

Party Propaganda in Motion: Finland 1954–1991

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The primary hypothesis is clearly supported by this research: political parties have structured their rhetoric to appeal to all voters as opposed to having earlier directed their message to a traditional voter class/category, such as farmers, manual workers and white collar workers. The Communist party platform of 1975, which displayed a high degree of class/category specific orientation, constitutes an exception from this rule. The use of offensive propaganda has decreased, but there are exceptions from this rule as well. This article serves as a summary of the main findings of my licentiate thesis in political science at the Åbo Academy University.

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Scientific research in the area of election campaigning has so far been quite limited. Usually, the election campaign forms only a part of a much larger study of the strategy of individual political parties. One exception is the work of Farrell & Wortmann (1987). Only recently have broader, more comparative studies concerning election campaigns been undertaken (Bowler & Farrell 1992). These studies have examined the role of the media, the use of professional campaign workers by individual political parties, the choice of campaign strategy and the various methods used to disseminate campaign information (Farrell & Bowler 1990; Esaiasson 1990). Other studies are more descriptive (Tarkiainen 1971; Pesonen 1965). Here the focus is on the election propaganda produced by the party prior to the parliamentary elections as well as on the question of whether the political parties increasingly resemble each other in their election propaganda.

Elements in a Theory of State-Building

An Inquiry into the Structural Preconditions for Successful State-Building in Europe

Changes in society have a direct influence on political parties. A higher standard of living, greater access to higher education and the structural transformation of society have often reduced the conflicts which define political parties in ideological terms. Political parties have increasingly developed into “catch-all” parties (Kirchheimer 1966, 190; Dittrich 1985, 258–259).

One goal of the political parties is to maximize the numbers of votes, i.e., to receive as many votes as possible in an election. In order to achieve this goal, the parties have at their disposal among other methods, the use of propaganda (Sjöblom 1968, 74, 97).

The objective here is to examine what societal changes have meant for party propaganda, and if it is possible to prove that the class orientation of the political parties has diminished.

These hypotheses pertain to the orientation of propaganda, political issues, propaganda methodology and its arena (i.e., where propaganda appears).

From Selective Parties to Catch-All Parties

According to Otto Kirchheimer, traditional parties formed on the basis of specific class distinctions (labourers, farmers and the bourgeoisie) have developed more or less into catch-all parties. As class boundaries have ceased to exist, the ideological party profile has given way to a catch-all strategy; a strategy according to which the parties try to attract new groups of voters, while simultaneously retaining traditional supporters (Kirchheimer 1990, 50–53, 58–60). There has been criticism of the claim that the role of ideology has diminished (Borre 1982, 153–169). Studies also show that the ideological debate varies in intensity with time (Rantala 1982, 56–59, Karvonen & Rappe 1991, 252–255).

Studies by Angelo Panebianco show that political parties have altered their organizational structure, thus becoming “electoral–professional parties” in response to the increasing social and cultural heterogeneity of the electorate. Within the electoral–professional party, professional campaign workers handle special assignments, but the main focus is increasingly on the leader of the party as emphasis is placed on appealing to public opinion in toto (Panebianco 1988, 262–274). A comparative study of election campaigns in Europe reveals the similarities between countries: political party campaigns are orchestrated by professionals and played out in the media with the party leader being in focus (Bowler & Farrell 1992, 223–235).

Studies of the strategies employed by political parties reveal that the parties choose, in part, to keep their old voter constituency while simultaneously attempting to lure new voters into the fold. When directing party propaganda towards groups whose interests do not coincide with the established party line, political party strategists must tread very carefully. If a part of the party platform evokes a negative response among a certain group of voters, the party strategists choose to restructure the propaganda so as to decrease negative reactions. Vote maximization makes parties focus on transient voters (Siune 1982, 264–265, Isberg et al., 1974, 189–191, 207).

A smaller study of the changes in party propaganda, as seen in political party newspapers during four election campaigns in Finland, shows that the strict class orientation has decreased (Rappe 1989).

Structural Change in Finland 1940–90

Comparatively speaking, structural changes in Finland after World War II began later and developed much more rapidly than similar changes in other West European countries and even in many East European countries. A majority of the population derived its livelihood from agriculture well into

Table 1. Active Population by Economic Sector: Finland (FIN) and Sweden (S) 1940–90 (percent).

Sector		1940	1950	1960	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
Primary	FIN	56	46	35	20	15	13	11	8.5
	S	29	21	14	8	6	6	5	3.5
Secondary	FIN	28	29	31	36	37	35	32	31.0
	S	42	47	40	36	32	30	30	29.5
Tertiary	FIN	17	25	33	43	48	52	57	60.5
	S	35	37	40	52	57	62	65	67.0

Primary sector = agriculture and forestry; Secondary sector = manufacturing, construction, miscellaneous; Tertiary sector = service.

Source: Toivonen (1988, 68); Statistisk årsbok (1991, 1990, 178); Statistikcentralens Arbetskraftsstatistik (1990, 1992, 62).

the 1950s. In Table 1 developmental changes in Finland and Sweden are compared.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Finland developed rapidly into a service society. Economic activity within the tertiary sector was greater than that in the secondary sector (Table 2). Migration from the countryside into cities was very intensive during this period. The population in the district of Nyland, Finland's southernmost county, which includes the capital region, increased by an average of 17,000 people annually between 1950 and 1970.

The Finnish Governments During the Elections

In connection with the parliamentary elections of 1954, 1966, 1975, 1987 and 1991, governments resigned (1954), notices of new elections were proclaimed (1954, 1975), and old and new government coalitions were considered and rejected (1966, 1987, 1991).

The period from 1950 to 1957 has been described as "back to the red soil". This is a term for a government coalition between the Centre Party and

Table 2. Social Strata in Finland, 1940–90 (Percent of Active Population).

Stratum	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985	1990
Farmers	38	36	28	17	10	8	6
Entrepreneurs	4	6	6	5	5	6	6
Functionaries	10	16	22	32	41	46	45
Agricultural workers	17	9	7	3	2	2	2
Other workers	31	33	37	44	42	37	41

Farmers = self-employed in agriculture and forestry; Entrepreneurs = other self-employed; Functionaries = managers and employees.

Source: Toivonen (1988, 82); Statistikcentralens Arbetskraftsstatistik (1990, 1992, 68–69).

the Social Democratic Party. After the election of 1951 the government coalition between the Centre Party (up until 1965 the Agrarian Party) and the Social Democrats continued. The end of the Korea boom was a setback for the export industry. The cabinet was forced to resign and a Centre minority government was formed. This Centre government had to resign after having suggested drastic cutbacks not acceptable to the opposition. A non-partisan government with only officials was formed but it failed to obtain parliamentary approval. New elections were called for March 1954, but did not result in any greater changes (Jansson 1992, 127–130).

