forskaren til stabbaren si sanslege oppleving av verda når den er førrefleksiv og non-verbal? "I am not a spectator, I'm involved".<sup>14</sup> Det fortel oss at fordi kroppen heile tida er konkret i verda, lever den kontinuerleg *i* verda. Fordi eg er involvert i verda, er det kroppen min som er synspunktet mitt i verda. Dette både avgrensar og opnar per-

13 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, ix-x

14 *ibid.*, 354

sepsjonen ut mot den fullstendige verda som ein horisont for ein kvar persepsjon. Slik er kroppen i ein gjensidig dialog med alt det som finst saman med den. Også med andre kroppssubjekt. Dette forholdet inneber at kroppen erfarer og uttrykkjer meining gjennom sin måte å eksistere på i eit gjensidig forhold til verda. Slik er forskaren heile tida i kommunikasjon med verda og det som er i den. Og i den forstand er eg i studia mi intersubjektiv på den måten at *fordi* eg er kroppsleg i verda som stabbarane er det, står vi også i eit gjensidig kommunikativt forhold til kvarandre.

### Å forske på stabbarar innanfor ei Merleau-Pontyansk forståingsramme

Fenomenologi kan karakteriserast i vid forstand “as the unprejudiced, descriptive study of whatever appears to consciousness, precisely in the manner in which it so appears”.<sup>15</sup> Ei fenomenologisk tilnærming inneber å vere nær og vise merksemd til det som viser seg for oss. Dei saker som fenomenologien siktar seg mot er altså *fenomen*; i betydinga slik dei viser seg for nokon.<sup>16</sup> Dette betyr, i følgje Nordtvedt,<sup>17</sup> eit forsøk på å forstå verda og fenomen gjennom å studere korleis dei viser seg for subjektet. Merleau-Ponty var oppteken av at vi må forstå at subjektet består av heile kroppen, difor kroppssubjektet. Slik er kropps-fenomenologiske studiar er opptekne av det som viser seg for kroppssubjektet. I studia mi er persepsjon såleis den kroppssubjektive forståinga eg har av stabbarane eg studerte. Følgjeleg er språket eg brukar på å formidle forståinga på altså ei forenkling av den faktiske persepsjonen eg har hatt av stabbarane sin taktile omgang med verda. Og denne språklege forenklinga er det viktig å gjere synleg av omsyn til realibiliteten på studia.

Eit sentralt spørsmål i studia av stabbarane sine handlingar er å utforske korleis ein metodisk kan nærme seg måtane dei er i verda på innanfor ei kropps-fenomenologisk forståingsramme. Det krev ei utforskande og aktiv haldning. Ved å vere i same rommet til stabbaren må ein erkjenne at ein allereie er involvert i stabbaren si livsverd. På same måte er stabbaren også involvert i forskaren si livsverd. Dei påverkar kvarandre og rommet. Dei er i verda i lag, *med* kvarandre, ikkje ved sidan av kvarandre. Merleau-Ponty brukar ordet sameksistens om dette forholdet. Om ein open intersubjektiv og sanseleg kommunikasjon, der grensene mellom kroppssubjekta er uklare. Denne uklarheita kan bli forstått som den kommunikasjonen som går føre seg i rommet mellom kroppssubjekta, altså ikkje avgrensingane i dei reint konkrete kropane.

15 Dermot Moran, “Editor’s Introduction”, in *The Phenomenology reader*, ed. Dermot Moran and Timothy Mooney (London: Routledge, 2002),1.

16 Bengtsson, “En livsvärldsansats för pedagogisk forskning”.

17 Finn Nordtvedt, “Kropps-fenomenologisk forskning – i grenselandet mellom empiri og filosofi”, *Vård i Norden* 28, no. 3 (2008): 53-55

Merleau-Ponty set altså kroppssubjektet som sentrum av oppfatninga og forståinga vi har av verda. Ein naudsynt konsekvens av å ta i bruk denne forståingsramma for ei studie som eg har gjort, er at den må ta det for gitt at både stabbarane og eg som observerande er kroppssubjekt, og at vi har innverknad på kvarandre fordi vi er ein del av same rommet. Det betyr også at orda eg vel å bruke i skildringane av stabbarane, er basert på alle dei sansingane min levde kropp har erfart i observasjonane, men også på kommunikasjonen som har gått føre seg i det aktuelle rommet. Dette utgjer slik både den ontologiske og epistemologiske forståingsramma for studia. Det vil seie at den har eit utgangspunkt i at både eg og stabbarane oppfattar og forstår verda gjennom kroppane sine sansingar av den. Det vil også seie at det ikkje berre var stabbaren sine sanseerfaringar eg utforska, men også mine egne. Dette var også ei av hovudutfordringane ved studia eg gjorde. Den tvinga meg til å kontinuerleg konfrontere mine egne oppfatningar av kva eg såg, kva eg erfarte, og korleis eg tolka det eg erfarte. Den kravde kontinuerleg sjølvrefleksjon og sjølvvurdering, men innebar også eit krav om å vere-i-verda og “return to things themselves”.

