

Multiple Institutional Embeddedness in Europe: The Case of Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish Government Officials

Jarle Trondal*

The questions posed in the current study are (1) whether, and (2) how, participation within Commission expert committees and Council working parties of the European Union (EU) affects the coordination behaviour of the participants. Based on organizational theory arguments, the coordination role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is arguably weakened by institutional dynamics existing within Commission expert committees. The opposite is argued to be the case within Council working parties. Empirically, this study is based on 160 questionnaires and 47 face-to-face interviews with Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish domestic government officials attending EU committees. Secondly, this study also includes answers from 49 officials at the permanent representation to the EU of these three Scandinavian countries. Being excluded from attending Council working parties, Norwegian civil servants participating within Commission expert committees are shown to coordinate considerably less with the foreign ministry than their Danish and Swedish counterparts. Notwithstanding these observations, this study also reveals how the coordination behaviour evoked by national civil servants reflects their domestic institutional affiliations. In addition to showing how EU committees affect coordination behaviour among the participants, the current analysis also shows how responses to integration requirements are filtered – and even conditioned – by a prior state of affairs at the domestic level of governance.

Introduction

The European Union (EU) bureaucracy is made up of permanent Eurocrats together with 'travelling national civil servants' (Nedergaard 1995, 26). Van Schendelen (1996) estimates that about 50,000 domestic officials are temporarily engaged in the administrative work of the EU per year. The Commission organized about 5500 committee meetings in 1989 and approximately 64,000 person days were spent on them. 'Since about 1963 the Commission's own work has become dominated by that of these various intermediary committees of national representatives' (Coombes 1970, 243).

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Introduction

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Thus, 'committees function as hybrids between EU governance and the organisations represented' (van Schendelen & Pedler 1998, 288).

Past and more recent literature on EU committees has in various ways measured the degree of cross-level participation through EU committees among national civil servants (e.g. Institut für Europäische Politik 1989; Wessels 1998). One question less frequently addressed is how such cross-level participation affects the officials themselves – their identities, role conceptions, and modes of acting. The current study tries to grapple with this question through analysing how participation within EU committees affects domestic coordination processes.

Past and contemporary literature pictures EU committee meetings as generally business-like, depoliticized, consensual, and technocratic; emphasizing the 'technocratic collusion' at the Community level (Dehousse 1997, 48; Wessels 1998; 1999, 265). Current studies on EU committees largely ignore the differentiated institutional character of the EU committees, paying heed to their commonality as a symptom of administrative integration and engrenage more broadly (Joerges & Neyer 1997; Neyer 1999). The current study argues that the way EU committees are formally organized may affect the coordination behaviour of the participants in particular ways. Thus, the coordination role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is arguably affected differently by the institutional dynamics within Commission expert committees and Council working parties.

Studies of actual decision behaviour within domestic governance institutions show that the formal organization of the bureaucracy is important, together with the professional background of the officials (Læg Reid & Olsen 1984; Egeberg 1999b). The formal build-up of the central governmental apparatus is also logically revealed to impact upon actual decision behaviour among government officials (Hammond 1986). This study basically argues that we have to unpack the organizational structure of the EU system in order to derive how domestic coordination processes are likely to be affected by it. In addition, we have to carve up the bureaucratic machinery of the nation state in order to unravel the dual institutional affiliations of domestic government officials, and ultimately to determine how different organizational structures are likely to affect modes of policy coordination. Organizational structures are seen as mobilizing particular modes of behaviour, identities, and role conceptions. Particular models of humankind and particular models of society embedding social interaction are perceived as moulded by particular principles of organization. Applying organization theory suggests going beyond a narrow *sui generis* view of the EU system to provide an understanding of 'the unfamiliar with the help of familiar conceptual lenses' (Jönsson et al. 1998, 320; cf. Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1998).

Based upon 160 questionnaires and 47 face-to-face interviews with Danish,

Norwegian, and Swedish government officials attending EU committees, the current study shows that officials attending Council working parties tend to coordinate inter-sectorally more frequently than officials attending Commission expert committees. (For a more thorough discussion of the concept of coordination, see note 1.) It is possible to hypothesize that officials attending Council working parties perceive the coordinating role of the MFA as fairly strong, whereas officials attending Commission expert committees tend to see the coordination role of the MFA as fairly weak.²

By comparing Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish officials attending EU committees, this study aims to test this hypothesis in countries with different forms of affiliation towards the EU: Norway as a European Free Trade Association (EFTA) member, affiliated to the EU through the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, and Sweden and Denmark as fully-fledged EU members. Hence, in order to test the robustness of the assumed relationship between EU committee affiliation and domestic coordination behaviour, the above hypothesis is studied under different conditions (EU membership versus EEA membership). Moreover, Sweden and Denmark are both included in this study because their length of EU membership differs. On the assumption that officials who have participated for long periods of time in EU committees are likely to be affected more strongly by these committees, as far as their coordination behaviour is concerned, than are newcomers in EU committees, both Swedish and Danish civil servants are included in this study.

In the following section some theoretical reflections are addressed in order to make different modes of coordination intelligible from a multiple institutional embeddedness point of view. Empirical data are then provided in the third section based on Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish civil servants participating within Commission expert committees (ECs) and/or Council working parties (WPs). These data cover officials employed within domestic ministries and agencies, as well as officials at the permanent representation to the EU of these Scandinavian countries. As suggested in the next section, the coordination behaviour of these officials is assumed to be affected by three major variables: (1) their EU committee affiliations, (2) the duration and intensity of participation within these committees, and (3) their domestic institutional affiliations.

A Theoretical Account of Multiple Institutional Embeddedness

The study of European integration and the 'Europeanization' of domestic bureaucracies has to an increasing extent been influenced by organization theory perspectives (e.g. Bulmer 1993; Cram 1997; Hix 1998; Olsen 1998;

Egeberg & Trondal 1999). Organizational theory has posed two major questions in the literature: first, whether institutions matter, and second, how institutions matter. This study goes beyond the question of whether institutions do matter (Weaver & Rockman 1993). In order to understand how organizational structures affect coordination processes, some micro-foundations based upon cognitive organization theory are added in the following (cf. Trondal 1999a).

Domestic civil servants attending EU committees have multilevel institutional affiliations. These officials are employed within domestic ministries and agencies, but at the same time participate on EU committees. Further, these officials have professional affiliations across different disciplines. Hence, domestic decision makers tend to be affected by multiple, partially contending, sets of information, premises, and considerations, reflecting their multiple institutional embeddedness. One important research task has to do with identifying the conditions under which decision behaviour is affected by different institutional affiliations. Studying government officials who are members of government institutions at different levels of governance, it is possible to emphasize organizational linkages between government institutions as one vital scope condition affecting modes of coordination at the domestic level of governance. One central feature attached to multiple institutional affiliations relates to the formal linkages between organizations, and to the intensity and length of such linkages. In the following, these two dimensions are discussed separately.

Principles of Organization

Different modes of policy coordination may reflect the basic organizing principles underpinning institutional linkages between formal organizations. One may argue that the EU system of governance in general and the web of EU committees and WPs in particular are organized according to two basic general principles of administrative life. Parallel to the sectoral and spatial institutional build-up of the domestic political-administrative apparatus (sector ministries and agencies versus foreign ministries), the EU Commission and the preparatory expert committees underlying it may be seen as exhibiting sectoral and functional principles.³ Conversely, the Council of the European Union and the web of WPs organized under it may be seen as exhibiting spatial and territorial principles of organization (Egeberg & Trondal 1999). Notwithstanding several contending organizing principles existing within the Commission and the Council of Ministers, it is argued here that the dominating and uppermost principles are those mentioned above. Sectoral principles tend to bias and skew coordination behaviour in sectoral directions. Being exposed to institutions organized by sector, the organizational members are systematically exposed to sectoral

information and stimuli. The area principle, on the other hand, is arguably more likely to activate coordination behaviour that is more inter-sectoral in character.