The years between 1957 and 1966 have been regarded as “the hegemony of the Centre Party”. Apart from some short periods, the Centre Party played a leading role in the governments in this era. At the 1962 election the bourgeois parties advanced and after an experiment with a bourgeois government with representatives of the biggest trade union and a government with officials, a majority government with four bourgeois parties was formed. The government led by the Centre Party was in power until the election of 1966. The winner of the election was the Social Democrats, now having changed its leadership. The former leaders were not politically accepted by the Soviet Union because of their foreign policy role during World War II. A four-party government was formed with the Social Democrats, the Centre Party, the Communists and the small Social Democratic Opposition Party (Jansson 1992, 134–144).

At the beginning of the 1970s the country had several government crises and early elections were held in 1972 as well as in 1975. After the election of 1972 a Social Democratic minority government was formed. For the approval of the EEC-treaty a broader majority government, including the Centre Party as well as the Social Democrats, was required. The government parties were bent on compromise. With the so-called oil crisis, exports went down and unemployment rose. The President intervened and gave notice of early elections in the autumn of 1975. A government comprising solely of officials ran the country from the beginning of the summer up until the election (Jansson 1992, 146–154).

Several governments up until 1983 were based on the principle of the people’s front, which called for the participation of the Social Democrats, the Centre Party and the Communists. In the meantime, however, a spirit of consensus had been reached that did not rule out cooperation with the major opposition party, i.e. the Conservatives. After the 1983 election, in which the Communists suffered heavy losses, a government comprising the Social Democrats, the Centre Party and two smaller parties was formed. The government stayed in office for a long time, up until the election of 1987. The personal chemistry between the leaders of the two big government parties was not good. The Social Democrats were interested in cooperation with the Conservatives rather than with a shrinking Centre Party. For the

Conservatives, government participation seemed more and more definite. The traditional red–green cooperation was cracking. The Conservatives won the 1987 election (Jansson 1992, 157–164).

There were several government options after the 1987 election. For the first time since 1970 the main bourgeois parties had a majority in parliament in their own right. Their official goal was a government on a wide basis, but unofficially the bourgeois parties agreed on forming a bourgeois majority government. Among the Social Democrats there was a strong opinion favouring a blue–red coalition with the Conservatives. Strong forces within the Conservatives also advocated such a solution. A government with Social Democrats and the Conservatives was formed. For the first time, the Centre Party had been outmanoeuvred at the formation of a majority government. The Conservatives now had government responsibility after 21 years in opposition. The reaction of the Centre Party was bitter, particularly as the Conservatives had reneged on the secret agreement to form a bourgeois majority government. The blue–red government was stable. Towards the end of the election period opposing interests arose. The Centre Party changed its leaders and was no longer saddled with a negative personal chemistry with other political leaders. Before the election of 1991 the Centre Party vigorously went in for a comeback. The great winner in 1991 was the Centre Party, too. After the election the first bourgeois majority government after 1966 could be formed (Jansson 1992, 164–168).

The Increasing Role of the Media and the Public Financing of the Parties

With the arrival of radio and television, the importance of these media for the political parties has increased. In Sweden of the 1950s, the radio became the most important campaign channel and in the 1960s television took over the role of the radio (see Esaiasson 1990). Other results indicate that the media play a central role in the process of the political moulding of public opinion. The media have freed themselves from the political parties and the competition among the various media has hardened. As a consequence, the competition between political actors has increased (see Asp 1986).

We can also observe that the media have moved over from being party-controlled to being more or less independent actors in the election campaigns. The political parties in Finland have supported the party press economically. Since the 1960s the party press has obtained public economic support, but in the 1990s the press support was drastically cut. Via their own news agencies the political parties have furnished their party newspapers with circular editorials and parliamentary material. The political parties have also controlled staff appointments within the party press (Anckar 1971, 15).

Since the 1950s the independent daily newspapers have grown vigorously at the expense of the party newspapers. For technical and economic reasons, the newspapers have tried to increase their circulation figures, as a result of which they have developed into newspapers in the proper sense of that word, less dependent on the political parties and more diverse in terms of content. The competition has become increasingly keen because of the tabloids, radio and television. At the same time, the journalists have become professionalized (Salminen 1988, 149, 293; Löyttyniemi 1988, 389).

Only since the late 1960s have the political parties in Finland received public party support. In the 1960s the traditional ways of raising funds, for instance through membership fees, canvasses, donations and lotteries, were not sufficient. In 1969 the political parties were legally recognized. The Party Law gave the political parties a privileged status in elections as well as in the distributions of public funds. The Finnish political parties have since become dependent on public support. It is the main source of income for the political parties represented in parliament. As of the 1970s, public support in many cases represented more than two-thirds of the total income of the political parties. In the 1980s half of the total income of the political parties came from public support. Today public support is the most important source of income to finance the electoral campaigns. The public support to the political parties has created a large cadre of party functionaries. The stability of monetary resources available has helped the party functionaries to operate more rationally than before and they are no longer forced to listen to private interests in order to have resources (Wiberg 1991, 55–115).

Parties and Class

Despite rapid structural changes, the political party system in Finland has not changed appreciably. Small groups have broken with the main parties in an effort to branch out and form new political parties, but the four largest – the Conservative, Centre, the Social Democratic and the Communist parties (as of 1991 the Leftist Coalition) have maintained their positions as the leading political parties. In the 1940s, these four parties captured more than 86 percent of the vote. In 1991, support among voters for these four major political parties decreased to a little more than 76 percent. Voter support for the leading parties has fluctuated earlier as well; in 1922, the four largest parties enjoyed the support of slightly more than 78 percent of the electorate.

It is interesting to note that the support for the Communist Party has decreased in the latest parliamentary elections, while at the same time the Conservative Party has increased its support among voters.

The special connection between class and party has in any case diminished with time, but there is still a very obvious relationship between the two.

Table 3. The Dependence of the Four Largest Parties on Their Core Strata: 1948–91 (Percent).

Party		1948	1966	1973	1982	1991
Communists	Farmers	19	11	9	5	–
	Workers	78	82	77	72	68
	Functionaries, Upper Middle	3	7	14	22	32
Social Democrats	Farmers	14	7	5	2	4
	Workers	76	74	71	63	52
	Functionaries, Upper Middle	10	19	24	34	43
Centre Party	Farmers	81	72	60	40	35
	Workers	16	18	23	28	27
	Functionaries, Upper Middle	3	10	17	32	38
Conservatives	Farmers	27	12	13	9	10
	Workers	25	20	20	24	13
	Functionaries, Upper Middle	48	68	67	67	77

Source: Sänkiäho (1991, 38).

