We are not in business at all; we are in politics. (Former President of the EC Commission
Walter Hallstein, quoted in Swann 1990, vii)

The aim of this study is to examine in what ways "Europe" is integrated into the French political field. More precisely, this article examines the relationships between the European Union's political institutions and one aspect of French political life, politicians' careers. To my knowledge, no systematic study exists on the topic, and, as a result, a crucial political and economic dynamic between a supranational polity and the national political fields that partly compose it has been left unexplored (except for European public opinion (cf. Feld & Wildgen 1976)). What is lacking is updated empirical and critical social scientific research on the formation of supranational political groups in relation to national politics (already outdated studies of the European institutions are Condorelli-Braun 1972; Coombes 1970; Willis 1983). A discussion of European institutions is even missing from one of the standard French textbooks on French politics targeted at law students (Lavroff 1979). In order to explore the relationships between European institutions and national politics more closely, this article examines

Resumé

This article examines one aspect of the relationship between European Union institutions and the French political field: politicians' careers. What is the value of positions in the Commission and the European Parliament for French politicians in terms of career mobility? This study shows that the value of the Commission as a source of domestic political capital has risen since the 19505, whereas the value of the European Parliament has remained relatively low. The position of Commissioner is now comparable to a ministerial-level position. Membership in the European Parliament has remained secondary to a national political career. Yet, as a result of the European Parliament's peripheral position in the French political field, new social groups, linking the regions to the European institutions or forming cross-partisan interest groups, have been created. Evidence shows that if the European Union institutions present an alternative type of political capital to national political capital, political careers and ambitions are still formed in national terms. National mechanisms for the formation of groups having a vested interest in the relative autonomy of supranational political institutions have not developed sufficiently. This inadequacy might be the single most important reason for the democratic deficit in the European Union.

two such institutions, the Commission and the Parliament. The goal is to analyse the composition of these institutions in relation to the French political class, and the position of these institutions in the career patterns of the members of this political class.

The argument of this study is that since the 1960s there has been an increase in the value of the Commission and to a lesser degree of the Parliament as sources of domestic political power. Furthermore, the strengthening of ties between French and European political institutions has led to the development of a subgroup of the French political class, tied to an extra-territorial source of political power, the European Union. Simultaneously, however, political career patterns and French national political culture itself prevent a deeper development of political supranationalism. It seems that the main reason for the democratic deficit of the European institutions might not lie so much in the supranational institutions themselves (cf., for instance, Featherstone (1994, 149-170)), but rather in the lack of national mechanisms which would promote the formation of a supranational political class having a vested interest in the relative autonomy of European institutions.¹ In the case at hand, Fifth Republic France, contempt of parliamentary democracy has relegated elected institutions, like the European Parliament, into positions inferior to the national executive (the presidency and the government).

After having introduced the main idea of this study, I show the way in which the French case is critical if one seeks to examine the relationships between the European Union and national politics. I then present the concepts utilized in this study and examine the political profiles of French MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) and Commissioners. To conclude, I return to my basic argument.

What are the dynamics between European institutions, those "creatures and victims of the esprit frangais" (Donat 1979, 98), and French domestic institutions? How do these dynamics promote European political integration? The fragile dynamic between nationalism and supranationalism is both the source of and a major impediment to further European political and economic integration. For France, whose political leaders have constantly wavered between de Gaulle's minimalism (a Europe of nationstates) and Mitterrand's maximalism (a Commission with more power in certain areas), "Europe" has always been an important issue of domestic politics and a means of achieving national political objectives (Kramer 1994; Maclean 1992, 30; Sidjanski 1992, 107). It is through Europe that the Presidents of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing, and Mitterrand, envisioned a global political and economic role for France. From the Euro-romanticism of the Federalists Schuman and Monnet, to the Euro-scepticism of de Gaulle and Couve de Murville, to the Eurorealism of Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand, "Europe" was to enable

France to regain lost grandeur² (for a historical view of this self-image, cf. Dietler 1994, 596). This was to be achieved by maintaining a dominant position in the duo France-Germany (Duverger 1994, 2), and by modelling European institutions on French culture and administrative structures (Dondelinger 1985, 89; Martial 1992, 120), a goal which had united de Gaulle and Monnet (Riemenschneider 1992,145). This reality was not left unnoticed by foreign political decision-makers. "In the EC France directs everything" (Helmut Kohl, quoted in Attali 1993, 814).

Numerous studies show that European integration is most effective when it is concordant with vital national interests (cf., for instance, Morse 1973; George 1991). But some national interests are more vital than others. Because Paris has been in Brussels since the beginning one of the most important actors in European construction, there has been and still is a close affinity between French and Communitarian policies. The rules of European integration have to a large extent been set by French politicians and civil servants (cf. Monnet 1976). Accordingly, policies which satisfy both the goals of the European Commission, that is the protection of the acquis communautaire (tied to the Treatises and their implementation (Coombes 1970, 1; Swann 1990, 178)), and those of powerful political actors responsible for policies relative to the European Community (such as the French President and the German Chancellor), are more likely to succeed than those which only further the interests of a single country ("nationalism") or those of the European Community ("Communitarianism"). The history of European integration has been a succession of balancing acts between these often contradictory sets of requirements, which have been subjected to larger political and economic changes such as the breakdown of the Soviet Union (Murgazina 1992, 5-9). For memberstates, the key question is how to transform national interests into Communitarian interests. Sometimes single countries are alone. France's empty chair policy in 1965 in response to Hallstein's (then President of the European Economic Community) nécéssité objective is a good example of the breakdown in the delicate balance between national and supranational goals (cf. Morse 1973, 72; Tiersky 1994).

As the Community has acquired more power, its position in the national political fields of the member-states has strengthened. For instance, in the French presidential elections in the spring of 1995, a struggle for the value of Europeanism took place. The Socialist Party and centrist parties such as the CDS {Centre des Démocrates Sociaux) promoted and developed two issues, which they presented as being neglected by the right-wing parties and their representatives, Prime Minister Edouard Baladur and Jacques Chirac: unemployment and Europe (Mitterrand 1994; Rocard 1994; Stasi 1994). In effect, Europe has become in 1995 one of the two most important issues in French domestic politics, some would say even the most important issue.