Coordination within and between government institutions may be either written or oral, or both. Oral coordination is arguably more likely when only a few actors are involved in the process, or if the actors share some fairly general interests, problems, or worldviews. Coordination through written documents is more likely when more actors are involved, where more conflicting interests are to be accommodated, and when more problems and worldviews have to be taken into consideration. The first scenario is more likely to materialize within, and between, government institutions. Within government institutions officials tend to be fewer, and the number of problems, solutions, and identities tend to be fewer and more easily accommodated than in the inter-ministerial arena. This argument may also be applied to EU institutions: the EU Commission is sectorally organized, whereas the Council is organized according to an area principle, implying that different sectors are more frequently confronted. Thus, the use of written coordination documents is more likely to dominate decision processes within the Council of Ministers than within the EU Commission.

Taken together, government officials attending Commission ECs are likely to evoke intra-sectoral and oral modes of coordinating, whereas officials participating within Council WPs are more likely to evoke inter-sectoral and written modes of coordinating. Domestic civil servants participating within both ECs and WPs are likely to evoke both these modes of coordination. Owing to the EEA agreement, Norwegian civil servants have access solely to Commission ECs, not to Council WPs. In the current study, Sweden and Denmark represent countries having participatory rights on both ECs and WPs. Thus, whereas inter-sectoral and written modes of policy coordination are likely to take primacy among Swedish and Danish officials, more intra-sectoral and oral modes of coordination are likely to be evoked by Norwegian government officials. However, when emphasizing how different organizational principles within different EU committees may affect coordination behaviour differently, Swedish and Danish EC participants are also likely to evoke intra-sectoral and oral modes of coordination.

Next, when studying government officials having multiple institutional affiliations at different levels of governance, it is necessary to pay heed to how these levels interact. Hence, we need to trace how administrative life is formally organized at both levels of governance, and how each level of governance is formally linked together. In the following it is argued that coordination processes within domestic government institutions may be affected by EU committees, conditional upon: (1) the degree of compatibility

in organizational structures across levels of governance, and (2) individual and institutional seniority at both levels of governance.

Institutional Compatibility

The impact from organizational principles that exist at different levels of governance may be conditioned by the degree of institutional compatibility across these levels of governance (March & Olsen 1995; Knill & Lenschaw 1998; Coporaso et al. 1999; Knill & Lehmkuhl 1999). The impact of institutional compatibility reflects the compatibility of cognitive shortcuts and scripts being systematically presented to the decision makers. I argue that institutional interpenetration – and thus the potential for domestic government officials to be affected by institutional dynamics within EU institutions – is more likely to emerge if government apparatuses at each level of governance are rather similar. I have argued elsewhere that the Commission ECs, on the one hand, and domestic-sector ministries and agencies, on the other, are in general organized along the same sectoral lines. Similarly, Council WPs and domestic foreign ministries may be seen as organized according to an area principle (Trondal 1999a). Thus, the coordination behaviour chosen by government officials employed within sectoral ministries and agencies is likely to reflect institutional dynamics within Commission ECs more strongly than institutional dynamics within Council WPs. The inverse relationship is likely among officials employed within the MFA attending Commission ECs. Instead of studying officials from the MFA, however, this study covers officials at the permanent representation to the EU. Permanent representations are formally organized under the auspices of the MFA; thus they embody territorial principles of organization. Officials at the permanent representation are more likely to attend EU committees more extensively than are officials in the domestic MFAs.

This article considers several primary institutional affiliations. Most important are civil servants who are employed within domestic ministries and agencies. *Ceteris paribus*, owing to the vertical despecialized ministry–agency structure in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, I argue that government officials employed at the agency level are more likely to evoke intra-sectoral modes of coordination than are officials employed at the ministry level. Conversely, officials at the ministry level are more likely to evoke territorial and inter-sectoral modes of coordinating. Further, officials at the permanent representations to the EU are likely to evoke inter-sectoral modes of coordination more frequently than are officials within the ‘home administration’, i.e. officials employed within domestic ministries and agencies. Moreover, most permanent representations are internally organized into sectoral and diplomatic realms. Inter-sectoral modes of coordination

are arguably more likely to be enacted among officials in the latter than in the former institutional realms. This is due to the fact that different organizational principles are uppermost within different realms at the permanent representations (Trondal 1999a). Further, officials in top-rank positions are more likely to enact inter-sectoral modes of coordination than officials in medium-rank positions. Finally, officials are likely to be pre-socialized from professional training even before entering the domestic bureaucracy, except before entering EU committees. The current study considers lawyers, economists, social scientists, and officials with more technical training, such as biology, physics, chemistry, etc. Generally, I argue that law, economics, and social sciences are more cross-sectoral in character than are technical disciplines. Thus, intra-sectoral modes of coordination are likely to accompany training in technical disciplines, whereas more inter-sectoral modes of coordination may accompany training in law, economics, and the various social sciences.

Duration and Intensity of Cross-Level Participation

Protracted and intensive participation within EU committees and working parties may add to the effect of (1) organizational principles and (2) institutional compatibility. *Ceteris paribus*, senior participants within EU institutions are more likely to be affected by the institutional dynamics dominating these committees than are officials who are newcomers to the EU arena (Beyers 1998). Duration and intensity of attending EU committees may arguably affect the extent to which the participants are affected by the organizational principles underpinning these committees. Theoretically, seniority and intensity of participation within EU committees may affect ways of acting through cognitive processes whereby civil servants are systematically exposed to particular sets of information. The impact from particular organizational principles may be further strengthened by intensive and protracted exposure to these principles (Lindberg 1963, 287). Hence, individual seniority at the EU level is likely to condition the extent to which domestic coordination processes are affected by institutional dynamics within EU committees. Individual seniority has to do with length of service within particular institutions. These propositions are *ceteris paribus* in character.⁴ Furthermore, within each nation state, different government institutions have participated at the EU level for different periods of time. Institutional seniority has to do with the length of time one institution has interacted with another. Hence, officials employed within government institutions who are senior participants in the EU arena are more likely to become Europeanized when it comes to their coordination behaviour than are officials within institutions who are newcomers to the European arena. Similarly, officials from old EU member states are likely to

be Europeanized more easily than officials from new member states (Beyers 1998). Therefore, individual and institutional seniority at the EU level may impinge upon the extent to which processes of Europeanization may occur.

To sum up the main arguments put forward in this section, the following propositions may be highlighted. Inter-sectoral modes of coordination are most likely to be evoked among domestic government officials educated in law, economics, or social sciences, who participate in Council WPs, who have participated for a long time, who generally participate intensively, who are employed at the permanent representation to the EU – especially within top-rank positions and within the diplomatic realm of this institution – and who are senior officials within this institution. Conversely, intra-sectoral modes of coordinating are more likely to accompany domestic government officials educated in technical disciplines, who participate within Commission ECs, who participate intensively, who have participated for a long time, who are employed within domestic-sector ministries or agencies – especially within medium-rank positions – and who have shorter lengths of service within these institutions.