Table 3 shows clearly that the Communist Party, the Leftist Coalition of today, nevertheless remains a party very deeply rooted in the working classes. The Social Democrats still enjoy considerable support among the working class, but the party has succeeded in attracting new voters from the middle class as well. The Centre Party has gained stable voters in the working as well as middle classes. In spite of this, the Centre Party remains the party of agriculture – of the farmer. All the other parties have in fact lost support within the shrinking Finnish agricultural sector. The Conservatives have obtained more and more support from the middle class and the upper echelons of society.

Analysing Party Propaganda

The development of party propaganda during election campaigns can be expected to lend support to the theory of the diminishing role of ideology. Gunnar Sjöblom defines propaganda as: (a) a technique for influencing the attitudes, opinions and/or behaviour of people, by the use of words or other symbols; and (b) the actual content of the thus used words or symbols (Sjöblom 1968, 114).

The technical dimension encompasses a wide range of methods with which the political parties attempt to sway and convince the voter. The content of propaganda is defined by orientation, in particular by the target group which the party wishes to reach and the subject matter to be undertaken.

Olavi Borg's "conceptualization of the levels of group orientation" has been adapted to this work to correspond to the electoral groups for the parties (Borg 1964, 162–184):

- (1) Individual: the individual, the citizen, the voter;
- (2) Class: the blue-collar worker, the farmer, the white-collar worker;
- (3) Quasi-class: high-, middle-, and low-wage earners, employees and employers;
- (4) Non-class: families with children, senior citizens, savers, women, country folk, city-dwellers, youth and the aged;
- (5) National: the Finnish people and the voters.

(For examples of levels of group orientation, see Appendix 1).

Concerning the question of which issues are addressed within the framework of propaganda, the following subjects, among others, have been utilized: housing policy, the economy, agricultural policy, environmental policy, party politics, social policy, foreign policy, and electoral proclamations (for examples of typical issues, see Appendix 2).

In so far as propaganda techniques are concerned, the following "Tricks of the Trade" by A. M. Lee and E. B. Lee (1939) are applicable. One of the techniques, transfer, has been omitted here:

- (1) Name-calling: giving an idea a bad label – used to make us reject and condemn an idea without examining the evidence;
- (2) Testimonial: consists in having some respected or hated person say that a given idea or programme or product or person is good or bad;
- (3) Card-stacking: involves the selection and use of facts or falsehoods, illustrations or distractions, and logical or illogical statements in order to give the best or the worst possible case for an idea, programme, person or product;
- (4) Bandwagon: has as its theme, "everybody (at least all of us) is doing it"; with this technique the propagandist attempts to convince us that all members of the group to which we belong are accepting his programme and that we must therefore follow the crowd and jump on the bandwagon;
- (5) Glittering generality: associating something with a "virtue word" is used to make us accept and approve the thing without examining the evidence;
- (6) Plain folks: is the method by which a speaker attempts to convince his audience that he and his ideas are good because they are "of the people", the "plain folks" (*ibid.*, 23–24).

(For examples of propaganda techniques, see Appendix 3).

In order to study where the political party's election propaganda appears, i.e., the arena for such propaganda, an examination has been made of the party's election advertisements in a number of daily newspapers. A selection of the candidates' individual advertisements has been made as well, in order to determine whether the group orientation of the individual candidate differs from the party group orientation as evidenced by the respective campaign advertising.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses are proposed regarding the campaign propaganda of the political parties:

1. *The parties attempt to reach as many voters as possible, as opposed to having earlier directed their message to traditional class members only.*

Here it is assumed that the parties increasingly turn their attention to groups such as the individual voter, the family, Finnish nationals or the entire population. Put another way, this means that the political parties which in the past had first and foremost turned to the parties' traditional voter factions, such as blue-collar workers, farmers or white-collar workers, are now carrying the appeal for voters to the entire electorate. At the same time, it is assumed that the use of propaganda technique plain folks has increased: each political party seeking to present itself as a party for all the people.

Likewise, it is assumed that the propaganda technique, bandwagon, increases with time: as the parties try to reach all the voters, they appeal to each and everyone to join in the tide and to ride the wave of the future. If this development does not follow a linear curve, the interest of the party on a parliamentary scale serves to counteract the maximizing of electoral votes.

2. *The substance of propaganda has become less ideological.*

This implies that the offensive propaganda has been curtailed. The offensive propaganda is based on attacks on other political parties, political leaders or groups. The parties become more cautious in their propaganda so as not to offend or exclude any voter group. The propaganda techniques name-calling and card-stacking are a measure of offensive propaganda. By the same token, the issue of party politics also represents offensive propaganda (see Appendix 2: definition of party politics).

If the technique, glittering generality, increases, the substance (of the message) becomes more vague. If the use of the technique, testimonial grows, it serves as a measure of increasing fixation on the political elite.

3. *The quantity of propaganda increases with time.*

In an attempt to reach ever-larger numbers of voters, the political parties have increased their use of propaganda. Simultaneously, the use of

propaganda is more extensive in those areas where the electorate is most accessible. In any case, this can lead to contradictory trends: while the political parties try to reach the general electorate, the individual candidate tends to concentrate more and more on "his own" specific constituency. This in turn leads to the next hypothesis:

4. *In the party's attempt to reach as many voters as possible, each individual candidate turns his attention to his own special group of voters.*

Special group here signifies typically the family, senior citizens, city dwellers, farmers, and blue- and white-collar workers.

Empirical Analysis

The content of the election platform and campaign posters of the four largest parties (Communist/Leftist Coalition, Social Democrats, Centre/Agrarian Party, and Conservatives) from the parliamentary elections of 1954, 1966, 1975, 1987 and 1991 has been analysed.

The twenty election platforms include the parties' written agenda or manifesto. During certain years, the parties have produced election agendas for their campaigns. During other election years the parties have drawn up an election manifesto, a so-called Set of Objectives for the Next Electoral Period. The latter is formulated in much the same way as the election platform (an abbreviated description of the current situation and a statement of the party's aspirations for the future).

Forty-seven campaign posters have been examined. A campaign poster advertises the party's campaign slogans and symbols; the poster is intended to be displayed in a public place. Those campaign posters included in the study were found in the party's archives. Campaign posters which refer to candidates in one electoral district, and one poster representing a mock election, have been omitted.

