In an international perspective Sweden appears to have unusually numerous and powerful interest organizations. Moreover, these organizations are thought to enjoy considerable influence over public policy (Cawson 1986, 99). Yet hitherto we have lacked general-level explanations for this relativelyunique situation. A partial explanation is that a labor movement characterized by a strongly reformist orientation, and by ethnic and religious homogeneity as well, tends to produce corporative political institutions due to the inherent negotiational and organizational logic which such a movement possesses (Rothstein 1987). Another argument is that corporatism, as a system of political representation, had already acquired legitimacy in Swedish political culture before representative democratic government was introduced (Rothstein 1991). A third explanation is that the state (here treated as certain gifted and strategically situated politicians) structured some of the most important social reform programs in such a manner as to strengthen the position of critical interest organizations in Swedish politics (Rothstein 1990). This last argument implies that the strength of interest organizations may be considered the result of concrete

Resumé

The question addressed in this article is how to explain major intentional changes in national political systems. The theoretical point of departure is that political systems are usually so tightly structured that the prospects of actors introducing such changes are very small. The argument put forward is that only under certain periods of crisis can such changes occur: it is only during such formative moments that political actors change the institutional parameters or the nature of the 'game'. Empirically, the article extends this argument in an attempt to explain why Sweden's political system became highly corporatist. It has been shown that from a rationalistic approach, collective action - e.g. why individuals join and support interest organizations - is difficult to explain. Instead, an institutional explanation is offered. The empirical analysis shows how centrally placed politicians in Sweden during the 19305, by changing the payoffs, could solve the 'free-rider' problem for both farmers' and workers' interest organizations. Contrary to earlier studies, the analysis shows that the breakthrough of corporatist principles in Swedish politics took place under a Liberal government strongly supported by the Conservative Party. The traditional connection between the Swedish Social Democrats and the corporatist nature of Swedish politics is thus questioned and the alliance between the Social Democrats and the Farmers' League in 1933 is given a new explanation.

political decisions, rather than a functional effect of such extra-political factors as the logic and tempo of class formation, or various other cultural, ethnic, and religious factors. The structure and behavior of the state thereby become central explanatory factors. In this context, the question is in what measure state action has furthered the growth and power of interest organizations (Lange 1987, 50 f.). This article is devoted to an investigation of this question.

Collective Action and Individual Rationality

This study's theoretical point of departure is that political systems are usually so tightly structured that the prospects that actors may introduce significant changes are very small. The playing field, the rules of the game, the resources of the players - the institutional order, in other words - is at any one point in time a given, and so the political actors' room for maneuver is extremely limited. Under normal conditions, therefore, the possibilities of fundamentally changing the structure of the political system are small to non-existent. Yet political systems nonetheless change, at times both rapidly and thoroughly. During certain special periods marked by mounting social and economic conflicts and crises, it appears that possibilities of changing the rules of the political game arise. These formative moments of political history are distinguished by the fact that existing political institutions so incapacitated as to be incapable of handling the crisis. In these situations, I argue, political actors can not only play the game, but can also change the rules. Political actors, in other words, are able to shape the political institutions of the future, at times even by prescribing rules favoring themselves (Rothstein 1990; cf. Cerny 1990, 4 ff.; Tsebelis 1990).