Methodology and Data

In order to test the robustness of the assumed relationships between EU committee affiliation on the one hand and coordination behaviour on the other, data from countries with different forms of affiliation to the EU have been systematically selected. The principal rationale behind this comparative design is to show that particular institutional affiliations embedding civil servants may be a more adequate explanatory factor regarding domestic coordination processes than the dichotomy between EU membership and non-membership (EEA membership). Moreover, in order to minimize noise from possible intervening variables, countries that are ‘sufficiently’ similar have been selected (Anchar 1993, 118): Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Norwegian government officials have participatory rights within approximately 50 percent of the Commission ECs. Norwegian civil servants are, however, formally excluded from participating within Council WPs. Their Danish and Swedish counterparts, on the other hand, have additional participatory rights within the Council WPs. Secondly, in order to study the impact of individual and institutional seniority within EU committees, both Denmark and Sweden are included in this study, despite their having almost identical forms of affiliation to the EU. Danish officials, however, may be expected to have, on average, longer tenure within EU committees than their Norwegian and Swedish colleagues (cf. Trondal 1999b).

In order to control for the potential impact of policy-sector affiliation, and also to limit the empirical scope of this study, standardized questionnaires have been distributed to civil servants at the ministry and agency level within the environmental sector and within the health and safety at the workplace sector in the three Scandinavian countries. This survey was conducted from summer 1998 until spring 1999. The response rate is 79 percent, giving 160 respondents. Additionally, almost similar questionnaires were distributed to all government officials at the permanent representations to the EU of these three Scandinavian countries. This study was conducted from fall 1998 until spring 1999. The response rate of this survey is 53 percent, giving 49 respondents. Officials from the permanent representations to the EU are included in this study partially owing to a priori expectations regarding intensity of attending EU committees, and partially because the permanent representations formally embody territorial principles of organization. In addition, 47 face-to-face qualitative interviews were carried out during the spring of 1999. Officials in these interviews were selected from the survey sample above.⁵ The following empirical analysis is mostly based on statistical data. The interview data is included in the analysis in an effort to provide additional support for the statistical analysis.

The Empirical Record: Europeanization of Domestic Coordination Processes

This section illuminates how different institutional linkages across levels of governance are likely to affect domestic modes of coordinating EU-related dossiers, as perceived by the civil servants themselves. The first part of this section reveals how processes of policy coordination within the domestic government apparatus reflect different forms of affiliation to EU committees. The next part of the section statistically controls for the duration and intensity of participation within EU committees. The final part shows how coordination processes reflect primary institutional affiliations at the domestic level of governance.

Secondary Institutional Embeddedness: Different Committee Affiliations in the EU

Past and contemporary research have revealed that domestic coordination processes are at least two-dimensional in character: intra- and inter-sectoral (Metcalf 1994; Rometsch & Wessels 1996; Hanf & Soetendorp 1998; Trondal 1998; Egeberg & Trondal 1999; Harmsen 1999). Whereas some scholars observe policy fragmentation and sectorization of domestic EU

policy processes (Hopkins 1976; Burnham & Maor 1994; Dimitrakopoulos 1995; Dehousse 1997; Siedentopf & Ziller 1998), other scholars report cross-sectoral coordination processes as the central mode characterizing EU policy making at the domestic level of governance (Spence 1993; Rometsch & Wessels 1996; Bulmer & Burch 1998). When comparing the three Scandinavian countries, intra-sectoral modes of coordination are observed in Norway after the EEA affiliation in 1994 (Trondal 1996, 1998, 1999c; Egeberg & Trondal 1997, 1999), whereas coordination processes have tended to oscillate between intra- and inter-sectoral modes more prominently within the Danish and Swedish central administrations subsequent to their EU membership (Dosenrode 1993; Nedergaard 1994; SOU 1996:6; Statskontoret 1996:7; Trondal 1996; Jacobsson 1999). In the following, different modes of coordination are shown to reflect institutional affiliations towards different EU committees.

It is argued that the general amount of policy coordination is likely to be greater among civil servants participating within Council WPs than among officials attending Commission ECs. Moreover, it is expected that officials solely participating within ECs engage in coordination processes less often than officials also participating within WPs. In the remainder of this section, several different dependent variables are applied to measure coordination behaviour. The overall rationale for using several different operational measures for coordination is to detect particular patterns: if several dependent variables coincide with predicted patterns, the test is shown to be fairly robust.

Table 1 provides an overview of general coordination efforts, paying particular heed to different coordination techniques. It reveals that the usage of clearances between governmental institutions is more frequent among WP participants than among officials participating within ECs. However, the general amount of inter-sectoral coordination is also fairly high among officials participating within ECs. This may partially be due to the contending principles of organization within ECs, but it may also reflect primary institutional affiliations at the domestic level of governance (cf. the next section). Additionally, it may be due to the large usage of informal clearances among EC participants. Supporting this interpretation regarding techniques utilized for coordination, Table 1 shows that WP participants utilize formal coordination arrangements more frequently than do participants within ECs. Conversely, participants within ECs use informal coordination arrangements more frequently than do participants within WPs. Similarly, Table 1 reveals that written instructions are used more frequently among officials within WPs than among officials attending ECs. These observations are also supported in qualitative interviews: whereas officials negotiate under rather clear, written instructions within WP meetings, more unclear, often implicit mandates tend to accompany negotiations within

Table 1. Proportion of Officials Engaged in Coordination Efforts (Percent)^a

	Domestic bureaucracy		EU representation	
	EC	WP	EC	WP
Clearances with other central administrative institutions before attending EU committees ^b	58	87	68	79
Informal clearances	77	72	–	–
Formal clearances	32	64	–	–
Problem notes ^c	41	75	45	43
Frame notes	42	79	40	60
Instructions	37	92	30	89
'Do these documents govern your positions?' ^d	81	95	82	100
Mean <i>N</i>	133	56	21	34

^a In this and the following tables, *N* varies somewhat, reflecting the extent to which the respondents have answered different questions. However, by using the mean *N*, extreme variations in *N* between different variables are omitted.

^b This variable and the following two variables involve officials doing clearances fairly well, or better.

^c This variable and the following two variables concern officials who draw up these documents fairly often, or more.

^d This variable pertains to officials reporting these documents governing their positions to a fairly great extent, or more.

EC meetings (sources: interviews; cf. Statskonsult 1999:6). The relative propensity to apply written problem notes, frame notes, and instructions varies greatly between the two classes of committee participants. However, no significant differences are identified between the two classes of committee participants regarding the extent to which written instructions, problem notes, or frame notes tend to affect the positions taken by participants during committee meetings.

The above findings are clearly supported by Table 2: officials partici-

Table 2. Proportion of Officials Who Always or Fairly Often Agree on the Following Assertions (Percent)

	Domestic bureaucracies		EU representation	
	EC	WP	EC	WP
'I have clear instructions as to what positions to follow'	27	64	24	59
'I have a great amount of freedom when participating in EU committees'	45	16	37	26
Mean <i>N</i>	139	58	20	37

pating within WPs perceive their instructions as being considerably more clear than do those participating within ECs. Table 2 also reveals that the general amount of perceived leeway or behavioural discretion relating to modes of proceeding, 'positions' to follow, roles to evoke, etc., is significantly greater among officials participating within ECs than among officials participating within WPs (cf. Table 10). As seen from the qualitative interviews, the amount of behavioural discretion available to the participants seems far more extensive within the ECs than within the WPs.⁶ At the permanent representation to the EU, the same tendencies are revealed regarding modes of coordinating. Moreover, going beyond Table 2, officials participating within ECs report their positions to be based upon professional expertise more extensively than among their colleagues participating within WPs. Furthermore, 'national interests', as a catalyst for determining their positions, are ascribed greater importance among officials attending WPs than is professional expertise. The inverse pattern is revealed among EC participants. Hence, the general amount of inter-organizational coordination behaviour seems to be affected significantly by the institutional embeddedness within EU committees.