With reference to election advertising, the parties' political ads in the four party dailies and in an independent newspaper have been studied for a two-week period prior to each parliamentary election. The newspapers are as follows: for the Communist Party, *Kansan Uutiset* (The People's News, formerly *Vapaa sana*, or Free Speech); for the Social Democrats, *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti* (The Finnish Social Democrat), for the Centre Party, *Suomenmaa* (The Country of Finland, formerly *Maakansa* or Country People), for the Conservatives, *Aamulehti* (Morning News) and the independent news daily, *Helsingin Sanomat* (Helsinki Tribune).

The term "political party advertisement" is used here to mean an ad which presents the party's platform on the eve of an election published in the name of the party, in the name of a parliamentary group, or in the name of the party's women's or youth organizations. In the independent newspaper,

Helsingin Sanomat, all four parties' campaign ads have been examined; in the partisan newspapers, we have focused exclusively on the ads by the party to which the paper claims allegiance. Out of a total of 326 newspapers, 189 political party campaign ads have been identified and studied.

Advertisements of individual party candidates from the four largest political parties have been examined only in the independent daily, *Helsingin Sanomat*, in an effort to limit the amount of material. A total of 1,608 such ads has been researched.

Methods

On the question of group orientation and political issues, every paragraph in the party platform represents a classification unit. Every passage is coded to the group level or issue which is most prominent. In order to compare results, the number of times each group level appears or shows up per year and per party has been determined. On this basis, an average value has been calculated: the number of paragraphs for one group level for one party during one election year is correlated with the number of paragraphs for the party during the same election year.

In the case of propaganda techniques, first, each clause in a party platform was selected as a classification unit. Second, in order to achieve a better correlation unit, the number of words in a given party platform was then selected, so that the number of techniques corresponds to the number of words in each party platform. Here it must be pointed out that only the incidence of one and the same propaganda technique per clause has been coded. That is to say, if, for example, glittering generality appears several times within the same clause, it is noted as one occurrence. Those clauses containing several propaganda techniques of the same type are relatively few in number. In order to compare results, an average value has been determined for each propaganda technique per year and per party in relation to the total number of words in the party's election platform for that year.

With respect to campaign posters, the entire poster has been treated as a single unit. A campaign poster can scarcely be divided into paragraphs. Instead, the level of group orientation has been determined on the basis of the total impression presented. As the number of campaign posters varied substantially per election and party, and whereas, generally speaking, they contained no real changes, it became difficult to determine the frequency of propaganda techniques on the basis of the number of words used (an exception was the Social Democrats' campaign poster of 1975 which quotes the party's election platform). Therefore, the campaign poster itself is used as the classification unit and the frequency of a propaganda technique is correlated with the number of campaign posters per party during one election

year. Since a campaign poster may not say a great deal about the real issues, but rather appeals to emotive issues like "security" and "welfare", it does not seem worthwhile to attempt to classify issues in campaign posters.

For the purpose of comparing the number of political party ads in relation to other types of newspaper ads, a column-centimetre measurement has been constructed: the height of the ad is multiplied by the number of columns which comprise the ad. By this method, a figure for the number of column-centimetres can be obtained. The total number of column-centimetres in the newspaper is thus obtained by taking the height of one page multiplied by the number of columns on each page, multiplied by the total number of pages in the newspaper. In this way it is possible to determine whether the volume of the party's campaign ads has increased with time. For each campaign ad, every paragraph and word is counted for analysis of group orientation and technique. After careful consideration, it was decided to leave out the question of political issues in campaign ads in view of the huge volume of material.

Research into the campaign ads of individual candidates has been concentrated to group orientation: to what group of voters does the candidate direct his appeal? Thus, it is less interesting to look at the particular propaganda techniques or choice of issues which can be found in these ads. Here the campaign ad itself is the classification unit. In some ads, individual candidates can be seen to appeal to several groups of voters; it becomes impossible to identify a main group. In this case, the group which is named first in the ad is counted.

Results

From One Class to Everybody

Concerning their group orientation, the political parties all begin to look increasingly alike. Table 4 presents the three most utilized levels of group orientation per party and per parliamentary election. It can be concluded that all parties, during every election year, direct their attention above all to the entire population, to the entire Finnish people; that is to say, to groups on a national level. The exceptions are the Communists in 1966 and 1975, the Social Democrats in 1966 and the Conservatives in 1954 and 1975. It is clear from Table 4 that the distribution of group levels among the various political parties bears a striking resemblance from party to party. In the election year, 1987, the group level given highest priority is almost identical in each party. With the exception of the Conservatives, all parties in the 1991 election year have arranged the group levels in the same ranking order.

Nevertheless, the traditional Communist working class constituency remained an important electoral group for the Communist Party in the

Table 4. The Three Most Utilized Levels of Group Orientation by Party and Parliamentary Election in the Party Platform.

Year	Communists	Social Democrats	Centre Party	Conservative
1954	National	National	National	Class
	Class	Quasi-class	Class	Quasi-class/national
	Non-class	Non-class	Non-class	Individual
1966	Non-class	Non-class	National	National
	Quasi-class	National	Non-class	Individual
	Class/national	Class/individual	Class/quasi-class	Non-class
1975	Class	National	National	Individual
	National	Non-class	Non-class	Non-class
	Quasi-class	Quasi-class	Class/quasi-class	–
1987	National	National/non-class	National	National
	Individual	Quasi-class	Non-class	Non-class
		Individual	Quasi-class	Quasi-class/class
1991	National	National	National	National
	Non-class	Non-class	Non-class	Non-class
	Individual	Individual	Individual	Quasi-class

elections of 1954, 1966 and 1975. In the election of 1975, this class represented the most important group of voters for the Communists. From then on, the Communist Party may be seen to lean less and less heavily on the working class for support. During the two most recent elections, all voters, and even each individual voter, have become important for the Communists.

The Social Democrats emphasize the salaried employee on the group orientation level in every election year. However, the party directs its appeal primarily to the entire population. The Centre Party is the party which tries to appeal to both rural and urban populations. Those groups are to be found in the group orientation level, non-class. Up until 1975, the party has shown a certain class group orientation; that is to say, the party has directed its appeal to its traditional constituency, the farmers.

The Conservatives address themselves primarily to white-collar workers, on a class level, in the election of 1954. In the election of 1975, it is the individual who takes centre stage: the party platform is actually called "You Decide"! Afterwards, it is above all the entire population, the full electorate, which is of utmost importance for the party.

Table 5 demonstrates how emphasis on the class level has decreased, while concomitantly the emphasis on the national level has increased. This trend is most obvious in the Centre Party, whereas variations exist among the other parties. In the case of both the Communists and the Conservatives, the frequency of the national level even falls during the latest parliamentary election. A partial explanation for this is the fact that two other groups, the individual level and non-class level, have played a significant role.

