Resumé

Since 1951 a Danish-American defense agreement on Greenland has regulated US military activities there. The article gives a detailed empirical-theoretical analysis of the negotiation of the Agreement under five perspectives: bargaining power, agenda setting, negotiating positions, strategies and outcomes. An important parameter was the fact that negotiations took place in a cooperative setting with a long shadow of the future. This made for a skewed, though regular negotiation process with a give-and-take of positions, counter-positions and concessions. Negotiating strategies varied, with the US side concentrating on an ■■authority" strategies. Although the US got the best outcome, it was not a dictate, because the ground was leveled by the negotiations taking place as part of the build-up of a long-term security relationship and the fact that the United States was the demandew vis-å-vis Denmark.

Introduction

In a matter of a few weeks in early 1951, a group of Danish senior officials negotiated a wide-ranging agreement on the future defense of Greenland with a visiting American diplomatic-military delegation ("the Agreement" or "the 1951 Agreement"). The Agreement is still in force and has, for nearly 50 years, authorized extensive American defense activities in Greenland. The negotiation of the Agreement has recently been highlighted in a study of Greenland during the Cold War. Grønland under den kolde krig. published by the Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI) (DUPI 1997).¹ The study was based on full access to all relevant Danish government papers as well as a very extensive documentation found in American archives, including an almost complete set of minutes from the negotiations. The report was therefore able to give a very detailed and exact account of the negotiations. their antecedents, and their general context." Furthermore and importantly.

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* Nikolaj Petersen, Department of Political Science. University of Aarhus. Universitetsparken, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark.

the material allows for an empirically based analysis of important theoretical
questions concerning international negotiations, especially with respect to
asymmetrical bargaining, cooperative bargaining and bargaining strategies.

The fact that negotiations took place between a superpower and a small state gave them a highly asymmetrical character. This makes it possible to probe some of the current notions about the relationship between bargaining power and outcomes. Furthermore, the negotiations took place within a cooperative framework, the NATO Alliance. The partners were supposed to share a common goal and reach a solution that reflected their common interests as well as those of the Alliance. In addition, the negotiation signified the initiation of a long-term relationship of mutual dependence, so the shadow of the future was long. Thus, this case should be well suited to illustrate the specific dynamics of cooperative bargaining with a long time horizon. Finally, the empirical richness of the case allows for specification of various actor strategies and not least an analysis of their effectiveness. These are the main research questions addressed in this article. But first, the background and the general context of the negotiations should be briefly presented.

The 1951 Agreement replaced an earlier defense agreement which the Danish Minister to Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, had signed with the United States on his own accord in April 1941 during the German occupation of Denmark. The agreement, which gave the United States almost unlimited access to defense facilities in Greenland, provided the basis for significant wartime activity in Greenland, which primarily served as a steppingstone on the air route to Britain.

The 1941 Agreement was ratified at the end of WWII by the Danish Government and Parliament. But this happened in expectation of its early termination now that the war was over, and of Greenland's return to "normalcy" as a strategic and international backwater far from the great power scene. This was not to be. The United States' new role as a global power combined with the onset of the Cold War to make an American evacuation of its Greenland bases increasingly unlikely. In 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes even hinted at the possibility of an American purchase of Greenland to a horrified Danish Foreign Minister.

During 1947^-8, the Danish Government tried in vain to persuade the United States to accept a solution which would make American peacetime presence in Greenland superfluous, and in April 1948 the issue was placed on the backburner in the hope that something would eventually turn up. What turned up was Denmark's membership of NATO in 1949, which offered an entirely new framework for the solution of the Greenland question. But which¹?

This issue was, at least formally, tied up with the regional planning process
in NATO, where Greenland was discussed during 1949-51, both in the
Atlantic and the Canada-United States regional planning groups. This process

finished in January 1951, at which time the two directly involved powers, Denmark and the United States, were invited by NATO to conclude an agreement on Greenland's role in the overall NATO defense. An important backdrop to the negotiations was that in December 1950, the United States had decided to build a major strategic air base at Thule in North Greenland. The negotiations started in Copenhagen on March 27, 1951, and concluded with signatures being appended just one month later, on April 27, to an "Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, concerning the Defense of Greenland."³

Five Analytical Perspectives to the Negotiation Process

The negotiation of the 1951 Greenland Treaty will be discussed under five analytical perspectives: bargaining power, agenda setting, negotiating positions, negotiation strategies, and outcomes. First, the bargaining power of the two parties is analyzed in the light of the clear asymmetry between them, both with respect to capabilities and motives. Secondly, agenda setting, i.e., the mutual understanding of the theme of negotiation, including its role in a wider NATO context, is discussed. Thirdly, the actual positions and shifts of positions of the two partners during the negotiation process are presented. Fourthly, the strategies and tactics which the two parties used to influence the outcome. The fifth and final section deals with the question of whose position prevailed in the end.

The Relative Bargaining Power of the two Parties

Whichever perspective is applied, the relationship between the negotiating parties was strongly asymmetrical. The impact of asymmetry and more generally power differences on negotiation outcomes is one of the traditional puzzles of negotiation theory (Rubin & Zartman 1995). There are two general positions on this. One is that the very act of negotiation serves to level the playing field between uneven partners through the various rules of the game and not least through the fact that in a formal sense both partners can veto the outcome (Zartman 1985). Others contend that while power, measured as resources, does not have a one-to-one relationship with outcome, asymmetry does make a difference. Strong partners usually, though not invariably, get the better deal. According to this view, strong and weak powers also behave differently. As summarized by Rubin & Zartman, "the party with high power tends to behave exploitatively, while the less powerful tends to behave submissively — unless certain special conditions prevail. ' (1995. 351).

In their article, Rubin & Zartman sum up the results of a comparative study of nine cases of asymmetric negotiation in the form of five lessons, three of which are relevant here. First, strong parties typically attempt to dominate the exchanges with their less powerful counterparts. The strong party tends to adopt "take-it-or leave-it" or "take-it-or-suffer" strategies. Secondly, weak parties typically respond not by acting submissively, but by adopting appropriate countering strategies of their own. "They blustered, dawdled, appealed, borrowed power, exercised their veto . . . and generally made a nuisance of themselves over an issue that mattered much more to them than to the distracted strong partner. ..." (ibid., 356f.) This difference in attention span is a well known aspect of the "power of the weak" (Bjøl 1968). Thirdly, negotiating parties are effective to the extent that they adjust their behavior in relation to the relative power of the other side. Especially in a relationship established over time the weak side may learn how to handle the strong partner, for example by exploiting the relationship itself. Therefore, "weaker parties do better than expected because they look for ways of empowering themselves" (Rubin & Zartman 1995, 359).

On this background, let us briefly discuss the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the two parties. The US delegation commanded a number of
relative strong-points in the negotiation:

In material terms it was paramount. While Denmark was still smarting under the aftermath of war and occupation, struggling with a weak and vulnerable economy, and only in the process of building up its military forces from scratch, the United States was the world's supreme economic and military power. This did not imply that the United States could use its power preponderance to simply grab Greenland by force or sit tight on its existing bases; that would be politically impossible between alliance partners. But Denmark was and would be dependent on US military aid and protection for an extended period of time. The shadow of the future (Axelrod 1984) as far as the military security of Denmark was concerned therefore strengthened the American position significantly.

