The Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia: An Actor–Structure Approach

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Processes of democratization and the struggle for democracy are best studied from an actor–structure perspective. In this article the struggle for democracy in contemporary Indonesia is seen as attempts by pro-democracy actors to change authoritarian structures. Actors and structures preventing and favouring democracy are discussed. During the past few years the Indonesian pro-democracy movement has grown significantly, but it is quite heterogeneous. Various pro-democracy actors tend to concentrate their struggle on different authoritarian structures. Structures of ideas as well as behavioural structures supporting authoritarianism are strong, but on balance the prospects for at least a limited form of democracy are quite good.

Introduction

This article deals with the struggle for democracy in contemporary Indonesia. The actor–structure approach outlined by Lundquist (1984, 1987) is taken as a point of departure. The influence of structures on actors (through socialization, information and enabling/limiting) (Lundquist 1987, 48–49) has often been emphasized by scholars adopting an actor–structure perspective. This is of course an important aspect which is analysed in this study as well, but I emphasize the actors' influence on structures. This is a part of the "linkage model" between actors and structures that is not developed by Lundquist. Neither is it explicitly and systematically analysed in studies of democratization. Scholars paying serious attention to the linkages between actors and structures in the democratization process tend to focus on how structures facilitate or limit the actions of actors (e.g. Karl 1990), not on how actors can change undemocratic structures.

I regard the whole struggle for democracy and the eventual democratization process as attempts by pro-democracy actors to change undemocratic structures. Different actors in Indonesia concentrate their struggle to different structures. The aim of this study is to analyse the struggle for democracy in contemporary Indonesia, as well as the prospects for future

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democratization, from this actor–structure perspective. The main questions are:

1. Which actors and structures prevent democratization and support authoritarianism in Indonesia?
2. Which actors and structures support democratization?
3. Which authoritarian structures do the various pro-democracy actors single out in their struggle for democracy and *how* do they try to change these undemocratic structures?

First, I discuss and define the concepts of democracy and democratization. Second, I present the actor–structure approach guiding this study. Third, I list and briefly discuss structures and actors preventing or supporting democracy in Indonesia. Fourth, I give some examples of how pro-democracy actors struggle to change authoritarian structures in contemporary Indonesia. Finally, I draw some conclusions from the analysis and try to assess the prospects for democratization in Indonesia.

Democracy and Democratization

Conventional, minimalist definitions of democracy tend to limit the term to signify a political system, separated from economic and social systems. Three components of political democracy are often put forward: (1) There should be *competition* between individuals and organized groups for all government positions. This should take place through regular and fair elections. (2) *Political participation* in the selection of leaders and policies should include, in principle, all adults. (3) Some basic *civil and political liberties*, such as freedom of expression and freedom to form and join organizations, should be respected (Diamond, Linz & Lipset 1990, 6–7). In many definitions of democracy this is expanded to include respect for human rights in general (cf. Kinnvall & Uhlin 1993, 10). A fourth aspect, important in the Latin American context (and equally important for Indonesia), is civilian control over the military (Karl 1990, 2).

The first component, competition, is emphasized by liberal elite democrats. The existence of elections is sometimes taken as the sole criterion for a democracy (cf. Huntington 1991, 9). The participative aspect of democracy is played down by those scholars. Participation in periodic elections is commonly seen as the only form of popular participation necessary or even desirable in a democracy. Liberal theorists also often seem to be satisfied with legal or formal aspects of democracy thus ignoring or opposing a more substantial content of democracy. Linz, for instance, explicitly states that it is "the legal equal opportunity for the expression of all opinions (. . .) rather than an unconditional opportunity for the

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expression of opinions, that distinguishes a democratic regime" (Linz 1978, 6). A further problem is that not even the limited criterion of free and competitive elections that is often used to define a democratic system is strictly applied when it comes to identifying actually existing democracies. There is a tendency to label a wide variety of political systems, in which elections are clearly less than fair and free, democratic. (For criticism against Huntington in this respect, see Uhlin 1992.)

The four criteria (competition, participation, civil and political liberties and human rights, and civilian control over the military), can, despite the problems discussed above, be taken as a point of departure, but I will give them more content and broaden the definition. The criterion of competition, meaning fair, free and meaningful elections of representatives of the people, should not rule out the practice of direct democracy as a possibility where it is deemed practical. Direct democracy is more in line with the original meaning of democracy (people's rule) than is representative democracy. But when we deal with representative democracy, which often seems necessary on the macro level in modern societies, the criterion of competition must be met. The criterion of participation should be interpreted not only as equal participation in elections (representative democracy), but also as direct participation by citizens in decision-making in issue areas of relevance for them (direct democracy). The third and fourth criteria (respect for human rights and civilian control over the military) should be seen as preconditions for democracy. Unless these criteria are met it is meaningless to speak of democracy.

Having defined democracy as including competition, participation, respect for human rights and civilian control over the military, democratization – i.e. the process towards democracy – should be defined as the extension of competition, participation and human rights to an increasing number of institutions, issues and people that were not previously governed by these democratic principles as well as the process whereby civilians take control over the military or at least restrict the military's willingness and capacity to intervene in politics (cf. O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986, 8; Kinnvall & Uhlin 1993, 13). Thus, my definition of democracy is not limited to a narrow political sphere, but includes the possible democratization of social and economic issue areas. This broader concept is especially useful when analysing a Third World country like Indonesia in which the lack of democracy in social and economic areas may render political democracy, in the form of elections, more or less meaningless.

There is no real process of democratization in Indonesia today. The country is still in a *pre-transition* phase, characterized by conflicts within the ruling elite and an increasingly strong pro-democracy movement struggling for democracy (Uhlin 1993, 519). Thus, it is the struggle for democracy and prospects for the success of this struggle that are analysed in this article.

One way of analysing factors that may foster or inhibit democracy is to distinguish between actors and structures. Structural factors have traditionally been emphasized both by modernization theorists in the 1950s and 1960s and, from a different perspective, by dependency theorists in the 1960s and 1970s. Lipset's article from 1959 is a classic when it comes to analysing social and economic requisites of democracy. The more recent works edited by Diamond, Linz & Lipset (1989) follow the same line in discussing factors that create, and especially consolidate, democracy in developing countries. Structural explanations – such as socio-economic development, social structure, the role of the state and political culture – dominate the analysis although actor-oriented explanations are not completely ignored. Hadenius (1992) also focuses on structural causes when he tries to explain in a quantitative analysis the state of democracy in the Third World.