### Kva er det å observere? Om upålitelige førrefleksive sansingar

I følge Merleau-Ponty betyr det å plassere synet i samsvar med det blikket er ute etter, og ikkje misse seg sjølv i det som visuelt viser seg framføre.<sup>18</sup> I følge Løkken og Søbstad<sup>19</sup> handlar observasjon om iakttaking, som hovudsakleg skjer ved hjelp av synssansen. Dei seier vidare at vi ikkje kan kutte ut dei andre sanseinstrykka, men at funksjonane deira er meir å supplere synsinstrykka. Her er nok Merleau-Ponty delvis einig, men samstundes kan ein kanskje tenkje seg at han ville stilt spørsmål ved definisjonen av supplement. Løkken og Søbstad<sup>20</sup> antyder at det er synssansen som er overlegen i observasjonen, og det vil nok dei fleste vere einig i. Likevel, når vi no reflekterer over ei kroppsfenomenologisk studie, må vi samstundes erkjenne at kroppen, i kraft av å vere eit kroppssubjekt, faktisk er eit sanseleg medvit, og at det difor er umogleg å vite konkret kva sansingar som ligg til grunn for orda forskaren brukar i skildringane av observasjonen. Løkken og Søbstad seier feilkjelder i observasjonen er tilhøve som kan påverke og gjere datamaterialet mindre påliteleg. Dei har ei heil liste<sup>21</sup> på ulike typar feilkjelder, men dei nemner ikkje kroppen som medvit. Med Merleau-Ponty kan vi altså føye til førrefleksive sansingar på lista, dersom ein reknar dei som upålitelege. Kanskje kan ein kalle dei upålitelige i den forstand at dei ikkje er konkretiserbare. Men det er igjen eit aspekt ved Merleau-Ponty sin filosofi ein må ta med i betraktinga når ein først legg ut på ei kroppsfenomenologisk observasjonsreise. Vi kan ikkje sikkert setje ord på kva som skjer i kroppen sine sansingar. Rasmussen<sup>22</sup> seier at eit par

18 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 263

19 Gunvor Løkken og Frode Søbstad, *Observasjon og intervju i barnehagen* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2006).

20 *ibid.*

21 *ibid.*, 64

22 Torbjørn H. Rasmussen, *Kroppens filosof, Maurice Merleau-Ponty* (København: Semi-forlaget, 1996).

fritthengjande auge ikkje kan sjå verda. Dei ser verda nettopp fordi kroppen på førehand er innbefatta i synet. Verda blir difor synleg rundt meg på grunn av at kroppen min er i eit tilhøyrighetsforhold til den same verda som den ser. Difor er auga avhengig av resten av kroppen og dei andre sansane for å kunne sjå. Dei opererer ikkje solitært, men, som tidlegare nemnt, i form av ei syntese saman med resten av kroppen.

### Kva finn ein som forskande kroppssubjekt?

Med Merleau-Ponty sine idear om kroppssubjektet er det vanskeleg, ja faktisk umogleg, å ha nokon annan funksjon enn ein deltakande observatør, fordi forskaren allereie er involvert i verda. Verda i ein barnehage som er vore full av stabbarar. Og nettopp når ein studerer små utforskande barn, er dette eit godt utgangspunkt å ha. Då må ein ta det for gitt at ein er involvert i verda deira og fenomenene i den gjennom persepsjonane sine.

Merleau-Ponty<sup>23</sup> seier at "(...) there is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself." Subjektet er slik opphavleg i verda, før den refleksive analysen gjer det til sentrum for verda. Denne verda omtalar Merleau-Ponty<sup>24</sup> som "(...) a pre-objective view which is what we call being-in-the-world". Det er her vi lever. Bengtsson og Løkken<sup>25</sup> framhevar at mennesket, og slik sett også forskaren, alltid er persiperande og erfarande tilstades i livsverda, – historisk, kulturelt og sosialt. Dei meiner at Merleau-Ponty syntetiserer, ved å avgrense seg frå einsidige ytterpunkt i objektivismen, subjektivismen, empirismen og intellektualismen, at livsverda uunngåeleg er ein del av oss. Såleis gjeld det for den observerande forskaren også. Fordi forskaren også er eit intensjonalt kroppssubjekt, inneber det slik at forskaren alltid er retta mot noko. Den retninga går det ikkje an å medvite stoppe. Slik sett erkjenner eg at observasjonane og skildringane eg har gjort i studia også har ei retning. Merleau-Ponty var oppteken nettopp av dette, at forskning alltid er og må vere forankra i menneska sine livsverder. Difor understrekar Bengtsson og Løkken at forskinga må forsøke å forstå denne verda med fylde og ikkje som reduksjonar av den. Dette stiller forskaren overfor ei nokså umogleg oppgåve i formidlinga av ei slik forståing, då det å nedteikne den i ord i seg sjølv vil vere å gjere reduksjonar av den. Slik som stabbaren har ei livsverd, har også forskaren det, og deira respektive livsverder er det berre dei sjølve som forstår heile fylde av. Difor gjeld det, som nemnt, å gjere seg synleg, og å gjere greie for sin eigen posisjon i studia. Følgjene av det er at ein mellom anna må stille seg spørsmålet om kva som er grunnlaget for kunnskapsproduksjonen i studia. Kva slags røynd er det den gjer synleg? Kva baserar den sine erkjenningar av røynda på? Merleau-Ponty erkjenner kroppssubjektet som sentrum for måten vi kjenner verda på. Eg eksisterer i den som forskande

23 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, xii

24 *ibid.*, 92

25 Jan Bengtsson og Gunvor Løkken, "Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Kroppens verdslighet og verdens kroppslighet," i *Pedagogikkens mange ansikter: Pedagogikkens idéhistorie fra antikken til det postmoderne*, red. Kjetil Steinsholt og Lars Løvlie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2004).

kroppssubjekt som observerer stabbande kroppssubjekt. Slik er det, som nemnt, kroppssubjektet som er det epistemologiske grunnlaget for ein kroppsfenomenologisk måte å finne kunnskap om røynda på. Den produserer kunnskap om livsverda, både om forskaren si og om stabbaren si livsverd. I følgje Bengtsson og Løkken er livsverda både før-objektiv og før-subjektiv. Den er ein tredje dimensjon, og ein formidlar mellom objektivisme og subjektivisme. Studia mi har såleis produsert kunnskap om det taktile i erfaring i livsverda til stabbarar i ein barnehage, slik eg forstår den gjennom videokameraet, gjennom persepsjonane mine, og slik eg skildrar og tolkar den i lyset av Merleau-Ponty sin kroppsfenomenologi. Den blir slik eit resultat av eit samspel mellom det teoretiske rammeverket, persepsjonane mine av livsverda mi og livsverda til stabbarane, og skildringane og tolkingane eg gjer av datamaterialet.