A clear example of the shifting political meaning of European institutions was the attempt by the Socialist Party to present Jacques Delors as a candidate to the French presidency in the spring of 1995. Before going to Brussels, Delors had been Finance Minister. After having spent ten years as President of the European Commission, a return to Paris might have led Delors to the presidency had he not refused to become the Socialist Party's candidate. Delors's example demonstrates that the European Commission can function as a source of domestic political power, or as a site of accumulation of political capital reusable in the French context in the form of qualifiers such as "international statesman", or better "European statesman" that situate politicians above party politics (O. Duhamel 1994). However, this conversion might only function in a presidential political system such as the French one, where a space outside of party politics exists. I will demonstrate how effectively democratically elected officials such as MEPs succeed in converting European experience into domestic political capital.

Political Field and Political Capital

From a social scientific point of view, the European Union, its institutions and practices, constitutes an incrementally expanding alternative market for political capital in the various European national political fields. European unification, with its institutions, procedures, and the various social resources these carry, presents both new resources and new forums for the accumulation of a new type of political capital. From this, it follows that the composition of French political capital is itself changing simultaneously with the formation of new groups of political agents structurally tied to the process of European unification and to the control and administration of an alternative market for political capital, comprising the Union and its institutions.

By "political capital" is meant the main social resource that constitutes the object and means of struggle in the political field: political knowledge, recognition, competence, and prestige (Bourdieu 1989; Gaxie & Offerlé 1985, 105-138). From the standpoint of this concept, "legitimacy" and "power" are close terms. Political capital includes official and unofficial status in political parties or other legitimate political institutions (such as labour unions and other pressure groups, in national and local political institutions such as parliament, regional councils, Senate, and so on) as well as in unofficial circles (for instance, the rocardiens grouped around the socialist politician Michel Rocard) and pressure groups (for instance, trade unions like the Confederation Générale du travail, CGT). To varying degrees, all these institutions are sources of political capital. In the French

political system, the most important sources of political capital are the
presidency, the government, and the two houses of the Parliament (Lavroff
1979).

Political capital also includes various kinds of subcapital: for instance, social capital (networks), economic capital (money and other financial resources), and educational capital (diplomas). In relation to French European politics, social capital is crucial in view of access to the most important decision-making centre, the entourage of the President of the Republic, and other sources, such as the cabinets of the prime minister and other ministers. Membership in prestigious clubs (for instance, Club de I'Hor loge or Club du polo de Paris) and family relations (on the influence of these on the beginnings of Jean Monnet's career, ef. Duchéne (1994, 32-35)) are examples of social capital. Economic capital can be directly transformed into political capital, especially in the less-regulated parts of the political field. The French Euro-elections of 1994, with millionaires like James Goldsmith (candidate on the anti-Maastricht list L'autre Europe led by Philippe de Villiers) using their private funds to finance their campaigns, are a fresh example of this possibility. This kind of capital is very flexible and in certain conditions (to be determined) directly convertible into political capital. In France, educational capital is especially important for access to the political elite, with institutions such as the National School of Administration (École Nationale d'Administration, ENA) and the Polytechnical School (École Poly technique) having a quasi-monopoly in the formal training of top politicians and executives (ef. Birnbaum et al. 1978; Birnbaum 1985).

What kind of political capital do individuals accumulate in European institutions? This new political capital revolves around Europe and its institutions: knowledge of Community affairs and of issues in other European countries; access to information channels relative to European decision-making, for instance to powerful, European business organizations (e.g., the European Employers' Organization, UNICE), labour unions (e.g., the European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC), and other sectorial organizations (cf. Sidjanski 1992, 341ff.; Streeck & Schmitter 1991); personal relationships with deputies and Commissioners from other member-states, and with Eurocrats and other top officials. But the value of this variety of political capital in the French political field is for the moment quite modest.

By "political field" is meant the totality of the institutions, social groups, and procedures that constitute the space in which struggles for political capital take place. It goes without saying that the political field, its structure, and the resources that can legitimately be used in the struggle for political power, at various levels, are themselves objects of struggle. Areas of struggle coexist with areas of agreement. For instance, "Europe" and the

values it represents, as well as its legitimate uses in political debates, are constantly debated over. Because of these struggles for definitions and boundaries, constant shifts of the limits, both official and unofficial, of the political field and of the legitimate procedures to acquire power occur and sometimes change rapidly. For instance, granting more budgetary powers to the European Parliament at the expense of the European Council of Ministers would suddenly change the relationships of this institution to other Community institutions and to French national political institutions.

In contrast to some researchers (Suleiman 1978, 9-10), I examine both social characteristics and positions in institutions. I believe power is best studied by combining these two variables with the levels of structuration of the areas studied. This level of structuration will determine whether social characteristics, previous political experience, and other "personal" qualifications will be more important than the attributes of the formal position in an institution (for instance, in the European Commission) in explaining political strategies and behaviour. For instance, because of the growing political power of the Commission, and some other Community institutions such as the Court of Justice, formal positions have become, as a result of almost four decades of political and economic integration, increasingly structural parts of the national political systems of each individual member-state. More controlled, more structured, they have requirements of their own, imposed on newcomers and political novices. This being said, the influence of the occupiers of the posts has also to be taken into account when analysing levels of structuration.

Next, I examine the political profiles of French MEPs and Commissioners.

French Members of the European Parliament

Some observers have argued that of the European Union institutions the power of the Parliament is likely to grow very fast during the years to come (Abélés 1992, 363; Jacobs et al. 1990). Concrete changes can be expected after the Intergovernmental Conference to be held in 1996. Since 1979 French representatives to the European Parliament have been chosen by direct proportional vote with a 5 percent threshold. Double mandates are not forbidden, but for practical reasons they remain rare (6.9 percent in 1994). However, maintaining other positions is more frequent. For instance, in 1994 20.6 percent of the MEPs were also mayors of provincial cities (data compiled from Who's Who in France 1993-1994). For French political parties who control the nomination process, the stakes have been lower than in national elections, and voter turnout has traditionally been modest, the abstention level being, however, relatively stable.

This abstention level is tied to the public image of European elections in France. As there is no majority in the European Parliament and no government to form and control, the European Parliament does not fit the image citizens have of politics. Nevertheless, European elections are an extension of French national politics, at least for politicians and the media. The media hype of the 1994 Euro-elections, with intellectuals (e.g., Bernard-Henri Levy) and populist rightist politicians (e.g., Philippe de Villiers) taking the front stage, prevented the abstention level from rising too much. As a result of low interest from citizens and politicians alike, France has, until now, sent only low-quality delegations to Strasbourg (Abélés 1992, 46). This has not been the case for Germany for instance, which has sent high-quality delegations to the European Parliament, more eager to become professionals of Europe than French delegations. A further study should compare the political profiles of the various French contingents in the European Parliament.³

The evolution of the seats of French political parties, or rather lists, in
the European Parliament since 1979 are presented in Table 2.