Secondly, the Americans were physically in place, as they were already entrenched in Greenland on the basis of the 1941 Agreement.⁴ Now they wanted to build a large additional base at Thule, and of course it was an advantage that they already had a foothold. Basically, Denmark could not and would not evict the Americans, and could only abrogate the 1941 Agreement unilaterally at a cost. Conversely, the American suggestion that the unpopular 1941 Agreement be replaced by a more "modern," quasi-multilateral agreement gave them a strong card to play.

Thirdly, the United States negotiated with NATO behind it, so to speak.
The United States had decisively influenced the recommendations concerning
Greenland by the NATO regional planning groups and could now argue that it

was negotiating to realize a joint NATO, not just a national platform.5 This
reduced the Danish maneuvering space during the negotiations.

Fourthly, the United States had the resources to lift the NATO defense tasks in Greenland, which Denmark had not. Denmark had, early on, realized that her resources were not adequate to provide for the wartime defense of Greenland. However, there was some hope that she would be able to perform most peacetime tasks in Greenland, such as operating the bases on a limited level of preparedness. This, however, required the definition of quite a limited defense task for Greenland, which proved unrealistic as soon as negotiations started.

Confronted with these American strengths, Denmark could boast only a few. The most important one was sovereignty. Greenland was undoubtedly Danish sovereign territory. This had been recognized in the 1941 Agreement. and the American "offer" in 1946 to buy Greenland had been effectively rebuffed (Amstrup 1978). The United States might have all the power potentials in the world, but if an agreement were to be entered, it had to be at least minimally acceptable to the Danish Government.

A related aspect was that the United States was the demandew who wanted to get something only Denmark could give. As mentioned, the United States could not just grab what it needed or sit tight on what it had. It had to persuade Denmark to give it what it wanted.

Another potential strength for Denmark was the fact that the United States was in a hurry to have the agreement signed. After the decision to build Thule Air Base had been taken in December 1950. the US military could hardly wait to start construction, among other things for climatic reasons. Even though preparations were under way before the treaty was signed in April, the Americans were vulnerable to delaying tactics on Denmark's part. In addition, May 1 was considered an important deadline for the signing of the Agreement for budgetary reasons (DUPI 1997, 117).

Finally, the shadow of the future also operated in Denmark's favor. Even though the Agreement was expected to give the United States extensive rights within the agreed defense areas, it soon became clear that it would be vitally dependent on Danish goodwill with respect to activities outside these areas.

Motivation is an important aspect of bargaining power. Small powers may be more motivated than large ones because of a more tocused attention, and because international negotiations often involve core national interests. In this particular case, motivation probably did not favor the Danish side very much. though. The American negotiators were instructed to reach a speedy agreement which would allow the construction of the strategically important air base at Thule to begin immediately. The motivation of the Danish negotiators was probably affected by the fact that the negotiation concerned a distant, thinly populated colony. Greenland was important to Denmark for two reasons, i.e., sovereignty and protection of the indigenous population, bu!

these considerations were probably weaker than the strategic interests that
motivated their negotiation partners.

To judge the importance of the asymmetrical power relationship, the broad context of the negotiation should also be taken into consideration. Negotiations may be conducted either in an antagonistic or cooperative setting (or something in between). As Schelling points out, politics is almost always made up of a mixture of conflictual and cooperative elements (Schelling 1960). In the context of international negotiation, this observation seems equally valid. It makes a difference whether a particular set of negotiations aims "to repair relations between nations which were endangered or already damaged by conflict" or "to create relations between nations in order to advance those interests that could only be realized through regularized interaction" (Winham 1979-80, 1). In other words, it does matter where a particular set of negotiations is placed on a conflict-cooperation continuum (Saunders 1987; cf. Yamamoto 1990). The more antagonistic interests are, the more the bargaining power of actors will be determined by their ability to inflict costs upon each other; conversely at the cooperative end, bargaining power will be more determined by the actor's potential contributions to an agreed solution (Petersen 1986, 188).

Another difference is that in antagonistic negotiations, bargaining power is explicit and brandished freely, while in cooperative settings it is subtle and discreet. This does not mean that bargaining power is immaterial to this analysis; as Hopmann argued, negotiations within the major power alliances are importantly affected by the differing power bases of the bloc members (Hopmann 1978, 145). What it means is that we may surmise that the negotiations were biased in favor of cooperative behavior, and that the playing field would be more level than normal (Petersen 1982). Ceteris paribus, this ought to favor the weak part, i.e., Denmark, in the negotiations.

Agenda Setting

Defining the agenda, "what the whole thing is about," may very well be the most crucial aspect of international negotiation (Pendergast 1990); the party who succeeds in having his agenda adopted is already halfway towards a satisfactory outcome. It is therefore of considerable importance to the understanding of the negotiation process how the actual agenda was determined.

In a limited, formal sense the negotiation agenda in 1951 was set by NATO, when the secretaries of the Atlantic Planning Group in January 1951 asked Denmark and the United States to initiate discussions in order to fulfill the military requirements of the adopted NATO Medium Term Plan (DUPI 1997, 111). These requirements were, however, only vaguely defined, consisting mainly of a list of military installations in Greenland needed for

NATO defense purposes. Apart from this, the Alliance provided no guidance,
and in practice the two countries were left to define the agenda during the
negotiations themselves.

Right from the beginning it was clear that the two parties had very different notions of the nature and scope of the future agreement. Should it be a joint and equal Danish-American arrangement, which was the Danish position, or should it be an agreement whereby Denmark gave the United States certain unilateral rights, which was the US understanding? Furthermore, should the scope of the agreement be the (local) defense of Greenland? Of the North Atlantic Ocean area? Of NATO as a whole? Or of the United States? Generally speaking, the Danish negotiators focused on the lower end of this continuum, while their American counterparts mainly had the upper end in mind.

The Nature of the Agreement

The American idea of the basic nature of the agreement was evident in the draft, which their delegation presented at the very opening of the negotiations (DUPI 1997, 128-32).⁶ Its preamble referred to NATO's request to the two countries to negotiate an arrangement that allowed NATO armed forces to use facilities in Greenland in the defense of Greenland and the North Atlantic Treaty area. Accordingly it was stipulated in the draft Art. 2 that

pursuant to its responsibility in the defense of the North Atlantic area. Denmark agrees to the utilization by parties to the North Atlantic Treat) of certain areas and facilities in Greenland in accordance with NATO plans, and pursuant thereto authorizes the United States to do the following in Greenland . . .

That is, the agreement was presented as a unilateral Danish concession to
NATO and the United States.

This notion was very different from the one the Danish negotiators argued for. The initial Danish reaction explained in a letter by Minister C. A. C. Brun. the Danish chief negotiator, to Ambassador Kauffmann in Washington, was that the American draft did not express the fact that a Danish-American cooperation was to be established "in which Denmark also has a role to play. and that the defense of Greenland primarily is a Danish concern." The draft might even give the impression "that we have practically sold Greenland to the United States."⁷

In their preparations for the treaty talks, Danish officials had agreed that the defense of Greenland was primarily a Danish responsibility. It was recognized that Denmark was incapable of lifting the whole defense burden. but the idea was to do as much as possible on a national basis and then to request Allied assistance to do the rest. Therefore the defense of Greenland should be under a Danish commander-in-chief (C-in-C).

