Try Federalism

Carsten Anckar*

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Introduction

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A Theoretical Framework

Size and Party System Fragmentation

The theoretical frames for why the party system should be affected by the size of entities were outlined by Dahl and Tufte in their seminal work *Size*

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and Democracy (1973). According to Dahl & Tufte, there are two ways in which size affects the fragmentation of the party system. One can be derived from social psychological theory building whereas the other one has to do with diversity. Dahl & Tufte take as a point of departure the famous experiments on conformity conducted by S. E. Asch. With regard to these experiments, the authors stipulate that a dissenting minority in a political system must exceed a certain level in order to be able to express their differing views (Dahl & Tufte 1973, 89–91).

The Asch experiments additionally constitute the base for an assumption about political conflicts in small and large units. According to Dahl & Tufte, it is reasonable to assume that in small units there is a high risk that such conflicts turn into personal conflicts, because people know each other well and it is difficult to, as Dahl & Tufte (1973, 93) put it, 'take refuge in anonymity.' In large units, however, it is possible that the antagonists never actually meet. This means that group conflicts should occur more frequently in large units than in small ones, since individuals presumably are less likely to take part in a conflict if this means that their personal relations are affected.

Consequently, Dahl & Tufte reach the conclusion that conflict solving mechanisms tend to be institutionalized in large units, whereas in smaller units one can assume that the parts tend to solve their disputes *ad hoc*, e.g., with face-to-face negotiations. The common conflict solving mechanism is, of course, the political party. The arguments laid out above lead to the conclusion that large units have more political parties than small units and that in large units the electoral support of the parties is more equally distributed than in small units (ibid., 91–103).

Another reason large units should have a more fragmented party system is that largeness, by necessity, leads to organizational diversity and complexity. A large unit presupposes a wide range of organizations and institutions, whereas a small one can manage with fewer ones. Although these organizations and institutions structurally might be very similar, one can assume that a multiplicity of such organizations and institutions leads to a higher degree of specialization and complexity. In other words, increasing size leads to increasing attitudinal diversity (ibid., 31–35). The above-mentioned argument is prevalent in the writings of other authors as well. Already in 1956, Griffith (1956, 102) argued that 'democracy is more likely to survive, other things being equal, in small states,' because small states were more 'manageable' than large ones. Similar arguments can be found in Lijphart's discussion on favorable conditions for consociational democracy: '. . . smaller countries are easier to govern than large ones because they tend to be less complex: the number and variety of groups and individuals whose interests and attitudes have to be taken into consideration are fewer' (Lijphart 1977, 68).

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A curiosity is that while there seems to be broad consensus on which countries should be considered federal, authors at the same time generally agree that the term is problematic to conceptualize. It has, for instance, been said that federalism 'is a difficult term to define' (Paddison 1983, 98) and that 'it is not easy to pin down what federalism stands for except in a formal constitutional sense' (Lane & Ersson 1994, 164). Nevertheless, it should not be venturesome to simply state that federalism is a strong form of power devolution.

One reason for why federal states should have a more fragmented party system than unitary states is that federal states tend to be highly heterogeneous in different respects. Indeed, regional differences are frequently mentioned as *the* exogenous factor when explaining the adoption of a federal constitution (e.g. Paddison 1983, 104–7; D. Anckar 1997, 48). Federalism is a mechanism which should make conflicts created by such diversities manageable. Regional differences can, of course, take many forms. If they are severe – and since the constitution makers have opted for a federal system, we must assume that they are severe – they can be thought to be reflected in the party system, thereby giving rise to a multiplicity of parties. The heterogeneity of federal countries is therefore likely to generate political parties with a basis of support anchored to a specific ethnic or religious group or to a specific region.

Another defining characteristic of federal systems of explicit relevance for the study is the presence of an elected legislative assembly at the lower level. The division of legislative power between the federal level and the regional level should constitute a favorable condition for the creation and success of regional parties. With elections to a regional assembly with substantial legislative power, one can assume that there is a special niche for regionally concentrated parties. In different regions, different interests prevail, shaping parties with different objectives and different bases of support. Since the power of the legislature at the subnational level is substantial, there is also supposedly great incentives to found political parties with the ambition to operate solely at the local level, concentrating mainly, or even exclusively, on questions concerning local matters. At the same time, it is reasonable to assume that regional parties are perceived as legitimate and relevant political actors by the electorate. This will possibly have a spill-over effect on national elections as well. When voters grow accustomed to voting for regional parties in regional elections, the threshold for voting for a regional party in national elections is lowered. Consequently, parties with a regional base should have a better chance to survive in federal states than in unitary ones. True, elections to subnational representative institutions do take place in unitary states as well. However,

in a federal system the price of gaining representation is generally much more awarding. By gaining representation at the regional level, a party can, at least to a certain extent, carry some weight when it comes to shaping national policy outcomes. In other words, while there is only one carrot to win in unitary states, parties in federal states compete for two carrots.