Table 5. Two Frequent Levels of Group Orientation by Party and Year in the Party Platforms (As a Percentage of the Parties' Total Levels of Group Orientation).

Party/levels of group orientation	1954	1966	1975	1987	1991
Communists					
Class	22.2	18.2	57.5	–	–
Nation	55.6	18.2	38.3	87.5	38.9
Social Democrats					
Class	3.8	12.5	–	–	–
Nation	61.6	25.0	63.6	40.7	70.3
Centre Party					
Class	26.3	8.1	5.0	3.6	–
Nation	42.1	62.2	67.5	70.0	88.9
Conservatives					
Class	82.0	–	–	2.0	3.3
Nation	7.7	93.7	–	71.0	66.7

The frequencies for the propaganda techniques plain folks and bandwagon in the party platform were low (see Appendix 4). For the parties of the left, i.e., the Communists and Social Democrats, the frequency has diminished during the two most recent election years, while the frequency for the two bourgeois parties has increased during the same period.

Campaign posters are directed first and foremost during every election year to the entire population (see examples, Appendix 5). The campaign posters of the both the Communists and the Social Democrats were aimed primarily at the wage-earner and the salaried employee during the 1954 and 1966 elections. The posters present, among other things, the toiling young worker – together with red flags flying. During the following election year, the campaign posters addressed the entire population. In 1954 and again in 1966, the Centre Party tried to appeal to voters in the countryside. The frequency of appearance of propaganda techniques in campaign posters varies considerably over time and amongst parties; it thus becomes impossible to draw definite conclusions about the efficacy of propaganda techniques in campaign posters.

With respect to political party advertisements in the party organ newspaper and in an independent daily, it becomes apparent that during some election years, no party ads appeared in a number of the party newspapers. A comparison has been made, for the purpose of group orientation analysis, between the ads of the parties in their own newspapers and between the parties' ads in an independent daily newspaper (see Table 6).

In the 1954 election, only the Conservatives placed campaign ads in the independent newspaper. During the elections of 1954 and 1966, the

Table 6. The Most Frequent Levels of Group Orientation by Party and Year in the Party Organ Newspaper and in an Independent Daily Newspaper (As a Percentage of the Parties' Total Level of Group Orientation).

Party/Newspaper	1954	1966	1975	1987	1991
Communists					
Party newspaper	Class Nation	Nation Class	Individual Non-class	– –	– –
Independent newspaper	– –	Nation Non-class	Individual Nation	– –	Non-class Individual
Social Democrats					
Party newspaper	Nation/non-class Class/quasi-class	Nation Non-class	Nation Non-class	Nation –	Nation Individual
Independent newspaper	– –	Nation Non-class	Non-class Nation	Nation Individual/ non-class	Nation Individual
Centre Party					
Party newspaper	Non-class Individual	Non-class Nation	Individual Nation	– –	Non-class Individual
Independent newspaper	– –	Nation Non-class	Individual Nation	Nation Individual	Nation Individual
Conservatives					
Party newspaper	Nation Individual	Nation Non-class	Individual Non-class	Individual Nation	Nation Individual
Independent newspaper	Nation Individual	Nation Individual	Individual Non-class	Individual Non-class	Individual Non-class

Communists and the Social Democrats are seen to gravitate more towards their traditional constituencies. After 1966, the political campaign ads of each party begin to resemble each other more and more, both in the party organ newspaper and in the independent daily: the three levels of group orientation most often employed are national, individual and non-class. No definitive conclusions can be drawn regarding the frequency of the propaganda techniques, plain folks and bandwagon; the occurrence of each is extremely limited and varied.

Group orientation analysis has been performed only for the campaign ads of individual candidates (of the four largest political parties) in three newspapers – two party-organ newspapers, namely those of the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, and the independent newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat* (see Appendix 6). Despite an emphasis on all voter categories during all parliamentary elections, in the first two elections, the individual candidates appealed to their own constituencies, i.e., the traditional groups of voters, e.g., the workers. During the most recent election years, the political

candidates have addressed themselves to all voters, to families, to women and to you, the singular voter.

In short, the class orientation of the political parties has decreased in both the party platform and in campaign posters. The class orientation has also decreased in party advertisements and in individual candidate ads. One exception, however, is the Communist Party platform of 1975. The huge class orientation in that election can perhaps be accounted for as a by-product of the fact that the party had been split a few years earlier, which in turn led to a more radical stance. In addition, the country experienced an economic depression during the first half of the 1970s. In other words, the hypothesis that the political parties seek to reach out to a wide range of voters, as opposed to having previously directed their message exclusively to the party faithful, is clearly borne out. This, despite the fact that during every election year it has been imperative for the political parties to appeal to all the voters (the total electorate, all the Finnish people in general). Not only has the phenomenon of class orientation diminished, but the political parties have also become increasingly similar, as reflected in both the party platforms and campaign posters.

Simultaneously, quasi-class group orientation has decreased – in direct contradiction to what had been postulated. Instead of the parties' (N.B.: the Social Democrats) attempt to appeal to the salaried employee, there is now an effort to win votes among senior citizens, the young, families and individuals. The assumption that the propaganda techniques, bandwagon and plain folks, are likely to increase is not supported. Here the frequency of occurrence diminishes, but at the same time the low frequency of these two categories makes it difficult to reach a definitive conclusion.

Only the Best for the People

In the party platform, offensive propaganda has decreased and become more vague. The techniques, name-calling and card-stacking, provided a measure of offensive propaganda. The results show that both techniques have become less evident in the party platform (see Appendix 4). The greatest change can be seen in the Communist Party, which in 1954 and 1975 had a high frequency of name-calling which subsequently abated. The economic crisis during the first half of the 1970s gave the Communists cause to rail against big capital.

The bourgeois parties present an exception – during the 1987 and 1991 elections, there was a greater frequency of name-calling and card-stacking within the Centre Party. This may be attributable to the fact that the Centre Party waged a more offensive campaign during the election of 1991, when it

was not in government. It should be borne in mind that the Centre Party has been a part of most governments since World War II.

A measure of vague propaganda is the technique, glittering generality, the frequency of which has increased in the party platform. During every election year, the frequency of this propaganda technique has been fairly high and under certain circumstances has actually increased.