During the actual talks, this view was expressed in various attempts to emphasize Danish sovereignty rights over Greenland, to argue that the overall defense of Greenland should be a joint affair, but also to define defense tasks in Greenland that were specifically Danish. For this reason, the Danish negotiators insisted on taking over the Grønnedal naval base as a national base and as headquarters for the Greenland C-in-C, and to have this specifically referred to in the Treaty.⁸

Furthermore, the Danes insisted on having the coming NATO Island Commander Greenland (= the Danish C-in-C in Greenland) mentioned in the Treaty. The Americans objected to this, arguing that the Treaty was not about command relations, but "only intended to give us certain rights." The Americans also objected strenuously to Danish demands for extensive rights for the Island Commander. These demands were mainly brought forward by the Danish chief military negotiator, Rear Admiral Kjølsen (who was himself designated for the post). At one point the Admiral argued that there had to be close relations between the American Commander and the Island Base Commander, because the latter "has to know his troops in an emergency." Being challenged on this, he asserted that the Island Base Commander would exercise jurisdiction over US forces in Greenland, including Thule, as C-in-C under NATO's Medium Term Plan. Now it was time for Mr. Gray Bream, the American chief negotiator, to be outspoken: "I cannot believe for one moment that the local commander is going to have any control over the air force passing through there . . . The Island Commander would not have the power to immobilize the strategic air force . . . ."'"

There were thus clear limits to how prominent a Danish role the Americans were prepared to accept. However, they were not immune to the Danish critique that the original draft gave Denmark too small a role. As a reaction, it was stated that the United States would do everything possible to remove the impression that the defense of Greenland was exclusively a matter for the United States, and that Denmark would play only a limited role. (DUPI 1997, 145). The Americans were thus willing to drop the idea that the basis of the agreement should be a Danish authorization to the United States, but it took several rounds before they accepted the Danish view that the principal basis of the agreement should be US assistance to Denmark. In the end, however, this became treaty text (Art. 2).¹¹ The Treaty also emphasized the Danish role by including references to joint responsibility for the Greenland bases, except Grønnedal, which would specifically be Danish, but the role of the Island Commander remained vaguely defined.

The Scope of the Agreement

Disagreements about the nature of the defense agreement were intimately

linked to different understandings of its purpose and scope. The Americans objected to the Danish conception of the defense of Greenland as primarily a Danish responsibility, because in their view the defense agreement was really about something which Denmark could not (and should not) take responsibility for, namely the strategic deterrence of the Soviet Union and the possibility of conducting nuclear warfare from or via Greenland. To them, the primary aim was to give the United States sufficient rights to perform "that strategic air responsibility and really nothing much more than that."¹²

This conception was a consequence of a strategic reappraisal which led to the decision in December 1950 to build a major air base at Thule. The reappraisal meant a shift from a perimeter to a polar strategy vis-å-vis the Soviet Union. Till then, the US grand strategy had envisaged retaliatorynuclear strikes on the Soviet Union from bases on the Soviet perimeter, e.g. in Britain or North Africa. However, after Korea, doubts arose as to whether these forward bases would be tenable in a war. Therefore. Minister of the Air Force Thomas Finletter commissioned a study on the feasibility of building an Arctic base which could be used either for stationing or staging of strategic nuclear bombers and pushed through a decision to build Thule in December 1950 (DUPI 1997, 114-17).

With this decision, the polar strategy was initiated, even though it would take quite some time (until approx. 1954) before it could be fully implemented. This was the new strategic context in which the negotiations with Denmark were embedded, and the primary American interest was therefore to ensure base rights in Thule as well as auxiliary rights to build and maintain installations related to Thule's strategic role.¹'

This development was, however, only partly appreciated by the Danish negotiators. In January 1951 when the Americans pressed to have Thule included in the NATO plans, the ostensible reason was its importance for the local defense of North Greenland, and for a long time some of the Danish negotiators worked on this assumption. Therefore it was natural for them to take a more narrow view of the scope of the agreement, namely to provide for the defense of Greenland and its adjacent waters in the North Atlantic. So while the American draft referred to "the defense of Greenland and the North Atlantic area" (meaning the NATO Treaty area, including the United States). the Danish draft referred only to "the defense of Greenland." NATO plans and their requirements were also frequently referred to. but no more than that. This corresponds to what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended before the negotiations: Denmark should demonstrate the greatest possible cooperativeness; concessions, however, should be limited to what the NATO plans required, and defense activities should not be designed with a view to special American interests (DUPI 1997. 124).

The United States, on the other hand, complained that the Danish view was
too narrow. The primary objective of the Agreement would not be the defense

of Greenland as such, but the defense of all NATO members. In the American view, the Agreement would be more important for the defense of Denmark proper, i.e. South Denmark, than of Greenland itself (ibid., 145). Behind this lay the American argument that NATO had given the strategic role to the United States, and that Greenland was to play a vital part in it.

During the negotiations, the veil was to some extent lifted to the real purpose of Thule Air Base. The Danish negotiators were told that the United States envisaged Thule as "a staging intermediate air base for bomber craft with fighter support."¹⁴ The staging units could be the B-36 heavy bomber or the B-47 medium bomber.

There is little indication of the Danish reaction to these plans, which certainly was to upset their pre-understanding of the issues involved. A Naval Command report did comment that "from a Danish political point of view it may be stated that the Thule base according to available information cannot be characterized as a decidedly defensive base." (emphasis in original) (ibid., 142). Aside from this, the Danish material contains no discussion of the strategic aspects of the agreement, and this aspect was also carefully shunned when the Agreement came up for ratification in the Danish Parliament.¹⁵ Still, the Danish negotiators must have received a clear understanding during the negotiations that the main objective of the Agreement was to allow that Greenland be used in the overall strategic contest with the Soviet Union. The Americans did not, however, want this aspect to be highlighted in the Agreement as Thule was still a secret project. Therefore, they were content with the official version of the Agreement as "the Defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area" (Preamble). This was also acceptable to the Danish side.

The American and Danish delegations thus had clearly divergent visions of the nature and the scope of the Agreement and fought about them throughout the entire negotiation process. The agenda was not fixed from the outset, but only settled gradually and incompletely. The United States was not able to exploit its superiority to enforce its agenda from the start, but had to argue continually and give concessions to the Danish side, especially concerning the nature of the Agreement, which became considerably broader than the Americans had originally envisaged.

Concerning the scope of the Agreement, the United States in reality got what it wanted, as Denmark had to concede that something larger than the defense of Greenland was at stake. But this was expressed indirectly in the Agreement, because the United States had no interest in calling attention to the coming strategic-nuclear role of Greenland. This aspect thus remained part of a secret agenda.

The outcome of the fight about the agenda can also be explained in terms of
a general accommodation of different actor interests. For Denmark, an
important objective was to cover as many aspects as possible in the

Agreement, because this would probably be the last opportunity. To secure this interest, the Danes closed an eye to their new insight in the real US interest. Conversely, what the United States needed was a practical solution to its future strategic use of Greenland. As soon as that agenda was tacitly accepted by the Danes, it could afford to be more tolerant concerning the additional aspects which the Danes wanted to burden the agenda with.