The 1994 elections were a victory for two political movements, which
succeeded in splitting the centre of the political spectrum: Philippe de
Villiers's (UDF) anti-Maastricht list L'autre Europe and the pro-Maastricht

Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche's (MRG) list Énergie radicate, led by millionaire Bernard Tapie. There has been a relative weakening of the other leftist parties, the Socialist Party and the PCF (Parti Communiste Frangais), and a steadiness of the extreme-right party FN (Front National). Symptomatically, in 1994 only 54 percent of lists were favourable to Maastricht (Le Monde 1994, 2).

The 1994 contingent of French MEPs fits grosso modo the profile of previous contingents (cf. Jouve 1984; Who's Who in France 1993-94). Political activists (in trade unions, agricultural unions, ecological groups, and so on), regional politicians (mayors of provincial cities, regional and municipal councillors, members of regional political organizations . . .) and top-level politicians (ex-ministers, for instance) meet in the European Parliament. Strongly represented in Strasbourg, French top politicians such as Jacques Chirac, Laurent Fabius, and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, have, however, not been very active in the European Parliament (cf. Jacobs et al. 1990, 45). Undoubtedly, this indicates a weak level of involvement and investment in European affairs, though French politicians have nonetheless made sure that sectors vital to French interests, such as agriculture and development aid, have been controlled by French representatives. In Parliament, the most important positions in this respect are the Presidencies of the Commissions of Agriculture and Development Aid (Kovar & Wendling 1975, 433ff.).

In order to present a general picture of the MEPs in relation to national politics, French MEPs can be divided into three groups: those that combine in their careers both regional and national politics; those who are national politicians; and those who are regional politicians. A comparison between the 1989 and 1994 contingents suggests that the percentage of those combining all three has been steady (41 percent in 1989, 40 percent in 1994) (Who's Who in France 1993-94; Le Monde 1994). Top politicians are in the first group. The relationship of regional and national politics to European politics has changed dramatically in the last five-six years: in 1989, 19 percent of French MEPs were regional politicians, against 29 percent in 1994, whereas in 1989, 40 percent were national politicians compared with 28 percent in 1994. Thus, in 1994 a relative strengthening of French regional representation in the European Parliament against a weakening of central political institutions can be observed.

The following table demonstrates in another form this same, fundamental
change in the first half of the 1990s between the regions, the national
political centre, and the European Parliament.4

As these figures indicate, there has been a slight increase in 1994 of MEPs having represented or representing regional interests, as municipal or regional councillors, advisers to mayors or regional assemblies, or as mayors of provincial cities. In 1994, over 60 percent of the MEPs were or

had been regional politicians. On the other hand, the percentage of politicians tied to national political institutions, that is institutions forming the central French political market (for this term, cf. Gaxie & Offerlé (1985, 113)), has slightly decreased. The increase in regional politicians might indicate that the grip of central political institutions on the European Parliament has weakened, thus leaving space for the formation of a new subgroup of Euro-regional politicians, removed from national politics.⁵

Apart from the strong presence of regional politicians, there are other signs of the relative distance between the central French political market and the European Parliament. Compared to other national political groups such as deputies, senators, cabinet members, and ministers, two characteristics of the French MEPs stand out: on the one hand, a relative absence of businessmen, and on the other hand a relative lack of members of the Corps (grands corps de I'etat, literally, "large corporations of the state") and of elite schools (grandes écoles, literally, "big schools").

The absence of businessmen confirms the distance between European institutions and the French business world. In the 19505, the Centre National du Patronat Frangais (CNPF, the National Confederation of French Employers) campaigned against the EEC, but was overruled by state-elites (cf. George 1991, 156). In 1989-94 and 1994-99, only 6.3 percent and 6.9 percent respectively of the contingents of MEPs declared being businessmen or industrialists by profession (Jacobs et al. 1990; Who's Who in France 1993-94; he Monde 1994).

In France, most high positions in the civil service, the state firms, and the political world are monopolized by various senior administrative branches of the civil service (grands corps de Vétat such as the State Council, the Audit Office, the Treasury Inspectorate).⁶ These branches are formed almost exclusively of individuals who have gone through elite institutions such as the Institute of Political Studies (IEP), the National School of Administration (ENA), the Polytechnical School (EP), the Normal

Superior Schools (ENS), the School of High Commercial Studies (HEC), to mention the most important ones. The IEP is a preparatory school to the other above institutions. These schools, which provide training for the elites, have appropriately been labelled as "schools of power" (Bourdieu 1989, 373). According to Ezra Suleiman, "the members of the elite become politicians, bankers, industrialists, international civil servants" (quoted in Stevens 1981, 166). Even more, high positions in the civil service, for instance in the government's Economic Advisory Committee (Commissariat General du Plan), an inter-ministerial agency in charge of French economic planning, in the prefectures, and in diplomatic positions are "reserved" in a quasi-official manner to the large Corps. Likewise, top political positions are manned by énarques (students of the ENA) or "X" (students of the Polytechnical School). In practice, top political positions (including state firms) and positions in the civil service are nominated by ministers, restricted in their choices by the powers of the Corps, which have monopolized specific posts (Suleiman 1978, 108). However, what is striking about the educational background of French MEPs is the relative absence of students of these elite schools and even to a greater extent of members of the state's administrative branches. The overall percentage of former elite school students (excluding the IEP) since 1979 is 12.6 percent (26/206). The average of Corps members for all French MEPs since 1979 is 3.9 percent (8/206) (Who's Who in France 1993-94).

A comparison with the French dominant classes is revealing. Of these, 22.2 percent were "X," while 18.5 percent were students of the lEP (Bourdieu 1989, 461). Of French MEPs, 4.9 percent were "X" and 18.5 percent were students of the lEP. The contrast between MEPs and top businessmen is even more striking: 94.7 percent of the CEOs of the 100 biggest French firms were "X" and all of them had gone through the lEP! These characteristics underline the peripheral position of the European Parliament in the French "neo-Colbertist" (Duverger 1994, 2) field of power, the top positions of which are colonized by elite schools and Corps (Birnbaum 1985). Therefore, the absence of senior administrative branches signifies that the European Parliament, a democratically elected institution outside the control of the Corps, is a modest source of institutional power in a political system emphasizing the role of the executive.