A look at the campaign issues reveals that the issue of party politics has waned (see Appendix 7). The Centre Party was a notable exception in 1991, when the party attacked the ruling administration for its government policies. Otherwise, the political party platforms have focused on social policy, questions concerning the economy, and housing policy. An overview of the party platforms reveals that, during the election of 1954, the political parties explain why the existing state of affairs was not as it should have been, then stake out the right way to run the country. During the election of 1966, the party platforms advocate change, then proceed to the presentation of the only alternative. The economic crisis of 1975 prods two parties into explaining who is to blame for the crisis, while the other two parties present a list of demands in a so-called point programme. In the election of 1987, the new morality was the order of the day; while in 1991, the political parties rallied around the promise that everything will be better. In the latter case, the Centre Party strayed from the prevailing theme and lashed out against the government's policies.

In the case of campaign posters, it is not possible to come to any final conclusions with regard to propaganda techniques. They occur sporadically. However, a comparison can be made of party political slogans (see Appendix 5). During the elections of 1954 and 1966 the parties clamoured for democracy, bread, work, welfare, peace and justice. In the 1987 and 1991 elections, the message of the campaign poster is more metaphorical: "a rose", "take hold of tomorrow's possibilities", "civil courage" and "for you" are slogans with a more diffuse meaning.

The propaganda technique, name calling, has diminished in so far as campaign advertising is concerned, both in the political party newspaper and in the independent newspaper (see Appendix 8). Here there were certain difficulties, since the Communists had no political party ads in the party newspaper in the years 1987 and 1991, nor in the independent newspaper in the years 1954 and 1987. The frequency of the other propaganda techniques varies, but a slight increase in the technique, testimonial, can be seen.

In conclusion, it can be said that the propaganda technique, name-calling, is utilized less and less. The propaganda technique, card-stacking, has also diminished to some extent, especially in the party platform. An exception here is the rhetoric of the bourgeois parties in the election campaign of 1991. The Centre Party went to the polls as being opposed to the policies of the ruling administration; and only the Conservative Party, in its election

propaganda, responded to the offensive propaganda from the Centre Party. Criticism of and attacks on fellow candidates/opposition parties in election campaigns have decreased; the use of offensive propaganda has declined, while at the same time the message of such propaganda has become more obscure. Thus, the propaganda technique, glittering generality, has increased slightly in the party platform, while campaign poster slogans have become more vague. However, it has not been possible to demonstrate that the obsession with high-profile public figures has increased. The propaganda technique, testimonial, has seen an increase in political party advertising, but in the party platform the technique is evidently foremost during the election years of 1954 and 1966.

Less Propaganda

Contrary to our expectations, the volume of propaganda in the material under study has declined. The frequency of propaganda techniques illustrates that during the three most recent election years under scrutiny, such techniques have become less common (see Appendix 4). However, the frequency increases for the bourgeois parties in 1991; while in the same year, the frequency is lower for the parties to the left. The average frequency for propaganda techniques is in any case at an all-time low in the election of 1991.

Measurement of the volume of advertising by political parties in the party organ newspaper reveals that the amount of advertising has decreased for the parties of the left, but has remained more or less constant for the bourgeois parties (see Appendix 9). The results do not hold very well for the Communists, who had no political party ads during the election campaigns of 1987 and 1991. The same is true of the Centre Party in 1987. The total amount of campaign advertising by the political parties in the independent daily, *Helsingin Sanomat*, has shown an initial increase followed by a subsequent decrease in relation to the total volume of the newspaper.

A comparison of advertising in the individual party newspapers as opposed to *Helsingin Sanomat* shows that it is more interesting for the Centre Party, the Conservatives and the Communists to advertise in the independent newspaper. It may also be seen that the volume of advertising by individual candidates has decreased in relation to the total volume of the newspaper – in 1954, candidate ads made up 5.27 percent of the total volume (7,810 column-centimetres of candidate ads out of a total of 148,048 column-centimetres), while in 1991 the figure dropped to 2.05 percent (9,646.5 column-centimetres of candidate ads out of 470,372 column-centimetres contained in the entire newspaper).

Summing up, it can be concluded that the hypothesis is not supported by the data; despite the fact that the political parties attempt to reach as many voters as possible, there has been no increase in the use of propaganda in the party platform or campaign advertising.

The Candidates Attempt to Reach All the Voters

In the quest for votes, the individual candidates try to reach the entire electorate. During each and every election year, the individual candidate appeals to the Finnish people, to the whole population, to voters in general (see Appendix 6). In addition, the candidates seek to capture votes among the following groups: families, senior citizens, Nyland residents, and individuals. Advertising by the party candidates begins to look the same. In other words, the hypothesis which proposes that the individual party candidates would increasingly focus on “their own” electorate is not supported.

Final Comments

The fact that the political parties are becoming more non-ideological, in the sense that the class orientation has decreased and by similarities in use of propaganda across party lines, cannot be explained merely by changes in the population structure. The political parties have been influenced by several other factors. Among these, as has already been mentioned, are new election laws, the introduction of governmental support, a more professional use of the media and the application of political strategy – all have exerted a decided effect. The current research addresses only a part of the total picture; however, one truth has emerged clearly – the political parties compete to a greater extent in the same electoral arena. In order to capture votes among the growing middle class, the political parties have chosen to appeal to all the voters. Nevertheless, the largest parties in Finland still find their support among the traditional voters, therefore the parties cannot afford to lose them. As a result, the propaganda message becomes more vague; the greater the array of voters which the parties attempt to win, the greater the probability that the message will be diffuse.

There are minor exceptions to the above generalizations – the Communists’ prominent class orientation in 1975, and the increased frequency of offensive propaganda as exhibited by the bourgeois parties in 1991. This is explained by the split in the Communist Party and its subsequent radicalization in the early 1970s, combined with an economic depression and unusually high unemployment for that period. At the time of the 1991 election, the Centre Party was part of the opposition. Previously, the party had enjoyed a place in almost every government following World War II.

Before the 1991 election, the Conservatives were in power for the first time in more than 20 years; thus being forced to defend themselves against the Centre Party's offensive campaign.

The political parties have not increased their use of propaganda techniques in the party platform and campaign advertising. In other words, the total volume of propaganda is not directly related to the particular group targeted by the propaganda. On the other hand, different types of propaganda, e.g., campaign brochures and election happenings (candidate show) may have increased. Campaign advertising on radio and television represents an entirely new area of propaganda. In any case, the tendency to advertise in an independent newspaper which is widely read has increased. As the number of political party newspaper and circulation figures for some of them continue to decrease, there is a much greater possibility of reaching a wider audience of potential voters in an independent newspaper with a large circulation.

An examination of the party platform of 1954 reveals how the political parties attempted to explain what had gone wrong with the country and what course was "the right one". This theme continued in the 1966 election as the parties insisted on the need for a change. During the latest elections the political parties have been putting forth certain demands. The political parties have provided the electorate with a set of causal models on how to attain a better society. But it may also be argued that the media have in many ways taken over the political parties' role of explaining society.