Negotiating Positions and Concessions

Positions and concessions are the building blocks of negotiation and are intimately linked. Positions signify a party's statement about outcomes it views as desirable or (at the very least) acceptable, while concessions is the mechanism whereby parties accept position changes with a view to approaching negotiating positions towards an equilibrium.

The US Initial Position

The US initial position was contained in the draft proposal presented at rhe
beginning of the negotiation. It covered seven main positions:

US P 1: Definition of defense areas

The US desired extensive base rights in Greenland. The draft mentioned six geographical locations: Narsarsuaq, Sondrestrom, Thule. Maraq, Ikateq and Grønnedal. This represented a major expansion of the US presence compared to the situation immediately before the negotiations. Narsarsuaq (BW-1)¹⁶ in South Greenland had been a US main base since 1941, its primary function being a steppingstone for trans-Atlantic aviation. Sondrestrom (Sondre Strømfjord) (BW-8) in Mid-Greenland had been an alternate transit base. which had been evacuated and transferred to Denmark in October 1950. The base was now acquiring a new function on the line of communication (LOC) to Thule, and Denmark had already before the negotiations accepted a limited return of USAF personnel to manage flight control and radio communications. Thule, as mentioned, was intended as a major strategic base within the new polar-strategic perspective. Initial surveys for the base had already begun with Danish permission in February 1951, and a huge construction expedition was under build-up in the northeastern parts of the United States, ready to take off as soon as the summer construction period began.

These were the main bases. Maraq (BW-4) and Ikateq (BE-2) were small wartime airstrips on the west and east coast respectively which had been evacuated in the early post-war years, and whose military importance was questionable. Finally, Grønnedal (BW-7) was a naval station in South

Greenland, which Denmark pressed to take over. In faet, negotiations had been going on for some time. Besides, the American list referred to undesignated localities outside these base areas for early warning, meteorological and communication purposes.

US P 2: Extensive military rights on bases

The US wanted extensive military rights within the designated defense areas, including full freedom to fit the areas for military use, to construct and operate facilities, to store supplies, to station personnel, etc. Essentially, full and unfettered freedom of military use was requested.

US P 3: Rights outside bases

The US also requested significant rights outside the designated areas, e.g., the right to make topographic, hydrographic and geodetic surveys all over Greenland and to take aerial photos anywhere, as well as the use of Danish weather and communication stations.

US P 4: Full freedom of military movement

Another requirement was full freedom of military movement by land, water and air, to and between the defense areas. Particularly, it was demanded that "United States aircraft may fly over and land in any of the territory of Greenland, including the territorial waters thereof, without restriction except as mutually agreed."

US P 5: Immunity rights

The US wanted a number of freedoms concerning the movement of persons, supplies and materiel to and from Greenland as well as exclusive jurisdiction over the defense areas and over US personnel. The application to Greenland of an eventual NATO status agreement should be the subject of consultation and not follow automatically. In short, the United States wanted the fullest possible immunity for its bases.

US P 6: Duration of Agreement

The defense agreement should remain in force for the duration of the NATO
Treaty, and the moment it came into force, the 1941 Agreement would cease
to be in force.

US P 7: Respect for Danish sovereign and native rights

The US offered to recognize Danish sovereignty over the designated defense areas and promised full cooperation with Denmark in carrying out operations under the Agreement. In particular, due respect would be given to all laws, regulations and customs pertaining to the local population and the internal administration of Greenland, and every effort would be made to avoid any contact between US personnel and the local population, which the Danish authorities would find undesirable.

The Danish Counter-Position

Even with the last-mentioned position, the United States was clearly aiming at a very extensive and virtually untrammeled military presence in Greenland. This program came as an unpleasant surprise to the Danish side, which had hoped to be able to settle for considerably less. Since 1945, the basic Danish policy had been to gradually take over the US installations in Greenland, and this policy had not been given up yet. Before the negotiations started, various strategies and positions had been discussed in Copenhagen. It was expected that the United States would want to build up one or several air bases, but it was uncertain whether it would want to station major units at the bases in peacetime, or whether it might accept "peacetime guardianship" by Danish caretaker forces, so that US forces would only take over in crisis or war (DUPI 1997, 123-24).

This preference was never presented as a formal negotiating position, as the American opening gambit made it utterly unrealistic. The main problem with the US proposal was its formal agenda aspects, i.e.. the fact that it did not seem to give Denmark any real defense role in Greenland. The original American proposal was therefore judged unacceptable, and in its stead a counter-proposal was fielded which also contained seven main positions:'

DK P 1: Take-over of Greenland facilities

The gradual take-over strategy should continue. In particular, the Grønnedal naval station should be transferred as an integral and explicit part of the Agreement and made into a national naval base, though with access rights for US and Allied naval forces for defense purposes. During the talks, the possible re-transfer of Sondrestrom was also vented, though without much conviction. It was also stated that the Agreement should not alter previous agreements to transfer Maraq and Ikateq to Denmark, and that these places should not be counted among the defense areas. The Danish position was thus to limit the American presence to no more than three bases, i.e.. Narsarsuaq. Sondrestrom and Thule.

DK P 2: Prominent Danish role

The joint character of Greenland's defense as well as Denmark's primary responsibility as the sovereign power was emphasized, e.g., by the previously mentioned formula, according to which the United States would "assist" Denmark in operating such stations as the two governments might from time to time deem necessary for the defense of Greenland, and which Denmark was unable to establish single-handedly. Furthermore, within this overall concept, the Danish proposal emphasized the joint and equal responsibility for the defense of Greenland, despite obvious differences in capability. Thus, the designated stations should formally be "combined Danish-American defense establishments" under both national flags. Such establishments would be operated by either party after mutual agreement, so the possibility of a Danish-operated defense area (e.g. Sondrestrom) was not excluded, even though the main assumption was that the United States would operate the three main bases.

DK P 3: Independent national defense role

In addition, a special defense task for Denmark should be carved out, as it should not appear that Greenland as a whole was a kind of Danish-American condominium. This is why Grønnedal should become a national naval station, not a Danish-operated joint defense area. As argued, there must be at least one place in Greenland, meaning one military installation, where the Danish flag would fly alone. In the same vein, the Danish counter-proposal emphasized the role of the (Danish) NATO Island Commander in the defense of Greenland.

DK P 4: US military rights

Within the US-operated defense areas, Denmark was prepared to give the United States all the military privileges requested in the US draft. That is, US P 2 was accepted right away without discussion. Likewise, the American demand for freedom of movement to and between the defense areas in Greenland (US P 4) was accepted, though with the proviso that this should be arranged after consultation with the Danish C-in-C, who would issue the relevant regulations.

DK P 5: Restriction on US activities outside bases

American activities outside the defense areas should be strictly limited. The
Danish counter-proposal omitted any reference to the US demand (US P 3)
for the right to conduct topographic, hydrographic, geodetic or aerial surveys,

for the reason that these activities should not be part of the Agreement, but managed on a case-to-case basis. However, the United States might utilize, on agreed conditions, data from Danish meteorological and communications facilities in Greenland, to the extent necessitated by observance of NATO interests under the Agreement. In arguing this point, the Danish negotiators referred to the Danish tradition with respect to cartography in Greenland. Compared to other Arctic regions, Denmark had made great efforts in this respect. "This survey work is a kind of national pride to us which we would like very much to keep to ourselves ... So we should like very much to finish the work ourselves so that your part will only fall within the defense areas ... ,"¹⁸ In the same vein, Denmark offered to act on special American requests, either by performing national surveys or by giving the United States the relevant permission. Despite this, this position represented a clear rejection of US P 3.