The European Parliament's political marginality manifests itself in yet another, more general form - that of structural instability. The overall turnover of the French MEPs is very high, making the development of a stable political image and enduring political practices difficult. In 1989, 57.1 percent of French MEPs were first timers (Who's Who in France 1993-94). In 1994, the figure rose to 65.5 percent (he Monde 1994, 2). In 1989, the average length of service of French MEPs was very low, 2.5 years, compared with 5.5 years for British MEPs (Jacobs et al. 1990, 44). In part,

the European Parliament's structural instability in the French political field is tied to its reputation as being "the" wild area of French politics. In Euro-elections, new lists are created all the time, today around Sarajevo, tomorrow focusing on nuclear waste (A. Duhamel 1994, 2). As the mechanisms of social control are loose, at least in contrast to national parliamentary elections, new political groups are formed and disappear every five years. In 1994, new lists included those of de Villiers and Tapie, both winning seats at the expense of established political parties, and of Swartzenberg (the so-called Sarajevo list), which succeeded in attracting media attention but without gaining seats.

In addition to the high turnover and the obstacles it presents for the institutionalization of political practices and indeed of a European political identity among politicians, it is of interest to note that turnover rates varied dramatically from one political group to another. Not surprisingly, only 7.6 percent of the politicians in the anti-Maastricht list L'autre Europe were second timers. In contrast, 71.4 percent of the Communist list and 63.6 percent of the extreme-right anti-Maastricht list led by Le Pen had previously been members of the European Parliament {Le Monde 1994). These figures might indicate that if the European Parliament is a channel for alternative, young, and radical political movements, such as Villiers's list and the intellectuals' Sarajevo list, which are on the margins of the central political market, it is also part of the political circuits of small political parties like the French Communist Party and the extreme-right {Front National), both anti-European movements, and of the right-wing list UDFRPR {Union de la Democratic Frangaise-Rassemblement pour la République) (42.8 percent of which had been previously MEPs), which is partly Europeanist in outlook. From the point of view of political power in specific political parties, the meaning of the European Parliament in career mobility thus varies widely.

Evidence seems to show that politicians most effectively combine European experience and national political status in small parties. In the Parti Communiste Frangais (PCF) and the Front National (FN), practically all MEPs (6 out of 7 in the Communist group, all 11 for the FN) were also members of the parties' central committees! Membership in the European Parliament, an Ersatz of power for these political movements, guarantees after all a very generous fixed income, if nothing else (for the economics of European representation, cf. Wickham & Coignaud (1986, 192-193)). Not surprisingly, the fervent "Europeanism" of these politicians seems to be motivated more by economic calculations and concerns about political survival than by support of European political idealism. But despite differences in motivations, the unintended consequences of the actions of European Federalists and of "nationalist" politicians alike converge in the European Parliament in a legitimation of European democratic representation.

In conclusion, the European Parliament seems to be a mixed bag of top, medium-level, and novice politicians, presenting no unified profile, combining new and old political styles, following drifting domestic and European currents. However, the structural looseness and general instability of the European Parliament is the condition for the emergence of new political structures and ad hoc intergroups tied to regionalism and sectorialism.⁷ In the 1989-94 contingent, almost three-quarters (67.8 percent) of MEPs were in stable trajectories, unable to capitalize on their experiences in European institutions, that is, to convert their European political experiences into domestic political power. The vast majority of the MEPs, situated at medium level positions in the French political field, returned to positions of approximately the same level in political hierarchies (for instance, deputy-deputy or a leading position in a national political organization, regional adviser-regional adviser or member of a local assembly). Almost one-fifth (18.6 percent) were in descending trajectories, and approximately only one-eighth (13.5 percent) were in ascending positions, that is, reaching higher positions upon exiting the European Parliament than those they occupied while entering (Who's Who in France 1993-94). Some MEPs left the political field altogether.

The Commission presents an altogether different picture.

French Commissioners

Whatever the value of these men, they cannot be really politically responsible. (French
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville on Commissioners (1971, 294))

The European Commission is closer to French national centres of political power than the European Parliament. Because of political and administrative proximity (Willis 1983, 9-15) and flexibility (a French civil servant being able to return after his/her detachement to Brussels to his/her initial ministry (Suleiman 1978, 259-260)), the structural conditions for ascending political careers exist.⁸

To guarantee the political control of national political interests numerous posts in the Commission are distributed according to nationality, although, officially, all but the Commissioners' positions are filled by merit. Thus, individual commissioners, though nominated by their governments, are representatives of both their government and the Community, although the Treaty of Rome, elaborated in the language of Euro-romanticism, emphasizes only the second aspect. According to article 157 of the European Economic Community (EEC), Commissioners were supposed to be chosen for their "general competence". They were to give an oath of independence from national governments. They were to serve as motors

of the Community, guardians of the Treaty, and "honest brokers" (Hallstein 1972, 58). Practice has shown, however, that what is needed to further Community interests is a balance between national and supranational (Communitarian) interests (Coombes 1970, 86).⁹ Thus, the Commissioner's task is one of "acrobatic exercise without a net" (Donat 1979, 138). S/he plays simultaneously on two boards: that of the Community, and that of domestic politics. Basically, the Commission is founded on inter-governmental cooperation with the assistance of a "supranational" bureaucracy. Its activities are grounded more in constitutional law than in democratic politics.

The political dependency on national politics guarantees political control by national interests, something the French Commissioner Claude Cheysson felt in his guts in 1973, when the then French Minister of Agriculture Jacques Chirac attacked him in he Monde and denounced him as "knowingly ignoring the interest of the country" (quoted in Donat 1985, 139). The Economist could write in 1992 about Jacques Delors's relationship with Mitterrand {The Economist 1992, 46):

If the French socialists take a drubbing in local elections in March, Mr Mitterrand might
call Mr Delors home to be prime minister. The offer would not thrill him.

