Leif Lewin: Samhället och de organiserade intressena. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1992, 135 pp.

This book is the first volume in a series on society and organized interests in Sweden, emerging from a research project launched in the mid-eighties at the University of Uppsala.^x Smaller parts of the project have previously been published within the framework of the much larger project on power and democracy in Sweden completed 1990, but not the present contribution.

The rise and decline of corporatism in Sweden is the theme of the present study, whereby Lewin distinguishes between three phases: the early years (1900-30), the heyday (1930-70) and the erosion of corporatism (from around 1970). The first phase was characterized by an outburst of relatively small and not fully recognized associations generally pursuing special-group interests. Their rise is explained, sophisticatedly but perhaps rather schematically, as a functional requirement complementary the already existing type of preference aggregation. The real and complex interest intensities of voters could hardly be adequately represented in general elections alone, it is argued.

As associations grew in terms of members and influence, associations of labour and capital ultimately became indispensable vehicles of political stabilization by sharing responsibility with the state for maintaining so-called 'good relations' in society. This period is often referred to as the 'Swedish model', but the author prefers to reserve this term for the post-war period from 1950 to 1970 only.

However, associations have increasingly faced problems in representing diverse categories of members and managing heterogeneous interests and have at the same time contributed to political stability. This has been pronounced within labour and has led to mistrust not only amongst members, but even in the public at large over recent decades. Consequently, by the early 1970s the corporatist system had captured both LO and SAF: LO could not continue its march towards social welfare and still have 'good relations' too. SAF, on the other hand, felt that some basic interests of Swedish employers had become seriously threatened. In brief, this is the essence of Lewin's evaluation of the rise and decline of corporatism.

As regards corporatist theory, Lewin operates with a somewhat narrow interpretation. corporatism is interpreted as more or less identical with tripartism at national levels whereas meso and micro arrangements, often of a bilateral nature, are ignored. This is striking, given the fact that numerous contributions within neocorporatism explicitly attempted to develop a less rigid and more disaggregated approach over the years and de-emphasized the often demanding societal variants of the theory. Following the traditions of the macro-oriented approach, however, organized labour (LO) is drawn into the very centre of the empirical analysis which, on the other hand, results in a certain negligence of the part played by employers (SAF). Other categories of interest groups are treated marginally.

On the background of the macro perspective, Lewin provides a very interesting and challenging discussion at the conceptual level. Here, much energy is devoted to a discussion of P. C. Schmitter's 1982 definition of corporatism² and the presentation his own alternative definition, intendedly less elaborate and more manageable. Subsequently, two hypotheses are advanced. They postulate a positive correlation between corporatist decision-making and monopoly representation and hierarchical associational structures as well as between corporatist decision-making and welfare (p. 57). The importance of associations to welfare, however, is according Lewin primarily pertinent to industrial peace and less to macro-economic performance, although it is far from easy to disentangle the two.

Lewin is here inspired by Mancur Olson's theories,³ but in this context it is of major importance that he clearly dissociates himself from an interpretation emphasizing the effects of associations on the historical upswings and downswings in the economy. If the Olsonian hypotheses were to be critically tested, Lewin would also have had to use another operationalization of 'encompassing organizations'. only characterizes encompassment in terms of size of membership, whereas, in my opinion, it would be highly relevant to include the organizational coverage of different categories of interests as well. Admittedly, Olson seems for reasons of simplicity to have pointed to the arithmetical aspect of encompassment⁴ but essentially he also addresses the problem of internal bargaining amongst members of this particular type of association.

In his test Lewin is able to confirm his two hypotheses: the monopoly of LO in representing labour was evident and the hierarchical structures not only prevailed but hardened from 1930 to 1970 during increased participation in public policymaking. also finds his second hypothesis valid and sees the responsible behaviour of labour as sustainable as long as material welfare improved.

Against this 'mature corporatism' stands the period after 1970, which, according

to Lewin, also presents some problems to the hypotheses. Evidence from the role of associations in policy-making is somewhat contradictory but the general trend is towards reduced corporatization. This goes well along with the fact that the monopoly of representation has weakened, too, but hierarchization has continued and their role in centralized collective bargaining partly lost. Regarding the second hypothesis, the economy has not been significantly less prosperous compared to other countries in Europe for example, but disappointment in labour has been great and conflicts have grown.

On the background of his empirical tests the most reasonable conclusion would be that the future of corporatism is unclear, and Lewin points to this, but at the same time he also arrives at the somewhat premature conclusion that the role of unions in stabilizing the political system as such has ceased. Lewin may be right, but his present data are not sufficiently convincing and unambiguous. In my opinion, this question is still open, like many others in the book, and it must be said that in his exciting analysis the author presents a range of interesting arguments and interpretations, rather than what may be the final conclusions. Indeed, that is no small achievement.

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NOTES

1. Hermansson, J., Laurin, U., Nordfors, L., Westholm, A. (1985). Riksdagen och de organiserade intressena, presentation af ett forskningsprojekt, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Uppsala.

2. See "Reflections on where the theory of neo-corporatism has gone and where the praxis of neo-corporatism may be going", pp. 260-261, in G. Lehmbruch & P. C. Schmitter (eds.) (1982). Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, London & Beverly Hills: Sage.

3. M. Olson (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations, Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities, New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

4. M. Olson (1990). How bright are the Northern Lights? Some Questions about Sweden, Lund & London: Lund University Press & Chartwell-Bratt.