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Appendix 1. Examples of Levels of Group Orientation

Individual: "Consider our goals and then decide if you would like to be a part of making our dreams a reality" (from the Conservative Party platform, 1975).

Class: "The Communist Party strives assiduously to cooperate with other organizations which represent the working people, for in this way can we

best protect the interests of the working class” (from the Communist Party platform, 1954).

Quasi-class: “The Communists, the Centre Party and the Swedish Party voted . . . for the government, for our country’s most conservative government . . . They did this even though they were well aware that tens of thousands of wage-earners would be impoverished as a result” (from the Social Democratic Party platform, 1954).

Non-class: “One goal of this administration must be [to proclaim] a programme for young people which encourages them to pursue higher education . . . which allows them the possibility to start a family . . .” (from the Conservative Party platform, 1987).

Nation: “Robust and vigorous natural resources and a clean environment are mandatory for the Finnish people and for the national economy of the country. We are a people whose well-being depends on renewing the gifts of nature” (from the Centre Party platform, 1991).

Appendix 2. Examples of Political Issues

The following have been classified as political issues: employment policy, housing policy, the economy, farm policy, environmental policy, social policy, transportation policy, youth policy, questions of education and culture, foreign policy, defence policy, campaign proclamations and value goals. A few examples are:

Party politics: When a party criticizes or comments upon another party, its policies and/or party leader, the political issue will be party politics. In other words, the issue party politics represents is offensive propaganda. One example: “It is the ruling administration and other opposition parties which have indicated that they support the government’s policies, which have mired the country in a deep crisis” (from the Communist Party platform, 1954).

Campaign proclamations: “The incoming parliament must, above all else, guarantee our people full employment . . . it is in the only true Finnish way, which we now implore all the Finnish people to join us in building” (from the Social Democratic Party platform, 1987).

Value goals: “The democratic social system must be maintained and strengthened” (from the Conservative Party platform, 1966).

Appendix 3. Examples of Propaganda Techniques

Name-calling: "It is not surprising that the capitalist big boys are laughing up their sleeves at such stupid political neophytes and . . ." (from *Vapaa Sana*, February 24, 1954).

Testimonial: ". . . despite the fact that the Social Democratic committee chairman, Tanner, initially recommended that a frugal budget be adopted . . ." (from *Vapaa Sana*, February 22, 1954).

Card-Stacking: ". . . just as mass capitalism for the people is treachery, it is likewise for the Rightists, self-deception" (from *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, January 1, 1987).

Bandwagon: "In order to make this policy a reality, the Party now admonishes all Finnish citizens to join in cooperation in the parliamentary election" (from the Centre Party platform, 1966).

Plain folks: "The Centre Party demands that society institute immediate measures to guarantee the protection of a basic living wage, not only for the salaried employee, but for the workers as well" (from the Centre Party platform, 1966).

Glittering generality: "The Social Democrats emphasize friendship and cooperation, traditional themes for the party; in contrast to the apathy, coldness and violence which is so widespread" (from *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, January 30, 1987).

Appendix 4. Propaganda Techniques in the Party Platform by Party and Year (Frequency of the Total Number of Words in the Platform).

Party/Year	Technique						Volume
	NC	TE	CS	BW	GG	PF	
Communists							
1954	1.82	0.11	1.94	0.94	2.53	0.94	8.28
1966	0.19	0.88	1.67	0.39	3.55	0.59	7.27
1975	1.17	0.08	1.67	0.16	2.76	0.67	6.61
1987	0.46	–	1.63	–	3.27	2.10	7.46
1991	0.18	–	0.73	–	3.50	0.36	7.44
Social Democrats							
1954	1.32	1.46	2.27	0.16	3.40	0.97	9.37
1966	1.31	–	2.63	–	5.92	–	9.86
1975	–	–	–	–	9.95	–	9.95
1987	0.56	–	0.75	–	8.47	0.94	10.72
1991	–	–	0.24	–	4.69	0.49	5.42
Centre Party							
1954	0.14	–	0.58	0.14	4.42	0.50	5.78
1966	0.14	0.32	0.44	0.16	4.42	0.60	6.06
1975	0.10	0.20	0.20	–	5.24	0.30	6.04
1987	0.08	0.12	0.21	0.04	4.87	0.25	5.57
1991	0.61	0.15	1.37	–	5.04	0.61	7.78
Conservatives							
1954	0.78	1.57	1.44	0.13	2.29	0.32	6.53
1966	0.30	0.15	0.35	–	4.67	0.30	5.77
1975	0.26	0.26	–	0.53	5.64	0.53	7.22
1987	0.10	–	–	–	5.43	–	5.53
1991	0.14	–	0.14	–	6.79	0.42	7.49

NC = Name-calling, TE = Testimonial, CS = Card stacking, BW = Bandwagon, GG = Glittering generality, PF = Plain folks.

Appendix 5. Examples of Campaign Posters

Since it takes too much space to publish the posters, some of them will be described in words. They serve as examples of campaign posters from 1954 to 1991.

The Communist Party:

1954: Picture of a family leaning on a bannister. In the background red banners.

1987: A well-dressed man losing his balance on a swing. Text of the poster: "Down with the power of money. The Communist Party – the power of change".

1991: Text of the poster: "Where do you have your heart?" against a red background. Under the text a swan forming a V and the party name *Vasemmistoliitto* (The Leftist Coalition).

The Social Democrats:

1954: A family looking at a house and a factory.

1966: Two young faces and the text: "For your future, the Social Democrats".

1975: Picture of a young family inside a red flag. Above the text: "Secure progress, the Social Democrats".

1991: A poster with the text: "For you, For Finland, For Europe, SDP the Social Democrats".

The Centre Party:

1954: Two hands breaking a bread with the text: "Bread from the home village, the Agrarian Party".

1966: Picture of a field landscape and the text: "The Centre Party – the only security for the countryside".

1987: Picture of an election box with the text: "Finnish courage. The Centre Party".

1991: A hand with a piece of paper and the word "is" on it. The whole text is: "The Centre Party is the alternative".

The Conservative Party:

1966: A house painted as the Finnish flag. In the window a family. Above the text: "The Conservatives". Below: "A secure choice".

1987: Picture with a little girl picking flowers (the flowers of the Conservatives). Above the text: "Take part in the possibilities of the future". Below the text: "The Conservatives".