It is from national politics that individual Commissioners like Delors, nominated by a common agreement of the governments, draw their political legitimacy and weight. National and European interests are closely intertwined. From this follows that, paradoxically, it is by being vehemently chauvinistic that a Commissioner can sometimes best further Communitarian interests (Coombes 1970, 86), provided the interests in question have become Communitarian interests. Everything depends on the Commissioner's ability to master the Communitarian crisis system, or decisionmaking system (Lindberg 1965, 79). The use of deadlines, ultimatums, and threats defines mastery, and the French are well prepared for this. These were exactly the techniques used by Delors as Finance Minister: he systematically threatened to resign when things were not done the way he wanted them to be done. Needless to say, he never resigned, either as Finance Minister or as President of the Commission for which his manners were that of a real President de la République (De Clerq 1990, 29).¹⁰

In France's case, the nomination of Commissioners is usually the result of bargaining between the government and the President, for whom foreign policy is a "reserved domain" (Lavroff 1979, 433-435). For instance, in 1994 two Commissioners were nominated: Yves-Thibault de Silguy, diplomat and Prime Minister Edouard Balladur's conseiller in European affairs, and Edith Cresson, ex-Prime Minister (Socialist) close to Mitterrand. Likewise, in 1984, Delors (Socialist) was Mitterrand's protegé, while Scrivener (UDF) was Giscard d'Estaing's representative. Inside the Commission,

where unofficial power struggles constantly take place, the domestic political weight will determine the individual's political Euro-muscle. Delors's close relations with Mitterrand, and Mitterrand's close relations with Chancellor Kohl, contributed heavily to making him a successful President of the Commission (cf. Attali 1993, 619; De Clerq 1990, 29), although, according to the special adviser to President Mitterrand, Jacques Attali, Delors would have preferred to continue as Finance Minister or as Prime Minister instead of going to Brussels (Attali 1993, 670).

In the Commission itself, France has traditionally kept key positions to itself. The most important is the portfolio of economic and monetary (and financial) affairs: Robert Marjolin (EEC 1958-67), Raymond Barre (1967-72), Francois-Xavier Ortoli (1973-84), Jacques Delors (1985-94), and Yves-Thibault de Silguy (1995-99). Other French portfolios have been those of agriculture Jean-Francois Deniau (1967-72) and Edgar Pisani (1981-84), development aid Claude Cheysson (1973-81), North-South relations and Mediterranean politics Claude Cheysson (1985-88), budget Christiane Scrivener (1989-94), and science and research Edith Cresson (1995-99). France has also made sure to have its men in the directorategenerales (D-Gs), especially as directors of the D-G VI (Agriculture) and D-G VIII (Development aid to the Third World), which was for twentysix years in French hands (Berlin 1987,325). Usually, the Commissioner and the Director-General come from different countries. In view of Community policies, the more permanent directorate-generales positions are in fact much more important than the Commissioner's positions. Since 1967, when the EEC, the ECSC and Euratom merged to become the European Community, France has held the presidency of the Commission for thirteen years out of twenty-seven (Ortoli from 1973 to 1977 and Delors from 1985 to 1994), and the portfolio for economic and monetary (and financial) affairs without interruption. These facts indicate that French domination of the Commission is not merely ideological (culture and language) and institutional (administrative structures and procedures), but also political.¹¹

In relation to national institutions, each Commissioner appoints at his/ her discretion a cabinet (a system modelled on the French cabinet system). Usually, these individuals have been associated with the Commissioner earlier. For instance, Pascal Lamy, a former student of the ENA nicknamed Delors's Exocet, had been Delors's chief of cabinet when Delors was Finance Minister. De Silguy, Commissioner in 1995, had been vice-chief of Ortoli's cabinet from 1981 to 1985. Cheysson's chief of cabinet, Philippe Soubestre, had been the director of D-G X (Information) and later became vice-director of D-G VIII (Development) (Berlin 1987, 327; Bottin administratif 1990-91). These cabinet members, usually top civil servants and often former students of the ENA, guarantee connections with national institutions, and also take an effective part in the Commissioner's activities in the Commission (cf. Ross 1995, 61-77).

Among French Commissioners, the percentage of students of the elite schools (grandes écoles) is closer to the average in the dominant classes than to the percentage in the European Parliament: 25 percent ENA., 15 percent Polytechnical, and 5 percent ENS. For the French delegations at the European Parliament the shares of elite school students were: 9.3 percent ENA, 3.4 percent Polytechnical and 1.9 percent ENS. The Corps presence is also more solid in the Commission than in the European Parliament: 9 percent State Council and 13.6 percent Treasury Inspectorate in the Commission vs. 1.5 percent State Council and 1.5 percent Treasury Inspectorate in the European Parliament. In terms of political experience, half of French Commissioners since 1952 had both ministerial experience (half of them had been secretaries of state, the lowest ministerial position) and had been members in ministerial cabinets. Since 1967, every second Commissioner entered the Commission from national politics (Senate, house of deputies, ministerial cabinets), but only one, Ortoli, from a minister's position (Who's Who in France 1993-94). Being an MEP before entering the Commission is a phenomenon of the 1980s. Of the nine French Commissioners since 1981, five had been or become MEPs, but none of the pre-1981 Commissioners had been MEPs.

If the position of Commissioner is today a ministerial-level position, it was not so in the 1950s and 19605. Since the 19505, a shift of emphasis from the civil service to ministerial cabinets can be observed. Until 1971, onethird of French Commissioners had ministerial experience. Most of them were top civil servants. Since 1972, all but one Commissioner (de Silguy in 1995, but he will undoubtedly correct this statistical anomaly!) had been ministers before Brussels or had become ministers after Brussels. Thus, the position of this post on the outskirts of the French political field has been rising since the 19705, to become one of the top political positions in the country in the 1990s.¹²

The Commission is an integral part of the French political reward system. It is colloquially called a fromage de la République (literally, a "cheese of the Republic"). It stinks but tastes good. Distributed as a reward to political loyalists, the inconvenience (remoteness from the political centre, Paris) is compensated for by a generous income (Wickham & Coignard 1986, 443). Originally, French Commissioners moving to Brussels did not require any special qualifications, except for previous ministerial experience and a high level of social and political capital. Out of the nine French European Community Commissioners, six had been ministers before going to Brussels. Four out of the nine had worked for the government's Economic Advisory Committee.¹³ Scrivener, who attended the Harvard Business School, is the only one among French Commissioners to have studied abroad. All others were products of the national education system.¹⁴

The positions the Commissioners received upon returning to France

(not a single one of the twenty French Commissioners in the various Communities went to work abroad) did not specifically require European competence, although probably all have profited from it. One Commissioner moved by pantouflage (that is, a switching from the public to the private) to become the director of a big French state-owned company, Total, Compagnie Francaise des Pétroles. Another became the President's representative in New Caledonia. Some, like Barre and Delors, have clearly succeeded in capitalizing on their years in Brussels. De Silguy will probably do the same. For some French civil servants like Barre, Deniau, Cheysson, Scrivener and de Silguy, the Commission is a backdoor to national politics (Brigouleix 1986).