In the remaining part of this section, more systematic attention is devoted to how coordination behaviour is moulded differently within ECs and WPs, paying more thorough attention to intra- and inter-sectoral modes of coordination. One initial empirical expectation, derived from the above theoretical discussion, would be that inter-sectoral modes of coordinating may reflect institutional dynamics within Council WPs, whereas intra-sectoral modes of coordinating are likely to accompany dynamics to a greater extent within the Commission ECs. Intra-sectoral modes of coordination, however, are also likely to be affected by institutional dynamics within Council WPs; intra-sectoral modes of coordination may, to some extent, precede inter-sectoral coordination efforts: when coordinating across policy areas, officials may need to coordinate intra-sectorally in order to allow for *ex post facto* cross-sectoral coordination. Hence, institutional dynamics within WPs are likely to foster domestic coordination efforts more broadly – be it intra- or inter-sectorally – to a larger extent than institutional dynamics within ECs. A second important distinction to be made is that institutional dynamics within ECs are likely to foster intra-sectoral modes of coordination to a far greater extent than inter-sectoral modes of coordination. Finally, written modes of coordination are expected to accompany the territorial principles of organizations underpinning WPs, whereas oral modes of coordination are more likely to reflect sectoral principles embedded within ECs.

Tables 3 and 4 show the relative proportion of officials conducting inter-organizational clearances with the MFA, and intra-organizational clearances with other departments within their own governmental institution.

Table 3. Proportion of Officials, Who Use Somewhat, or More, of Their Time Participating on EU Committees, Doing Clearances with the Foreign Ministry (Percent)

	Domestic bureaucracies		EU representation	
	EC	WP	EC	WP
Yes	33	53	67	81
No	67	47	33	19
<i>N</i>	142	105	24	38

Table 4. Proportion of Officials Who Conduct Clearances with Other Departments within Their Own Government Institution before Entering EU Committees (Percent)^a

	Domestic bureaucracies		EU representation	
	EC	WP	EC	WP
	55	77	–	–
<i>N</i>	148	60	–	–

^a Table 4 includes officials doing intra-organizational clearances fairly often, or more.

The figures presented in Table 3 are not perfectly comparable to the figures presented in Table 4. However, they reveal some interesting differences. As expected, participants within WPs utilize clearances more frequently than participants within ECs – both intra-sectorally (Table 4) and inter-sectorally (Table 3). Those participating within ECs conduct clearances more frequently intra-sectorally than inter-sectorally. Læg Reid (1999, 25) also reveals that tendencies towards intra-sectoral modes of policy coordination are more widespread within the Norwegian central administration than are inter-sectoral coordination efforts – owing to Norwegian officials being solely affiliated to the Commission ECs. In Denmark and Sweden, inter-sectoral modes of coordination are reported to be more widespread (Nedergaard 1994; SOU 1996:6; Statskontoret 1996:7; Læg Reid 1999). This difference between Norwegian officials, on the one hand, and Danish and Swedish officials, on the other, is due largely to the additional institutional embeddedness within Council WPs among the latter. However, Danish and Swedish officials who participate solely within ECs report a generally low frequency of inter-sectoral coordination efforts – especially towards the MFA – compared with Danish and Swedish officials attending WPs (source: interviews).⁷ As such, the EC–WP nexus is shown to affect domestic coordination processes more strongly than the sheer dichotomy between EU membership and EEA membership. Finally, Table 3 shows

that clearances with the MFA take place more frequently among officials at the permanent representation than among officials within the home administration. This may be a result of the fact that permanent representatives embody territorial, and thus cross-sectoral, roles more fully than officials within the home administration.

Coordination more generally involves contact patterns with other governmental institutions. Table 5 reveals how participation within different EU committees may be reflected in contact patterns within the domestic administrative fabric. The upper half of Table 5 relates to inter-sectoral modes of coordination. Consistent with prior observations in this section, one of the most striking observations from Table 5 is the differences between the two classes of committees: inter-sectoral contact patterns are more frequent among officials attending WPs than among officials participating within ECs. Clearly, contacts with the MFA, which is the ministry formally embodying territorial principles of coordination, are significantly more frequent among WP participants than among EC participants. Officials participating within ECs have more frequent contacts with other sectoral ministries than with the MFA, save the domestic parliament or the national political leadership. Lægveid (1999, 20–1) observes the same tendency: inter-sectoral contact patterns and coordination efforts are more

Table 5. Proportion of Officials Who Have Contacts with the Following Units (Percent)^a

	Domestic bureaucracies		EU representation	
	EC	WP	EC	WP
Inter-sectoral				
Political leadership ^b	21	53	19	47 ^b
Foreign ministry	12	52	29	62
Other ministries	28	54	47	37
Domestic parliament	8	18	0	4
Intra-sectoral				
With domestic agencies within own policy sector ^c	67	78	63	80
With own superior ministry ^d	56	75	75	95
Mean <i>N</i>	84	40	17	34

^a This table includes officials who have contacts fairly often, or more, with the government institutions listed.

^b This pertains to contacts with the political leadership in the capital.

^c This variable pertains to officials employed at the ministry level within the domestic bureaucracy. This limitation does not, however, involve officials at the permanent representation to the EU.

^d This variable pertains to officials employed at the agency level within the domestic bureaucracy. This limitation does not involve officials at the permanent representation to the EU.

widespread within the Danish and Swedish government apparatus than within the Norwegian bureaucracy, due to their different form of affiliation towards the EU (cf. Sundström 1999). When intra-sectoral contact patterns are added to this picture, the tendency from Table 4 is repeated in Table 5: those participating within ECs make relatively more frequent use of contacts with other government institutions within their own policy sector than with government institutions in other policy areas. However, WP participants have intra-sectoral contacts more frequently than EC participants, that is, with hierarchical subordinated agencies and with hierarchical superior ministries within the same policy area (cf. Trondal 1999c).

Finally, modes of policy coordination may be measured by how civil servants perceive the relative importance of different government institutions. Contact patterns do not provide any understanding of the perceived importance of these contacts. Table 6 reveals how civil servants perceive

Table 6. Proportion of Officials Who Assign Weight to the Following Government Institutions when Important Decisions are Reached (Percent)^a

	Domestic bureaucracies		EU representation	
	EC	WP	EC	WP
Inter-sectoral				
Importance:				
Political leadership	41	88	–	–
Foreign ministry	19	42	–	–
Other ministries	29	59	33	46
Domestic parliament	20	37	24	41
Intra-sectoral				
Inputs:				
Own superior ministry ^b	82	91	95	100
Domestic agencies within own policy area ^c	68	64	90	85
Importance:				
Own superior ministry ^b	64	86	76	100
Domestic agencies within own policy area ^c	70	60	63	60
Mean N	80	38	19	33

^a This table involves officials attaching fairly much weight, or more, to the government institutions listed.

^b This variable pertains to officials employed at the agency level within the domestic bureaucracy. This limitation does not, however, involve officials at the permanent representation to the EU.