## Å erfare ei kroppsfenomenologisk studie

Eit vesentleg aspekt ved å forstå filosofien til Merleau-Ponty, og innhaldet i orda og mellom orda hans, handlar om å opne seg for ein kommunikasjon med teksten. Merleau-Ponty<sup>26</sup> seier: "In order to perceive things, we need to live them". Vi må altså leve filosofien hans for å kunne erfare og forstå den. Vi kan persipere verda fordi kroppen allereie er tona inn på, og stemt til, verda. I same tanke framhevar Løkken<sup>27</sup> også viktigheita av å kunne "tone seg inn på teksten" gjennom gjentakande lesing og tolking, der ein gjennom dette får ei kjensle av at forståinga av teksten manifesterer seg kroppslig, som ei kroppssubjektiv erfaring. Løkken<sup>28</sup> omtalar også dette fenomenet som medproduksjon, som handlar om at kunnskap blir til i den inkarnerte forskaren sine møter med det som blir studert og utforska.<sup>29</sup> Denne inkarnerte erfaringstypen er faktisk også det største paradokset i kroppsfenomenologiske studiar. Eg har fornemma og observert stabbarverda, og det har blitt til noko som eg formidlar attande til verda.<sup>30</sup> Studia har blitt eit produkt som eksisterer i verda, den er ei erfaring som er *i* og *med* verda, og difor influerer den i sin eksistens. Paradokset består i behovet for å bruke ord i eit ynske om å rette fokuset bort frå det som faktisk er konkretisert i form av ord, slik også Merleau-Ponty sin kroppsfenomenologi gjer. Han ville, som nemnt, at vi skal attende til den sanne erfaringa, som er før-refleksiv og ordlaus, for å forstå mennesket. For orda vi brukar er i seg sjølv tolkingar av hovudpoenget, som er denne sanne og basale erfaringa. Heile prosjektet i å ville setje ord på noko heilt konkret, til dømes slik eg har gjort når eg skildrar måten stabbarar (utan verbalt språk) brukar den taktile sansen, samstundes som eg vil finne ord på kva meininga med denne måten å vere i verda på kan vere, er i seg sjølv motseiande. Kvifor setje i gang med det når den sanne erfaringa er sann

26 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 379

27 Gunvor Løkken, "Bevegelse er meningen," i *Barnas Barnehage 3: Kroppslighet i barnehagen*, red. Ellen B. Sandseter, Trond L. Hagen, og Thomas Moser (Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2010).

28 Gunvor Løkken, *Levd observasjon* (Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 2012)

29 *ibid.*, 10

30 *ibid.*, 151

og meningsfull berre for kroppssubjektet som er i den, ja som faktisk *er* den? Kan ein ikkje berre godta at svaret bur i kvart enkelt menneske? For med Merleau-Ponty sin kroppsfenomenologi finn ein faktisk at meiningane i mennesket sine handlingar er der, og at dei er eksistensielle, men at dei ikkje er konkretiserbare fordi dei er kroppslege og førrefleksive, og dermed utilgjengelege.

Erfaringa i ei kroppsfenomenologisk studie av stabbarar handlar om å formidle ei erkjenning og ei forståing av stabbarane, så vel som seg sjølv som forskande kroppssubjekt. For som forskande kroppssubjekt må ein erkjenne at ein har ei før-refleksiv forståing, og erfaring, av livsverda til barna. Det er den ein får gjennom å vere *ei erfaring*, som Merleau-Ponty ville ha sagt. Dei kontinuerlege førrefleksive sansingane vi har av verda er dekkja av ein intensjonal opasitet, men fargar likevel det kroppsfenomenologiske studiar av stabbarar finn. Den fullstendige forståinga ein har av stabbarane kan ein dermed ikkje skildre fullt ut med ord, fordi den også har ein sanseleg utilgjengeleg dimensjon i seg. Det vil seie at eg som forskande kroppssubjekt er refleksivt medviten på at eg forstår verda sanseleg kroppsleg, men eg har ikkje direkte ord på korleis dei påverkar forståinga mi. Det må eg berre erkjenne, og det er vesentleg å gjere synleg i slike studiar. I det ligg det også ei anerkjenning, ei anerkjenning om at det ein ikkje kan finne forklaringar på alt i verda. Skildringane eg har gitt av stabbarane si livsverd vil difor aldri vere tilstrekkelege for å uttrykkje den faktiske kroppssubjektive forståinga eg har av dei. Dei er enda mindre eit direkte og fullstendig dekkjande uttrykk for den meininga stabbaren faktisk legg i handlingane sine. Skildringane er ei overflate. Men dei er samstundes farga av fenomenet slik det har vist seg for meg som forskande kroppssubjekt. Det er der den førrefleksive dimensjonen ligg, og denne dimensjonen er det berre forskaren som kjenner gjennom å vere ei kontinuerleg erfaring. Difor er det umogleg for forskaren å skulle peike på noka universell sanning om stabbaren sitt univers. Verda som blir skildra kan ikkje bli skildra direkte utan referansar til forskaren som erfarande person eller kroppsleg medvit. Når desse observasjonane blir tilført ei tolking, er desse basert på ei refleksiv forståing (forskaren si forståing) av kroppen som eit før-refleksivt medvit som orienterer seg intensjonalt. Denne forståinga er også ein del av ei levd erfaring. Og det er denne forståinga formidlinga av ei kroppsfenomenologisk studie av stabbarar bør forsøke å reflektere. Det den finn er difor "sant" eller "gyldig" i den forstand at den forsøker å formidle innsikta og forståinga det forskande kroppssubjektet har av fenomenet som blir sett under lupa gjennom ei kroppsfenomenologisk forståing av stabbaren. Den gjer den gjennom ei refleksiv bevisstheit på fenomenet og ved å synleggjere at forskaren er ei erfaring. Eit kroppssubjekt som er i og med verda, historisk, sosialt og kulturelt, og som difor er i kontinuerleg kommunikasjon med denne mangefasetterte verda. Ein kommunikasjon der perspektivet alltid er frå kroppen, fordi det er den mennesket er i verda med. Heilt fysisk og konkret. Det er denne erkjenninga Merleau-Ponty ynskte skulle liggje til grunn for all vitenskapleg aktivitet. Å forstå og ta utgangspunkt i at vi alltid er kroppsleg, og sanseleg i verda.