In conclusion, the Commission, which is composed of politicians having
ministerial experience, today occupies a position of the highest level in the
French political field.

Conclusions

The European institutions present an alternative political market, which until the 1980s was still small, distant, inconvenient, and whose revenues were modest (Wickham & Coignard 1986, 127). In the 19905, this political weight has increased unevenly in relation to the central French political market. The Commission has become a ministerial position, tied to the presidency and the government, which has enabled politicians occupying it to accumulate both personal and collective ("European politician") political capital. In contrast, the European Parliament, which is in a lowly codified and socially less-regulated area compared to the central political market, does not present central positions sought by high-level political actors, like a ministerial position. In France, it seems to be an accessory to a political career. For instance, Laurent Fabius, one of the youngest auditors at the State Council and one of the youngest ministers ever, entered the European Parliament in 1989 only to exit a few years later to take the position of First Secretary of the Socialist Party. Likewise, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, former President of the Republic, known for his fervent Europeanism, joined the European Parliament in 1989, but did not seek re-election in 1994.

In terms of career patterns, this preliminary research shows that the Commissioners' position in French political hierarchies was of ministerial level (highest level), whereas that of MEP combined those of national deputy and top-level regional representative (medium high level).¹⁵ Of the 1989-94 contingent of French MEPs, 13.5 percent were in ascending trajectories (the entrance point into Parliament being lower than the exit point, a ministerial cabinet or ministerial-level position), 67.8 percent in

stable trajectories (the entrance and exit points being roughly equivalent), and 18.6 percent in descending trajectories (the entrance point being higher than the exit point). For the Commission, the figures were 20 percent for ascending trajectories (to a senior ministerial position), 45 percent for stable trajectories, and 35 percent for descending trajectories. The high percentages of stable trajectories perhaps indicate that entry to these levels takes place mostly in other, close positions (such as that of deputy, top regional representative, or member of ministerial cabinet) and that it is difficult to capitalize on the kind of political capital available in European institutions. The high percentage of descending trajectories for Commissioners can be explained by the post's elevated position in political hierarchies, often leading to retirement.

The relative positions of these posts in French political hierarchies correlate with the frequency of elite schools and Corps, a central factor in career mobility. The percentage of French Commissioners that have been members of the Corps (only Treasury Inspectorate or State Council, but not the Audit Office, which is more closely linked to domestic institutions) and that have passed through elite institutions such as the ENA and lEP is close to the average in the French dominant classes (compare with Bourdieu 1989). In contrast, the percentage of MEPs having the required educational qualifications (and the probable career patterns that follow) to gain access to and retain top political positions in the central French political market was below the average in French dominant classes. This relative independence from the political centre has its advantages, enabling the formation of cross-national and regional political groups at the mediumlevel of national political hierarchies.¹⁶

The interaction between French Commissioners and the European Parliament has been increasing since the end of the 1970s (cf. also De Clerq 1990, 153-154). Since then, five Commissioners were MEPs before going to Brussels and one became an MEP after having been a Commissioner. Clearly, this indicates that some top politicians, usually those having rare political trajectories, see European institutions as offering possibilities for a political career. Until now, most top politicians have become members of the European Parliament in order to add this source of political capital to their political profiles without committing themselves to Europeanism. Some have done the reverse, however. Delors, Pisani and Scrivener have held important positions in the Parliament before going to the Commission: Delors and Pisani were presidents of its economic and monetary committee, and Scrivener, vice-president of the Kangaroo Club. The relationships between top positions in both systems can be summarized in figure 1.

Top positions in both the Commission and the Parliament have been
occupied by top national politicians, while the more modest positions in
the Parliament have been left to middle-level and novice politicians.

Evidence seems to indicate that the simple reason why French politicians are unlikely to support rectifying the European democratic deficit by creating a supranational and federal state has more to do with the structure of the domestic political markets and the political trajectories of individuals in them, than with the structure of European institutions themselves, as most observers have claimed (cf. for the freshest exposition of this, for instance Featherstone (1994, 149-170)). European structures can develop only to the extent that domestic structures "give in." Simply put, by becoming a Federalist and working in Strasbourg, no politician would ever get (re)elected. The danger of too eager a Europeanism is evident: alienation from domestic politics and possible failure to renew a national mandate. Not enough Europeanism prevents for its part, access to important positions in the European political structure.¹⁷

This study indicates that the political profiles of French MEPs and Commissioners do not differ in many respects from those of the rest of the French political class: for instance, 5 percent of Commissioners and 1.7 percent of MEPs had studied abroad. Apart from working in European institutions, only one Commissioner had worked abroad. Few spoke foreign languages. The middle position of the European Parliament in French domestic political hierarchies prevents French politicians from developing predispositions and policies that reinforce European Federalism (e.g., knowledge of issues in other countries, language skills, and so on). For better or worse, political attitudes and political structures reinforce one another.

As the career patterns sketched above show, the conditions for the development of a French, democratically elected and European-minded supranational political elite are not particularly favourable. If there has been an increase in European institutions as sources of power, this increase has not led to the point where these institutions would radically or suddenly restructure the political careers of politicians, which are still tied to national political structures. Presently, the only institutional incentives to develop Europeanism and by this way proceed to European political harmonization are the ones tied to regionalism and sectorialism.¹⁸ These, not necessarily opposite terms, are the main elements in the specific type of collective and personal political capital accumulated by Commissioners and MEPs alike.¹⁹

The obvious weakness of this type of political capital is that it is situated at the lower end of political value hierarchies in the French political field, and removed from the central political market, which detains political legitimacy. Today, in a more abstract way, one could say that three political structures are clashing in European institutions: the national and static political structure (in France's case, cf. Badie & Birnbaum 1979), the "neofeudal" (subnational or regional), sectorial political structures, and the supranational political structure (cf. Streeck & Schmitter 1991, 151). The present European polity can be best described as a hybrid of these structures.