In this respect organizations are treated as a problem. Alternatively, it may consider that, irrespective of who or what caused the crisis, organizations are necessary partners in handling it. In this respect organizations are treated as part of the solution. Which approach the state adopts is critical, not just for how the crisis is managed, but also for what character relations between the state and interest organizations take in the future (Cerny 1990 part 1; cf. Olsen 1983). A central problem facing every interest organization is that the benefits issuing from the organization's activity - a higher price or wage level, for instance - typically fall to non-members as well as to members. This obviously renders membership less attractive; indeed, joining the organization such conditions verges on the irrational, since so-called free-riding is an available option (Olson 1965, 132). Thus, severe institutional may prevent collective action even when individuals would profit by it. The emergence of strong collective interest organizations is therefore fundamentally mysterious, at least from a perspective seeking to explain individuals' economic and political behavior in terms of their self-interest (Bendor & Mookherjee 1987). Explaining how strong interest organizations arose in Sweden is therefore a theoretical challenge in itself. For one thing, the socio-economic structure of Swedish society is not so unlike that of other countries as to make plausible a structural explanation based on the assumption that Swedish wage-earners, farmers or businessmen act according to a calculus of rationality in kind from that employed by their counterparts in the rest of the world. In addition, it has recently been demonstrated that purely actor-based, so-called game theoretical models fail to explain how voluntary collective organizations come into being (Bianco & Bates 1990; Bendor & Mookherjee 1987). Furthermore, it has been shown that even when such organizations arise (on what may seem to be the basis of non-rational behavior) they are highly unstable, as their members face the constant temptation to quit and thus draw benefit from the organization's operations without helping to defray its costs (Lange 1987). To explain how collective action can - despite its elements of irrationality and instability - arise on a large scale, these authors have begun to search for the explanation in institutional rather than actor-based terms. For example, they have investigated how systems of sanctions against those refusing to cooperate (the free-riders) can be arranged, while corresponding reward systems for those joining the organization solidaristic) are established. The problem, in essence, is how to create institutional conditions that change individuals' calculus of rationality (and in time their norms) when assessing whether or not cooperation and organization are in their interests (Bianco & Bates 1990, 133 f.; Rothstein 1990; Cerny 1990, 85).

The Formative Moment in Sweden

To the extent that Swedish corporatism is an institutional arrangement affecting individual assessments, when did it arise? It is widely agreed that the 1930s was a highly significant decade for the long-term character of Swedish politics. Analysts have pointed in particular to the breakthrough of majority parliamentarism in 1933 - with the agreement between the Social Democratic Party and the Farmers' League - and the 1938 settlement between the employers' confederation and the trade unions over the rules of the game in the labor market (Korpi 1983; Katzenstein 1985; Weir & Skocpol 1985). If Sweden is stamped by a corporatist and collectivist democratic ideal, it is above all associated with these agreements the major driving force behind which is considered to be Swedish Social Democracy.

milk market as a result. Earlier, the farmers located near the cities and market towns had, by virtue of their relatively small number, been able to form supply cartels and thereby fetch a uniform price in the market for socalled milk. A highly perishable commodity such as milk could not, in view of the technology of the day, be transported over especially long distances. Dairy farmers located near cities had therefore escaped competition. The conditions of competition changed suddenly, however, when trucks were introduced into the Swedish countryside. Now farmers located much further from the cities could undersell their more favorably situated colleagues. These so-called free suppliers, or 'bucket carriers' to use a more common term, supplied a competition that was ardently despised both by farmers active in the cooperatives and by those who, at a high price, had bought properties near the larger communities and had reckoned with being able to obtain a high price for their milk. Furthermore, at this point not only were individuals in competition with one another, but the breakdown of the export of butter forced different cooperative dairies to compete with one another as well, because national coordination and leadership did not exist. What cooperation did occur was not merely rudimentary, but also notoriously unstable (Seyler 1983, 170 f.).

in each individual case, levy a charge on unorganized producers, so that no individual farmer would - in view of distance, herd size, etc. - find it worthwhile to transport milk to a purchasing center and sell it at a price below that established by SAL and the state. A portion of the revenues collected, moreover, would go not to the Ministry of Agriculture but directly to SAL, in order to help fund that organization's activities (Hellström 1976, 370 ff.). This proposal was essentially a demand to enroll all producers in the organization on a compulsory basis. It would be accomplished not by enforcing a formal legal rule, but rather by employing a power of economic compulsion resting on the favoritism of the state. Even those refusing to join the organization would be forced to contribute toward defraying its expenses, as though they were members. SAL had earlier tried to establish a producer cooperative supply monopoly for other agricultural goods as well, but such efforts had not been particularly successful due to insufficient voluntary enrollment. The reason for this was that 'farmer individualism was too deeply rooted in the Swedish countryside. If the organizing of farmers were to be an appropriate means of combating the crisis, the assistance of the state's coercive power was required' (Thullberg 1974, 161; cf. Thullberg 1979, 51). The Liberal Minister of Agriculture, himself a farmer and prominent member of the cooperative movement, endorsed SAL's proposal enthusiastically, indeed wrote the greater part of the proposition, which was approved with great haste in the parliament's eleventh hour, on 10 June 1932 (Hellström 1976, 374 ff.). There are several reasons for dwelling on this debate, but particularly since the matter came to be viewed (including the participants of the time) as a break with the previously accepted view of the state's relation to interest organizations, and accordingly a turning-point in the history of corporatism in Swedish democracy.