# Anmeldelser

**Marie Luise Knott**  
***Unlearning with Hannah Arendt***  
**London: Granta Books, 2015**

De hellenistiske og romerske filosoffer betragtede filosofien som en helt igennem praktisk livsform, der skulle udfri den enkelte fra livsbesvær ved at give ham eller hende den rette personlige holdning til at leve et liv med sin gode skytsånd (eudaimonia). Tilegnelsen af denne filosofi krævede, at eleven allerførst aflærte sin dårlige dannelse, som havde bragt ham eller hende på vildspor ved at give en forkert personlig holdning. Den hellenistiske og romerske filosofi havde overtaget og omformuleret dette pædagogiske princip om aflæring fra henholdsvis Sokrates og buddhismen, ligesom at princippet blandt andet videreførtes i kristendommens idé om åndelig omvendelse.

Princippet om aflæring er forbundet med en bestemt form for eksistentiel læring og spirituel dannelse – og ikke mindst med en bestemt form for tænksomhed. Dermed udgør princippet også en slags modsætning til den tankeløshed, som Hannah Arendt indfanger i sin skildring af ondskabens banalitet i værket *Eichmann i Jerusalem. En rapport om ondskabens banalitet* fra 1963. I dag er Arendts begreb om 'ondskabens banalitet' næsten selv blevet en banalitet i visse akademiske kredse, men i 1963 vakte det furore. Ikke mindst blandt de jødiske intellektuelle, som havde forventet, at Arendt i stedet ville benytte begrebet om en 'radikal ondskab' til at karakterisere SS-officeren Adolf Eichmann, der havde været ansvarlig for deportationen af tusindvis af jøder under anden verdenskrig. Efter at have overværet retssagen mod Eichmann i 1961, fandt Arendt det imidlertid umuligt at anvende dette begrebet om den radikale ondskab, som hun ellers tidligere selv havde benyttet til at skildre nazismen med i bogen *Det totalitære samfundets oprindelse* fra 1951. Ifølge Arendt var Eichmann nemlig ingen dæmonisk psykopat men derimod en tankeløs funktionær, der var helt igennem normal. Ondskaben bor i netop normaliteten og truer derfor også hele tiden med at bryde frem, hvis systemerne og reglerne blot følges uden omtanke. Her er vi så tilbage ved de gamle hellenistiske og romerske filosoffer, for hvem aflæringen netop gjaldt fjernelsen af den dårlige dannelse til blindt at efterfølge normerne og konventionerne.

For at vende os mod 2015, står forlaget Granta Books bag en britisk udgivelse af den amerikanske professor David Dollenmeyers oversættelse af *Verlernen. Denkwege bei Hannah Arendt* fra 2011. Den tyske forfatter Marie Luise Knott's bog blev i sin tid nomineret til Leipziger Buchpreis, og den er da også både medrivende og læsevenlig. I bogen begiver Knott sig ikke – som jeg her gjorde indledningsvist – ud i en afklaring af aflæringsprincippets idéhistorie. I stedet læser hun en særlig form for aflæring frem af Arendts biografi og forfatterskab. Dermed knytter Knott an til en stigende tendens til at fremstille en snæver sammenhæng imellem filosofernes person og

deres idéer, som udgør en modsætning til poststrukturalismens annoncering af subjektets død. Knott har tidligere redigeret en række bøger med Hannah Arendts skrifter, herunder den filosofiske dagbog *Denktagebuch*, der netop giver et personligt indblik i Arendts tænkning. Der er så kommet et særdeles læseværdigt resultat ud af Kotts bestræbelser på at læse Arendts personlige og intellektuelle tilgang til Eichmann som udtryk for en særlig form for aflæring. For at kunne skrive værket fra 1963 måtte Arendt med andre ord aflære alt det, som hun tidligere mente at vide om nazismen – og herunder delvist afskrive sin egen tidligere bog fra 1951. I den forbindelse får Knott aflæringen til at fremstå som en udvej fra den lidelse og bekymring, der opstår ved, at vi hænger fast i traditionelle opfattelser af verden og mennesket. Hos Arendt kommer aflæringen således også til at virke som en slags sekulariseret udgave af kristendommens spirituelle lære ved at fungere som en intellektuel vækkelse, der virker ved at skabe chok og ubehag. I bogen udforsker Knott så fire områder, hvor Arendt aflærer sin nedarvede viden: Latter, oversættelse, tilgivelse og dramatisering.

Søren Kierkegaard beskrev i afslutningen af disputatsen *Om Begrebet Ironi med stadigt Hensyn til Sokrates* fra 1841, hvordan ironien ikke behøver at være at være trodsig pjat men i en behersket form kan udgøre kongevejen til engagement med virkeligheden og erkendelse af sandheden. På samme måde benytter Arendt ironien – og dermed latteren – i sin skildring af Eichmann som en banal embedsmand. Dette kunstgreb befrier hendes – og læsernes – opfattelse af ondskab fra at omfatte noget radikalt eller ekstremt, og dermed kan vi alle få øjnene op for, hvordan ondskaben lige præcist lurer iblandt de arbejdssomme familiefædre, som Heinrich Himmler bevidst rekrutterede til SS. Friedrich Nietzsche skrev i 1882 noget tilsvarende om behovet for en munter videnskab, der ved hjælp af en sund og homerisk latter bekræftede livet ved at udstille det komiske i de overleverede sandheder. For at gå tilbage til den hellenistiske og romerske filosofi, gik kynikerne ligeledes til sandheden ved at være frække som slagterhunde.

Lucius Seneca beskriver i *Consolatio ad Helviam Matrem* fra 41, hvordan det menneske, som bliver bortsendt i eksil, i virkeligheden er bedre stillet end de mennesker, der lever i fremmedgjorthed i massesamfundet. På tilsvarende vis måtte Arendt flygte til USA i 1941 og oplevede som tysktalende at være sendt i lingvistisk eksil i det engelske sprog, hvormed en stor del af hendes kulturelle baggrund mistede sin kraft. Arendt får imidlertid vendt dette forhold til noget positivt, idet tilegnelsen af det nye sprog giver hende samme fordel som digteren, der kan puste nyt liv i ordene og udtrykkene. Arendt er netop kendt for at luge ud i betydningen af vores traditionelle begreber og gentænke dem ved at placere dem i nutiden. Dermed bliver den sproglige oversættelse ikke et onde men tværtimod den kraft, der kan være med til

at føde noget nyt – en fødtthed, som bliver et centralt begreb i Arendts værk *Om menneskets vilkår* fra 1958.

