

to Lewin, also presents some problems to the hypotheses. Evidence from the role of associations in policy-making is somewhat contradictory but the general trend is towards reduced corporatization. This goes well along with the fact that the monopoly of representation has weakened, too, but hierarchization has continued and their role in centralized collective bargaining partly lost. Regarding the second hypothesis, the economy has not been significantly less prosperous compared to other countries in Europe for example, but disappointment in labour has been great and conflicts have grown.

On the background of his empirical tests the most reasonable conclusion would be that the future of corporatism is unclear, and Lewin points to this, but at the same time he also arrives at the somewhat premature conclusion that the role of unions in stabilizing the political system as such has ceased. Lewin may be right, but his present data are not sufficiently convincing and unambiguous. In my opinion, this question is still open, like many others in the book, and it must be said that in his exciting analysis the author presents a range of interesting arguments and interpretations, rather than what may be the final conclusions. Indeed, that is no small achievement.

#### NOTES

1. Hermansson, J., Laurin, U., Nordfors, L., Westholm, A. (1985). Riksdagen och de organiserade intressena, presentation af ett forskningsprojekt, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Uppsala.
2. See "Reflections on where the theory of neo-corporatism has gone and where the praxis of neo-corporatism may be going", pp. 260-261, in G. Lehmbruch & P. C. Schmitter (eds.) (1982). *Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making*, London & Beverly Hills: Sage.
3. M. Olson (1982). *The Rise and Decline of Nations, Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
4. M. Olson (1990). *How bright are the Northern Lights? Some Questions about Sweden*, Lund & London: Lund University Press & Chartwell-Bratt.

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Christopher Hood & Michael Jackson: *Administrative Argument*. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991, 221 pp.

This book deals with administrative reform. The main idea is that the process of change is typically not a process of validation and disproof using hard data, but rather a rhetorical process of persuasion through doctrines. Doctrines are what-to-do-ideas which come somewhere between 'policy' and 'theory'. Though doctrines are multiple and often contradictory, they are not infinite in number. The commonest of them recur with striking regularity in spite of changes in terminology, and they can be collected and catalogued.

The authors discuss six factors essential for acceptance of administrative doctrines: the idea of *symmetry* means to produce linguistic 'solutions' which are exactly symmetrical to the social 'problems' experienced by the audience. Where final proof is impossible, persuasion needs to be achieved by the correct choice of *metaphor*. A third key to acceptance is held to be *ambiguity*, the ability to speak simultaneously

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to groups with divergent interests. Fourth, successful persuasion demands that private benefit must be justified in terms of *public good*. Fifth, a rhetorical argument needs to be highly *selective* in its choice of maxims and arguments to fit the desired conclusion. The last key to acceptance is *suspension of disbelief* by those to whom the argument is addressed.

The authors then go on to record administrative doctrines from major textbooks in administration, plus a set of reform documents and historical works. They end up with 99 doctrines categorized as 'who-type doctrines' (getting 'the best sort of person' in office), 'what-type doctrines' (what type of organization to choose) and 'how-type doctrines' (what procedures or methods should be used). All the doctrines are contestable in the sense that a contradictory doctrine can always be found. The doctrine 'prefer experienced hands' and the doctrine 'prefer raw recruits' are for instance coexistent, as are the doctrines 'have inclusive responsibility by vertical integration' and 'have divided responsibility by administrative pluralism'. What remains puzzling is why some of these doctrinal keys open the lock of acceptance so readily in some times and places, and why the door remains firmly shut to them in other circumstances.

Three reports of administrative reform are then analyzed to discover empirically how the acceptance of particular doctrines is to be explained. The six elements identified above as possible clues to the 'acceptance factor' seem to give us *some* purchase on understanding the three cases.

Special attention is devoted to the use of metaphor and fiction to achieve persuasiveness. The authors hypothesize that the persuasiveness of economics and management science (rather than, say, traditional Public Administration) in administrative argument can be explained by their metaphors rather than their truths.

Without referring explicitly to it, Hood and Jackson's approach seems to have much in common with the 'institutionalized environments approach' in organization theory. The basic idea is that organizational forms are adopted according to whether they fit into a larger historical lock (p. 195), or broader political and social context (p. 151), or reflect social rules, customs and habits. The perspective is clearly in opposition to a design perspective where the basic idea is that institutions are structured deliberately according to explicitly stated collective goals.

Hood and Jackson present their approach as a post-positivist alternative (or additional line of analysis) to the positivist Simonian tradition in politico-administrative science. In their opinion, more than 40 years of research concentrating on the link between administrative design and administrative performance have had only limited success: 'We seem to be little nearer to "scientific" answers about when to use contradictory principles of administration than was Aristotle two thousand years ago' (p. 20). My first comment is that surprisingly *few* studies have been made explicitly on the relationship between structure and performance (Egeberg 1992). The reference to the 'contingency theory' literature in this respect (p. 20) is almost irrelevant, since in these studies structure is normally treated as a *dependent* variable, contingent on characteristics of the environment, organizational technology, size, age, etc. This impression of the 'state of the art' is shared by Hammond (1990), who suggests that Simon's criticism of Gulick, together with the impression which took root that Simon won the duel in the 1940s, can be the reason why there is almost a complete lack of empirical studies on the effects of alternative structural forms.

My second comment is that even if empirical research is able to reveal understandable consequences of alternative designs, the principles *are still contradictory*,

in the sense that one necessarily has to *choose* among the principles, depending on what one wants to achieve. For instance, if research documents that specialization by purpose or by area makes a difference to policy content (as was Gulick's argument), then one's choice of organizational solution should be derived from one's policy objectives.

Hood and Jackson's book is an important contribution to the literature on administrative reform. It is very well organized, and it draws on classic political theory in a fruitful way. The presentation of the 99 doctrines and their justifications is very useful, and may be seen as a set of hypotheses to be tested on the relationships between structure and performance, and between personnel and performance, respectively. Its perspective on reform processes creates a sound scepticism towards the administrative fashion trade of consultocracy and pop management.

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Bob Deacon (ed.): *The New Eastern Europe: Social Policy Past, Present and Future*. London: Sage Publications, 1991, 198 pp.

Employing a broad concept of social policy, which covers employment, education, housing, workplace democracy, natural and human environment, minority rights, gender relations, health care and social security, this book uses different types of social policy regimes derived from OECD countries to categorize emergent Eastern European social policies. One may question the validity of these categories in the Eastern European context, but there was a kind of welfare state in the former Communist regimes.

Three regime categories – liberal welfare states, corporatist welfare states and social democratic welfare states – are employed as tools for comparative inquiry. The authors characterize all of the former Communist systems as bureaucratic collectivism, and then go on to state that the liberal welfare state model is the most likely model for Slovenia and Hungary. By comparison, a social democratic welfare state model is recommended in the long run for the (former) Czecho-Slovakia. However, we wish to point out that the ruling party in Hungary – the Democratic Forum – has established corporatist networks and that Vaclav Klaus, who follows a *laissez-faire*-oriented economic policy, rules the Czech provinces at present. We would also warn that in the long run the bureaucratic collectivist state could degenerate into authoritarian populism in Romania, the republics of the former Soviet Union, in parts of former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and perhaps Poland.

The authors underline the need for adapting social policy measures to the problems of market liberalization without hampering economic growth. And they underline the need for social policy measures to be domestically acceptable, if the