One can also find other arguments that link federalism to party system fragmentation. Federalism tends to go hand in hand with bicameralism. In fact, in my research population (to which I shall return shortly) there is only one exception from this rule, The Federated States of Micronesia. Combining representation based on population and representation based on territory means that at the national level there are elections to two representative bodies instead of only one. Therefore, it is not unlikely that vote splitting might occur. A voter who favors a regional party, but is uncertain whether the party in question will gain representation or carry any weight in national politics, might as a compromise choose to split his vote between a large, national party, which presumably will carry some political weight, and a regional party which politically attracts him the most.

The theoretical arguments laid out above suggest that ethnic, religious or regional differences and, in particular, an elected legislative assembly at the lower level are of importance for party system fragmentation. In this study, a state is consequently regarded as federal if and only if it a) formally regards itself as federal (thereby explicitly expressing that there are serious differences between different parts of the country) and b) has an elected regional legislature. This means that I am operating with a qualitative and not a quantitative variable. The strategy can of course be criticized on the ground that I disregard the fact that there are significant differences within the categories. True, Spain is a more decentralized state than France. However, since the operationalization of decentralization is problematic, and for the validity of the study also dangerous, I choose to operate with only two categories which can be easily and naturally separated from each other.

The Research Population

Since the number of countries that fulfil my two criteria for a federal system is fairly low, it is natural to include as many countries as possible in the study. Some restrictions do, however, apply. Needless to say, it is important that only countries in which the formation of political parties is free can be included in the study. As a departure point, I use the meritorious study *Democracy and Development* by Hadenius (1992). The author measures the level of democracy according to two dimensions: *elections* and *political freedoms*. Each dimension covers a field of subdimensions. Here, I use only those subdimensions that are of explicit relevance to the formation of

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parties, namely *universal suffrage, meaningful elections*, and *organizational freedoms.* For each dimension, states are given points on various scales. On the elections dimension, the scale ranges from 0 to 12 points. I have chosen to include countries obtaining the value 6 or more. On the organizational freedoms dimension, the scale ranges from 0 to 8. Countries obtaining the value 5 or more are included. Concerning universal suffrage, Hadenius measures it according to the following formula: the proportion of the population that is enfranchised times the proportion of seats in parliament that are filled by public elections. I choose a slightly different strategy, excluding all countries that impose restrictions on the right to vote. In addition, I demand that at least 90 percent of the representatives are elected by general elections.

Since Hadenius' study does not reflect the present situation (his data are from 1988), and does not cover all the countries in the world (OECD countries and Eastern European countries are excluded), I must also use other sources. I have therefore chosen to make use of Freedom House's renowned compilations of *political rights* and *civil liberties.* Both dimensions are measured on a scale from 1–7, where values close to 1 tell us that the degree of rights or liberties is high, and values approximating 7 denote a lack of such rights and liberties. For the present study, the political rights dimension is more relevant than the civil liberties dimension. I therefore focus on this dimension only, using the value 5 as a cutting point, and only countries scoring below 5 are included in the study. Since the study covers a time span of approximately ten years, I demand that countries meet the criteria derived from Hadenius' study and from Freedom House's surveys on two different occasions namely the 1994/1995 issue and the latest issue (available on the Internet, *http://www.freedomhouse.org/ political/frtable1.htm*). For countries not included in Hadenius' study, I use the 1987/1988 issue of Freedom House's survey as a point of reference. Since a party system might be unstable at the initial stage of the democratization process, I also demand that there has been at least three consecutive elections carried out under democratic rule (before June 1996). Altogether, 77 countries meet the criteria laid out above. The countries are listed in Appendices 1 and 2.[1]

Three Measures of Party System Fragmentation

A natural, albeit rough, estimate of party system fragmentation is the number of political parties in a country. Of course, defining a political party is not an easy task. According to Downs (1957, 27), a political party is 'a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election.' Lapalombara & Weiner (1966, 6) put forward four criteria for a political party:

(1) Continuity in organization – that is, an organization whose expected life span is not dependent on the life span of current leaders; (2) manifest and presumably permanent organization at the local level, with regularized communications and other relationships between local and national units; (3) self-conscious determination of leaders at both national and local levels to capture and to hold decision-making power alone or in coalition with others, not simply to influence the exercise of power; and (4) a concern on the part of the organization for seeking followers at the polls in some manner striving for popular support.

Epstein (1967, 9) gave a loose definition, stating that 'any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental officeholders under a given label . . . rather than an organization is the crucial element.' Sjöblom (1968, 21) defines a party as 'an organization that appoints candidates at general elections to the system's representative assembly and also to other political positions,' whereas Sartori's (1976, 64) 'minimal' definition states that 'a party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office.'

Although there are some differences between the quotations above, there seems to be broad consensus that political parties strive for power by placing candidates for election. This is the crucial point when drawing a line between parties and interest organizations. When operating with a large number of countries, it is important that the same criteria apply for each country. Fortunately, there is a useful source, namely the handbook-series published by Longman Current Affairs (see Appendix 2). The source uses self-definition as a defining criterion, although 'editorial judgments have had to be made on case-by-case basis' (Lewis & Sagar 1992, vii).

