

Social Movements, Voluntary Associations and Cycles of Protest in Finland 1905–91

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During the 20th century five cycles of protest have emerged in Finland: 1905–18, 1928–32, 1944–48, 1966–76, and the continuing cycle of new social movements beginning around the end of the 1970s. This article begins with an examination of the differences and similarities in the formation of these cycles against the background of antecedent political opportunity structures. The question of the relationship between social protest movements and formal voluntary associations is then addressed. It is shown that social movements and formal voluntary associations have been interactive, mutually reinforcing ways of reacting to different manifestations of social crisis. Existing formal associations have created the preconditions for the occurrence of protest movements and vice versa: new voluntary associations have been born out of cycles of protest and protest movements. Movements and voluntary associations have also been central in creating pressures for reforming state institutions and thus in developing the Finnish welfare state.

The aim of this article is to examine the formation of social movements and voluntary associations in Finland during the cycles of protest occurring across this century and to identify their similarities and/or differences. Characteristics of protest cycles are treated against the background of existing political opportunity structures. According to Tarrow, it is the 'set of constraints and opportunities that encourage or discourage' collective action and 'lead it towards certain forms rather than others' (1989, 32). Tarrow distinguishes four aspects of this opportunity structure: (1) the extent to which formal political institutions are open or closed to groups on the margins of the polity; (2) the stability or instability of political alignments; (3) the presence or absence of influential allies; and (4) political conflicts within and among elites (Tarrow 1989, 34–35). These aspects are not in themselves explanations of protest movements, but rather conceptual tools which facilitate focusing of research.

Social movements are processes of social protest against prevailing conditions and those that are held responsible for them. Movements are carried by social groupings whose memberships tend to grow while such movements are advancing (cf. Rammstedt 1978, 130). The degree of a movement's organization can vary from loosely organized groupings to formal associations with an internal division of labour and power, formal rules and an

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officially sanctioned legal status. Formal voluntary associations can either constitute moments of development within social movements, or more tightly organized reactions to the same social crisis.

A second question considered in this article is the relationship between social movements and formal associations. This question is addressed, firstly, by investigating the role of the institutionalized system of voluntary associations in the production of protesting social movements and, secondly, by examining the direct and indirect impacts of social movements and the cycles of protest during which such movements are born on the formation of formal voluntary associations.

Finnish Cycles of Protest During the 20th Century

The end of the 1980s witnessed a growth of interest in social and political cycles in sociology and social movement research (see e.g. Buerklin 1987; Tarrow 1987, 1989; Silverman 1985; Brand 1990; Siisiäinen 1990a). Unlike early theories of cyclic development, which saw history as a perpetual fluctuation between rise and fall (e.g. Michels 1966), new theories of social and political cycles are connected with conceptions of a development process stressing the importance of social struggles and conflicts. Cycles in this perspective do not end in a repetition of the conditions preceding the cycle. On the contrary, cycles are seen as vehicles of change or reform in social and political systems.

The concept of a cycle of protest is based on the findings that collective protests are not distributed evenly in time and place but are clustered. During a rising cycle of protest, protest activity spreads to institutionalized organizations, from the centre to the periphery, from the main carrier groups of protest to other sectors of the population (Tarrow 1989, 44–47). Following Tarrow (1989, 48–49) we can note the following operational indicators of protest cycles:

- (1) a cycle will show an increasing and then declining magnitude in the use of disruptive direct action; (2) as the cycle proceeds, collective action is diffused to an increasingly broad spectrum of the public; (3) conflict is diffused across much of the national territory, though not with the same frequency or intensity to all regions; (4) movement organizations become more prominent towards its peak and occupy the field during its declining phase; (5) although conflict forms around people's concrete interests, demands are broadened and transformed into new interpretive frames as the cycle proceeds.

So far, five cycles of protest can be distinguished in Finland during the 20th century: 1905–18, 1928–32, 1945–48, 1966–76, and from 1979 to the present. In 1905–18 the workers' political movement was the dominant political force both in towns and in the countryside. In 1900 there were 69 workers' party associations in Finland, and six years later almost a thousand.

At the same time the total number of members increased from 9135 to 85 027 (Siisiäinen 1990a, 206). After 1907 the movement gained strength ideologically, but suffered a decline in terms of both numbers of associations and members. Then about 1915 it commenced to rise again. In 1916 the Social Democrats won a majority in Parliament, but this was then dissolved by the Tsar. This action weakened trust in the bourgeois political system within the workers' movement and was one of the factors (together with domestic economic and political developments and the effects of the Russian Revolution in 1917) that led to the abortive revolution in 1918 (cf. Alapuro 1988).