Since the 1980s it has been increasingly common to play down structural preconditions of democracy and to focus on the role of actors. Political actors and their strategies, interests, perceptions and choices are emphasized in the influential works by O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986). Przeworski (1986, 48) argues that "objective factors constitute at most constraints to that which is possible under a concrete historical situation but do not determine the outcome of such situations". Similarly, Huntington maintains that structural factors create conditions favourable to democratization, but the actual explanations of a democratization process must be sought in the actions of certain actors. "Democracies are created not by causes but by causers" (Huntington 1991, 107). This focus on the decisions and choices of actors is not entirely new. In 1970, Rustow claimed that "decision means choice, and while the choice of democracy does not arise until the background and preparatory conditions are in hand, it is a genuine choice and does not flow automatically from those two conditions" (Rustow 1970, 356).

Bermeo argues that actor and structure approaches are useful for different aspects of the democratization process. According to her, structuralist approaches are relevant when we try to understand why regimes are threatened, but we "need other sorts of analysis to explain how and why elites succeed in projecting democracy as a preferable alternative" (Bermeo 1990, 368).

The concentration on either actors or structures is, however, unfortunate. Terry Lynn Karl has underlined the need for "an interactive approach that seeks explicitly to relate structural constraints to the shaping of contingent choice" (Karl 1990, 1). While maintaining that the decisions of certain actors are of utmost importance in a democratization process, she argues that "structural and institutional constraints determine the range of options available to decision-makers and may even predispose them to choose a

specific option" (Karl 1990, 7.) The aim of this study is to use an actor–structure approach that emphasizes the interactions between actors and structures in an analysis of the struggle for democracy in contemporary Indonesia. As a point of departure I will discuss the actor–structure approach outlined by Lundquist.

Actors and Structures

The need to combine an actor and structure perspective in social science analysis is evident, but often difficult to realize. How can it be determined if a social process should be explained by the actors' preferences or by the structures in which they act and by which they are formed? (Rothstein 1988, 29.) The main problem is how relations between actors and structures should be conceptualized and studied empirically.

Individual actors are characterized by a more or less correct perception of themselves and their environment ("understand"), capacity for action ("can") and more or less conscious and explicit preferences ("will") (Lundquist 1987, 43). The actors' autonomy in relation to the structures depends upon the substance and value of these actor characteristics. But if actor characteristics are created by structural factors, which seems plausible to assume at least to a considerable extent, there is not much explanatory power left in the autonomy of actors (cf. Rothstein 1988, 30). Thus, it is not fruitful to study actors and completely ignore structures.

Societal structures comprise patterns of activities and ideas (Lundquist 1987, 40). Lundquist distinguishes between *behavioural structure* (i.e. the outcome of individual and collective actions) and *structure of ideas*, i.e. norms, perceptions of reality and myths. Societal structures are the result of past actions and old structures are continually changed and new ones created by actors. Without actors who change the structures there is no dynamic in the analysis (Rothstein 1988, 34). Thus, it is not fruitful to study structures and completely ignore actors.

To understand the relations between actors and structures a linkage model is needed. Structures are difficult to penetrate and control and thereby possess some autonomy vis-à-vis the actors. But the actors also possess some autonomy vis-à-vis the structures because they can distance themselves from them, reflect on them and affect them.

> Thus politics becomes a question of how some actors seek to maintain a social structure which operate to their advantage, and how other actors seek to change the structure in order to bring it into accord with their own particular goals (Lundquist 1987, 47).

This proposition is the base for the present study. The central question that follows from this theoretical assumption reads: What actors manage to

influence which structures in what way? (cf. Rothstein 1988, 35.) The opposite question – what structures influence which actors in what way? – will also be dealt with.

Scholars paying serious attention to the relationships between actors and structures have tended to focus on the effects of structures upon actors. Structures, according to Lundquist (1987, 48–49), influence actors through three flows, *socialization*, *information* and *limiting/enabling*. Individuals are *socialized* into groups, organizations and society. When a person enters a social system he or she encounters a theory of reality and is given a certain role which sets out the expected behaviour of the individual (cf. Lundquist 1984, 10). This includes what Nancy Bermeo has called "political learning" (Bermeo 1992). The actors receive *information* about the structures through direct observation or through other actors. Structures *restrict or promote* certain actions. Some actions are more or less impossible in certain social structures. Lukes (1977, 10–11) suggests some useful distinctions in this respect. He distinguishes between *external constraints*, i.e. structural constraints that exclude options whatever the agents want, feel or believe, and *internal constraints*, i.e. structural constraints that exclude options which are unacceptable to, beyond the capacity of, or even inconceivable by, the agents.

The influence of structures upon actors is seldom complete. It is true that there are *structurally necessary actions* which are necessary in order to maintain a given system, but there are also structurally possible actions which provide actors with a real choice (Lundquist 1987, 54–55). Furthermore, there is, under certain circumstances, the possibility of opposing the existing structure and of refusing to carry out the structurally necessary actions and thereby, if enough actors are included in the opposition, of causing the breakdown of the societal system.

The influence of actors on structures consists of, on the one hand, efforts to *change or destroy* existing structures by opposing the flows from structures to actors and, on the other hand, efforts to *create* new structures. Actors can, by various means, try to *oppose the socialization* into certain structures. Attempts to bring up children in a non-authoritarian, non-patriarchal way and thus oppose the usual authoritarian socialization in an authoritarian and patriarchal society is one example. By spreading *alternative information* about (a) alternative structures in other systems and/or times, and (b) the illegitimacy of a present structure, actors can change what other actors' "understand", "will", and "can" and thereby indirectly influence the structures. They can, for instance, try to undermine the will of other actors to undertake "structurally necessary actions". By *stretching the limits of constraints* set by certain structures, actors may try to increase the number of structurally possible actions.

Actors can create new structures by promoting the *socialization* or

Table 1. Actors' Influence on Structures.

Change or destroy existing structures	Create new structures
(a) Oppose socialization	(a) Organizing/socialization
(b) Alternative information	(b) Information
(c) Stretch limits of structural constraints	

organizing of other actors into structures favoured by themselves. Through information they can also create new structures (see Table 1).