Et andet centralt begreb i Arendts filosofi er tilgivelsen, og dette begreb spiller både en særlig rolle i Arendts personlige historie og hendes tilgang til Eichmann. Samtidig må Arendt netop aflære sin hidtidige forståelse af tilgivelsen, som i det væsentlige er hende overleveret fra den kristne idé om næstekærligheden. For Arendt gav tilgivelsen netop muligheden for fødslen af noget nyt, idet den indstifter en ny begyndelse, hvor situationen truer med at blive låst fast i hævn. En sådan tilgivelse hviler imidlertid ikke på næstekærlighed i den kristne betydning men derimod på respekt for den anden. Arendt måtte selv arbejde med tilgivelse, idet mange af hendes tidligere intellektuelle venner havde tilsluttet sig nazismen i 1933. Tilgivelsen giver ikke en mulighed for at ændre historien, men derimod giver tilgivelsen en mulighed for, at man fremadrettet kan ændre sin historie i en retning, der ikke var den ideoende. Dermed kan tilgivelsen i sig selv skildres som en form for aflæring. Ifølge Arendt giver forsoningen samtidig frihed og en mulighed for at etablere et politisk

venskab, men dette forudsætter, at skadevolderen har bedt om tilgivelse og ønsker en ny begyndelse.

For Arendt er tilgivelse en handling snarere end en reaktion, og i den sammenhæng skildrer Knott dramatiseringen som fjerde aspekt af aflæringen. Handlingen udgør et afgørende begreb i Arendts filosofi, og det er netop igennem den bevidste handling, at mennesket kan formå at forandre verden og dens udvikling. Samtidig er mangfoldigheden et væsentligt aspekt af denne handlingsdimension, og Arendt konstruerer netop sine tekster som teaterscener, hvor flere aktører kan komme i spil. Hermed får Arendt også mulighed for at aflære tænkningens traditionelle figurer og lade nyt komme i spil. Knott formår tilsvarende at lade Arendt komme til syne som en levende figur, og på den måde giver hun selv en ny form til filosofien som levet tænkning.

*Anders Dræby Sørensen,  
e-mail: ands@edu.au.dk  
Aarhus Universitet, Danmark*

**Morten Timmermann Korsgaard**  
**Hannah Arendt og pædagogikken**  
**Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2014**

Inden for de seneste årtier har den tyskfødte amerikanske filosof Hannah Arendt fået en stigende opmærksomhed som politisk teoretiker. Arendt døde i 1975, og hendes politiske teori har også inspireret nyere pædagogisk tænkning, hvilket blandt andet ses i Mordechai Gordons bog *Hannah Arendt and Education. Renewing Our Common World* fra 2001, Anna Firlas bog *Der pädagogische Begriff Verantwortung im Denken Hannah Arendts: Zwischen Politik und Pädagogik* fra 2012 samt Helen Gunters bog *Educational Leadership and Hannah Arendt* fra 2015. Hoveddelen af denne pædagogiske tænkning trækker især på Arendts politisk teoretiske hovedværk *Menneskets vilkår* fra 1957, der især benyttes som afsæt for udvikling af en tidsvarende kritisk og demokratisk pædagogik.

Den danske pædagog og pædagogiske filosof Morten Timmermann Korsgaard har skrevet en interessant og velformidlet bog, der i stedet tager sit primære udgangspunkt i Arendts egne udkast til en pædagogik. Arendt udarbejdede ganske vist aldrig nogen egentlig pædagogisk teori, men i hendes forfatterskab man kan til gengæld finde et par udkast til et syn på pædagogik. Det drejer sig nærmere bestemt om de to mindre tekster *Reflections on Little Rock* og *The Crisis in Education* fra tiden omkring 1957/8. I disse tekster udfolder Arendt især en kritik af datidens progressive amerikanske pædagogik, og det gør hun ved at lancere et alternativt perspektiv på uddannelse og pædagogik, der balancerer imellem konservatisme og fornyelse. For det første går Arendts kritik i den forbindelse umiddelbart fint i tråd med den aktuelle danske kritik af reformpædagogikken, men det er ikke Korsgaards hovedærinde at lave denne kobling. Hans primære ambition er i stedet at sammenfatte og formidle Arendts udkast til et syn på pædagogik, og det vil han først og fremmest med henblik på at kunne bringe dette syn i dialog med vor samtids to mest dominerende bud på pædagogiske og uddannelsesmæssige sammenhænge: Henholdsvis teorien om det lærende samfund og konkurrencestatspædagogikken, der netop italesættes som reformpædagogikkens afløser. For det andet indeholder Arendts skrifter som nævnt et element af konservatisme, der er fremmed for de aktuelle lærings- og konkurrencestatstilgange, og derfor kan Korsgaard samtidig benytte Arendt som afsæt for en kritik af de to bud.