The 1932 Debate on Milk Prices

The foremost supporters of this proposal to collectivize the Swedish class of farmers forcibly were the governing Liberals, although necessary parliamentary was garnered from the Farmers' League and from the greater part of the Conservative Party as well. Supporters argued that the severity of the crisis called for extraordinary measures and so previously established political principles would have to yield. But some bourgeois parliamentarians also offered interesting principled arguments against individualism the free competition of the market. The Minister of Agriculture thus argued:

Those who earlier lived in the vicinity of cities and towns could probably be said to have enjoyed a sort of monopoly on the sale of milk to these towns. Now, however, it is possible to transport milk quickly and cheaply over long distances. And in certain parts of the country, where farmers had been able to achieve a relatively satisfactory price for milk - on account of how milk suppliers within the districts surrounding each town joined forces and held together - trucks laden with milk from other districts further afield suddenly appeared. As a result, the price of milk fell rapidly [Parliamentary minutes, lower chamber (LC) 1932-59, 14; compare upper chamber (UC) 1932-49, 23].

free tradesmen - that is, independent farmers who refuse to become members of the dairy organizations concerned -are placed by the fee in a situation which, even if it does not immediately drive them by force into these organizations, nonetheless works in such a direction with time (ibid. p. 45).

ministrative and private arbitrariness'. The proposition further meant, in the view of this unquestioned authority on the subject, that the ancient sole right of the Swedish people to tax themselves (through their parliament) had been set at nought. The fundamental law of the realm, in Reuterskold's view, set clear limits to corporatism in Swedish politics.

he said, which would come to affect the posture adopted toward such questions by future parliaments (UC 1932-49, 20). It should also be added that Reuterskold cannot be said to have attempted to use the constitutional argument to stop crisis aid to the farmers. On the contrary, he strongly supported such assistance, but demanded that it be accomplished in forms compatible with the fundamental law of the realm, and submitted a proposition his own aimed at achieving this. His proposal suffered the drawback, however, that while it featured help to farmers struck by the depression, it included no support for the creation of a producer-controlled organizational monopoly.

The Link to the Labor Market

What makes the milk price debate deserving of the label 'formative moment' is that the principles expressed in this debate had direct implications another of the time's most burning issues, namely the relation of the state to the trade union movement. This question, which generally went under the name of 'third party rights', had been a perpetual source of contention between Social Democracy and the bourgeois parties since the turn of the century. Since the middle of the 1920s the Conservatives in particular had carried on an intensive campaign to ensure that 'neutral' parties need not be damaged by the industrial actions of trade unions. Especially controversial was the demand of the Conservative Party and the Farmers' League that strike-breakers be reckoned as 'neutrals', and therefore entitled to the protection of the state in their efforts to work at wages lower than those accepted by the trade unions. The Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen, or LO) had of course strongly opposed legislation, as it would seriously limit that organization's effectiveness 1989, 63).

the tråde unions (Unga 1976). And sure enough, Reuterskold himself had
drawn this parallel in his speech during the parliamentary debate on
supporting agriculture:

unorganized with the greatest possible courtesy and kindness, when it comes to checking their declarations and collecting their dues' (UC 1932— 49, 15). Many Social Democratic MPs expressed surprise over the fact that the bourgeois parties, which so warmly and for so long had recommended the virtues (albeit in another economic sector) of 'free labor', now trod these sacred principles underfoot, and, moreover, treated the provisions of the fundamental law with the most unceremonious disregard (UC 1932-49, 17, 51. 61 f.). Gustav Moller, the once and future Minister of Social Affairs, asserted that this was, to his knowledge, the first time parliament had approved the forcible organization of Swedish citizens; but this did not, in his estimation, constitute a reason for rejecting the proposal. On the contrary, he declared, 'the idea that the state should force citizens to adopt certain organizational measures awakens in me the warmest sympathy'. He did not desire any 'society of general coercion', yet in certain situations the 'general welfare' required that measures of this sort be adopted (UC 1932-49, 51). He further emphasized, as did Sköld and Reutersköld, the significance of the precedent that had now been established, but stressed - in contrast to the last-mentioned, gentleman - its positive character. If the state could contribute actively to the organization of agriculture, then it could in similar fashion favor the organizing efforts of the trade unions.