^c This variable pertains to officials employed at the ministry level within the domestic bureaucracy. This limitation does not involve officials at the permanent representation to the EU.

the relative importance of different domestic government institutions – both inter- and intra-sectorally. Consistent with the figures presented in Table 5, Table 6 shows that the relative importance attached to different government institutions reflects diverse institutional embeddedness within EU committees. Officials participating within ECs seem to attach greater importance to government institutions within their own policy sector, and considerably less importance to institutions in other policy fields, compared with officials attending WPs.

The analysis so far thus seems to confirm our main hypothesis, emphasizing that the organizational principles underpinning EU committees affect the actors within them. Most importantly, however, this analysis reveals how diverse institutional embeddedness within the EU system of governance affects decision processes within domestic bureaucracies differently. The above analysis, however, still does not provide any understanding of to what extent EU committees contribute to resocializing domestic decision makers. To this end, the next section analyses the relative impact of the length and intensity of participation within these committees.

Length and Intensity of Participation across Levels of Governance

'[N]egotiations [within ECs and WPs] sometimes last for years and take place among almost the same set of delegates . . . ' (Neyer 1998, 159). As such, a socialization dynamic may come into force. On average, Danish civil servants have participated for a longer period of time within EU committees than have their Norwegian and Swedish counterparts.⁸ Whereas Denmark joined the EU in 1973, Sweden became an EEA member in 1994, and a fully-fledged EU member in 1995. Similarly, Norway has been formally affiliated to the EU, through the EEA agreement, since 1994. On this basis, the data sets have been divided into two parts: those officials having participated since before 1994, and those officials who entered EU committees after 1994. Based upon this division, Table 7 reveals significant correlations between modes of coordination and length of participation within EU committees.⁹ In the following analysis, not every correlation is presented, but the general tendencies are highlighted.

The usage of written instructions and problem notes as coordinating tools seems generally to relate negatively to the sheer length of participation within ECs and WPs: senior participants within EU committees are less likely to use binding written mandates. On the other hand, those officials who have participated within WPs since before 1994 seem to coordinate to a lesser extent intra-sectorally compared with officials who are newcomers within these committees. Similarly, officials at the permanent representations, who have participated for longer periods of time within ECs, seem to

Table 7. The Impact of Length of Participation within EU Committees (Pearson's r)^{a,b}

	Domestic bureaucracies		EU representation	
	EC	WP	EC	WP
Contacts with the political leadership			0.41	
Instructions	-0.19*			
Problem notes		-0.30*	-0.50*	-0.38*
'My position has been coordinated with all relevant departments within my own institution'	0.25*			
Contacts with domestic agencies within own policy area ^c		0.76**		
Weight assigned to domestic agencies within own policy area		0.58*		
Mean <i>N</i>	140	29	20	30

* $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$.

^a This table compares officials entering EU committees for the first time after 1994 (coded 1) and officials who have participated since before 1994 (coded 2).

^b The dependent variables in this table are dichotomized, using the same values as in prior variables.

^c This variable and the next variable pertain to officials employed at the ministry level within the domestic bureaucracy. This limitation, however, does not involve officials with permanent representation to the EU.

have less frequent contacts with the political leadership at the domestic level than those who have participated for shorter periods of time within ECs. Thus, as expected, when exposed to different EU committees for longer periods of time, officials are more easily affected by the uppermost principles of organization present within these committees. Hence, duration of participation seems to strengthen and further the impact resulting from the uppermost principle of organization.

In addition to the effect of individual and institutional seniority within EU institutions, one may add the impact resulting from the sheer intensity of the participation of domestic officials within EU committees, measured by the number of committees they attend, the number of formal and informal meetings chaired, the degree of activity regarding giving oral presentations within these meetings, etc. Generally, intensity is assumed to correlate positively with the degree to which officials are affected by the organizational principles that are uppermost within these committees. One important finding is that modes of coordination appear to be most strongly affected by the number of committees that officials attend. The number of meetings and the degree of activity during these meetings correlate less strongly with particular modes of coordination behaviour.¹⁰

Table 8. Impact of the Number of Committees in Which Officials Are Participating (Pearson's r)^{a,b}

	Domestic bureaucracies		EU representation	
	EC	WP	EC	WP
'I have clear instructions as to which position to follow'	0.17*			
'I take the position which I believe is in the best interest to my country'	0.20*			
The importance of the MFA		0.28*		
Inputs from own superior ministry ^c		0.40		
Importance attached to own superior ministry		0.40*		
Importance attached to domestic agencies within own policy area ^d		0.48		
Contacts with domestic agencies within own policy area		0.68**	-0.57*	
Mean <i>N</i>	139	30	19	-

* $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$.

^a This table compares officials who participated on a maximum of two EU committees (coded 1) and officials who participated on more than two EU committees (coded 2).

^b The dependent variables in this table are dichotomized, using the same values as in previous tables.

^c This variable and the next variable pertain to officials employed at the agency level. This limitation does not, however, involve officials within the permanent representation to the EU.

^d This variable and the next variable pertain to officials employed at the ministry level. This limitation does not, however, involve officials within the permanent representation to the EU.

Table 8 clearly indicates how the impact from particular principles of organization within EU committees is strengthened and furthered by the sheer intensity of officials' exposure to these principles: officials participating on many ECs seem to coordinate more rarely inter-sectorally than do officials participating in fewer ECs. Similarly, officials participating within many WPs seem to coordinate less intra-sectorally than do officials participating within fewer WPs.

The analysis so far seems to confirm our main theoretical propositions: the duration and intensity of exposure to certain organizational structures – even though these structures are of secondary nature and embedded within collegial arrangements at the EU level of governance – seem to further and strengthen the impact of these structures. This section has shown that: (1) secondary institutional embeddedness does indeed impact on modes of acting among the participants, and (2) the intensity and length of participation at the EU level has an independent effect on the extent to which coordination behaviour is affected by secondary institutional embeddedness.

The next section aims at uncovering how the relationships presented so far are filtered and modified by the different domestic institutional affiliations embedding these officials.

Primary Institutional Embeddedness

Generally, primary institutional affiliations are likely to affect modes of coordination fairly strongly (Egeberg 1999a; Knill & Lehmkuhl 1999). This section discusses how domestic institutional embeddedness affects modes of policy coordination. More precisely, this section illuminates the independent (controlled) effect of domestic institutional affiliations. Thus, the control variable in this section is 'form' of affiliation towards EU committees'.

Past research on decision-making behaviour among Norwegian civil servants reveals that the ministry–agency nexus may be significant for understanding modes of policy coordination (Lægreid & Olsen 1984; Christensen & Egeberg 1997). I have argued that cross-sectoral modes of coordination are more likely to be evoked among officials at the ministry level than among officials at the agency level. Moreover, at the permanent representations to the EU, formally embassies under the auspices of the MFA, systematic attention to cross-sectoral coordination is formally institutionalized. However, officials within the diplomatic realms of these representations are more likely to enact cross-sectoral modes of coordination than are officials within the sectoral realms – the latter are delegates from domestic-sector ministries. Additionally, I have argued that institutional compatibility across levels of governance is likely to condition these effects to some extent: owing to institutional compatibility, officials within domestic agencies are likely to be affected by the institutional dynamics within ECs more strongly than are officials at the ministry level, except for officials within the diplomatic realms at the permanent representation. Similarly, officials at the ministry level, and especially officials within the diplomatic realms at the permanent representation, are likely to be affected by decision impulses from the WPs to a greater extent than are officials within the sectoral realms of the permanent representation, except for officials within domestic agencies. Table 9 largely confirms the majority of these propositions.