DK P 6: US subsidies

As a special point it was proposed that the United States should consider favorably any Danish request for subsidies for installations, such as weather stations, which Denmark would establish or maintain for NATO defense purposes.

DK P 7: US immunity rights, etc.

The Danish counter-proposal only applied to the above-mentioned aspects of the United States position. During the negotiations, however, no opposition was raised to the American demand for immunity or the proposed duration of the Agreement (US P 4 and 5).

The Negotiation Process

The American delegation responded negatively to the Danish counterproposal. In a telegram to Secretary of State Dean Acheson on April 4 it was termed "a complete rewrite" of the US proposal, representing "confused" thinking on the role of the Island Commander and the objectives of the Agreement which reflected the Danes "pre-occupation with matters of national pride" as well as the problems of parliamentary and public acceptance. Large parts of the proposal were termed useless, so a number of alternative propositions were being prepared by the delegation.¹"

Acheson responded on April 6 by authorizing the first US concessions. The
Air Force was willing, if need be, to drop Maraq and Ikateq as defense areas:
the United States could also accept the transfer of Gronnedal to Denmark, and

was willing to accept the Danish demand for a proper delimitation of the
defense areas.20 These were important, though rather costless, concessions to
the Danish position.

When negotiations resumed, the Americans proved flexible on several aspects of DK P 2 as well. They accepted that both flags would fly over the defense areas which should be operated either by the United States or Denmark, i.e., a Danish-operated defense area was accepted in principle. They also accepted most of the Danish proposal concerning the US-operated bases (which, however, had been largely copied from the original US proposal). For instance, the American negotiators accepted the idea that a Danish liaison officer should be placed at each US-operated area with whom the commanding officer should discuss "all important matters affecting Danish interests" - but added the little word "local." That is, the commander was not supposed to discuss strategic matters with the liaison, only local business.

On the other hand, the Americans failed to see the logic in having a separate Danish national military presence in Greenland (DK P 3), and argued that Grønnedal might as well be a Danish-operated defense area under the Agreement. They also argued that if Grønnedal should be Danish, it should be omitted from the Agreement. Thus, the United States did not accept the Danish position, which in its essence meant that because of Denmark's sovereignty there would be a difference between the two parties' positions, and that this difference should be clearly reflected in the Agreement.

As we have seen, the Americans also objected strongly to giving the Island Commander in Greenland a special status in the Agreement. Specifically, they wanted to avoid giving him any competences that might interfere with US operations in and out of Greenland. Thus they did not accept that all flights in Greenland should be notified to the Island Commander. Important aspects of DK P 3 were therefore unacceptable to the Americans.

An important US concession was recorded on DK P 5. The position concerning meteorological and communication support was largely accepted, but at the same time the question of mapping was re-opened. According to the US counter-proposal Denmark should provide the United States with needed data and aerial photographs; should Denmark be unable to do so, the United States should be permitted to make its own surveys. The US also wanted the right to prospect for new defense areas besides those agreed upon in the Agreement.

Finally, the Americans outright rejected DK P 6 concerning financial subsidies. They felt that such expenses should be seen as part of Denmark's contribution to the common defense, which might be difficult to get through Congress.

Important questions during the talks were discussed in working groups.
During the initial phase, a military committee discussed the specific problems

concerning the individual defense areas, while another group discussed and quickly agreed on most legal problems. Now special working groups were set up to discuss especially knotty problems, e.g., Grønnedal and the definition of the defense areas (US P 1).

On Grønnedal there were two opposing arguments. The US had accepted its transfer to Denmark, but concluded that it should then be omitted from the Agreement. Conversely, the Danish delegation strongly wanted it in for political reasons, namely as a visible sign to the public that Denmark was increasing, not giving up, its control over Greenland. After some hard-fought battles, a solution was found on the basis of an American concession by which the stipulations concerning Grønnedal were to be placed further back in the Agreement and after the article on defense areas.

Another related question proved to be tougher, namely the Island Commander. The Danish side wanted to give a prominent place in the text. while the American side wanted to restrict references to him as much as possible. While Denmark wanted it made clear that a Danish officer would be responsible for the defense of Greenland, the Americans objected to any arrangement that might interfere with their strategic mission in Greenland,

Concerning the definition of defense areas, considerable agreement had already crystallized during the first discussions. It had been agreed that Narsarsuaq and Thule should be US operated areas, while Denmark had not quite given up Sondrestrom as a Danish operated area or perhaps as a Danish national facility å la Grønnedal. This met with firm US resistance and a rhetorical question whether Denmark would shoulder the investments necessary to make Sondrestrom a support base for Thule. The Danish negotiators now acquiesced to Sondrestrom as a US-operated base, especially as the US indicated that this might be only temporary (during the building of Thule) and that it might then revert to Danish operation.²¹ Finally, the United States agreed to omit Maraq and Ikateq and gave up the vague references in the first draft to "other areas and facilities." This concession was probably facilitated by the Danish willingness to develop a practical formula for the establishment of new defense areas when need arose.

On this basis, a joint working draft could be agreed on April 7 - less than two weeks after the start of the negotiations. The draft was then referred to the Danish government for approval, and after a short meeting on April 11. where the draft was fine-tuned, it was also referred to the American Government. This meeting settled some of the remaining problems. The American delegation accepted that the reference in the title of the Agreement was to "the defense of Greenland" instead of to "defense areas in Greenland." On the other hand, the Danes conceded that the le)41l^e)4l Agreement should not be terminated until the new Agreement was in force, even if they preferred language to indicate that it had lapsed a long time ago." Another agreement. which was placed in a secret annex to the Agreement, was reached on the

geographical definition of the defense areas; the Danes also proposed a
confidential annex on the procedures for changing the geographical definition
of the defense areas.

Now it was the US Government's turn to consider the draft. There were only a few comments. The Government wanted the Agreement to refer to the security of "the North Atlantic Treaty area" instead of "the North Atlantic area" which was accepted by Denmark. Furthermore, the United States preferred the formula "the C-in-C for the Danish forces in Greenland" to "the Danish C-in-C in Greenland," but settled for a formula (Art. XIII, 1) that nothing in the Agreement should be interpreted as affecting command relationships. The final question concerned the free movement of US personnel outside the defense areas. The Danish side argued that Greenland was still a closed country, and therefore US servicemen could not be allowed to roam at will through Greenland. This question was also settled by an agreed formula. After these last-minute adjustments, the Agreement was signed on April 27 by Foreign Minister Ole Bjørn Kraft and US Ambassador Eugenie Anderson.

The description of the process shows that there was a regular negotiating process. Positions and counter-positions were presented, concessions were traded, and the end result was a compromise of the two opening positions, though certainly closer to the American than to the Danish one.

Negotiating Strategies

Above it was noted that the weak part in a negotiation may use a number of specific strategies to equalize the relationship and reach an acceptable agreement. On the other hand, it may be expected that the strong part will not use specific strategies but prefer to let the weight of its power and authority do the job. The negotiation of the Danish-American Agreement illustrates some of these mechanisms.