Economic Theories vs. Interest Politics

Before 1932, the bourgeois had propagated intensively for the view that the solution to unemployment lay in lowering wages. The argument, in accordance with the precepts of neoclassical economics, was that the trade unions had, on the strength of their monopoly over the supply of labor power, driven wages to an 'unnaturally' high level and that the total pool of wages did not therefore suffice to furnish all takers with work. Hence, economic recovery demanded not only that wages be lowered but also that unions be weakened (Unga 1976 chs 5 and 8; Lewin 1984, 169). In opposition this notion, the Social Democrats had from 1930 begun to argue that the only way to surmount the crisis was to boost the purchasing power of wage-earners - the so-called purchasing power theory. It is important to recall here that wage policy is the hub of the trade union movement. A wage cut forced through by state policy always saps the strength of trade unions, while a wage hike has the opposite effect. The policies called for by opposing economic theories therefore had direct implications for the strength of the interest organizations. As Nils Unga has shown, it was not any new insight in economic theory, but rather solicitude for the union movement's organizational preconditions which motivated the Social

Democratic adoption of the purchasing power theory in 1930, even although
this theory of course figured heavily in Social Democratic rhetoric (Unga
1976 ch. 10; Therborn 1988).

enterprise in agriculture after 10 June 1932: 'individualism's time was past.
With the approval of the regulation of milk, . . . this view had been
enshrined in law' (Thullberg 1979, 53). The ease with which the bourgeois
parties shed their individualist liberalism in 1932 suggests that a collectivist
view of state and society has older and deeper roots in Swedish politics
(Rothstein 1991).

The Crisis Agreement of 1932 - a Question of the State and the Organizations

The logic behind the unexpected crisis agreement of June 1933 between the Social Democrats and the Farmers' League has been interpreted by earlier researchers in a strikingly uniform manner. Scholars with roots in altogether different theoretical traditions have agreed on a game theoretical type of explanation and have stressed the superior parliamentary skills and negotiating strategies of certain politicians (Lewin 1984; Therborn 1988). Yet this explanation supplies no tenable answer as to why these skills came to be employed just for achieving an alliance with the Farmers' League and not, as would have been more natural, with some other party. If, instead of focusing on the parliamentary nimbleness of individual actors, we examine the relation of the parties to the institutional objectives of different organized class interests, the answer to the riddle of the 1933 agreement becomes apparent. The key to the answer may be found in the special relation of Social Democracy to the trade union movement and in the similar connection of the Farmers' League to their cooperative movement.

Social Democracy's success in the 1932 election resulted in that party's formation of a minority government; Per-Edvin Sköld became Minister of Agriculture. For the Farmers' League, it was naturally a matter of the keenest interest just what stance the Social Democratic government would adopt toward the recently passed agricultural price supports. It was feared the Social Democrats would abolish the state support not just to agriculture as such, but above all to the organizing efforts of the cooperative movement, which had entered a particularly sensitive phase (Thullberg 1974). When the new government submitted its first proposition on support for farming in the Fall of 1932, however, it became clear that the Social Democratic leadership had greatly changed its views and had now accepted, save for some minor details, state support for the farmers' interest organizations. One of the reasons why the Social Democrats no longer preached the free trade gospel was that this line had been overtaken by events, now that even Great Britain - the last bastion of free trade - had imposed restrictions on imports (Thullberg 1974, 160 f.). Another reason for leaving agricultural

support undisturbed was that Sköld realized the prospects were slight for replacing the agricultural associations with state agencies as administrators of the milk regulations. He wrote in the proposition that it was important that the levying of fees 'be brought into closer correspondence with general legal principles'. By this he meant the proceeds of the fees should not be considered to belong to the producers' organization, but should instead be seen legally as state property. Furthermore, such revenues ought to be collected and administered by state agencies, which in addition to determining level of the charge, should be able to decide over reductions and exemptions in individual cases. But such a change was not to occur. In the government bill, Sköld wrote:

From this viewpoint it is clear that the present arrangement - in which private organizations collect and administer the fees - should be abolished, and that this collection and administration be assumed by state agencies. Since an organ for these tasks already exists in the form of the Swedish Association of Dairies, however, it is inappropriate for practical reasons to undertake such a re-organization. The arrangement of the fee system according to the principles indicated seems therefore not to constitute a hindrance to His Majesty's Government's wish to conclude an agreement with this organization, according to which the latter shall, under public control and in return for a certain compensation - which shall be covered by the revenues generated from the charges - attend to the collection and administration of the fees (Proposition 1933-258, 42).

Sköld also agreed to the use of a portion of the fees for the 'promotion of organizational work in the dairy business, propaganda and suchlike' (ibid. p. 39). There was probably an additional motivation on the Social Democrats' for retaining the agricultural regulations intact - namely a strategic one. In the parliamentary debate on support to agriculture in February 1933 (four months before the crisis agreement). Sköld declared that the bourgeoisie had no reason to show malicious pleasure at the aboutface the Social Democrats in regard to agricultural policy. Instead, the new situation should serve as food for thought for the bourgeois parties, as to 'whether on the other side as well one must, in the present serious situation, revise principles that have proved incompatible with an effective assault on the present crisis - I have in mind especially measures for combating unemployment' (UC 1933-13, 7). Sköld stressed that the Social Democrats stood for the principle that the state should treat all social groups alike. It is certainly not too much to say that Per-Edvin Sköld, by structuring agricultural support as he did in the Fall of 1932, offered a direct strategic invitation to link the principles for agricultural support and for unemployment policy. This was, in fact, noted sympathetically by the Farmers' League's speaker in the debate, Axel Pehrsson i Bramstorp (Nyman 1947, 93).

The structure of farming support revealed certain points in common
with the problems experienced by the trade union movement. From the
standpoint of Social Democracy and the trade unions, the problem with

the state unemployment policy, as it had been formed by the bourgeois parliamentary majority (including the Farmers' League), was that it threatened organizing efforts of the labor movement in three different and cumulatively decisive ways. First, the Unemployment Commission (AK) could refer unemployed laborers to boycotted workplaces. This directly undermined the effectiveness of the strike weapon. Second, the bourgeois parliamentary majority had enjoined the AK systematically to underbid the tråde unions, by paying wages below the level specified in union contracts. Third, the bourgeois unemployment policy was an intentional granting of support to only about half the unemployed, the purpose being to hold down the general wage level. Taken together, these comprised a direct threat to the unions' most important power resource, namely their monopoly over the supply of labor power - or, in other words, the labor movement's ethic of solidarity (Rothstein 1986, 111 f.). This approach was, as Skold rightly observed, diametrically opposed to the bourgeois policy in the agricultural field, for it built on the idea that the crisis could be resolved by weakening interest organizations.

The community of interests between the Social Democrats and the the Farmers' League consequently lay above all in their view of the state's relation to the interest organizations most closely allied to the parties and from which the parties drew, or came to draw, their foremost support. The agreement in June 1933 meant that all three threats posed by the Unemployment Commission towards the union movement were dismantled (Rothstein 1986). Thus, the manner in which previous research has portrayed agreement (e.g., Lewin 1984, 180 f; cf. Weir & Skocpol 1985), as simply a parliamentary exchange of different types of monetary support (duties on butter in return for increased expenditure on unemployment policy), gives a quite false picture of its primary content. Social Democracy and the Farmers' League were joined above all in their view of the relation of interest organizations to the state, for they regarded the former not as obstacles, but as instruments for solving the economic crisis. They were also united in their collectivist view of democracy, in which the good of the individual depends on his/her solidarity with organized class interests (cf. Olsen 1990).