The effects of actors upon structures do not have to be conscious. Structures are the intended or unintended result of the activities of actors (Lundquist 1987, 9). Actors may, for instance, promote democratization as a more or less unintended "side effect" while their primary goal is something different. This is probably the case of independent businessmen who, in pursuit of profit, try to undermine the authoritarian state and thereby foster pluralism and democratization.

An individual actor's capacity to transform the macro structure is probably very limited. It is easier for the state than for small groups and individuals to influence the societal structure (Lundquist 1984, 9). But the effects of the combined efforts of a plurality of individuals should not be underestimated.

Positive and Negative Factors for Democracy in Indonesia

In this section I list and briefly discuss some of the factors that have been said to prevent or support democracy in Indonesia. Obviously, the list is not exhaustive. Neither are the categories always clear-cut and easily distinguished from one another. There is some overlapping which I find inevitable. The intention is only to provide a background on preconditions for democratization in Indonesia and a tentative explanation of the recent increase in popular demands for democracy.

Structures of Ideas Supporting Authoritarianism

(1) Authoritarian and anti-democratic features of Indonesian cultures render democratization difficult. The emphasis on harmony and rejection of opposition in Indonesian cultures – especially in Javanese culture – is often noted. Patron–client relationships and anti-individualism are said to be important aspects of Indonesian cultures (e.g. Pye 1985). Many Indo-

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nesian leaders have claimed that a corporatist or "integralistic" vision of the state is in accordance with Indonesian values. The concept of an "integralistic" state was developed by nationalist intellectuals, especially Professor Raden Supomo, before independence (Reeve 1990, 157). According to Supomo, the Indonesian state should be an organic unity. Supomo's view of an "integralistic" state, together with the related concept of *kekeluargaan* (the family principle) have had a profound influence on the Indonesian constitution which emphasizes nation and state instead of individuals (Reeve 1990, 158). This corporatist vision has been inherited and refined by the present New Order regime and is especially prevalent in the rulers' party *GOLKAR*.

It is clear that elitist Javanese values, norms and traditions to a great extent have been "nationalized". The New Order has used this process to establish a political culture emphasizing order and respect for authority (van Langenberg (1990, 134). Arguments about the incompatibility of a certain culture and democracy are, however, problematic. There is a risk that such arguments only serve to legitimize authoritarian regimes. Similar arguments about the incompatibility of a certain culture and economic development have proven wrong. Furthermore, arguments about anti-democratic cultural features in Indonesia tend to neglect the plurality of cultures in the country. It is true that there is a feudalist upper-class culture with deep roots in Javanese history and later strengthened with the adoption of among other things features of Japanese fascism. But this is not the only Javanese, let alone Indonesian, culture. There are also deeply rooted cultural values of social justice, grassroots opposition against unjust leaders, etc., which may support the development of democracy in Indonesia.

(2) Pancasila, dwi-fungsi and developmentalism. The New Order has from the beginning attempted to justify itself, and especially military involvement in politics, on ideological grounds, not as a short-term solution to political and economic instability, but as the natural regime for Indonesia in the long run. This has been done through the state ideology *Pancasila* and the doctrine of the military's dual function (*dwi-fungsi*), both concepts originating from the period before Suharto's rise to power (cf. Liddle 1992a, 448–449).

Pancasila (Five Principles) is the state philosophy which all individuals and social organizations in Indonesia must accept as their ideological base. The five principles are (1) belief in the one and only God, (2) just and civilized humanity, (3) the unity of Indonesia, (4) democracy guided by inner wisdom in unanimity arising out of deliberation among representatives, and (5) social justice for all the people of Indonesia. The problem with *Pancasila* is not primarily the principles as such, but its status as state ideology and Suharto's attempt to monopolize its interpretation, accusing all opponents of being "anti-Pancasila".

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According to the dual function doctrine the Indonesian armed forces should not only defend the country, but also play an active role in social and political affairs.

The New Order regime has also derived its legitimation from "developmentalism", i.e. the ideology giving priority to economic development, measured as economic growth, instead of political freedom and human rights.

(3) Negative interpretations of Indonesian experiences with democracy in the 1950s. Indonesia has experienced a period of parliamentary democracy from the beginning of the 1950s until about 1957 when President Sukarno introduced his "guided democracy". In 1955 the country's only free elections so far were held. According to official Indonesian writing of history, it was a time characterized by ethnic and religious conflicts, political and economic instability and chaos, due to the fact that a foreign political system – liberal democracy – which did not suit Indonesia, was introduced. Thus, it is a dark picture of democracy in Indonesia that is painted in school books and other official publications (Bourchier 1994).

Behavioural Structures Supporting Authoritarianism

(1) The authoritarian state is very strong while civil society is weak in Indonesia. The common wisdom among Indonesianists has long been that political life in Indonesia is overwhelmingly dominated by the state. The correctness of this picture has been questioned recently, for instance by Andrew MacIntyre who, from a neo-pluralist perspective, shows that sections of the business community in Indonesia have attained greater impact on policy formation (MacIntyre 1990). Richard Robison, from a structuralist perspective, has shown the importance of a domestic capitalist class in Indonesian political history (Robison 1986). But apart from some sections of the business community civil society still seems to be severely controlled and dominated by the state.

The economic and military capabilities of the state are impressive. The main features of the New Order state are patronage and repression (James 1990, 18–19). Foreign and *cukong*[1] capital is distributed to military bureaucrats and rural elites and also used to buy the loyalty of potential dissidents such as Muslim groups by building mosques, for instance. Those dissenting sections of society that oppose corruption, and thus are not likely to be influenced by patronage, are violently repressed.

As noted by Tanter (1990, 269) the Indonesian intelligence organization has totalitarian ambitions, "in the sense of acquiring comprehensive information about any and all potential sources of social or political disruption to the state-ordained process of capitalist growth". However, the com-

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plexity of the Indonesian society and the internal weaknesses of the state make many of the totalitarian practices ineffective (Tanter 1990, 270).

(2) The Indonesian class structure is unfavourable for democracy. The independent bourgeoisie and the working class, classes that have historically been connected with the rise of democracy, are small and relatively powerless in Indonesia. The relatively low level of urbanization and industrialization (two-thirds of the population earn a living from agricultural activities (Sundhaussen 1989, 458) means that the middle and working classes are relatively small. This is a problem as history proves that it is the working class and sections of the middle class that have been the classes most in favour of democracy. The business class in Indonesia is also said to be highly dependent on state power and to lack the autonomy that has enabled the business class in other countries to push through demands for the rule of law and some democratic rights. Part of the problem is that a key component of the business class is the ethnic Chinese, who as a minority are politically vulnerable and therefore even more dependent on state protection (Feith 1991, 65).