The United States did follow a strategy of authority. As the preeminent world-power and leader of the NATO Alliance, the United States could argue very forcefully for its strategic needs in Greenland. But the Americans could not only argue in terms of the urgency of their needs, but also in terms of a superior understanding of the real issues involved; thus, the Danes were repeatedly told that they did not really understand the meaning of NATO and of the arrangement being negotiated (which the Americans implicitly did).

On the other hand, there was no use of threat strategies of the "take-it-orleave-it" or "take-it-or-suffer" kind, nor were exploitative strategies used. For two reasons: First, the United States was in the role of the demandeur, who wanted something from Denmark, and therefore could not credibly threaten to break up the relationship. Secondly, the negotiations took place in

a cooperative setting with a long shadow of the future in which an open power
play was both inappropriate and dysfunctional.

The American side primarily used its superior knowledge in a preemptive agenda strategy. The American delegation to some extent succeeded in conquering the high ground by presenting its draft agreement at the very beginning of the negotiations. Even though it was eventually revised, it significantly influenced the outcome of the talks. A number of the initially proposed articles and provisions made it more or less unchanged to the final text, simply because the Danes decided to concentrate their efforts on changing those American positions that were least acceptable to them. Aside from this, the Americans used no discernible strategies.

The Danish negotiators, of course, could follow none of the American strategy lines, but they might try to thwart them, which they did in various ways. The US preemptive agenda strategy was countered with a reactive agenda strategy of its own, when it was decided to present a Danish counterproposal to the essential articles of the US draft. In this way, discussion entirely on US premises was avoided, and the Americans were forced to also consider and react to the Danish ones. As we have seen, this strateg}' succeeded in a number of cases, perhaps also because the Americans had no stomach for protracted bargaining.

But the Danish side used other strategies as well. One can be termed the moral strategy, the underlying implication of which was to shame the American side for being unfair, even bullying, in its treatment of Denmark. A dramatic example of this occurred in the third plenary on April 3. when C. A. C. Brun, leader of the Danish delegation, fielded a severe complaint of crude US behavior at Sondrestrom towards the Danish commandant, who had been treated "with very little consideration and rather negligently." The American delegation was requested to inform the State Department of the episode, which it promised to do.²³

Another example occurred in a discussion of the tricky problem concerning
the Island Commander. At one point a Danish negotiator blurted out:

I am afraid you do not fully appreciate what it means in Denmark to conclude this agreement. We got an agreement in 1941 . . . that . . . should he terminated when the socalled present danger did not exist. That happened a long time ago . . . After long and difficult negotiations ... we have now begun to discuss the question of when it should be terminated . . . Now, all of a sudden we present the Danish people with a new agreement. telling them that the old agreement will be terminated but instead we will hand over to you a lot of defense areas . . . This means quite a change of policy ... It is. theretore. in m\ opinion, very natural that the Government would like an agreement that makes the step back in respect of Danish sovereignty as little conspicuous as possible . . ."⁴

This quotation also illustrates another main strategy, which could be called
a counterweight or "tied hands" strategy. This strategy, which referred to the
problems of having the agreement accepted domestically, was used almost

continuously. At the third plenary meeting on April 3, C. A. C. Brun argued forcefully that the original US draft was probably unacceptable to the Danish Government and Parliament, adding that if an agreement were to be reached which could be ratified by Denmark, it would have to follow the main lines of the Danish counter-proposal.²⁵ On several occasions reference was also made to strong feelings on specific points both of the Government as a whole and of individual ministers, such as the Prime Minister or the Defense Minister. Finally, numerous references were made to public opinion in an attempt to show the Americans that the hands of the negotiators were tied and that there were limits to how far they could be pushed. What the Danish negotiators did was thus to present a narrow "win-set" to the American side, exploiting the two-level aspects of the negotiation (cf. Putnam 1988; Evans et al. 1993).

A common weak power strategy is to seek support from third parties, i.e., the strategy of borrowed power. Denmark had, at an earlier stage (in 1949), attempted to enlist British support against the United States on the Greenland question, but received a stern rebuff from Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin who reminded Denmark that as an alliance partner it had to contribute what it could. Denmark would do a "disservice" not only to itself, but to the whole alliance, if the American needs for facilities there were rejected (DUPI 1997, 105). Under these circumstances, Denmark could derive little benefit from the fact that the negotiations were conducted in a nominally multilateral setting; there was no support to be had from other NATO members. In fact, as pointed out by Foreign Minister Ole Bjørn Kraft in the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee, it might even have been an advantage for Denmark that the agreement had actually been negotiated between the directly concerned parties, and not multilaterally, because this had ensured a greater Danish influence."⁶

Another unused strategy was procrastination. For budget and construction purposes, the Americans were in a hurry to have the deal with Denmark under wraps before the summer. The Danish negotiators were aware of this, although they probably did not fully understand the urgency of the US need. Under any circumstance, there is no indication that they ever played on this. On the contrary, the negotiations were swift, lasting less than two weeks from their inception till an almost final agreed draft was on the table.

A final, rather disingenuous strategy was what could be called the "collusion" strategy, which essentially was a reflection of Denmark's weak negotiating position. The idea behind it was to assure the Americans that they would get essentially what they wanted, if they would only cooperate by bowing to special Danish interests, which would ease the Government's handling of possible criticism from Parliament, e.g. the Communists. On one instance, it was expressed in this way:

you must concede that we are going to give you the rights you need. It is only to put a dress on the thing so that we can go to Parliament and sav that we are going to give the United States certain rights in Greenland, but it does not mean that we are going to give away Greenland. We are going to fight the Communists with all we have.²⁷

Another similar expression from the same meeting was:

I think we must have as a starting point that it is to our mutual interest that this agreement
can be "smuggled through" our respective parliaments, and I have a very strong impression
that we shall run into difficulty if we cannot have that concession from you . . .

Contrary to theoretical expectations, the United States did not apply clearly exploitative strategies, which probably reflects that the negotiation took place in a cooperative setting with a long shadow of the future - at least the duration of NATO. But the United States did use its position as alliance leader to exert a certain pressure on Denmark and to have her preferences adopted. Denmark did not act submissively either, but tried through a variety of strategies to better her position.

The Outcome

When the Danish delegation sent the April 7 working draft to the Government for approval, it also drew up a balance sheet listing those points where it had prevailed and those where it had had to compromise. The list had eight items on the positive side:

1) Grønnedal had been kept in the Agreement and as a purely Danish naval
station.

2) Denmark had succeeded, though with a changed formula, to maintain that it was the United States that gave assistance to Denmark; ""that it. Denmark is the boss (driftsherre)" as it was stated in a somewhat selfcongratulatory manner.

3) The existence of the Danish C-in-C was referred to. though somewhat
indirectly, in the text.

4) Defense areas had been limited to three US operated areas.

5) US rights of survey, etc. outside the defense areas had been limited
compared to the original US demand.

6) It had been accepted that admission rules for Greenland should be
formally issued by Danish authorities (but not that the Danish C-in-C should
explicitly have this competence).

7) An acceptable formula had been lound concerning the applicability in
Greenland of a coming NATO status agreement.

8) The Agreement had been given a revision clause.