Another measure of party system fragmentation is the support for the leading party in parliamentary elections. The larger the support, the more homogeneous the country in terms of political attitudes. However, since this measure does not take into account the overall degree of fragmentation – the vote shares of all other parties than the largest one are disregarded – it is necessary to complement this measure with one that takes into account the vote shares of all parties obtaining votes in general elections. The most widely used measure is 'the effective number of parties,' created by Laakso & Taagepera (1979) and calculated according to the following formula:

$$N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i \in M} V_i^2}$$

where V_i is the vote proportion of the i-th party.

I consequently operate with three dependent variables: number of registered parties in a country, electoral support for the leading party, and effective number of parties. The results will show if and how these three measures of party system fragmentation are affected by variations in the independent variables. Electoral data have been collected from the two

latest elections. The mean value constitutes the electoral support for the leading party and the effective number of parties. The latest data are from May 1996. For countries with two-chamber parliaments, I have regarded the elections to the lower chamber only. Concerning the number of parties, I have for each region used the latest version of the Handbook series published by Longman Current Affairs.

Empirical Evidence

We find that of the 77 countries with free party systems, 15 are federal, while 62 are unitary. To test whether or not federalism is linked to party system fragmentation, I shall first conduct a comparison of means test, using T-statistics. Data concerning electoral support for the leading party and the effective number of parties are not available for Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. In addition, Papua New Guinea is excluded from all analyses concerning the effective number of parties. In Papua New Guinea, a very high number of candidates usually run as independents. This means that the effective number of parties will be very high indeed (the calculations have been done presuming that all independents do not constitute one homogeneous group, but instead are 'independent' from each other as well as other parties). Papua New Guinea would therefore be an extreme 'outlier' in the data.

Let us first establish how size, federalism, and party system fragmentation are interrelated. We already know that there is a strong link between size and party system fragmentation (Anckar 1998). Accordingly, we must establish whether a corresponding association between federalism and party system fragmentation exists and whether size and federalism are interrelated. If this is not the case, the conclusion is that federalism does not account for the explanatory power of size on party system fragmentation. Tables 1 and 2 report empirical findings on these relationships. Since the two size dimensions as well as the number of parties are distributed lognormally, I use the logaritmized versions of population and area as well as of the number of parties.

As can be seen, size is, no doubt, related to federalism in the sense that federal states tend to be much larger than unitary ones. This holds true concerning both population and area. The results furthermore indicate evidence of a link between federalism and party system fragmentation. There is a strong association between state structure and number of parties. The number of parties is much higher in federal states than in unitary ones. Electoral support for the leading party is not related to state structure. As concerns the effective number of parties, the result is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, it does point in the presumed direction.

Table 1. Degree of Party System Fragmentation in Federal States and Unitary States. Comparison of Means

	Number of parties (log)	Electoral support for leading party	Effective number of parties
Federal states	2.85 (15) 1.13	41.71 (15) 19.80	4.32 (15) 2.40
Unitary states	2.16 (62) 0.92	45.84 (60) 17.47	3.38 (59) 1.34
T-sig.	0.02 (ev)	0.42 (ev)	0.16 (ev)

Note: In each cell, the arithmetic mean is listed first, followed by the standard deviation. (ev) = T-statistics calculated assuming equal variances in the standard deviations. (N).

Table 2. Association between Size and State Structure. Comparison of Means

	Population (log)	Area (log)
Federal states	17.16 (15) 2.08	13.33 (15) 2.70
Unitary states	14.39 (62) 2.55	9.88 (62) 3.23
T-sig.	0.00 (ev)	0.00 (ev)

Note: In each cell, the arithmetic mean is listed first, followed by the standard deviation. (ev) = T-statistics calculated assuming equal variances in the standard deviations. (N).

Contesting Variables

So far, I have dwelled upon the presumed relation between size, federalism, and party system fragmentation. In addition to size and federalism, a number of factors are frequently cited as relevant for party system formation. A study of the determinants of party system fragmentation is not complete without the inclusion of these factors. Consequently, I shall introduce the following contesting variables: electoral system, effective threshold, and presidentialism.

The Electoral System

The effects of electoral systems on party systems have received much attention in the literature. Normally, Hermens (1941) and Duverger (1951) are mentioned as the pioneers in the field, although Droop (cited in Riker

1986, 22–23) preceded them both. Duverger's biggest merit was that he was the first to present clear theoretical arguments for why and how different electoral systems affect party systems. In short, his argument was that a plurality electoral system leads to a two-party system, whereas a proportional electoral system leads to the formation of a multi-party system.