(3) Ethnic and religious cleavages render democratization difficult. A precondition for democracy, according to Rustow (1970, 350), is national unity. To what extent Indonesia really meets this criterion is questionable. There are active independence movements and apparently strong popular sentiments against the central Indonesian power in East Timor (invaded in 1975 and annexed the following year), West Papua [Irian Jaya] annexed in the 1960s, and Aceh. Indonesian politics is very much dominated by the largest ethnic group, the Javanese, who comprise slightly less than 50 percent of the population. Anti-Javanese feeling is widespread not only in the occupied territories of East Timor and West Papua and in Aceh, where thousands of civilians were killed by Indonesian troops in the early 1990s, but also in other parts of the country. Nevertheless, there is undoubtedly a widespread feeling among people from the "outer islands" (outside Java) of being Indonesians. Discontent with the centralization of power and economic resources does not seem to lead people in general to question the existence of the unitary state (cf. Booth 1992, 45). Neither did regional rebellions in the 1950s aim at establishing independent states. The goal was only to replace the government in Jakarta (Booth 1992, 36).

Thus, although it is difficult to say anything for sure, I think that there is sufficient national unity in Indonesia, with the exception of East Timor, West Papua and possibly Aceh, to make democratization possible. Democratization might in fact be necessary for continued national unity. It would be much more attractive for various ethnic minorities to remain in a democratic Indonesian state than in the present repressive dictatorship. Thus, a Yugoslavian scenario is not likely, provided that a democratization process take place and issues of regional autonomy are handled with

tolerance and flexibility. If East Timor and West Papua were given independence and Aceh provided with a high degree of autonomy, I do not think that the rest of Indonesia would disintegrate. But obviously the ethnic cleavages and regional imbalances constitute problems for a future democracy in Indonesia.

Apart from these regional conflicts there is also tension connected with the Chinese minority which holds a strong economic position in all parts of the country. Furthermore, there are religious cleavages between the Muslim majority and especially Christian minorities and also within the Muslim community between orthodox and less orthodox sections of Islam. Most religious leaders, however, seem well aware of the potential problems and state their determination to promote mutual understanding between different religious groups.

(4) Undemocratic gender relations strengthen authoritarianism. In Indonesia, as in other societies, there is a structural inequality between men and women. The role of Indonesian women as caretaker of the household and loyal supporter of the family is expressed in the official Applied Family Welfare Programme (*Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* – PKK), which is the base for the state- sponsored women's movement (Sullivan 1991, 64). The PKK has been described as a tool to strengthen women's subordination (Wieringa 1993). The gender structure which, through the families, socializes children into patriarchal and authoritarian forms of rule influences all other societal structures.

Structural Changes Favouring Democracy

The main thesis of this article is that contemporary Indonesian politics is best studied as a struggle by pro-democracy actors to change authoritarian structures. But there are also structural changes taking place upon which the Indonesian pro-democracy actors have had little or no influence.

I have argued that there has been a marked increase in demands for democratization in Indonesia during the past couple of years. Different pro-democracy actors become increasingly outspoken and offensive. But why do these actors act now and not earlier? How should the recent increase in demands for democratization in Indonesia be explained? The expansion of pro-democracy groups in Indonesia might be explained by the recent changes in several structural conditions.

(1) The class structure of the Indonesian society is changing in a way favouring democracy. Social classes (working and middle classes) that might have both an interest in democracy and a capacity to put forward demands for democratization are growing in number and strength. Richard Robison argues that the struggle for democratization in Indonesia is very much a middle-class revolution. In the past two decades a middle class has

emerged and become increasingly alienated from the regime. The middle class needs a political system that serves its interests better than the current system of patronage. But this does not mean that it strives for some kind of popular democracy. Instead, it is seeking a formal place for itself in the political system without allowing for mass democracy (Robison 1989).

It has been argued that the pressure for economic as well as political liberalization comes mainly from an emerging group of relatively independent businessmen who are opposed to the state-dependent "client bourgeoisie" and the state bureaucrats. For this group – the entrepreneurs – democratization is mainly a way of attacking state-favoured businesses (cf. Budiman 1990, 6–7).

A working class, potentially with an interest in more genuine and far-reaching democratic reforms, is also emerging in the industrial areas of Java and Sumatra (cf. Manning & Hardjono, eds., 1993).

(2) Internal contradictions in the development of capitalism in Indonesia favour democratization. Like Robison and Budiman, Törnquist argues that the struggle for democracy is associated with material interests among different social classes. But according to him, it is not the middle classes as such that have an interest in and try to promote democratization. Instead, the development of capitalism in Indonesia results in new, more widespread material interests in democratization. According to this argument, most people, in both rural and urban areas, have one thing in common, "they are to a large extent subordinated by extra-economic [i.e. political, administrative and military] means" (Törnquist 1984, 25; cf. 58–59). Therefore they should have a common interest in democratization "to get rid of the extra-economic force used against them" (Törnquist 1984, 25).

Törnquist argues that a new form of "rent-capitalists" has developed from within the state. Their power is based on control of state resources. There are two ways of attacking this monopolization of public resources: first, the transfer of power to private capitalists through "liberalization"; second, the transfer of control over public resources to the real producers by way of "democratization" (Törnquist 1990, 44). Potential interest in democracy is thus "spread at least as widely as exploitation through rents of what is collectively owned" (Törnquist 1990, 45). Therefore there is an option for broad social and political alliances based on common interests in democratization.

(3) The legitimacy of the authoritarian regime is decreasing among its former supporters due to (a) the wealth gap, and (b) the absence of a communist threat. Authoritarian regimes are said to find themselves in somewhat of a catch-22 situation. If they do not perform, they lose legitimacy because performance is their only justification for holding power. If they do perform they risk losing legitimacy, either because socio-economic progress leads to demands for political participation and the termination

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of authoritarian rule, or because success in meeting the challenge that justified their seizure of power makes them dispensable (Diamond quoted in Diamond, Linz & Lipset 1990, 14.)