This study has offered some initial ideas for a study of the relationships between French national and European politics. Further research is needed in order to examine in detail the concrete possibilities and modalities for European political integration/harmonization. Some have argued that the institutional solutions for political harmonization are, on the one hand, gradually to strengthen the position of the European Parliament (Duverger 1994, 2) and the interaction between national and European parliaments, and, on the other hand, to create a uniform European electoral system (Jacobs et al. 1990, 11). The popular will for European supranationalism is assumed, and the concrete structural constraints imposed by national political fields, sketched above in the French case, neglected. Needless to say, the process of European multicultural and multilingual nation-building involves incremental, multi-levelled, and uneven changes in whole national political systems and political cultures, changes which will certainly take decades, perhaps even centuries to materialize.²⁰

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NOTES

1. On a basic level, these mechanisms include European schools and universities as well as various policies that would symbolically and materially promote European-wide political approaches and competencies. From the point of view of European-minded politicians, like Pauline Green, leader of the Socialists in the European Parliament, the constant danger is that the power of the European Parliament will be reduced as a result of French domestic politics, and specifically by "nationalist" politicians like Edouard Balladur and Jacques Chirac, the current President of the Republic (cf. Green 1994, 1).

2. The precedence of political interests over economic interests in France's European policy has been clear from the beginning (Fratrianni 1994, 233). "It is widely acknowledged that monetary union has been promoted by advocates like Jacques Delors primarily on political grounds, as a mechanism for stimulating further political integration" (Whiteley 1994, 302). The complementarity of European and French goals was reiterated by the French President of the Republic Francois Mitterrand in his last New Year's speech: "Never separate France's grandeur from Europe's construction . . . while serving one, we serve the other" (Mitterrand 1994). This objective emphasizes France's thirst for a global political, economic, cultural, and military role, lost with Napoleon's defeat, two World Wars and decolonization. This obsession, prevalent in all aspects of French education is a vicious circle, which might become a handicap in a multicultural and multiethnic Europe.

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2. The precedence of political interests over economic interests in France's European policy has been clear from the beginning (Fratrianni 1994, 233). "It is widely acknowledged that monetary union has been promoted by advocates like Jacques Delors primarily on political grounds, as a mechanism for stimulating further political integration" (Whiteley 1994, 302). The complementarity of European and French goals was reiterated by the French President of the Republic Francois Mitterrand in his last New Year's speech: "Never separate France's grandeur from Europe's construction . . . while serving one, we serve the other" (Mitterrand 1994). This objective emphasizes France's thirst for a global political, economic, cultural, and military role, lost with Napoleon's defeat, two World Wars and decolonization. This obsession, prevalent in all aspects of French education is a vicious circle, which might become a handicap in a multicultural and multiethnic Europe.

3. Domestic voting systems have multiple effects on European politics. For instance, as French MEPs do not have, in contrast to British MEPs, a geographical constituency to nurse, sectorial (or functional) and regional questions can develop more freely in their political agendas.

4. By national politics is meant politics relative to national organizations, such as both houses, government, ministerial cabinets, national organizations of political parties, and so on. By regional politics, I mean institutions such as regional, municipal or communal councils, pressure groups, local and city assemblies, and so on. The distance of individual politicians to national political centres can be assessed by the degree of state recognition (for instance, whether individuals have been awarded the Legion d'honneur) and informal proximity (for instance, membership in prestigious clubs like Échanges et projets, created by Jacques Delors).

5. This hypothesis and its significance for the eventual formation of regional, crossnational Euro^—elites tied to the "four motors" (that is, Baden-Wiirttemberg, Rhone Cataluna and Lombardy, cf. Harvie (1994, 4)) and, more generally to a "neofeudal" or Federal European political structure (cf. Sidjanski 1992), needs to be explored more in detail. Distance from the national political centre has also enabled women politicians to accede to powerful positions in the European Parliament and to break the implicit division of political labour, according to which women take care of less important portfolios (social affairs, culture, and so on). This aspect has been more fully explored in my unpublished manuscript (Kauppi, forthcoming).

6. Since the Ancien Regime, one of the main characteristics of French administration has been its colonization by corporations (for details, consult the classic work by Kessler (1986)). This peculiarity has a direct effect on European institutions, and specifically on how groups in the European institutions interact. Some French Eurocrats might be bonded by an esprit de corps, originating from membership in the same corporation, which might prevent the development of the political and institutional loyalties required by the Eurocracy (for similar problems in French administration, see Suleiman (1978, 185), in the Eurocracy, see Willis (1983, 4)).

7. This looseness is partly due to the lack of uniform voting discipline. According to rule 2-2 of the European Parliament, MEPs "shall vote on an individual and personal basis" (quoted in Jacobs et al. 1990, 47).

8. In 1953, a French law professor declared triumphantly that the European Coal and Steel Community-legislation, which was transposed later to the European Economic Community and to the Euratom, was a "conquest of French administrative law" (Cassese 1987, 12; Chevallier 1975, 459). French administrative law and especially the State Council had been its model (cf. Cartou 1983, 220ff.; Kovar & Wendling 1975, 455-471).

9. At the heart of the Commission's recruitment policies lies the basic dynamism of European integration, that between external and internal processes. Too much internal recruitment would lead to suspicion by member-states, too little to charges of partiality. Likewise, too much government pressure has to be counterbalanced by concessions to the intérét communautaire (on the technique of package dealing or engrenage that follows these political requirements, cf. Coombes (1970, 283)).

10. The various techniques of manipulation and political struggle in the Commission itself would constitute a beautiful topic for a social scientific analysis. The diaries and biographies of ex-Commissioners (for instance, De Clerq 1990; Hallstein 1972; Jenkins 1989; Marjolin 1986) and other political actors (Attali 1993; Couve de Murville 1971; Monnet 1976; Pfimlin 1991) provide ample material for such a study. For instance, Couve de Murville revealed that in one negotiation, "Again we had to get angry, Edgard Pisani first, then myself" (Couve de Murville 1971, 325), partly revealing the tactics of French negotiators (cf. also Spinelli 1966, 205ff.). According to some, French diplomacy in the EEC was based on conscious precipitation of crises (the Common Agricultural Policy is an example in point, cf. Morse (1973, 253)).

11. The political significance of the French nature of many European institutions should be explored in more detail. The ideology of French civil service emphasizes politics as a mechanism for reconciling different demands. Public opinion and party politics are seen as just "mixing things up". The transfer of this ideology, various procedures and structures from the domestic to the European level (cf. Monnet 1976, 379, 390, 400, 439) gives French politicians and civil servants a permanent, invisible political advantage over other nations (cf. Spinelli 1966, 143-176). These provide the French with a permanent tacit support of their legitimacy as leading European actors. The procedures and institutions which were devised to further French grandeur have been bent to further European grandeur. In a historical perspective, it can be argued that a political and ideological dominance (French initiatives in all areas of Europeanbuilding in the 1950s and to a lesser extent after that) has been transformed into a technical, institutional and judicial form (Condorelli-Braun 1975, 455-471), which has become in its turn the basis and condition (in the form of the Treaties and the acquis communautaire) for further integration. No wonder French candidates are often considered more "competent" than others, as many of their criteria have become the criteria by which Community actions are measured! (cf. Spinelli 1966,73) For instance, when the presidency of the Commission had to be filled in 1984, the then Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers wrote to Mitterrand and defended his candidate by pointing to his "knowledge of French language and culture, which gives him a clear advantage over other candidates" (quoted in Attali 1991, 664). New members, like Finland and Sweden, are coerced into this mould, for instance by accepting the Common Agricultural Policy and its practical status as a compulsory budget expenditure (Swann 1990, 72-73), formulated largely to satisfy French political interests (cf. Gorce 1975, 68-69). The multiple uses of this structural bias should be studied in more detail (for some ideas, cf. Willis 1983, 8).