Consistent with the above propositions, Table 9 reveals that cross-sectoral modes of coordination – especially through the MFA¹¹ – are more frequent at the ministry level than at the agency level. Table 9 also shows that this effect is present under different statistical conditions, for example when controlling for EU affiliation. However, the first variable in the table clearly indicates the dual-role expectations juxtaposed by these officials.

Table 9. Impact of Primary Institutional Affiliations (Pearson's *r*)^{a,b}

	Domestic bureaucracies		EU representation	
	EC	WP	EC	WP
'My position is based on my professional expertise'	-0.36**	-0.27*		
Contacts with political leadership		0.43**		
Contacts with other ministries	0.36*	0.50**		
Importance attached to political leadership	0.20*			
Importance attached to other ministries	0.21*	0.30*		
Inputs from the MFA		0.40**		
Contacts with the MFA	0.23*			0.34*
'I have to coordinate with the MFA or other important coordinating units'		0.41**	0.46*	
'My position has been coordinated with all relevant ministries'	0.19*	0.35**		
Are instructions, problem notes, or frame notes governing the positions to be followed?			-0.46*	
Mean <i>N</i>	118	52	22	36

* $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$.

^a This table compares officials within the domestic bureaucracy who are employed at the ministry level (coded 1) versus those at the agency level (coded 2). Within the permanent representation to the EU this table compares officials from the diplomatic realm (coded 1) versus officials within the sectoral realm (coded 2).

^b The dependent variables in this table are dichotomized, using the same values as in previous tables.

Owing to contending principles of organization present within both ECs and WPs, officials at the ministry level are expected to act like 'government officials' and 'expert representatives' within both ECs and WPs. Notwithstanding these conflicting role expectations, Table 9 clearly indicates how cross-sectoral modes of coordination are strengthened as one moves from the agency level to the ministry level. Similarly, when controlling for EU committee affiliation, the impact of domestic institutional affiliation turns out significantly negative regarding whether positions are 'based on professional expertise'. Consistent with these observations, officials within the diplomatic realms at the permanent representations to the EU evoke cross-sectoral modes of coordination more frequently than their colleagues within the sectoral realms at the permanent representations. Hence, Table 9 identifies positive relationships between domestic institutional affiliations and

modes of coordination, notwithstanding diverse committee affiliations at the EU level.

Effects stemming from institutional compatibility are not clearly reflected in the data: when controlling for EU affiliation, the sign of the relationships between the ministry/agency variable, on the one hand, and coordination behaviour, on the other, remains the same.¹² Support for the compatibility thesis would require that the sign of these correlations varied across the EC–WP nexus. Such co-variation is not revealed in the data (cf. below). However, the strength of some correlations varies across the EC–WP axis. This may provide some support for the compatibility thesis. Because the signs of many correlations are largely equal across the EC–WP dichotomy, some of the observations in the first part of this article, which reveal how different committees at the EU level affect coordination behaviour differently, may be spurious to some extent. It is neither possible nor necessary to test for spuriousness in the current analysis. It is not possible because in the questionnaire the EU affiliation variable is merged with each dependent variable.¹³ Secondly, testing the relative explanatory power of forms of EU affiliation, on the one hand, and domestic institutional affiliations, on the other, is not necessary because these independent variables are not strongly correlated (the ministry–agency variable correlates only at $r = -0.05$ with EC participation, whereas the ministry–agency variable correlates at $r = 0.16^*$ with WP participation: $*p \leq 0.05$). This may indicate that the two major independent variables of this study have independent explanatory powers with respect to domestic coordination behaviour.

When controlling for rank, the same tendency as in Table 9 is repeated in Table 10: officials in top-rank positions seem to engage in cross-sectoral modes of coordination more frequently than officials in medium-rank positions, independent of their diverse European institutional embeddedness. Additionally, one may expect officials who have a lot of behavioural discretion (coded 1) to be more easily affected by their participation on EU committees than officials who have less behavioural discretion at their disposal (coded 2). Table 10 indicates these relationships.

Clearly, officials who perceive their behaviour as fairly regulated by norms and rules report their positions to be clear. These officials also seem to coordinate more frequently – both intra- and inter-sectorally – than officials who have a lot of behavioural discretion at their disposal. Conversely, officials with a lot of behavioural discretion at their disposal ‘often choose which positions to follow’. Similarly, officials at the EU representations report that rule following accompanies high awareness of the interests of their home country. Officials reporting their decision behaviour to be governed by rules and practices to a fairly great extent, or more, also tend to coordinate actively with the MFA, compared with officials whose

Table 10. Impact of the Degree of Discretion Available to Officials (Pearson's r)^{a,b}

	Domestic bureaucracies		EU representation	
	EC	WP	EC	WP
'I have clear instructions as to which position to follow'	-0.19*			
'I often choose which position to follow'	0.20*			
'I have a great amount of independence when participating'	0.26**	0.27*		
Importance attached to the political leadership	-0.21*			
Importance attached to the MFA		-0.30*		
'I have to coordinate with the MFA or with other important coordinating units'		-0.41**		
'My position is coordinated with all relevant ministries'	-0.20*			
Clearances with other departments within own institution	-0.17*	-0.27*		
Respecting the national interests of my country				-0.42**
Inputs from the MFA				-0.50**
Mean N	147	56	-	38

* $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$.

^a This table compares officials whose behaviour is perceived to be fairly discretionary, or more (coded 1), versus officials whose behaviour is perceived to be governed by rules and norms to a fairly great extent, or more (coded 2).

^b The dependent variables in this table are dichotomized, using the same values as in previous tables.

behaviour is perceived as fairly, or more, discretionary. These tables, thus, indicate the major role played by domestic government institutions in moulding coordination behaviour among domestic government officials. Moreover, this effect is also significant when controlling statistically for EU committee affiliation.

Moreover, government officials are highly presocialized even before entering formal positions within ministries and agencies, except before entering EU committees. Prior professional training may continue to affect modes of acting also after officials are assigned formal positions within highly formalized organizations like domestic ministries and agencies. Table 11 takes into consideration prior professional training among civil servants, be it law, economics, various social sciences, or more technical disciplines such as biology, physics, etc. Relating to the sectoral-territorial

Table 11. Impact of Formal Education (Pearson's *r*)^{a,b}

	Domestic bureaucracies		EU representation	
	EC	WP	EC	WP
Contacts with political leadership	0.25*	0.39*		
Signals from the political leadership			0.39	
Contacts with the MFA		0.52**		
Importance attached to the MFA		0.48**		
Contacts with other ministries		0.36*		
Importance attached to the domestic parliament		0.50**		
'I take the position which I believe is in the interest of my country'			0.49	
Clearances with other departments within own institution		0.38*		
Contacts with other domestic agencies			-0.68**	
Importance attached to other domestic agencies				-0.42*
Mean <i>N</i>	139	54	24	37

* $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$.

^a This variable compares officials educated in law, economics, or social sciences, on the one hand (coded 1), and officials educated in technical disciplines, on the other (coded 2).