The New Order regime has performed well enough when it comes to economic development to create demands for political participation.[2] Still, its economic performance, with a wide gap between an increasingly rich upper class and the poor masses, is bad enough to stimulate opposition. Furthermore the New Order has managed to crush the Indonesian communist party and with the world-wide collapse of communist regimes there is no longer any credible threat that might legitimise the authoritarian rule.[3]

(4) Conflicts within the ruling elite weaken the authoritarian regime.[4] O'Donnell & Schmitter distinguish between two groups present in authoritarian regimes, "hard-liners" and "soft-liners". "Hard-liners" believe that the perpetuation of authoritarian rule is possible and desirable. Their position may be based on self-interest or ideological conviction. "Soft-liners" may initially be equally repressive, but they become increasingly aware that the authoritarian regime will need some form of electoral legitimation and certain freedoms to make it acceptable to moderate sections of the domestic opposition and international public opinion (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986, 16). In Indonesia, there is a conflict between the president and some sections of the military.[5] In the early 1990s some elite groups promoted certain political reforms and a certain degree of political openness and even supported demands for democratization by various social forces. This has weakened the authoritarian regime and provided dissidents, both on the elite and grassroots level, with a space for putting forward their demands for democratization. Since 1988 there has been increasing activism within the parliament (DPR), student demonstrations have become common for the first time since 1978, and there have been unusually open political discussions in the press until the banning of the three leading weeklies in June 1994. Furthermore, the number of strikes and land disputes has increased indicating a growing political participation of workers and peasants. As a result of the cleavages within the ruling elite, there has been a *provisional tolerance* for at least some forms of such public dissent.

However, one should not be overly optimistic about the significance of these conflicts on the elite level. I find it hard to identify any obvious "soft-liners" in the New Order regime. The support for limited liberalization that some figures in the military and bureaucratic elites have shown seems to be based on short-term tactical considerations designed to undermine the power bases of other political elites, rather than any awareness that such reforms are necessary in order to maintain their own power and some features of the New Order regime in the long run. Thus, I suggest that we distinguish between *short-term tactical soft-liners* and *long-term convinced*

soft-liners. Soft-liners in Indonesia today are mainly of the first category. If this observation is correct, prospects for democratization in Indonesia are very uncertain, as short-term tactical soft-liners quickly can reverse their positions and try to stop the political opening up. It does make a difference if the provisional tolerance of political dissent is based on a conviction of the necessity (but not desirability) of some democratic openness in the long run or if it is only a result of short-term tactical considerations and part of the power play on the elite level.

(5) There is a global trend towards democracy which inspires pro-democracy actors in Indonesia. The global political "climate" is much more favourable towards democracy than it was one or two decades ago. This is due to the end of the cold war and the recent more or less global trend towards at least limited, formal democracy. In a time of extensive global communications there is an opportunity to learn from and imitate the tactics and strategies for achieving democratization used by pro-democracy activists in other parts of the world. In another article I have analysed the phenomenon of *transnational democratic diffusion* or *demonstration effects* (Uhlin 1993). The study shows that democratization events in other parts of the world have had a profound impact on Indonesian pro-democracy actors particularly as a source of inspiration showing that change is possible.

Authoritarian Actors and Their Supporters

(1) The Suharto family. It has become increasingly evident that the New Order is more the personal rule of Suharto than a military dictatorship. This means that Suharto himself is a major obstacle to democratization in Indonesia. The main reason behind Suharto's determination to continue as president as long as possible is probably his concern for the business interests of his family (cf. Crouch 1992, 44). There is a widespread hostility, also among the military, towards the favoured treatment of Suharto's children, and the next president will probably come under pressure to do something about their business empires.

The simple fact that President Suharto, aged 73 and in power since 1965–66, is growing old makes succession inevitable. The question is whether the succession will provide an opportunity for democratization or whether Suharto will be replaced without any regime transition. That depends on the extent to which the New Order regime has been institutionalized. Recent developments with open conflicts within the ruling elite suggest that the New Order is very much the personal rule of Suharto and will collapse when he dies or is forced to stand back. Others have suggested that the New Order does not stand or fall with its founder, but has been profoundly institutionalized (Liddle 1985).

(2) The military. The Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) are small both in

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terms of manpower in relation to the whole population and in terms of budget as a percentage of GNP. ABRI's manpower strength amounts to 0.15 percent of the total population and its budget is 1.96 percent of total GNP, which is considerably less than in Indonesia's Southeast Asian neighbour states (Vatikiotis 1993, 62). The power of ABRI derives instead from its internal policing function and its control over society. A member of the army is placed in every settlement down to the smallest hamlet. This "territorial structure" ensures in principle almost total control over the population by ABRI.

The military must therefore be regarded as the main obstacle to democratization in Indonesia. It is difficult to envisage how the military might be persuaded to give away its power, and even more difficult to contemplate how it might be defeated. O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986, 36) hope for "a gradual change in the military's image of itself as ultimate guardian of the national interest and a shift from preoccupation with internal security to some more credible and orthodox role as defender of the country's (or the region's) external security". Similar arguments have indeed been put forward by retired generals in Indonesia, most notably former commander of the armed forces and defence minister A. H. Nasution, the inventor of the *dwi-fungsi* ideology giving the Indonesian military a social and political as well as military role. It is, however, unclear how much support the retired dissident generals have received from among the acting officers.

(3) External actors supporting the authoritarian regime. With half of the development budget financed with foreign aid, Indonesia is one of the world's major aid recipients (Vatikiotis 1993, 188). This is significant as so much of Suharto's power stems from his ability to deliver "development". The donor countries, with Japan as the major contributor, have cooperated in IGGI (the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia), which was replaced by CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia) in 1992.[6] Military support for the New Order regime has also been massive from the West.

Pro-Democracy Actors and Their Supporters

(1) The pro-democracy movement. The Indonesian pro-democracy movement, which has grown significantly during the past few years, is quite heterogeneous.[7] The various opposition groups have different goals. There are elite dissident groups, such as the Petition of 50 and the Forum for the Purification of People's Sovereignty which consist of former military officers and politicians and intellectuals. The Democratic Forum, formed in April 1991 by 45 leading intellectuals, is another group on the elite level with no grassroots connections. Elite dissidents would like to see a smooth transfer of power from Suharto to another elite group, combined with the implementation of the rule of law and some political liberties.

The moderate opposition, mainly consisting of liberals and social democrats active in NGOs, has more far-reaching goals for real democratization. But they, too, take a rather non-confrontational position towards the regime and many of them are prepared to cooperate with sections of the military or other elite groups. In this category we find activists in the increasingly vocal pro-democracy organization the Legal Aid Institute as well as more moderate NGOs, many of which take part in the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID).[8] The independent trade union SBSI should also be put in this category.