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11. The political significance of the French nature of many European institutions should be explored in more detail. The ideology of French civil service emphasizes politics as a mechanism for reconciling different demands. Public opinion and party politics are seen as just "mixing things up". The transfer of this ideology, various procedures and structures from the domestic to the European level (cf. Monnet 1976, 379, 390, 400, 439) gives French politicians and civil servants a permanent, invisible political advantage over other nations (cf. Spinelli 1966, 143-176). These provide the French with a permanent tacit support of their legitimacy as leading European actors. The procedures and institutions which were devised to further French grandeur have been bent to further European grandeur. In a historical perspective, it can be argued that a political and ideological dominance (French initiatives in all areas of Europeanbuilding in the 1950s and to a lesser extent after that) has been transformed into a technical, institutional and judicial form (Condorelli-Braun 1975, 455-471), which has become in its turn the basis and condition (in the form of the Treaties and the acquis communautaire) for further integration. No wonder French candidates are often considered more "competent" than others, as many of their criteria have become the criteria by which Community actions are measured! (cf. Spinelli 1966,73) For instance, when the presidency of the Commission had to be filled in 1984, the then Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers wrote to Mitterrand and defended his candidate by pointing to his "knowledge of French language and culture, which gives him a clear advantage over other candidates" (quoted in Attali 1991, 664). New members, like Finland and Sweden, are coerced into this mould, for instance by accepting the Common Agricultural Policy and its practical status as a compulsory budget expenditure (Swann 1990, 72-73), formulated largely to satisfy French political interests (cf. Gorce 1975, 68-69). The multiple uses of this structural bias should be studied in more detail (for some ideas, cf. Willis 1983, 8).

12. De Silguy's appointment to the Commission is an example of a clear ascending political trajectory, from a modest position in the Foreign Service (1976-80), passing by Ortoli's cabinet in the European Commission (1981-85), Prime Minister's Jacques Chirac's cabinet (1986-88), Prime Minister Edouard Balladur's cabinet (1993-94), in order finally to end up at a ministerial-level position in the European Commission (1995-99).

13. The role of this agency for European integration is absolutely central. Monnet worked for the Plan, and in many ways European institutions are the continuation of the Plan (Monnet 1976, 379, 390), which is structurally a cross-partisan (sectorially, regionally, politically . . .) organization. But if in France the same Corps-men sat around the table representing industry, the civil service, and other interests, thus enabling close contacts and effective action, this is not the case on a multinational level. Heterogeneity of training of various representatives on the European level is the rule, not the exception.

14. An in-depth study of the Commission would require analysing French Eurocrats and comparing their careers with the careers of other Eurocrats (cf. Vignes 1975, 515-520 for already outdated data, and for the British, cf. Willis 1983).

15. These relative positions are reflected in the average ages of politicians reaching these posts. Since 1967, the average age of Commissioners entering their posts was fiftyfour years, whereas the average for the 1989-94 contingent of MEPs was 45.7 years.

16. For obvious reasons, the training of national political elites is closely tied to a national and static political structure. For instance, ENA training emphasizes the capacity to examine various problems on a general political level (cf. Stevens 1981, 137-138). The preferences of ENA-training (oral expression, use of literary language, general education . . .) have been duplicated in the entry exam to the Eurocracy (Willis 1983, 19), thus favouring French candidates at the expense of British candidates, for instance. However, the regional and sectorial character of the European polity requires expertise in one or more sectors (agriculture, telecommunications, and so on), in one or more regions, and a capacity to communicate with individuals from other cultures in languages other than one's native tongue.

17. In parliament, the top positions are the following: president and vice-presidents of parliament, committee chairs and vice-chairs, committee coordinators, and finally rapporteurs of prestigious or controversial cases (Jacobs et al. 1990, 51).

18. By sectorialism I mean competence and power tied to sectors of political, economic, and social activities (such as telecommunications, energy, agriculture . . .) crossing national borders. Experience in local government is unequally distributed among national delegations. For instance, in the European Parliament of 1989 France had, after Italy, the strongest regional representation, in contrast to the Dutch, Danish, and British delegations, which had very little local political experience (Jacobs et al. 1990, 46).

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18. By sectorialism I mean competence and power tied to sectors of political, economic, and social activities (such as telecommunications, energy, agriculture . . .) crossing national borders. Experience in local government is unequally distributed among national delegations. For instance, in the European Parliament of 1989 France had, after Italy, the strongest regional representation, in contrast to the Dutch, Danish, and British delegations, which had very little local political experience (Jacobs et al. 1990, 46).

19. From a social scientific perspective, the modalities of decision-making in the European institutions, which are basedon cross-partisan (political, occupational, national . . .) lines, and that apply technical knowledge to regional issues, challenge the largely national and political variety of political decision-making (and its divisions left/right, parliament/government . . .), dominant today. For instance, the institutional forms of this alternative variety of political capital in the European Parliament are the various intergroups: the Crocodile Club, the Kangaroo Club, the intergroup of local and regional representatives, and the Animal Welfare Group, for instance.

20. The nature of this European state-building is easily misunderstood. It could be argued that a European state exists already, but that a European nation does not exist yet. Legally. European institutions and legislation are the product of national public law, not like the United Nations, of international law. It has largely been modelled upon the French State Council (Chevallier 1975, 459). Both the European institutions and the State Council are basedon the argument of the continuity of the state as a source of law. Thus, the existence of a state, European or French, is a premise, not a result of the activities of these institutions. The state is then not so much the result of actions by European institutions or the State Council, but rather the presupposition for their own existence. Paradoxically then, a European state has existed from the beginning. It is constantly strengthened by the retroactive reinforcement of the Treaty and the acquis communautaire.

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