Duverger gave two reasons for why the formation of a two-party system in a plurality electoral system is inevitable. First, there is the *mechanical effect*, which is associated with the rules that regulate the transformation of shares of votes to shares of seats. In plurality electoral systems, these rules favor, to a large extent, the leading party in each constituency, as the party with the largest share of the votes gets 100 percent of the seats (e.g., the only seat in a single-member constituency). At the same time, its share of votes can be the lowest possible as long as it is higher than the share of votes of any other party. Second, there is also a *psychological effect*. When voters are aware of how the mechanical effect operates, they tend to concentrate their votes to the large parties to avoid wasting the vote, i.e., give the vote to a party that lacks realistic possibilities of getting its representative elected (Duverger 1964, 206–55). In this study, the electoral system is treated as a dummy variable, countries with a plurality electoral system are given the value 0, and countries with a proportional electoral system obtain the value 1.[2]

The Effective Threshold

There is strong evidence supporting a link between district magnitude and party system fragmentation. The argument is that the larger the number of persons elected from an electoral district, the higher the degree of proportionality and the better the possibilities for representatives of small parties of getting elected (e.g., Rae 1971; Taagepera & Shugart 1989, 112–25; Gallagher 1991; Jones 1993, 64–66; Lijphart 1994). The legal thresholds used in some countries to make it more difficult for small parties to gain representation have the same presumed effect on party system fragmentation as small electoral districts. Legal thresholds can be expressed as a certain percentage of the votes or, alternatively, a fixed number of votes or some other criteria. In most cases, the threshold operates at the national level, but in some countries the threshold operates on the district or regional level (Lijphart 1994, 11–12).

The effects of district magnitude and legal thresholds cannot be assessed separately. Often, countries with large district magnitudes use legal thresholds as a countermeasure to the proportionality obtained by the large district magnitudes. Some countries even combine low district magnitudes with high legal thresholds (e.g., Turkey). We are in both cases unable to state which factor carries more explanatory power (Anckar 1997, 507–8).

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District magnitudes and legal thresholds are therefore combined into one single measurement, *the effective threshold*. This measurement was first suggested by Taagepera & Shugart (1989, 273–75) and later on modified by Lijphart (1994, 25–30). In short, the difference between the two versions is that while Taagepera & Shugart's measurement converts legal thresholds into district magnitudes, Lijphart's measurement does the opposite. In this study, I use Lijphart's measurement, which is calculated according to the following formula:

$$T_{eff} = \frac{50\%}{(M+1)} + \frac{50\%}{2M}$$

where M stands for district magnitude.

For countries that employ legal thresholds, the value obtained by Lijphart's formula is compared to the legal threshold. The higher value constitutes the effective threshold. Calculation of the effective threshold is problematic in countries with multi-tier districting, i.e., where seat allocation takes place in two (or, as in Greece, three) levels. Things get even more complicated in countries with multi-tier districting and legal thresholds calculated in more complex ways. Space prohibits a long discussion of how thresholds should be calculated in these cases. Let me therefore only say that I have chosen the same strategy as Lijphart (1994, 30–39). I have only made one slight alteration. Lijphart calculates the effective threshold based on the electoral district where a party most easily can gain a seat. I choose to make the assumption that all districts are equally large, and that the votes are distributed equally between the parties throughout all electoral districts. The motivation for this strategy is that the threshold is relevant for small parties, which are often regionally concentrated and not necessarily to the largest electoral districts (i.e., mostly the capital district). In fact, it is not unreasonable to assume that these parties have their base of support in distant parts of the country. In some countries, the district magnitude or legal thresholds have changed between the two elections from which data have been collected. In these cases, I operate with the average value.

Establishing the effective threshold is more problematic for countries using plurality electoral systems. Based on a reasonable assumption that four to five parties put forward candidates in each constituency, Lijphart (1994, 28–29) gives a rough estimate of 35 percent for plurality electoral systems. In the present study, this value will constitute the effective threshold for countries with plurality electoral systems.

Presidentialism

There is some evidence of a relation between a presidential form of government and party system fragmentation. According to Shugart and Carey

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(Shugart 1988; Shugart & Carey 1992, 206–58), a parliamentary system is likely to have a more fragmented party system than a presidential one. Their results have been confirmed by other authors (Stepan & Skach 1994, 121; Mainwaring 1993, 210–14). The argument is that since a presidential election often is a race between two candidates only, one can assume that this might have the same consequences on voting behavior as a plurality electoral system. The presidential election is thereafter thought to have a 'spill-over' effect on the parliamentary election, resulting in a concentration of the votes to a few parties. The empirical evidence shows that this is the case only if a) the presidential election is conducted under a plurality voting system; b) the election of the legislature coincides with the election of the president; and c) the president is seen as a relevant political actor (Lijphart 1994, 130–34). To determine when a president should be seen as a relevant political actor, I use Sartori's definition of a presidential system. According to Sartori, a political system is presidential if 'the head of state (president) i) results from a popular election, ii) during his or her pre-established tenure cannot be discharged by a parliamentary vote, and iii) heads or otherwise directs the governments that he or she appoints' (Sartori 1994, 84).