^b The dependent variables in this table are dichotomized, using the same values as in previous tables.

dimension of coordination in Table 11, law, economics, and social sciences are perceived as representing cross-sectoral disciplines (coded 1), whereas technical disciplines are seen as representing more sectoral professions (coded 2).¹⁴

Table 11 shows, foremost, that educational background and professional affiliations do have impact upon modes of policy coordination: lawyers, economists, and social scientists tend to coordinate more frequently cross-sectorally, irrespective of the EU committee that they attend, than do technicians. Conversely, technicians tend to coordinate intra-sectorally to a larger extent.¹⁵ For example, lawyers, economists, and social scientists at the permanent representation who participate on ECs tend to coordinate cross-sectorally (applying national positions, paying heed to signals from the political leadership), whereas technicians are more geared towards intra-sectoral coordination behaviour (contacts with other ministries and domestic agencies, importance attached towards other domestic agencies), irrespective of which committees they attend. Thus, modes of policy coordination tend to vary according to educational background as much as

committee affiliation. However, the upper half of Table 11 also gives support to a compatibility hypothesis: officials participating within WPs tend to enact cross-sectoral modes of coordination more extensively if their educational background is compatible with the organizational principles within the WPs, i.e. cross-sectoral in nature (law, economics, and social sciences).

Since we are left with some statistically significant bivariate relationships in which some of the independent variables are related, multiple regression analyses are provided in an effort to unveil spuriousness. It has been shown above that it is not necessary to unravel the relative explanatory potential of EU committee-affiliation because this variable does not correlate significantly with domestic institutional variables (e.g. the ministry-agency variable). In Tables 12–18, we measure the relative explanatory potential of (1) intensity and duration of participation within EU committees, and (2) primary institutional affiliations.

Table 12. Factors Related to the Following Assertion: 'I have clear instructions as to which position to follow'. Pearson's *r* and Multivariate Regression (Beta). Officials from the Capital, Attending ECs

	Pearson's <i>r</i>	Beta
Number of ECs	0.17*	0.24**
Behavioural discretion	0.19*	0.22**

* $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$.

Table 13. Factors Related to the Importance Assigned to the Foreign Ministry. Pearson's *r* and Multivariate Regression (Beta). Officials from the Capital, Attending WPs

	Pearson's <i>r</i>	Beta
Number of WPs	0.28*	-0.32
Behavioural discretion	0.30*	0.15
Professional background	0.48**	0.31

* $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$.

Table 14. Factors Related to Contacts with the Domestic Political Leadership. Pearson's *r* and Multivariate Regression (Beta). Officials from the Capital, Attending WPs

	Pearson's <i>r</i>	Beta
Ministry-agency affiliation	0.47**	0.47**
Professional background	0.39**	0.19

** $p \leq 0.01$.

Table 15. Factors Related to Contacts with Other Ministries. Pearson's *r* and Multivariate Regression (Beta). Officials from the Capital, Attending WPs

	Pearson's <i>r</i>	Beta
Ministry-agency affiliation	0.50**	0.74**
Professional background	0.36*	0.03

* $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$.

Table 16. Factors Related to the Importance Assigned to the Domestic Political Leadership. Pearson's *r* and Multiple Regression (Beta). Officials from the Capital, Attending ECs

	Pearson's <i>r</i>	Beta
Ministry-agency affiliation	0.23*	0.17
Behavioural discretion	0.21*	0.15

* $p \leq 0.05$.

Table 17. Factors Related to the Following Assertion: 'I have to coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or with other central coordinating units'. Pearson's *r* and Multivariate Regression (Beta). Officials from the Capital, Attending WPs

	Pearson's <i>r</i>	Beta
Ministry-agency affiliation	0.41**	0.33**
Behavioural discretion	0.41**	0.33**

** $p \leq 0.01$.

Table 18. Factors Related to the Following Assertion: 'My position has been coordinated with all relevant ministries'. Pearson's *r* and Multivariate Regression (Beta). Officials from the Capital, Attending ECs

	Pearson's <i>r</i>	Beta
Ministry-agency affiliation	0.19*	0.16
Behavioural discretion	0.20*	0.16

* $p \leq 0.05$.

First, the following two independent variables turn out to be equally significant in the multiple regression analyses: (1) the sheer number of committees that officials attend, and (2) the level of discretion available at the domestic level. These are the only variables indicating the relative impact of primary and secondary institutional affiliations. Tables 12 and 13 indicate that the relative explanatory power of these institutional affiliations is fairly

similar. According to Tables 14–18, which look at the relative explanatory potential of different primary institutional affiliations, the ministry–agency nexus turns out to be the most important, closely followed by the degree of behavioural discretion. Formal education is shown to reveal more spuriousness than the former variables. So, Tables 12–18 show the importance of the ministry–agency affiliation when explaining modes of coordination within domestic bureaucracies.

Conclusion

Studies of public administration have contributed only marginally to our understanding of how different institutional affiliations may affect decision behaviour (Egeberg 1999b). This study suggests ways of filling this gap. Our initial argument emphasized primary institutional affiliations as vital cues for affecting decision behaviour within government organizations. However, this analysis also identifies conditions under which secondary institutional affiliations at the EU level of governance may affect domestic coordination processes. I argue, basically, that under conditions of (1) institutional compatibility and (2) intensive and protracted cross-level participation, domestic coordination processes may reflect secondary institutional embeddedness among domestic civil servants. Moreover, I argue that different organizational principles – domestically as well as within EU committees – are likely to affect modes of coordination differently.

The empirical analysis supports these arguments to a considerable extent. Regarding principles of organization, inter-sectoral modes of coordination are evoked more frequently among officials participating within Council WPs than among officials attending Commission ECs. Moreover, the differences between ECs and WPs are furthered and strengthened when officials have participated intensively and for protracted periods of time within EU committees. However, notwithstanding these observations, this study also indicates the pivotal role played by domestic institutions when it comes to their effect on coordination behaviour among civil servants. The present study reveals that domestic institutional affiliations have an independent casual impact upon domestic coordination processes, even when statistically controlling for EU committee affiliation. When controlling for EC–WP affiliations, Pearson's r tends to vary according to the domestic institutional affiliations among the officials. This observation does not support the institutional compatibility thesis. The empirical support of the compatibility thesis is rather weak: variations in the strength of some relationships are observed. However, the signs of most relationships are the same along the EC–WP axis. The multiple regression analysis, however, indicates that the relative explanatory values of intensity and length of

participation within EU committees, on the one hand, and domestic institutional affiliations, on the other, are fairly equal. Thus, despite providing clear indications of processes of Europeanization of domestic coordination processes, the current analysis also shows how 'responses to integration requirements are filtered – and even conditioned – by a prior state of affairs' at the domestic level of governance (Spanou 1998, 469).

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NOTES

1. The present study uses the coordination behaviour evoked by civil servants as an operational measure of policy coordination more broadly. The general aim is to study the latter through measuring the former. Inter-sectoral modes of coordination, I argue, involve linkage processes across policy sectors as far as actors, problems, solutions, consequences, role conceptions, and identities are concerned. In the current study, inter-sectoral coordination resembles horizontal inter-ministerial coordination processes, whereas intra-sectoral coordination resembles both horizontal coordination processes within each government institution, and vertical coordination processes within each government institution and between the ministry level and the agency level. Moreover, my definition of coordination is also two-dimensional as regards techniques applied: coordination may involve (1) proactive processes geared to outlining written and clear-cut mandates and instructions, or (2) reactive processes and anticipated reactions not geared to outlining any written instructions. Whereas the first process tends to foster formally binding mandates, the second process tends to produce unclear mandates. Whereas the process towards producing imperative mandates is based upon notions of institutions as coupled, sectorally coordinated systems of governance, the notion of unclear mandates rests upon notions of institutions as uncoupled, segmented, and inter-sectorally fragmented government systems (Olsen 1988, 162–70).
2. The current article analyses how different organizational principles – as embedded within the EU Commission and the Council of Ministers – affect modes of coordination. The term 'Europeanization' denotes processes by which domestic coordination processes are affected significantly by institutional dynamics within Commission ECs and/or Council WPs. The *modus operandi* of the Commission and the Council is different: they are located at different phases of the decision-making cycles of the EU machinery. However, the present article does not make any efforts to theorize decision phases. Organizational principles are put to the fore in this study partly because organizational principles are underresearched in general, and partly because it is possible to derive testable hypotheses from the notion of organizational principles more easily than from the notion of decision phases.
3. Whereas a huge body of literature conceives of the EU system as a novel and partially 'mysterious' polity – not resembling anything seen before – I argue that the EU system to a great extent reflects the structures of nation state politics. I thus reason against arguments stressing that the 'European Community is a political entity that does not fit into *any* accepted category of government' (Sbragia 1993, 24, my emphasis). My