Korsgaard indleder sin bog med at skildre overlappet imellem læringsparadigmet og konkurrencestatspædagogikken, der begge underordner pædagogikken et politisk ideologisk ideal for samfundet og dets borgere. I den forbindelse knytter begge bud an til et konkurrenceimperativ og anlægger et instrumentelt effektivitetsperspektiv på pædagogikken. Det indebærer blandt andet,

at tilgangene adopterer evidensstilgangen fra det medicinske felt, hvorfor pædagogikken skal vurderes på, hvad der virker snarere end på, hvad vi egentlig vil med den. Konsekvensen er, at uddannelsesfeltet i disse år undergår en generel økonomisering, hvormed feltet mister sin selvstændighed og underlægges et mere overordnet arbejdsmarkedsperspektiv. I modsætning N.F.S. Grundtvigs tanke om skolen for livet får vi derfor en idé om skolen for konkurrencen som markedslogik, og denne idé bliver indlemmet i en altomsluttende politisk-økonomisk rationalisering af menneskelivet og samfundet. Arendt er imidlertid generelt skeptisk over for den blinde tiltro til fornuften og den medfølgende bestræbelse på at instrumentalisere tilværelsen, og dermed er hun især beslægtet med den sene Martin Heideggers teknologikritik og den tidlige kritiske teori hos Theodor W. Adorno og Max Horkheimer. Samtidig fastholder Arendt, at pædagogikken ikke alene bør unddrage sig teknologiens og økonomiens herredømme, men at den også må adskilles fra den politiske sfære. Det er netop betoningen af denne adskillelse mellem det politiske og det pædagogiske, som Korsgaard mener bliver overset af de aktuelle bestræbelser på at gøre Arendts politiske teori til udgangspunkt for en pædagogisk tænkning. Samtidig er betoningen grunden til, at Korsgaard derfor vælger at begive sig ud i eksperimentet med at udforske, hvad resultatet mon bliver, hvis man loyalt følger i fodsporet af Arendts egne tekster om pædagogik.

Som Korsgaard påpeger, må Arendt lade pædagogikken balancere imellem konservatisme og fornyelse, fordi hun mener, at pædagogikken har en dobbelt opgave. Dels skal pædagogikken beskytte barnet, og dels skal den beskytte verden. Mens opdragelsen hører til i hjemmet og dermed i den private sfære, hører pædagogikken og uddannelsen til i skolen, som befinder sig i en mellemverden mellem det private og det offentlige. Skolens opgave er med andre ord at introducere børnene til verden og dermed i en mere snæver forstand til det politiske handlingsliv i den offentlige sfære, som børnene træder ind i som voksne. Eftersom børnene endnu ikke er klar til at begå sig i den offentlige verden, må skolen imidlertid skærme børnene fra offentligheden, uden at skolen dermed vanarter til en kunstig børneverden. Samtidig må skolen kunne medvirke til, at verden skærmes fra børnene, sådan at de ikke vælter verden men derimod fornyer den, når de bliver voksne.

Ifølge Arendt er det en ulykke, at den moderne reformpædagogik netop iscenesætter skolen på børnenes præmisser og sætter legen i centrum, hvormed lærerens og pædagogernes autoritet undermineres. Autoritetens opgaver var traditionelt at sørge for en overlevering af den gamle verden på en måde, hvor denne verden netop fornyes af de nytilkomne generationer uden samtidig at bliver forandret i grunden. Hvis vi følger Arendt, må autoriteten altså genoprettes, men denne genoprettelse må også finde sted på en måde, som adskiller sig fra den aktuelle lancering af læreren som klasseleder. Hvorfor?

Fordi klasselederen lige præcist er et instrument – og dermed en agent – for en bestemt politisk-økonomisk rationalitet og således slæber hele læringsparadigmet og konkurrencestatsideologien med sig ind i klasseværelset. Ifølge Korsgaard er det netop afgørende, at læreren igen bliver en autoritet i sin egen ret uden blot at blive reduceret til et instrument for mere overordnede magtstrukturer.

Korsgaard holder sig ikke snævert til Arendts pædagogiske tekster men knytter i stedet disse tekster til hendes øvrige filosofiske projekt. I *Menneskets vilkår* beskriver Arendt, hvordan det moderne samfunds krise skyldes, at menneskets fremstilling af genstande og dets politiske handlingsliv i offentligheden fortrænges til fordel for en tiltagende betoning af arbejdslivets allestedsnærværende nødvendighed. Den nødvendige politik er ligesom den arbejdsmarkedsforberedende skole lige præcist et resultat af denne fortrængning, som indebærer, at det sociale liv med dets normalitetskrav og konventioner bliver altdominerende for mennesket. Hermed tildækkes det uforudsigelige og unikke aspekt ved den menneskelige eksistens, som ifølge Arendt og dermed Korsgaard må reddes ved at pædagogikken igen adskilles fra økonomien og markedets konkurrencecelogik.

Ifølge Arendt er det ikke bare vor tids pædagogik og offentlige handlingsliv men også filosofien, der er præget af reduktion. Lige siden Platon har filosofien således nedvurderet det aktive liv til fordel for det kontemplative liv, der ganske vist har en afgørende betydning for mennesket, i det omfang filosofien er tænkning. I bogens afslutning forsøger Korsgaard at udfylde de manglende huller i Arendts pædagogiske tænkning, og her gør han lige netop gældende, at tænkningen bør være pædagogikkens vigtigste opgave som en forberedelse til det voksne handlingsliv.

Korsgaards bog er meget spændende og tankevækkende samt ganske velskrevet. Bogens styrke består, i at Korsgaard forsøger at følge Arendt på en loyal måde, men vores styrker er næsten også altid vores svagheder. Arendt følger nærmest Heidegger i sin betoning af tænkningens betydning, men hun falder derfor også selv lidt under for hendes egen problematisering af den kontemplative filosofis mangler. Arendts filosofi peger ganske vist mod praksis, men den er ikke særlig anvendelsesorienteret.

Anders Dræby Sørensen,  
e-mail: ands@edu.au.dk  
Aarhus Universitet, Danmark

**Steen Beck**

**Veje til vinden: Piagets og Vygotskys læringsteorier i historisk og teoretisk belysning**

**Frederiksberg: Frydenlund Academic, 2015**

Steen Beck har skrevet en bog om Piaget og Vygotsky. Og Freud. Piaget og Vygotsky er de centrale tænkere, der på omfattende og grundig vis diskuteres i bogen. Freud er deres samtalepartner. Egentlig lader det ikke til at Freuds teorier har en plads i sig selv, men psykoanalysen er springbræt til på den ene side at lave en skarp opdeling mellem Piaget og Vygotskys teorier og på den anden side at pege på en forbindelse mellem de to centrale tænkere.