The form of government is treated as a dummy variable, countries which meet all the above-mentioned criteria, and where the president is elected by plurality vote and the presidential elections coincide with parliamentary elections are regarded as presidential and given the value 1. Other countries are given the value 0. Some countries use mid-term elections, which means that one election from which data have been gathered has coincided with the presidential election, whereas the opposite is true for the other election. In these cases, I have given the countries the value 0.5 on the scale. The question of how to treat the so-called semi-presidential systems does not have to be tackled, since none of the countries with a semi-presidential form of government (Finland, France, and possibly Sri Lanka) meet all the other requirements for a presidential system.

Empirical Evidence

Table 3 shows the levels of association between the independent and the dependent variables for all the countries included in the study. In these regression models, state structure is treated as a dummy variable. Unitary states obtain the value 0, federal states the value 1. Since the two size dimensions are highly interrelated (Pearson's r .87), I use separate regression models for population and area. The same applies for the electoral system and the effective threshold. To avoid too many tables, I only show, for each dependent variable, the result of the regression analysis with the highest explanatory value (R^2).

Table 3. Size, State Structure, Electoral System, Effective Threshold, Form of Government, and Party System Fragmentation in 77 Countries with Free Party Systems. Multiple Regression

Independent variables	Number of parties (log)	Electoral support for leading party	Effective number of parties
Population (log)	0.30** 0.81 9.94	not included in model	not included in model
Area (log)	not included in model	−3.21 ** −0.61 −5.85	0.20 ** 0.40 3.78
State Structure	−0.12 −0.05 −0.59	5.72 0.13 1.26	0.65 0.16 1.53
Electoral System	0.06 0.03 0.40	−7.24 * −0.20 −2.06	not included in model
Effective Threshold	not included in model	not included in model	−0.04 ** −0.36 −3.72
Form of Government	−0.23 −0.06 −0.86	6.70 0.11 1.11	−1.57 ** −0.28 −2.87
Multiple R	0.79	0.63	0.64
R^2	0.63	0.40	0.41
Adjusted R^2	0.60	0.37	0.38
F-sig.	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	75	75	72

Note: The unstandardized regression coefficients are listed first, followed by the standardized regression coefficients and the absolute t-values.
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test).
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test).

The results clearly show that the impact of federalism on party system fragmentation is negligible. The strong association between federalism and the number of parties vanishes when we control for population size. The explanatory power of the independent variables is approximately the same for all three dependent variables. In addition to size, the effective threshold is a powerful determinant of the effective number of parties. Also, we note that a presidential form of government reduces the effective number of parties to a certain extent. In addition to area, the electoral system affects the electoral support for the leading party.

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Table 4. Size, State Structure, and Party System Fragmentation in 77 Countries with Free Party Systems. Multiple Regression

Independent variables	Number of parties (log)	Electoral support for leading party	Effective number of parties
Population (log)	0.30 **	not included in model	0.29**
	0.81		0.47
	10.31		4.16
Area (log)	not included in model	−3.38**	not included in model
		−0.65	
		−6.28	
State Structure	−0.14	7.36	0.17
	−0.06	0.17	0.04
	−0.74	1.61	0.72
Multiple R	0.79	0.60	0.49
R^2	0.62	0.36	0.24
Adjusted R^2	0.61	0.34	0.22
F-sig	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	77	75	74

Note: The unstandardized regression coefficients are listed first, followed by the standardized regression coefficients and the absolute t-values.
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test).
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test).

The results obtained in Table 3 indicate that size is a far more important determinant of party system fragmentation than state structure. This is particularly the case concerning the number of parties. Concerning the other dependent variables, it is less clear whether the explanatory power of federalism can be attributed to size, since there are several other independent variables with substantial explanatory value. It is therefore necessary to establish whether size accounts for the explanatory power of federalism. The reader is reminded that the internal association between federalism and the electoral support of the leading party was very weak. Let us therefore run regression analyses where only size and federalism constitute the independent variables. The results are shown in Table 4 and leave little or no room for interpretation. Nearly all the explanatory power of federalism disappears when controlling for size. This holds true concerning all dependent variables.

Conclusion

The findings leave little or no room for doubt. The explanatory value of federalism is clearly overshadowed by size, which leads to the conclusion

that physical characteristics play a much more important role than institutional factors for party system fragmentation. Of course, the reasons for this are hard to pinpoint. However, one plausible line of reasoning is that federal systems are likely to generate a special kind of parties, namely *regional* parties. Although these parties in some cases are relevant and even powerful actors on the political arena, for instance in Canada and India, voters still tend to regard ideological cleavages as more important than cleavages based on territorial or ethnic differences (e.g. Lewis-Beck 1986; McDonough et al. 1988, 204, 218; Dix 1989, 24; Rokkan & Urwin 1983, 154-56; Keating 1985). At the same time it should also be stressed that regionally concentrated parties do not exist exclusively in federal countries. Let me here only point at the important role the secessionist *Lega Nord* is playing in Italian politics.