argument does not ignore idiosyncrasies of the EU system as being supranational, multinational, multilingual, and multilevel. The basic arguments laid out here, however, do stress the similarities of the EU polity and other polities. Still, due to this polity being described as unique, novel, and 'mysterious' (Bartolini 1997), and faced with an assumed lack of appropriate concepts and categories for the understanding of this polity (Coombes 1970, 101; Jachtenfuchs 1997, 40), one vital step in this enquiry must be to carve this polity into empirically meaningful and theoretically fruitful categories.

4. Another hypothesis could be that length of service within EU committees reduces the need for coordinated instructions due to increased knowledge and feeling as regards appropriate solutions and positions. However, this hypothesis has weaker empirical support than the hypothesis suggested here (cf. Table 7).
5. Certain biases always accompany data based upon systematic selection of samples. In our data set officials at medium-rank positions loom large compared with officials in top-rank positions. Moreover, officials from the agency level are also more adequately represented in the sample compared with officials from the ministry level. Similarly, officials from the sectoral realms at the permanent representations are overrepresented compared with officials from the diplomatic realms. However, we do not have any universe against which to compare our samples. Available empirical findings indicate that our sample does not deviate significantly from any tentative universe of committee participants (Trondal 1999b).
6. Forty percent of the officials who participate solely on expert committees report their decision behaviour to be governed by rules and practices to a fairly great extent, or more. On the other hand, 52 percent of those officials participating within both ECs and WPs report their decision behaviour to be governed by rules and practices to a fairly great extent, or more.
7. Time pressure is reported as one additional hindrance for coordination (source: interviews).
8. In our sample from the home administration, 51 percent of the Danish officials entered ECs before 1990, whereas only 5 percent of the Norwegian officials and 2 percent of the Swedish officials entered these committees before 1990. Regarding participation within WPs, all of the Swedish officials entered these committees for the first time after 1994 (when Sweden became an EEA member), whereas most of the Danish officials entered WPs long before 1994.
9. Owing to systematic selection of data, significance does not tell us anything about any universe. On the contrary, significance may tell us something about the robustness of the relationships tested. Moreover, owing to the low N , and with the aim of studying only fairly robust relationships, Pearson's r values that are not significant at the 95 percent level or that are lower than 0.40 are not shown in the tables presented here. On this basis, the likelihood for random errors is reduced.
10. Those officials participating in many EU committees also seem to take part in many formal meetings (Pearson's $r = 0.23^{**}$, $N = 159$; $^{**}p \leq 0.07$). Moreover, those taking part in many committees are also generally senior participants (Pearson's $r = 0.34^{**}$, $N = 159$).
11. Pearson's $r = 0.32^{**}$, $N = 148$ within the domestic bureaucracy.
12. However, the strength of some relationships differs along the EC-WP axis, as expected from the compatibility thesis. For example, contacts with other ministries are conducted more frequently among officials at the ministry level attending WPs than among ministry officials attending ECs (variable 3). The same tendency occurs with officials who attach importance to other ministries (variable 5) and who have contacts with the MFA (variable 7). Finally, officials at the ministry level attending WPs report coordinating more frequently with all relevant ministries than do officials at the ministry level attending ECs. These observations, thus, support the compatibility thesis somewhat. However, the signs of the relationships are the same along the EC-WP nexus, thus going counter to the compatibility thesis.
13. A test of the independent, non-spurious, explanatory status of EU committee affiliation would require cross-tabulations controlling for at least the ministry-agency affiliation. This test is not done here because it would render only few units in some of the cells (especially among ministry officials).

14. Linking law, economics, and social sciences into the same variable causes one major problem: whereas a law education and an economics education are professional in character, which may tend to increase the likelihood for strong professional allegiances, most social-science disciplines are cross-disciplinary. Thus, the level of professional allegiance may differ between these disciplines. Technical disciplines are also mostly organized as professional education.
15. In the current sample, technicians loom largest – both within ECs and WPs. Nevertheless, whereas technicians and economists dominate as delegates from domestic agencies and ministries (82 percent), lawyers and social scientists are more frequent representatives at the permanent representations (66 percent). However, officials educated in law and social sciences represent the ministry level (30 percent) more frequently than the agency level (7 percent). At the permanent representations to the EU, lawyers and social scientists tend to represent the diplomatic realms (71 percent) more frequently than various sectoral realms (67 percent).

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participation within EU committees, on the one hand, and domestic institutional affiliations, on the other, are fairly equal. Thus, despite providing clear indications of processes of Europeanization of domestic coordination processes, the current analysis also shows how 'responses to integration requirements are filtered – and even conditioned – by a prior state of affairs' at the domestic level of governance (Spanou 1998, 469).

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NOTES

1. The present study uses the coordination behaviour evoked by civil servants as an operational measure of policy coordination more broadly. The general aim is to study the latter through measuring the former. Inter-sectoral modes of coordination, I argue, involve linkage processes across policy sectors as far as actors, problems, solutions, consequences, role conceptions, and identities are concerned. In the current study, inter-sectoral coordination resembles horizontal inter-ministerial coordination processes, whereas intra-sectoral coordination resembles both horizontal coordination processes within each government institution, and vertical coordination processes within each government institution and between the ministry level and the agency level. Moreover, my definition of coordination is also two-dimensional as regards techniques applied: coordination may involve (1) proactive processes geared to outlining written and clear-cut mandates and instructions, or (2) reactive processes and anticipated reactions not geared to outlining any written instructions. Whereas the first process tends to foster formally binding mandates, the second process tends to produce unclear mandates. Whereas the process towards producing imperative mandates is based upon notions of institutions as coupled, sectorally coordinated systems of governance, the notion of unclear mandates rests upon notions of institutions as uncoupled, segmented, and inter-sectorally fragmented government systems (Olsen 1988, 162–70).
2. The current article analyses how different organizational principles – as embedded within the EU Commission and the Council of Ministers – affect modes of coordination. The term 'Europeanization' denotes processes by which domestic coordination processes are affected significantly by institutional dynamics within Commission ECs and/or Council WPs. The *modus operandi* of the Commission and the Council is different: they are located at different phases of the decision-making cycles of the EU machinery. However, the present article does not make any efforts to theorize decision phases. Organizational principles are put to the fore in this study partly because organizational principles are underresearched in general, and partly because it is possible to derive testable hypotheses from the notion of organizational principles more easily than from the notion of decision phases.
3. Whereas a huge body of literature conceives of the EU system as a novel and partially 'mysterious' polity – not resembling anything seen before – I argue that the EU system to a great extent reflects the structures of nation state politics. I thus reason against arguments stressing that the 'European Community is a political entity that does not fit into *any* accepted category of government' (Sbragia 1993, 24, my emphasis). My