More radical opposition is found in sections of the student movement as well as among labour and peasant activists and among sections of the women's movement. These activists are more confrontational towards the regime and demand profound socio-economic change as well as political democratization. Since the mid-1980s a new student movement, with demands for democracy and human rights as a main theme, has emerged in Indonesia (Aspinall 1993). A significant feature of this generation of student activism is that it has given birth to openly political organizations outside campuses which are calling for political change and often seeking support from peasants and workers (cf. Lane 1991, 18–19). The new generation of pro-democracy and human rights NGOs – such as Infight, PIJAR, Geni, Lapera, LBH Nusantara, Progress Together Foundation, PIPHAM, Free Women Foundation, Rumpun, Lekhat, People's Democratic Union, Aldera, and many others – has sprung from the student movement in the 1980s. Their radical political campaigning, and in many cases tendency to reach out to peasants and workers, distinguish them from the established NGOs (cf. Lane 1991, 19).

The Islamic influence is obvious within most sections of the pro-democracy movement. Islam can serve to legitimize conservative and liberal as well as socialist interpretations of democracy (Uhlin 1993, 528–530). Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia and also leader of Democratic Forum, is one of the country's most important proponents of liberal or social democratic values. Islamic democracy discourses are prominent among elite dissidents as well as in NGO circles and certain sections of the student movement.

Despite many differences concerning more long-term goals and strategies for democratization, there are many common themes in the pro-democracy movement. Minimal goals – such as respect for human rights, (particularly the right to organize and freedom of expression), restrictions on the arbitrary nature of the state and the implementation of the rule of law, and genuinely free and fair elections – are shared by the whole opposition (cf. Bessell 1992).

(2) External actors supporting the pro-democracy movement. Most of the Indonesian pro-democracy groups have gained quite extensive overseas

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contacts and support. INFID is the prime example of the transnationalization of Indonesian NGOs. The leading intellectuals in Democratic Forum benefit from extensive academic contacts in other countries. Women student, labour and peasant activists have their own respective contacts. TAPOL, the London-based Indonesian human rights campaign, is an important supporter of Indonesian pro-democracy activists as are other groups in The Netherlands and Australia.

These transnational NGO and solidarity networks are important, but there are also signs that governmental support for the authoritarian regime in Indonesia is decreasing. The US government has always been a reliable supporter of the New Order regime, but under the Clinton administration relations between the United States and Indonesia have deteriorated. The US government has, for instance, threatened to suspend Indonesia's trade favours related to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) because of labour repression in general and the banning of the free trade union SBSI in particular (Cohen 1993).

Pro-Democracy Actors Trying to Change Authoritarian Structures

From an actor–structure perspective, the struggle for democracy in Indonesia can be seen as attempts by pro-democracy actors to change or destroy authoritarian structures and create new democratic structures. This can be done through opposing the socialization into authoritarian structures, spreading alternative information, stretching the limits of constraints set by authoritarian structures, and organizing or socializing other actors into democratic structures.

There are many stories to be told about the struggle for democracy in Indonesia. Various actors use different methods and concentrate on different structures. Here I will only indicate some stories. The hope is that it could eventually result in a more sophisticated classification of different possibilities for actors to change structures in general, and for pro-democracy actors to change structures supporting authoritarianism in particular.

Opposition to the Socialization into Authoritarian Structures

In an article on the tasks of a democratic opposition, Alfred Stepan has pointed to the importance of resisting integration into the regime (Stepan 1990, 44). This has to do with what I call opposition to the socialization into authoritarian structures. In Indonesia many NGOs, especially Muslim organizations, have managed to protect at least part of their independence vis-à-vis the authoritarian state. It is a fight that, to a varying extent, is

fought by all sections of the democratic opposition, but naturally most seriously by the more radical pro-democracy actors who refuse to have anything to do with the authoritarian regime. One example of such opposition to authoritarian socialization is the opposition to compulsory indoctrination courses in the state ideology which led to the imprisonment of several students in Bandung in 1989 (*Inside Indonesia* 1990, No. 23).

Information About (a) Alternative Structures in Other Systems and/or Times, and (b) the Illegitimacy of Present Authoritarian Structures

By disseminating this kind of information pro-democracy actors try to change what other actors "understand", "will", and "can", thereby undermining authoritarian structures. Indonesian pro-democracy actors challenge the information hegemony of the New Order. Democratic systems in other countries are often put forward as models (Uhlin 1993). Indonesia's own democratic past is also put forward as a model. Indonesian pro-democracy actors challenge the official view of Indonesia's period of democracy in the 1950s. They emphasize that it was a time when politicians were committed to democratic values, human rights were generally respected and the courts enjoyed a great deal of independence. The claim that democracy is a Western idea which was (and is) not suitable in the Indonesian cultural context is rejected. A prominent expression of this argument is the doctoral dissertation by the famous lawyer Buyung Nasution (Nasution 1992).

A common theme in various student and NGO publications is the illegitimacy of the authoritarian regime. Information about human rights abuses are spread and the ideological pillars of the authoritarian regime are attacked. Similarly, Marsilam Simanjuntak, a member of Democratic Forum, in his dissertation attacks the concept of an "integralistic state", one of the ideological foundations of the New Order regime (Simanjuntak 1989).

Stretching the Limits of Constraints Set by Authoritarian Structures

Indonesian pro-democracy actors continually stretch the limits of what it is possible to say in public in Indonesia. Public criticism against human rights abuses in East Timor and West Papua or the massacre on the left following Suharto's rise to power was more or less unthinkable in Indonesia a few years ago. Now it is an increasingly common theme among radical activists and also taken up by sections of the moderate opposition.

The Catholic priest, author and outspoken critic of the government, Father Mangunwijaya provides a good example on how the limits of constraints set by authoritarian structures are stretched and the discursive

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space is expanded, at the same time as the authoritarian regime is delegitimized. In a conference paper he stresses the ideological impact of Japanese fascism on the Indonesian military (and thereby on the whole society) through the military training of the Indonesian youth during the Japanese occupation. He claims that many features of New Order Indonesia, including the dual function of the armed forces, are inspired by Japan.

> It is not a matter of simple imitation of Japan, but many institutions and policies have sprung, consciously or unconsciously, from the Japanese way of thinking and operating (Mangunwijaya 1994, 84).