NOTES

1. I make the following exceptions: Singapore has continuously received the value 4 on the political rights dimension. In the 1993/1994 issue of *Freedom in the World* this value was raised to 5. However, in the latest issue, it was again lowered to 4. Electoral data for Singapore has, in any case, been collected prior to the raise. Turkey's values have been oscillating between inclusion and exclusion. In the 1992/1993 survey, Turkey received the value 2. The oppression of the Kurdish population led to a sharp rise and in the 1995 survey, Turkey received the value 5. In the latest ranking, however, Turkey is again barely qualified for inclusion, obtaining the value 4. I therefore choose to include Turkey in the study.

2. Countries which use majority electoral systems, i.e., either the second ballot system (France, Kiribati, Monaco) or the alternative vote system (Australia, Nauru), are, perhaps rather unconventionally, included among the countries with proportional electoral systems. This is because the possible implications of these electoral systems for party system fragmentation are closer to those of proportional systems than those of plurality systems (e.g., Duverger 1964, 240; Anckar 1998, 65–68). Countries using the single transferable vote system (Ireland and Malta) and the single non-transferable vote system (Japan until 1996, Taiwan, and Vanuatu) are also included among countries with proportional electoral systems. Some countries use mixed systems, where a part of the legislature is elected by proportional representation and the other part by means of plurality. In those cases where the voters have different ballots for the different elections, I have only regarded the proportional election. For the strategies adapted in those countries where voters have only one ballot, the reader is referred to Appendix 1.

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Appendix 1. State Structure, Size, Electoral System, Effective Threshold, and Form of Government in Countries with Free Party Systems

Country	State Structure	Population	Area (km^2)	Electoral System	Effective Threshold	Form of Government
Antigua & Barb.	unitary	64 000	440	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Argentina[a]	federal	32 547 000	2 780 000	PR	12.55	pres. NCE, SP
Australia	federal	17 065 000	7 686 850	AV	NA	parliamentary
Austria	federal	7 718 000	83 850	PR	4.69	hybrid
Bahamas	unitary	255 000	13 940	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Barbados	unitary	257 000	430	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Belgium	federal	9 967 000	30 510	PR	7.52	parliamentary
Belize	unitary	189 000	22 970	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Bolivia[b]	unitary	6 573 000	10 986 000	PR	4.97	pres. CE, maj.
Botswana	unitary	1 300 000	600 400	SP	35.00	hybrid
Brazil	federal	144 723 000	8 512 000	PR	5.26	pres. NCE, maj.
Bulgaria	unitary	8 991 000	110 840	PR	8.95	hybrid
Canada	federal	26 584 000	9 975 220	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Colombia[c]	unitary	32 300 000	1 139 000	PR	13.56	pres. NCE, maj.
Costa Rica[a]	unitary	2 805 000	50 700	PR	8.54	pres. CE, SP
Cyprus	unitary	681 000	9 250	PR	8.00	parliamentary
Denmark	unitary	5 140 000	43 080	PR	2.00	parliamentary
Dominica	unitary	71 000	750	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Dominican Rep.[d]	unitary	7 170 000	48 730	PR	5.12	pres. CE, maj.
Ecuador[e]	unitary	10 264 000	283 560	PR	5.93	pres. PCE, maj.
El Salvador	unitary	5 172 000	21 390	PR	12.04	pres. NCE, maj.
Finland	unitary	4 986 000	337 050	PR	5.36	s.pres. NCE, maj.
France	unitary	56 735 000	547 030	SB	12.50	s.pres. NCE, maj.
Germany	federal	79 365 000	356 910	mixed	5.00	parliamentary
Greece	unitary	10 161 000	131 990	PR	3.29	parliamentary
Grenada	unitary	91 000	340	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Guatemala[e]	unitary	9 198 000	108 890	PR	5.22	pres. CE, maj.
Honduras	unitary	5 105 000	112 090	PR	9.68	pres. CE, SP
Iceland	unitary	255 000	102 850	PR	6.60	hybrid
India	federal	834 697 000	3 287 590	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Ireland	unitary	3 503 000	68 390	STV	16.07	hybrid
Israel[f]	unitary	4 660 000	20 700	PR	1.25	parliamentary
Italy[f]	unitary	57 661 000	301 280	PR	4.61	parliamentary
Jamaica	unitary	2 415 000	11 420	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Japan[f]	unitary	123 537 000	371 860	SNTV	16.49	parliamentary
Kiribati	unitary	72 000	680	SB	NA	hybrid
Liechtenstein	unitary	29 000	160	PR	8.00	hybrid
Luxembourg	unitary	382 000	2 590	PR	4.79	parliamentary
Malaysia	federal	17 764 000	332	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Malta	unitary	354 000	320	STV	1.11	parliamentary
Marshall Islands	unitary	46 000	181	SP	35.00	hybrid
Mauritius	unitary	1 059 000	2 040	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Mexico[f,g]	federal	86 154 000	1 972 550	mixed	21.15	pres. PCE, SP
Micronesia (Fed. States of)	federal	101 000	702	SP	35.00	hybrid
Monaco	unitary	30 000	2	SB	0.00	hybrid
Nauru	unitary	10 000	21	AV	NA	hybrid
Netherlands	unitary	14 952 000	34 000	PR	0.67	parliamentary
New Zealand[f]	unitary	3 363 000	269 060	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Norway	unitary	4 241 000	323 900	PR	4.00	parliamentary
Pakistan	federal	112 049 000	803 900	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Papua New Guinea	unitary	3 699 000	462 840	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Peru	unitary	21 550 000	1 285 220	PR	5.10	pres. CE, maj.
Philippines	unitary	61 480 000	300 000	SP	35.00	pres. CE, SP
Portugal	unitary	9 896 000	92 080	PR	6.76	hybrid
St. Kitts & Nevis[h]	unitary	42 000	270	SP	35.00	parliamentary