On the negative side the delegation listed six items:

1) It had not been possible to have Sondrestrom defined as a free Danish
facility or a Danish-operated defense area.

2) It had not been possible to include a reference to the NATO Island
Commander in the article on Grønnedal.

3) It had been necessary to accept a commitment to ask the United States
to take over Grønnedal, if Denmark could no longer cope with its operation.

4) It had been accepted not to have Maraq and Ikateq mentioned in the
agreement.

5) It had been accepted to omit an article on US economic assistance to the
establishment of Danish facilities.

6) It had been accepted to include a US right to perform surveys outside
the defense areas.

In conclusion it was the considered opinion of the delegation, that

in this draft agreement has been achieved in essence what the Danish side has wanted and
practically everything we rightfully might have expected to achieve, and that it will not be
possible to achieve more - at least not unless the matter is pushed to an extreme.28

As demonstrated, the delegation's scoreboard was narrowly concerned with formal negotiation positions. It could also have taken in some wider aspects which undoubtedly played a role. On the positive side, it played a major role that the old, unequal 1941 Agreement would finally lapse, and that the Danish-American relationship was put on a more even (though still in many respects skewed) keel. Another important aspect, which had not been disputed during the negotiation, was the sharp delimitation between the defense areas and the Greenlandic society, i.e., the codification of the nonfraternization principle.

Among the unlisted drawbacks of the Agreement was open-endedness concerning the role of the US defense areas. The veil had been lifted, and no one could doubt that Thule was destined to play a major role in American nuclear strategy. But the implications, e.g., whether Danish permission was required for their wartime use, had not been discussed and were left dangling in the air. This was undoubtedly a conscious decision on the Danish side.²⁹

The American negotiators apparently did not draw up a scoreboard like
their Danish colleagues did. If they had, it might have read something like this
on the positive side:

1) The Americans had basically achieved the base areas they were after,
especially a green light for building Thule.

2) Within the base areas, they had acquired full freedom of military
activity as well as immunity for personnel, etc. Some Danish insight had been
agreed to, though, through the appointment of a liaison.30

3) The United States had acquired full freedom of movement to and
between the defense areas as well as flying rights all over Greenland.

On the negative side, the main items would have been:

1) Most US activities on Greenland territory outside the defense areas
were to be specifically agreed with the Danish authorities on a case-by-case
basis.

2) The United States had given more concessions to Danish sovereignty
and political sensitivities than desirable. It can, however, be questioned how
costly these concessions really were.

Comparing the two scoreboards, there is no doubt that the United States made the best bargain. It had its paramount military interests taken care of almost 100 percent. On the other hand, Denmark did protect some important interests. First, important symbolic interests were secured, such as respect for Danish sovereignty and, not least, Danish control over Greenland outside the three more or less isolated defense areas. As it was once said, an "iron curtain" had been lowered between the US bases and Greenlandic society. At the same time, Denmark got an economically favorable solution to the Greenland defense problem and an important negotiating card - the so-called "Greenland card" - which could be used later in other dealings with the United States, who now to some extent "owed" Denmark something.

The Danish-American agreement could also be viewed in the perspective of two other base agreements which the United States negotiated with NATO members in 1951, namely Iceland and Portugal.³¹ The background of these agreements was different from that of the Danish one. First, the relevant bases, Keflavik and Lajes on the Azores, were situated in populated areas, i.e., the bases would interfere more with everyday life. Second, the US negotiated on the basis of unsatisfactory post-war agreements unlike in the Danish case; thus, they were even more in the position of the demandeur than in the Danish case. There are also indications that the Icelanders and the Portuguese applied stronger negotiation tactics and drove a harder bargain than their Danish counterparts, very likely reflecting differences in national bargaining styles. As mentioned, the Danish negotiators refrained from pushing the matter "to an extreme."

These differences were reflected in the two agreements which gave the host countries somewhat more control over American activities on the bases and also a more limited duration to the arrangement than in the Danish case. In the Icelandic case, a regular termination clause concerning peacetime stationing was inserted, and the agreement with Portugal only allowed 5 years' peacetime presence at Lajes. Thus Greenland's physical characteristics, the fact that the 1941 Agreement had not been terminated, and perhaps also a more accommodating negotiating style gave Denmark a comparatively weak negotiation position vis-å-vis the United States and a weaker outcome.

Conclusion

The analysis started with a focus on the two main characteristics of the 1951 negotiations: their asymmetry and their cooperative embeddedness. The negotiations took part between two very unequal partners, but within a cooperative setting, joint NATO membership, and with a view to developing a long-term framework for a security relationship around Greenland. The shadow of the future was therefore long. Furthermore, the United States was the demandeur who wanted something only Denmark could give. This made for somewhat ambivalent predictions about the actual negotiations and their outcome, as the United States' bargaining strengths were offset by the leveling function of the negotiation process, its cooperative context and the long shadow of the future. Nevertheless, the basic assumption was that the United States' bargaining position had such important strengths that its main preferences would prevail.

One particular aspect of the 1951 negotiation was the fact that the agenda itself was a recurrent and never quite agreed negotiation item. This was partly because the US national agenda had changed dramatically, yet secretly, a few months before the negotiations started with the decision to opt for Thule; this meant that the Danish negotiators were unprepared and to some extent genuinely baffled. Besides, they had a very different national agenda of their own. Under these circumstances there was never an agreed agenda, but a repeated tug-of-war over the basic principles of the Agreement in which the Americans were to some extent handicapped as they were operating with a half-concealed agenda. Nevertheless, the Americans carried their agenda through, even though they had to give important concessions to Denmark at the rhetorical and symbolic level.

The actual negotiation was a give-and-take of positions, counter-positions and mutual concessions. By presenting a fully-fledged draft agreement at the beginning of the negotiations, the American delegation took the lead, and many of their original high-priority positions made it unaltered to the final Agreement. The Danish delegation concentrated on changing the least acceptable American positions and to defend its own core positions concerning sovereignty and formal equality. The Americans were willing to compromise on a number of these positions, and the result was a compromise, closer to the American than to the Danish end.

The prediction that the Americans would negotiate exploitatively or highhandedly (take-it-or-leave-it, etc.) was not confirmed. The American side did use a strategy of authority as well as a strategy of agenda preemption. Occasionally negotiations were tough, but in general the shadow of the future and the US position as demandeur prevented open strong-arm tactics.

As predicted, the Danish side used a number of offsetting strategies. The
moral strategy was used several times in attempts to paint the United States'

demands as unreasonable or its behavior as obnoxious. The strongest strategy, though, was the counterweight, "tied hånds" strategy, where the need for government and parliamentary opposition as well as public acceptance was used to ease Danish preferences through. Finally, a rather dubious collusion strategy was used on specific occasions. On the other hånd, the Danish negotiators did not use a "borrowed strength" strategy (because there was no strength to borrow) or a delaying strategy, which might have proved effective given the American hurry to get to Thule.

The outcome mainly reflected what the Americans wanted most, i.e., freely operated bases in Greenland and full access to the Greenland airspace. In return they were willing to give a number of concessions to the Danes, though mostly of a symbolic nature. As the development would show, the fact that US activities outside the bases were to be agreed on a case-by-case basis became an important aspect of Danish control over Greenland. It meant that even though the US was allowed a wide range of activities outside the bases, it was under at least some Danish control (see DUPI 1997, Chapters 7 and 9). Compared to other base negotiations the Americans conducted at the time, they got a very good deal in Greenland. This reflected different US needs, but also different host country interests and sensibilities; finally, differences in host nation negotiation style probably also contributed to the outcome.