Når jeg konstaterer, at Beck bruger Freud til at lave en skarp opdeling mellem Piaget og Vygotsky, så hænger det sammen med måden bogen er inddelt på. Bogen starter med en indledning, hvor Beck redegør for de motiver og anliggender, der ligger til grund for udgivelsen. Herefter begynder kapitel 1, der er en metateoretisk diskussion. Jeg vender tilbage til kapitel 1, da dette er et centralt kapitel for at forstå, hvad Beck vil med bogen og hvem den henvender sig til. Efter de indledende øvelser fortsætter Beck til at inddele bogen i fire dele. Del 1 handler om Piaget, del 2 handler om Vygotsky, del 3 søger at forbinde Piaget og Vygotsky, hvilket den afsluttende del også gør. Del 4 er dog orienteret mod Piaget og Vygotskys betydning for praksis, hvorimod del 3 søger de teoretiske forbindelser mellem de to.

Ved at bruge Freud og psykoanalysen som samtalepartner for først Piaget og dernæst Vygotsky kan Beck udsætte den direkte diskussion mellem de to centrale aktører indtil han har gennemgået deres respektive biografier og teorier enkeltvis. På den måde får læseren et indblik i, hvad der er særligt for henholdsvis Piaget og Vygotsky, inden der foretages en mere komparativ diskussion heraf. Dette giver også Beck anledning til at demonstrere en meget dybdegående viden om Piaget og Vygotskys personlige historier, deres samtid og i forlængelse heraf spekulere i, hvilken betydning den personlige historie og opvæksten har haft på udviklingen af deres teorier.

Når jeg yderligere konstaterer, at Freud skaber en ofte overset forbindelse mellem Piaget og Vygotsky, så hænger det sammen med, at Piaget og Vygotskys veje aldrig krydsede selvom de levede samtidigt og har haft stor betydning for pædagogikken. Beck indleder i del 3 kapitel 10 med en kort udredning af dette forhold (313). Vygotsky havde inden sin død kendskab til Piagets teorier. Vygotsky kritiserede en del af Piagets konklusioner. Blandt andet mente Vygotsky, at det var en fejl, når Piaget konkluderede, at egocentrisk tale først og fremmest handler om, at individet opbygger nogle kognitive strukturer, der senere sætter det i stand til at forstå andre menneskers tænkning og følelsesliv. Vygotsky mente ikke i lige så høj grad, at vi først tillærer os kognitive strukturer som individer, og derpå er i stand til at indgå i en social sammenhæng. Vygotsky mente snarere, at vi kon-

stant indgår i sociale relationer. Således mente Vygotsky, at ideen om egocentrisk tale altid indeholder et socialt element. Dette er et eksempel på en standardudlægning af Piaget og Vygotskys forhold, men Beck påpeger forbindelser mellem Piaget og Vygotsky, der rækker udover standardbilledet. Om end det skal understreges, at Beck til tider er på spekulativ grund – hvilket han selv gør opmærksom på. Et eksempel er den russisk fødte Sabrina Spielrein, der på personniveau kan skabe en forbindelse (71). Spielrein, der havde været Jungs patient og elskerinde, kom til at tilhøre inderkredsen omkring Freud. Efter dette vender Spielrein tilbage til Rusland, hvor hun deltager i de samme psykoanalytiske kredse som Vygotsky. I 1921 kommer Spielrein til Genève, hvor hun og Piaget skiftevis deltager i hinandens forelæsninger (71). Dette er fra Becks side et forsøg på, at spekulere i hvilken indflydelse Freud kan have haft på Piaget og Vygotskys teorier.

I kapitel 1 redegør Beck for, at han vedkender sig en kritisk realisme som sit videnskabsteoretiske position (19). Han hævder således, at virkeligheden eksisterer uafhængigt af menneskets bevidsthed, samt at det epistemologisk set er muligt at formulere tilnærmelsesvis sande sætninger. Dette leder Beck frem til at vedkende sig Bashkar og Archers aktør-struktur model. En model, der tillader forfatteren at pege på, at der ligger nogle strukturer i samfundet og samtiden, der påvirker tænkerens teori i en bestemt retning. Men samtidig er tænkerne også aktører, handlende agenter, der udvikler disse ideer. Dette er altså et forhold mellem nogle passive strukturer og agentens aktive handlinger. Denne position tillader yderligere, at Beck giver os et nuanceret syn på Vygotsky og Piaget. Sagt på en anden måde, så bliver ingen af dem gjort til radikale konstruktivist, men deres respektive konstruktivistiske teorier bliver netop fremstillet således, at der eksisterer en virkelighed uafhængigt af menneskets bevidsthed.

Men struktur-aktør modellen har også den konsekvens, at den giver forfatteren et bestemt fokus, hvor indholdet af teorierne træder i baggrunden til fordel for tænkerne, deres samtid og historien. Dette er ikke et problem, men det gør, at der til tider hersker tvivl om, hvem bogen henvender sig til. Er det til pædagogen og læreren i praksis? Den studerende på universitet eller professionshøjskole? Forskeren? Mit umiddelbare indtryk er at Beck ønsker at henvende sig til sine kolleger – altså forskeren –, men struktur-aktør modellen bevirker, at Beck ofte har lange passager, der gør det besværligt at følge teoriens indhold i forhold til forfatterens intention. Dette kommer specielt til udtryk, når Beck som indledningen på en redegørelse giver os titlen på en bog, mens i selve redegørelsen er der kun få konkrete nedslag og teksthenviisninger. Se eksempelvis side 79-81.

Jeg forsøger ikke at betvivle forfatterens kendskab til teorierne, eller rigtigheden af udlægningen, men det kan være svært at spore om, vi forholder os til Becks for-

tolkning eller Piagets og Vygotskys intention med deres respektive teorier.

Med struktur-aktør modellen som drivkraft i undersøgelsen får vi, i mine øjne, ikke en række nye og kontroversielle teorier, der på denne måde kan bidrage til at drive forskningen i læring og læringsprocesser frem. Til gengæld får vi et stykke grundig forskning i relationerne mellem to forskere, der har betydet utroligt meget for dansk skole- og læringshistorie. Becks forskning leverer således et værdifuldt bidrag, fordi han i vidt omfang har gjort det muligt at konsultere én bog, hvis man vil vide mere om relationen mellem Piaget og Vygotsky. Beck har lettet byrden for alle, der i arbejdet med Piaget og/eller Vygotsky ønsker at underbygge deres fortolkning med biografisk og historisk materiale.