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Country	State Structure	Population	Area (km²)	Electoral System	Effective Threshold	Form of Government
St. Lucia	unitary	133 000	620	SP	35.00	parliamentary
St. Vincent & Grenadines	unitary	107 000	390	SP	35.00	parliamentary
San Marino	unitary	23 000	61	PR	31.47	parliamentary.
Senegal[e]	unitary	7 504 000	196 190	mixed	16.66	pres. PCE, maj.
Singapore	unitary	2 705 000	616	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Solomon Islands	unitary	320 000	29 790	SP	35.00	parliamentary
South Korea[f g]	unitary	42 869 000	98 500	SP	35.00	pres. NCE, SP.
Spain	unitary	38 959 000	504 880	PR	10.18	parliamentary
Sri Lanka[c]	unitary	16 993 000	65 610	PR	12.50	s. pres. NCE, maj.
Suriname	unitary	404 000	163 820	PR	13.10	hybrid
Sweden	unitary	8 559 000	449 700	PR	4.00	parliamentary
Switzerland	federal	6 712 000	41 290	PR	9.00	hybrid
Taiwan	unitary	20 286 000	36 000	SNTV	12.40	hybrid
Thailand	unitary	56 082 000	514 000	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Trinidad & Tob.	unitary	1 227 000	5 130	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Turkey	unitary	56 098 000	779 450	PR	12.60	parliamentary
Tuvalu	unitary	9 000	26	SP	35.00	parliamentary
Uruguay	unitary	3 094 000	186 930	PR	0.75	pres. CE, SP
United Kingdom	unitary	57 561 000	244 100	SP	35.00	parliamentary
USA	federal	249 911 000	9 372 570	SP	35.00	pres. PCE, SP
Vanuatu	unitary	147 000	14 760	SNTV	19.74	parliamentary
Venezuela	federal	19 325 000	912 050	PR	1.16	pres. CE, SP

[a] The presidential election is, strictly speaking, not conducted by means of plurality. In Argentina, a candidate must obtain 45 percent of the votes in the first round in order to get elected. Similarly in Costa Rica, 40 percent of the votes are enough to get elected.

[b] In order to get elected in the first round, a presidential candidate must receive an absolute majority of the votes. If this is not the case, the president is elected by the parliament, which chooses among the three candidates receiving most votes in the popular election.

[c] Presidential elections occur generally only a couple of months after parliamentary elections. One can therefore regard them as concurrent (e.g., Jones 1995, 10–11) or as non-concurrent (Shugart & Carey 1992, 177).

[d] Until the 1996 elections, the president was elected by plurality vote. Presidential elections were held concurrently with parliamentary elections. Since the 1996 elections, the president is elected by majority vote. Presidential elections are no longer concurrent with parliamentary elections. Since I have used data from the 1994 and 1996 elections, the Dominican Republic is given the value 0.5 on the variable describing the form of government.

[e] Elections of national deputies (*diputados nacionales*).

[f] Since the 1996 election, the prime minister of Israel is elected by popular election. This reform can be thought to have the same consequences on party system fragmentation as presidentialism. I have therefore only considered the results from the 1988 and 1992 elections. In Italy, Japan, New Zealand, and Peru, the electoral system has recently changed. I therefore use data from the two latest elections prior to the changes. The same thing applies for South Korea. Since there have only been three elections under democratic rule, I only use data from the 1992 elections. For Mexico, I have used data from the 1994 elections only, since the previous electoral system strongly favored the largest party, *Partido Revolutionario Institutional*. Presidential and parliamentary elections partly concur in Mexico. Since I have used data from the 1994 elections only, which concurred with the presidential elections, Mexico is given the value 1.0 on the variable describing the form of government.