In conclusion, the 1951 negotiations were regular international negotiations with give-and-take of proposals and concessions. It was not a US dictate, because a number of factors to some extent leveled the ground between the two highly asymmetrical parties: the build-up of a long-term security relationship with a long shadow of the future, the fact that the United States was the demandeur, and finally the countervailing strategies of the small power.

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NOTES

1. Grønlund under den kolde krig. Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1Q45-6S. 2 vols.. Copenhagen: DUPI. 1947. The background to the Report was the discovery in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a top secret document on a Danish-American part oi a i^overnmenl paper to Parliament. During the ensuum public debate demands were made for a comprehensive and independent analysis of the security policy role of" Greenland, a task which was given to the newly established Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI). DUPI took on the assignment on the condition of full access to all relevant government documents and the subseiiuent access to these documents by other scholars. The DUPI Report was released in January 1W on the responsibility and authority of" the Board of the Institute. The present" author was a member of the working group which drafted the report and is member of the Board of the Institute. However, the conclusions of the present article are those of the author.

2. Cf. chapter 5. ■■Forhandlingerne om ny forsvarsoverenskomst marts-april l'>s!."" PP. 127-70.

3. The Agreement is reproduced in DUPI IW. documentary volume, doc. 24.

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4. This agreement was to "remain in force until it is agreed that the present dangers to the peace and security of the American Continent have passed" (Article X). Since 1946 Denmark had argued that the situation had changed and that the agreement should now be abrogated, but to no avail. See text in DUPI 1997, documentary volume. doc. 1.

5. Thus the United States had, in a last minute intervention, decisively altered the recommendations of the Atlantic Ocean planning group in January 1951, when it succeeded in adding a requirement for the building of a third major base (Thule) in Greenland. This reflected the faet that the American decision to build Thule was not taken until the second half of December 1950. This unexpected volte-face caused major consternation and bewilderness in the Danish government. See DUPI 1997, 110-12.

6. Cf. text (unofficial Danish translation) in DUPI 1997, documentary volume. doc. 24. The English version is in Dossier 981, 230_—41 HEM, Ministry of Defense. Copenhagen.

7. Letter from C. A. C. Brun to Kauffmann, March 29, 1951. Danish Forcign Ministry Files (hereafter UM) 105.F.1.a. Rigsarkivet (RA).

8. The Americans argued that it was illogical to mention a purely Danish base in a agreement dealing with joint defense areas (i.e. bases). The Danish side did not agree that the agreement was only about joint defense areas, but its main argument was that "political reasons have precedence over logicai reasons . . .; (o)ur real basis is that for political reasons we want to have it in" (DUPI 1997, 150).

9. Notes on Meeting at Foreign Office, March 29 at 2:30 p.m. RG 59, State Department Decimal File (hereafter DS) 759.5/3-3051. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park. MD.

10. Notes on Meeting at Foreign Office, April 5. 1951. DS 759.5/7-1351. NARA.

11. The text of Article II reads: '"In order that the Government of the United States of America as a party to the North Atlantic Treaty may assist the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark by establishing and/or operating such defense areas as the two Governments, on the basis of NATO defense plans, may from time to time agree to be necessary for the development of the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic area, and which the Kingdom of Denmark is unable to establish or operate single-handed ..." Text in DUPI 1997. documentary volume, doc. 29.

12. Notes on Meeting at Foreign Office on April 6, 1951. DS 759.5/4-651. NARA.

13. This meant, for example, the use of Sondrestrom Air Base, which had in faet been evacuated and handed over to Denmark in October 1950, both for transit purposes and for putting up radars and communication facilities.

14. The official US definition of staging is the following: "(A) landing or takeoff area with minimum servicing, supply and shelter provided for the temporary occupancy of military aireraft during the course of movement from one location to another." Official Dictionary 1988.

15. In the Parliamentary debate on May 23. 1951. Foreign Minister Ole Bjørn Kraft refuted Communist allegalions that the Agreement would allow the United States to launch nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union by stating that its only objeetive was "to seeure the defense of Greenland, the defense of the remaining North Atlantic area, but not attaeks from Greenland . . ." (DUPI 1997. 168).

16. BW (Bluie West) and BE (Bluie East) were the World War II code names for the US establishments in Greenland.

17. See Danish Draft (Artieles 1-6), tabled April 3, 1951. Reproduced in DUPI 1997, documentary volume, doc. 26.

18. Notes om meeting at forcii'n Oihcc April 3 in cnnncction with (irccnlaml Neuotiatums. DS 759.5/4-351. NARA.

19. Tel. 821, US Emb Cph to Sec/State, April 4, 1951. DS 759A.5/4-451. NARA.

20. Tel. 534. Department of State to US Emb Cph, April 6, 1951. DS 759A.5/4-451. NARA.

21. Sondrcstrom was not taken over by Denmark until 1992.

22. The argument against this was that in this case, the United States would have had no legal basis for their presence in Greenland.

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23. Notes on meeting at Foreign Office April 3 in connection with Greenland negotiations: DS 759.5/4-351. NARA. State Department reacted by regretting "any lack of tact or show of disrespect to DEN Commander or DEN flag of kind Brun reported to you Tel. to US Emb Cph April 5, 1951. RG 341, Project Decimal File 1942-1954. folder: OPD 000.93 Greenland (29 Sep 47), Sec 2, box 829. NARA.

24. Notes on Meeting at Foreign Office, April 5, 1951. DS 759.5/7-1351. NARA.

25. 3. plenarmøde . . . Møde i Udenrigsministeriet den 3. april 1951, kJ. 10-11. UM 105.D.1.a. RA. Cf. Notes on meeting at Foreign Office April 3 in connection with Greenland negotiations. DS 759.5/4-351. NARA.

26. Minutes of meeting in the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee. April 12. 1951. UM 3.E.92. RA.

27. Notes on meeting a! Foreign Office on April 6. DS 759.5/4-651. NARA.

28. Beretning til regeringen fra den til forhandling med De Forenede Stater om rettigheder for amerikanske militære styrker i Grønland udpegede delegation. April 9. 1951. UM 105.D.1.a. RA.

29. In 1952, a high-ranking State Department official (Charles E. Bohlen) opined that US bases in Greenland could only be used in wartime after consultation with Denmark. Opinion in the Danish Foreign Ministry was somewhat concerned about the implication of Danish co-responsibility for strategic strikes against the Soviet Union, and nothing was done to probe the question officially with Washington. See DUPI 1997. 162-63.

30. It is debatable, though, if this freedom also included the storing of nuclear weapons. The DUPI study documents that the US negotiators were not authorized to negotiate such a right, which was not mentioned during the negotiations either. On this see DUPI 1997, 117-19.

31. Cf. Defense Agreement Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty between The United States of America and the Republic of Iceland, May 5, 1951. RG 341. Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Decimal File 1951, entry 345. folder AFOOP 092.2. Treaties and Agreements, box 31. NARA. Defense Agreement between Portugal and the United States of America, September 6, 1951. Ibid.

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