Appendix 6. Individual Candidate Campaign Ads in the Party Organ Newspaper and in an Independent Newspaper

The three most frequent levels of group orientation by party and year				
Year	Party newspaper	Independent paper	Party newspaper	Independent paper
Social Democrats			Conservatives	
1954	Nation	Quasi-class	Non-class	Nation
	Non-class	Non-class	Nation	Non-class
	Class	Individual	Class	Quasi-class
1966	Nation	Nation	Nation	Nation
	Non-class	Non-class	Non-class	Non-class
	Class	Quasi-class	Class	–
1975	Nation	Nation	Nation	Nation
	Non-class	Quasi-class	Non-class	Non-class
	Quasi-class	Non-class	Individual	Individual
1987	Nation	Nation	Nation	Nation
	Quasi-class	Non-class	Non-class	Non-class
	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual
1991	Nation	Nation	Nation	Nation
	Non-class	Non-class	Non-class	Non-class
	Quasi-class	Quasi-class	Individual	Individual
Communists			Centre Party	
1954	–	Non-class	–	Non-class
	–	–	–	–
1966	–	Quasi-class	–	Nation
	–	Non-class	–	Non-class
	–	Nation	–	Quasi-class
1975	–	Nation	–	Nation
	–	Class	–	Non-class
	–	Quasi-class/ non-class	–	–
1987	–	Nation	–	Nation
	–	Individual	–	Non-class
	–	Non-class	–	Individual
1991	–	Nation	–	Nation
	–	Non-class	–	Non-class
	–	Individual	–	Individual

Appendix 7. The Three Most Discussed Political Issues Per Party

	Communists	Social Democrats	Centre Party	Conservatives
1954	Party politics Economy Foreign policy	Party politics Employment policy Camp. procla.	Value goals Farm policy Ed. and cult.+)	Farm policy Employment policy Party politics+)
1966	Social policy Economy Youth policy	Economy Social policy Housing policy+)	Farm policy Housing policy Social policy+)	Foreign policy Defence policy Value goals+)
1975	Economy Party politics Social policy	Social policy Economy Housing policy+)	Social policy Economy Farm policy	Social policy Economy Camp. procla.
1987	Economy	Social policy	Social policy	Environmental policy Social policy Employment policy
	Value goals Employment policy+)	Employment policy Farm policy	Farm policy Environmental policy	
1991	Economy Social policy	Social policy Farm policy	Party politics Foreign policy	Housing policy Economy/farm policy Environmental policy+)
	Employment policy	Employment policy+)	Economy+)	

camp. procla. = campaign proclamations, ed. and cult. = questions of education and culture, +) = plus several political issues with the same frequency.

Appendix 8. The Three Propaganda Techniques Most Often Used in Political Party Campaign Ads in Party Organ Newspapers and in an Independent Newspaper

Party/year Newspaper	Communists		Social Democrats		Centre Party		Conservatives	
	Party	Indep.	Party	Indep.	Party	Indep.	Party	Indep.
1954	TE	-	NC	-	GG	-	GG	TE
	NC	-	GG/CS	-	CS	-	TE	GG/CS
	CS	-	PF	-	BW	-	CS	PF/BW
1966	BW	GG	GG	GG	GG	GG	GG	GG
	-	CS	CS	CS	PF	CS	CS	CS
	-	PF	NC	NC	BW	TE/PF	NC	NC
1975	GG	CS	GG	CS	GG	GG	GG	GG
	CS	GG	CS	GG	CS/BW	CS	PF/BW	PF
	NC/PF	PF/BW	TE/NC	NC	PF	TE	TE/NC	CS/NC
1987	-	-	GG	GG	-	GG	GG	GG
	-	-	-	PF	-	CS	CS	BW
	-	-	-	BW/NC	-	TE	BW	CS
1991	-	GG/CS/TE	GG	GG	GG	GG	GG	GG
	-	BW	TE	TE/PF	TE	TE	CS	TE
	-	-	CS	-	CS	CS	PF	CS

Party = party organ newspaper, Indep. = an independent newspaper.

Appendix 9. Volume of Political Party Ads in Party Organ Newspaper and in the Independent Paper *Helsingin sanomat* (in Column-Centimetres)

	Year/Newspaper									
	1954		1966		1975		1987		1991	
Party	Party	Indep.	Party	Indep.	Party	Indep.	Party	Indep.	Party	Indep.
Comp.	143.5	-	82	118	870.5	476	-	-	-	416
Sdp	542.5	-	1,079	999.5	536	177	37.5	256	269.5	200
Cp.	285.5	-	572	630.5	267.5	188	-	2,300	232	1,211.5
Cons.	1,077	861	744	795	573	665	1,315.5	1,452	998	1,600

Comp. = Communist Party, Sdp = Social Democrats, Cp. = Centre Party, Cons. = Conservative. Party = party organ newspaper, Indep. = an independent newspaper.

Appendix 10. Reliability Test

For the party platform, an intra-individual classification test has been carried out (according to Pietilä 1973): 20 percent of the material (N = 4) has been randomly chosen and classified by the same person on two separate occasions. With the campaign posters, an inter-individual qualification test has been performed (in accordance with Pietilä 1973): 20 percent of the material (N = 9) has been classified by another person. The choice of tests has been made on a solely practical basis: the party platforms were accessible from the administrative offices of the political parties, and the campaign posters were photographed, thus making it possible to conduct an inter-individual test.

However, it must be said that the political party advertisements and the campaign ads of the individual party candidates have not been subjected to reliability testing. Clearly, this is a flaw; however, the reliability test has been left out in view of the fact that these ads are to be found in 326 different daily newspapers. They are contained in an archive. In view of the tremendous amount of time and effort required to double code the two groups of ads, reliability testing of has been omitted. The campaign advertisements are only a part of the composite research study. The results for group orientation yield a 99 percent reliability and an 88.9 percent reliability for the party platforms and political party campaign posters, respectively, which is very satisfactory.

In the case of propaganda techniques in the party platform, the degree of reliability varies between 75 percent and 96.3 percent. Here the technique, testimonial, has been problematic – it is the only technique with less than 80 percent reliability. In one of the studies, testimonial was interpreted too broadly: the technique has been counted also when one party describes what “we” have done. Testimonial really describes a reference to what “someone” has done, e.g. “. . . If the Conservatives, with the Tanner-Leskinen group fraternizing with them, can strengthen their position in the election standings. . . .” (excerpted from the Communist Party platform, 1954).

The results for propaganda techniques in campaign posters turned out extremely well in the case of testimonial, bandwagon and glittering generality – 100 percent. As the sample was small, (N = 9), the techniques name-calling and card-stacking were absent. The technique, plain folks, was counted once in the first coding; however, in the second coding, this technique was totally absent. Here there would have been reason to expand the sample in order to obtain a more dependable reliability test. Reliability testing of the issues of the party platform yielded a satisfactory result of 93.2 percent.