> But the most influential novelty brought by the Japanese is the entire fabric of social and cultural engineering, with its atmosphere of uniforms, marching, inspection-ceremonies, parades, unification of professional organisations, military and paramilitary language, attitude and behaviour, security surveillance, and a whole set of commands and chains of instructions, directed in uni-language formulations with prescribed official interpretations, indoctrination, etc., etc. (Mangunwijaya 1994, 86.).

Others stretch the limits set by authoritarian structures more by direct actions than by words. Anti-government demonstrations, strikes, active opposition in land disputes, etc., are all examples of how pro-democracy actors try to advance their positions and expand the structurally possible actions.

Socialization of Other Actors into Democratic Structures

This is crucial for the consolidation of a democratic regime, but also important in the struggle for democracy during the pre-transition phase. If it has been possible to establish autonomous organizations (NGOs, trade unions, etc.) with a democratic structure it is important to get as many people as possible socialized into these potential "schools of democracy". Organizations that aim at mass mobilization use this method. In Indonesia the free trade unions Setiakawan and SBSI have tried to organize workers. Radical peasant and worker groups, as well as more moderate NGOs working at the grassroots level, also try to socialize people into their organizations which are (hopefully) based on democratic principles.

Creating New Democratic Structures Through Information

The most important, and most difficult, task of the democratic opposition is to create a credible alternative to the authoritarian regime. According to Stepan (1990, 47) such a democratic alternative should consist of a "broadly agreed-upon formula for the conduct of democratic contestation". Such a broadly agreed-upon democratic alternative has not yet appeared in Indonesia. But various pro-democracy actors have started to formulate democratic alternatives. One of the most promising efforts might be the

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Table 2. Examples of Structures Supporting Authoritarianism Under Attack by Various Pro-democracy Actors in Contemporary Indonesia.

Structures supporting authoritarianism	Attacked by pro-democracy actors
Structures of ideas: (Javanese culture, "integralistic" state, *Pancasila*, *dwi-fungsi*, "development-alism", interpretation of the 1950s)	Various parts of the democratic opposition, especially intellectuals (through articles, seminar papers, public statements, etc.)
Behavioural structures: state dominance over civil society	Pro-democracy groups (through letters and public statements); moderate and activist-oriented NGOs, trade unions, independent businessmen (by creating a civil society)
Class structure (social and economic inequality)	Radical pro-democracy groups; trade unionists; women, students, workers and peasant movements (through organizing, strikes, demonstrations, etc.); development-oriented NGOs (through development work at grassroots level)
Ethnic and religious cleavages	Religious leaders (by preaching tolerance)
Oppressive gender relations	Women activists (through information, organizing and opposition to authoritarian and paternalistic socialization)

writings of Buyung Nasution. In an epilogue to his doctoral thesis he sketches a democratic future for Indonesia and discusses what is to be done to reach the goal (Nasution 1992, 425–433).

Much more could be said about various pro-democracy actors struggling against various structures supporting authoritarianism in Indonesia. But I will stop here and just summarize some of the struggles in Table 2.

Conclusions: Prospects for Democratization in Indonesia

Indonesian pro-democracy actors have to struggle against strong authoritarian structures. There is a whole set of structures of ideas which is used to support and legitimize the authoritarian rule. The state ideology *Pancasila*, the doctrine of the armed forces dual function, "developmentalism" defending authoritarianism and human rights abuses with economic development, and the concept of an "integralistic" (i.e. corporatist and anti-individualistic) state are structures of ideas that have to be fought in the struggle for democracy. Elitist, hierarchial elements of

Javanese cultures are also used by the New Order to support its authoritarian rule. So are negative interpretations of Indonesia's own period of democracy in the 1950s.

Strong behavioural structures that support authoritarianism include the state apparatus (especially the military) which controls and dominates civil society, the Indonesian class structure with relatively weak working and middle classes, ethnic and religious cleavages in this large multi-ethnic state, and the gender structure which leads to the subordination of women and the socialization of children into patriarchal and authoritarian social relations. A further problem for those who would like to see a democratization of the Indonesian society is the economic, political and military support that the New Order regime receives from foreign capital and governments.

But prospects for democratization in Indonesia are not as bleak as this listing of factors supporting authoritarianism might suggest. On the contrary, there are strong indications that things will change in Indonesia and the possibility that at least a limited form of democracy will develop in the not too distant future is not small. In recent time there have been some significant structural changes in favour of democracy. The class structure is changing as working and middle classes are growing in number and strength and there are indications that broad sections of the society have got a material interest in democracy. The legitimacy that the New Order regime might have had both in Indonesia and abroad is decreasing due to the wide gap between rich and poor Indonesians and the lack of a communist threat. Conflicts within the ruling elite weaken the authoritarian regime. The global political "climate" is also more favourable towards democracy and processes of democratization and the struggle for democracy in other countries inspire Indonesian pro-democracy actors. Foreign governments, most importantly the Clinton administration, have started to put pressure on Suharto and his government to initiate democratic reforms and respect human rights. The most important factor, however, is the growing strength and courage of the pro-democracy movement. As a succession of leadership is coming nearer because of the age of the president, the ruling elite seems to be more split than ever before and the pro-democracy movement, consisting of wide sections of society, increases its demands for democracy.

In this study I have analysed the struggle for democracy in Indonesia in terms of pro-democracy actors trying to change structures that support authoritarianism. The following preliminary and tentative conclusions could be drawn from this effort. Conservative pro-democracy actors concentrate their efforts on the state structure. Liberals and social democrats are also primarily interested in this more narrowly defined political sphere. They seem to be especially keen on attacking various authoritarian structures of

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ideas. Radical pro-democracy actors try to change a wide range of structures including the class and gender structures. In particular, it is the more radical pro-democracy actors, especially some student and women activists, who actively oppose the socialization into authoritarian structures. Information as a means to undermine authoritarian structures is mainly used by intellectuals (with different ideological leanings) who have gained access to information channels. Limits set by authoritarian structures are continually stretched, especially by more radical pro-democracy actors. Organizing or socialization is a method used especially by trade unionists and some student activists. The delegitimation of authoritarian structures has been going on for quite some time, but the creation of new democratic structures has only begun in Indonesia.

There are different paths of democratization resulting in different kinds of democracy (cf. Stepan 1986). What is the most likely path for Indonesia?