It should, however, be underlined that the agreement between the SAP and the Farmers' League was made possible also by a couple of structural factors outside the reach of the contemporary political actors. As Luebbert pointed out in his fascinating comparative study about the establishment of political regimes in interwar Europe, all countries where a Social Democratic was established had the following common denominators. First, there was an historical inability on the part of the urban middle class to establish itself as a hegemonic political force (as was the case in e.g. Britain and France). Second, the alliance between the labor movement and

the farmers was facilitated by the former's inability, or unwillingness, to organize the rural proletariat (agrarian laborers and/or smallholders dependent on the labor market) as a force against the economic interests of the family-operated farms. Should that have occurred, an alliance between organized labor and organized farmers would have been highly unlikely. If the Social Democrats were to have become engaged in a rural class conflict, an agreement with the farmers would have been difficult to reach. In the aliberal countries where the labor movement did organize the rural proletariat (e.g. Germany, Italy and Spain), the family peasantry was driven into the arms of the fascist movements (Leubbert 1991). As Lindstrom has pointed out, the fear of rising fascist tendencies probably also played a role among both parties' elites, forcing them to reach an agreement in order to prove the viability of parliamentary democracy (Lindstrom 1985, 166). Yet, while these structural and ideological factors are indeed important, they do not by themselves explain the specific corporatist nature and rationale of the compromise that took place in Sweden in 1933.

One may well wonder whether the Farmers' League might have reached as favorable a settlement if, in traditional fashion, it had sought support from the other bourgeois parties? The new party leader, Pehrsson i Bramstorp, gave the answer in the parliamentary debate on the agreement in June 1933. The reason for turning to the Social Democrats was that one of the bourgeois parties - the smaller of the two liberal parties - still stood by its free market principles and opposed the extended support to agriculture, which after all had taken the form of replacing the market with protectionism and regulations (Thullberg 1977, 302). This small group of urban liberals was the only bourgeois party which, throughout the crisis, held truly and dogmatically to the doctrine of economic liberalism. Consequently, to Pehrsson, there was no stable bourgeois parliamentary over either the short or long term, for a policy securing the interests of the agricultural associations. By striking a deal with the Social Democrats, the Farmers' League could rest assured of a stable, longterm for the organizational efforts of its supporters, especially since it was clear that the Social Democrats - and their trade union supporters in particular - were at least as dependent on the agreement for furthering their organizational endeavors as were the League and its allies.

Choosing Institutions in a Formative Moment

The result of the crisis agreement, then, was that the state attempted to
master the economic crisis by cooperating with, and offering strong support
to, the interest organizations representing farmers and workers. The representativesof

resentativesofboth movements crafted an institutional solution favoring their future prospects for political influence. They were skillful not only in the short term; their actions proved to be wise for the long term as well, for the way in which they re-wrote the rules of the political game came powerfully to favor the organized class interests in whose name they spoke. The result was an enormous increase in the rate of membership in both farmers' associations and trades unions. During the 1930s the unionization rate among industrial workers rose from 63 to 86 percent, and among nonagrarianworkers 45 to 66 percent (Kjellberg 1983, 272, 33). It was during these years that the Swedish trade union movement achieved its internationally unique position of strength. Expressed in numbers, the increase in organization among farmers was also extraordinarily impressive: membership in producer cooperatives rose from 160,000 to 721,000 between 1930 and 1940, an increase of 450 percent. Another example is provided by the tenfold increase in the number of subscribers to the farmers' movement's newspaper during this period (Therborn 1988, 61; Michelletti, 1990, 62 f.). The stability of this arrangement was guaranteed by the formal coalition formed by the two parties in 1936, which was succeeded by the National Unity government of the war years, in which these two parties together held a majority.

The 'formative moment' approach applied in this analysis, in essence, means that the determinism of both the rational choice theory and approaches on socio-economic structures, whether Marxist or not, can be transcended. The analysis proves the statement made by George Tsebelis that choosing institutions is the sophisticated equivalent of choosing (Tsebelis 1990, 162). Choosing institutions in a formative moment means that certain political agents are able to structure the future parameters of the political game. Political actors may, in other words, in fact design political structures.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This essay is based on the research project 'Parliament and the Organized Interests', which
was financed by the Swedish National Bank's Jubilee Fund. I thank Peter Mayers for help
with the language and Klas Åmark and Per Thullberg for valuable comments.

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