[g] In Mexico, 300 of the Representatives in *Cámara de Diputados* are elected by plurality electoral system and 200 by proportional representation. Voters have only one vote. I have chosen to regard the system as proportional, since the number of representatives elected by proportional means supposedly is large enough to enable the voters to vote for smaller parties. The effective threshold is consequently very high, 21.15 percent. A similar electoral system is in use in Senegal, although the proportion of representatives elected by proportional electoral system is higher, 58.33 percent. In the 1992 elections (the only election from which data have been gathered) in South Korea, 237 deputies were elected by simple plurality vote, whereas 62

Appendix 2. Number of Parties, Electoral Support for the Leading Party, and the Effective Number of Parties in Countries with Free Party Systems

Country	Number of Parties	Electoral Support for Leading Party (%)	Effective Number of Parties
Antigua & Barb.	8	60.2	1.97
Argentina	50	46.1	3.19
Australia	7	41.8	3.05
Austria	6	36.5	3.73
Bahamas	5	54.3	2.05
Barbados	3	49.1	2.40
Belgium	14	17.0	9.64
Belize	2	51.1	2.00
Bolivia	17	30.4	4.95
Botswana	9	59.0	2.18
Brazil[a]	21	21.3	8.40
Bulgaria	95	39.0	4.03
Canada	15	42.2	3.46
Colombia	18	52.1	2.42
Costa Rica	5	43.3	2.65
Cyprus	4	32.2	3.89
Denmark	14	36.0	4.80
Dominica	3	42.6	2.84
Dominican Rep.	11	41.5	3.01
Ecuador[b]	21	30.7	5.92
El Salvador	12	45.4	3.20
Finland	15	26.6	5.84
France	17	28.6	5.51
Germany	68	36.6	3.70
Greece	18	46.9	2.63
Grenada	8	33.7	3.74
Guatemala[b]	20	28.2	5.59
Honduras	7	52.0	2.43
Iceland	7	37.9	4.26
India	77	32.3	5.84
Ireland	9	41.7	3.66
Israel	15	32.9	4.97
Italy	28	32.0	5.62
Jamaica	3	58.4	1.94
Japan	12	41.4	4.39
Kiribati	4	NA	NA
Liechtenstein	2	47.8	2.38
Luxembourg	7	31.4	4.69
Malaysia	41	58.5	2.65
Malta	4	51.4	2.03
Marshall Islands[c]	1	100.0	1.00
Mauritius	11	59.0	2.25
Mexico	8	48.7	3.01
Micronesia (Fed. States of)[cd]	0	100.0	1.00
Monaco	2	85.6	1.35
Nauru	1	100.0	1.00
Netherlands	18	29.7	4.81
New Zealand	13	41.6	2.93
Norway	9	35.6	4.51
Pakistan	27	39.2	3.39
Papua New Guinea[e]	13	12.1	34.10
Peru	23	40.2	4.11
Philippines	29	43.5	3.22
Portugal	14	47.2	2.97
St. Kitts & Nevis	4	50.9	2.54
St. Lucia	3	54.5	2.15
St. Vincent & Grenadines	3	60.4	1.97

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Appendix 2. *Continued*

Country	Number of Parties	Electoral Support for Leading Party (%)	Effective Number of Parties
San Marino	6	42.8	3.46
Senegal	9	64.0	2.08
Singapore	19	62.1	2.26
Solomon Islands	3	NA	NA
South Korea	7	38.5	3.78
Spain	45	38.9	3.40
Sri Lanka	16	49.8	2.53
Suriname	16	47.9	3.19
Sweden	8	41.5	4.12
Switzerland	17	21.4	7.11
Taiwan	9	49.3	2.83
Thailand[f]	20	21.9	6.01
Trinidad & Tob.	13	46.7	2.56
Turkey	7	24.2	5.43
Tuvalu[d]	0	100.0	1.00
Uruguay	20	35.2	3.48
United Kingdom	31	42.1	3.20
USA	40	50.7	2.19
Vanuatu	10	31.0	4.52
Venezuela	12	33.3	4.50

[a] Because of lack of data, the electoral support for the leading party as well as the effective number of parties have been calculated from the share of seats in parliament.

[b] Elections of national deputies (*diputados nacionales*).

[c] There have been only two elections since the countries gained independence. However, democratic elections were held prior to independence as well. Thus, a democratic tradition exists in both countries (e.g., Burdick 1988; Johnson 1988).

[d] Countries without parties obtain the value 1.00 on the effective number of parties. Since there are no political parties, the assumption is made that the country politically is extremely homogeneous.

[e] Excluded from analyses concerning the effective number of parties.

[f] Due to lack of data, I have only used data from the 1992 elections.

Sources: The number of parties have been taken from Coggins, J. & Lewis, D. S., eds., *Political Parties of the Americas and the Caribbean*; East, R. & Joseph, T., eds., *Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East*; Jacobs, F., *Western European Political Parties: A Comprehensive Guide*; Lewis, D. S. & Sagar, D. J., *Political Parties of Asia and the Pacific*; Szajkowski, B., ed., *New Political Parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*. For electoral data, the same sources which concerned electoral system characteristics (Appendix 1) have been used.