(1) Modest reforms from above due to pressure from below.
Only modest reforms initiated and implemented by the present government would probably not be enough for the opposition and probably not even for external actors. The succession crisis and the cleavages within the ruling elite make it necessary to broaden the social base of the regime and include at least some sections of the moderate opposition in a future elite group.

(2) Negotiations between soft-liners in the authoritarian regime and sections of the moderate and conservative opposition.
One path towards democracy is a pact negotiated among a small number of participants representing established groups and institutions (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986, 37). Pacts attempt to limit accountability to wider publics and control the policy agenda. However, they may alter power relations and lead to (often unintended) steps towards increased democracy. Such pacts, therefore, "move the polity toward democracy by undemocratic means" (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986, 38). This is the most likely scenario for Indonesia. It is the path favoured by the moderate opposition, foreign and domestic capital and external powers. Sections of the military can probably be convinced to follow this path as well. The radical opposition might also find it acceptable as a first step. There are in fact already signs that Suharto in the future might be prepared to make a pact with the Petition of 50 and other sections of the moderate opposition. In July 1993 Suharto invited former defence minister and armed forces chief Abdul Harris Nasution for a meeting for the first time in more than 20 years (*Editor*, 7 August 1993). The meeting was seen as a first step towards reconciliation with the Petition of 50 and perhaps other parts of the moderate opposition. Another possible pact might be between Abdurrahman Wahid and sections of ABRI. Wahid is known to have good

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relations with Benny Murdani, the former minister of defence and chief of the armed forces.

(3) Popular upsurge leading to the breakdown of the authoritarian regime.
This is not a likely scenario for Indonesia. The authoritarian state is too strong and the popular movements too weak to make this a feasible alternative. Besides, there is little external support for such a path of democratization. This scenario could, however, not be entirely ruled out. Some people compare the Indonesian society to a volcano that might erupt violently and unexpectedly. Finally, a fourth scenario must be considered:

(4) Continued or strengthened authoritarianism.
This is not very likely in a longer time perspective. Factors favouring democracy (at least in a limited version) are on balance stronger than factors preventing democracy. But in the short run (less than a decade) this scenario should not be ruled out.

NOTES
1. Indonesian–Chinese capitalists often with close relations to the political and military elite.
2. Indonesia has experienced a long period of economic growth with GDP growth rates of 5–7 percent annually (cf. Hill 1992, 18–19).
3. Apart from these indications of decreasing legitimacy, there is a fundamental problem with the concept of "legitimacy" and its measurement which makes statements about the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime questionable. It is sometimes argued that the New Order regime enjoys a high degree of legitimacy due to its economic performance and the ideological factors discussed in a previous section (see, for instance, Liddle 1992a; Thompson 1993). However, the consent that is sometimes claimed to show the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes is probably often more a matter of self-interest or fear of repression (cf. Przeworski 1986, 51). Illegitimate regimes can last for decades. I agree with Przeworski (1986, 51–52) that "what matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives".
4. Conflict within the ruling elite is actually a phenomenon on the actor level, but from the actors' perspective it can also be perceived as a structure enabling pro-democracy actors and inhibiting authoritarian actors.
5. The cleavages between President Suharto and sections of the military became evident with the challenge to Suharto's nominee for vice-president in March 1988 (MacIntyre 1990, 259; Feith 1991, 62; Liddle 1992b, 61). The election of a president and vice-president by the People's Consultative Assembly has during the New Order period

been little more than a ceremony in which Suharto and his candidate for the vice-presidency have been unanimously elected without having to stand against other candidates. This happened in 1988 as well, but what startled many observers was that the army initially refused to support Suharto's candidate for the vice-presidency and nominated another candidate. Suharto quickly won the power struggle and got his man elected, but the cleavages within the ruling elite were evident.

6. On 25 March 1992 the Indonesian government decided to refuse receiving official development assistance from The Netherlands and to dissolve IGGI, which was chaired by the Dutch minister for development cooperation. This was a reaction to Dutch criticism on human rights matters, particularly following the massacre in Dili, East Timor, on 12 November 1991 and the attempts to link development assistance to human rights. Instead, the CGI, under the leadership of the World Bank and excluding The Netherlands, was established (INGI Circular Letter No. 7, July 1992).

7. On Indonesian pro-democracy actors, see Uhlin 1995, Ch. 6.

8. The abbreviation of the organization was changed from INGI to INFID in 1993 (INFID Circular letter No. 9, November 1993).

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relations with Benny Murdani, the former minister of defence and chief of the armed forces.

(3) Popular upsurge leading to the breakdown of the authoritarian regime.
This is not a likely scenario for Indonesia. The authoritarian state is too strong and the popular movements too weak to make this a feasible alternative. Besides, there is little external support for such a path of democratization. This scenario could, however, not be entirely ruled out. Some people compare the Indonesian society to a volcano that might erupt violently and unexpectedly. Finally, a fourth scenario must be considered:

(4) Continued or strengthened authoritarianism.
This is not very likely in a longer time perspective. Factors favouring democracy (at least in a limited version) are on balance stronger than factors preventing democracy. But in the short run (less than a decade) this scenario should not be ruled out.

NOTES
1. Indonesian–Chinese capitalists often with close relations to the political and military elite.
2. Indonesia has experienced a long period of economic growth with GDP growth rates of 5–7 percent annually (cf. Hill 1992, 18–19).
3. Apart from these indications of decreasing legitimacy, there is a fundamental problem with the concept of "legitimacy" and its measurement which makes statements about the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime questionable. It is sometimes argued that the New Order regime enjoys a high degree of legitimacy due to its economic performance and the ideological factors discussed in a previous section (see, for instance, Liddle 1992a; Thompson 1993). However, the consent that is sometimes claimed to show the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes is probably often more a matter of self-interest or fear of repression (cf. Przeworski 1986, 51). Illegitimate regimes can last for decades. I agree with Przeworski (1986, 51–52) that "what matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives".
4. Conflict within the ruling elite is actually a phenomenon on the actor level, but from the actors' perspective it can also be perceived as a structure enabling pro-democracy actors and inhibiting authoritarian actors.
5. The cleavages between President Suharto and sections of the military became evident with the challenge to Suharto's nominee for vice-president in March 1988 (MacIntyre 1990, 259; Feith 1991, 62; Liddle 1992b, 61). The election of a president and vice-president by the People's Consultative Assembly has during the New Order period

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