En utvetydig fordel ved "Veje til viden" er, at den i del 4 forsøger at drage en række praksisnære konklusioner, ved at fokusere på læring i relation til undervisningen. Beck udlægger Piaget og Vygotskys teorier på en måde så læseren nærmest får et didaktisk værktøj, hvorved

praksis kan analyseres. Dette forsøger ikke at påtvinge læseren bestemte undervisningsformer og kan således være til stor gavn for f.eks. lærerstuderende eller andre der arbejder med analyser af praksis.

Jeg vil desuden understrege, at "Veje til viden" er en yderst velskrevet bog. Sproget er flydende og letlæselig, hvilket bevirker, at Beck formår at formidle svært stof på en måde, der gør den tilgængelig for også relativt uindviede læsere.

På denne baggrund vil jeg anbefale alle med en interesse for pædagogik, læring, dannelse og skoleafholdelse at læse Becks bog. Men jeg vil i særdeleshed anbefale, at man læser "Veje til viden", hvis man ønsker at udvide sin viden om bogens centrale aktører og de strukturer, der påvirker dem og deres teorier.

*Mathias Christensen,  
e-mail: Mamc@edu.au.dk  
Aarhus Universitet, Danmark*



## Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi

*Studier i pædagogisk filosofi* udkommer to gange årligt og udgives med støtte fra Nordisk Publiceringsnævn for Humanistiske og Samfundsvidenskabelige Tidsskrifters (NOP-HS). Lejlighedsvis udgives monografier inden for pædagogisk filosofi.

*Studier i pædagogisk filosofi* er i den elektroniske udgave gratis og tilgås via tidsskriftets hjemmeside <http://ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf>. Her er det også muligt at købe tidsskriftet i papirudgave. *Studier i pædagogisk filosofi* publicerer artikler på de skandinaviske sprog svensk, norsk og dansk samt i særlige tilfælde på engelsk. Indsendelse af manuskript til bedømmelse sker via hjemmesiden og medfører ikke tab af copyright til teksten for forfatteren.

### Retningslinjer for forfattere

Bidrag til *Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi* og modtages reviews året rundt.

### Krav til indsendte manuskripter:

1. I første omgang (altså for at kunne accepteres til fagfællebedømmelse (peer-review)): Det indsendte manuskript må ikke tidligere være blevet publiceret, og det må heller ikke være sendt parallelt til et andet tidsskrift med henblik på at komme i betragtning til at blive publiceret. Artikel manuskript uploades som Word fil eller RTF til tidsskriftet. Det kræver registrering som forfatter. Se <http://ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/spf/user/register>  
Manuskriptet bør indeholde et kort resumé (100 ord), der sammenfatter artiklens indhold og formål, ligesom forfatterne bedes angive max. 10 nøgleord.  
Manuskriptet skal være anonymiseret, dvs. ingen autoreferencer ("min artikel..."), fjern forfatter identifikation fra filens dokumentegenskaber.  
Omfang: 30.000-80.000 anslag inkl. alt (noter, mellemrum, litteratur etc.)  
Sprog: Dansk, norsk, svensk og engelsk
2. I anden omgang (altså hvis bidraget antages til publikation), så skal følgende gælde: Manuskriptet skal opfylde normerne for "Notes and Bibliography" på [http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools\\_citationguide.html](http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html)  
Brug venligst fodnoter.  
Alle fremmedsproglige citater skal oversættes; angiv eventuelt originalt citat i fodnote.  
Forfatterne bedes ligeledes angive institutionel tilknytning og mailadresse.  
Manuskriptet skal indeholde et kort abstract (max. 100 ord) på engelsk.

### Krav til indsendte anmeldelser:

1. Forslag om bog til anmeldelse med angivelse af anmelders postadresse sendes i første omgang til anmeldelsesredaktionen ([spf-anm@paedagogiskfilosofi.dk](mailto:spf-anm@paedagogiskfilosofi.dk)).
2. Hvis forslaget godtages (som note, anmeldelse eller essay), sørger redaktionen for at bogen (bøgerne) tilsendes anmelderen.  
Bognoter 2.000 anslag, anmeldelser 8.000 anslag og essays 20.000 anslag inkl. alt.

# Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi

Årgang 4 Nummer 2 2015

---

## Indhold

<i>Torill Strand</i> : Kosmopolitisme og realisme .....	1
<i>Helgard Mahrtdt</i> : Refugees and Europe: a dilemma or a turning point? .....	6
<i>Katariina Holma &amp; Tiina Kontinen</i> : The Rocky Road of Growth into Contemporary Citizenship: Dewey, Gramsci, and the Method of Democracy .....	24
<i>Claudia Schumann</i> : Graphic Contaminations: Cosmopolitics of the 'I' in <i>American Born Chinese</i> and <i>Persepolis</i> .....	38
<i>Hansjörg Hohr</i> : Oppdragelsen til verdensborgerskap i kunstnerisk perspektiv .....	54
<i>Rebecca Adami</i> : Paideia and Cosmopolitan Education: On Subjectification, Politics and Justice .....	68
<i>Rebecka Lettevall</i> : En kritik av det kosmopolitiska förnuftet? Om samtidsrelevansen av Kants kosmopolitism .....	81
<i>Torhild Godø Sæther</i> : Utfordringer i å vere eit forskande kroppssubjekt .....	94

## Anmeldelser

<i>Anders Dræby Sørensen</i> : Marie Luise Knott: <i>Unlearning with Hannah Arendt</i> .....	104
<i>Anders Dræby Sørensen</i> : Morten Timmermann Korsgaard: <i>Hannah Arendt og pædagogikken</i> .....	106
<i>Mathias Christensen</i> : Steen Beck: <i>Veje til vinden: Piagets og Vygotskys læringsteorier</i> <i>i historisk og teoretisk belysning</i> .....	108