The semi-fascist protest in 1928–32 was headed by the Lapua Movement and, after its prohibition, the Patriotic People's Movement (IKL). This movement was based socially on the wealthy peasantry, parts of the bourgeoisie and certain groups of the intelligentsia. Whereas leftist cycles have generally come into being at the start of an economic upswing, the rightist one took place under recession conditions in the late 1920s and early 1930s. During the unsuccessful attempted coup in 1932, the basis for this protest was lost (cf. Siisiäinen 1990a). The same period also saw the growth of populist movements by small-farmers as a reaction to the depression (cf. Helander & Toivonen 1971).

The short-lived left wing cycle of protest following World War II (1944–48) took place at a time when Finnish society was recovering from a general depression in all spheres of life, a depression which lasted, with a few short interruptions, from the 1920s to the end of World War II. Another feature of the situation was that after 20 years, leftist organisations were allowed to function once again. A leftist political turn and efforts to establish a kind of 'people's front' were not, of course, unique phenomena in post-war Europe. The broad coalition of the left in France and the rise of Labour in Britain were variants of the same kind of international political conjuncture (cf. Silverman 1985). In 1944–46 the communist movement was the dominant force in Finnish politics. After this, however, the forces of power were for a short term balanced between the left and right before finally turning to the advantage of the rightist forces under the leadership of J. K. Paasikivi.

The radical cycle of protest of the 1960s (1966–76) rose together with a growth in prosperity accompanied by a rapid expansion in the number of university students and the new middle classes. In Finland, as in other Western countries, students were the main carriers of the protest. Radical movements developed in interaction with other movements, however, especially workers' movements, and then diffused to other parts of the social movement and association sectors (cf. Siisiäinen 1990a, 1990b).

The 'new social movements' of the 1970s and 1980s appeared later in Finland than in most other developed European countries. Women's

movements entered the stage around the middle of the 1970s, first appearing among students and Swedish-speaking women belonging to the new middle classes (Jallinoja 1983). Students and the new middle classes have in fact been the main social basis for all new social movements of the 1980s and early 1990s. The first impressive ecological demonstration, for example, took place in 1979. At the beginning of the 1990s, however, it looked as if the sting was taken out of this protest as an insurgent movement. Rather, it had for the most part been institutionalized both as a green party and through the adoption of issues by existing institutions and associations.

Political Opportunity Structure and Finnish Cycles of Protest

Open vs. Closed Political Institutions

On the basis of previous studies, it can be argued that protests and insurgent movements generally arise in situations (often connected with economic upswings) when doors to new opportunities have begun to be opened for groups that were previously isolated (cf. Eisinger 1973; Tarrow 1989). In Finland this was clearly the case for the 1905, 1944 and 1966 cycles of protest.

After the General Strike in 1905 the Finnish workers' movement, equipped with its socialist programme, was able to utilize the concessions made by the Russian authorities after the war was lost to Japan to strengthen its own position (e.g. regarding possibilities to found new workers' associations and push for parliamentary reform). The same was true also for bourgeois movements arising at about the same time and challenging the prevailing system. Finland may be quite typical of small nations in this regard, i.e. domestic class conflicts and international factors have usually been intertwined in the opening up of new opportunities.

Autumn 1944 is an important case in this latter respect: at this point it became possible for the banned communist movement and its allies (associations of the People's Democratic Union) to start up again after almost 25 years underground. One reason for their success can be found in the changed international situation and in the real or imagined support for the communist movement from the Soviet Union. The other side of the coin, however, was the fact that those associations which had created the semi-fascist cycle of 1928–32 were now in their turn abolished as 'fascist'. What is felt as an opportunity in one movement, in short, can be an obstacle to its enemy.

The cycle of 1928–32 also demonstrates the importance of open institutional doors for facilitating the rise of a protest movement. In this period semi-fascist movements were able to proceed as long as they remained

within the boundaries of bourgeois institutions. The Lapua Movement was one of the most influential fascist movements in Europe in this regard (cf. Karvonen 1988). If a state is to remain a bourgeois democracy (even in a restricted sense), however, it must eliminate the power of those extreme rightist movements which could lead to a fascist coup d'état. Thus, when the Finnish semi-fascist movement took one step too far to the right, essential doors were closed and previous allies drew apart. This actually put an end to the semi-fascist protest cycle.

The cycle of protest from 1966 to 1976 is also in keeping with the general rule. The 1950s and early 1960s were times of rapid economic fluctuation in Finland (cf. Hjerppe 1988) and during the period politico-ideological moods were not very radical. This was also the case elsewhere in Europe (cf. Silverman 1985, 7). During the 1950s Finland was still recovering from World War II and its main concerns were economic. In the 1960s, however, the situation began to change. International exchange of information and cultural impulses increased very rapidly, so that the international youth culture, largely through television, invaded Finland for the first time. In addition, Finland became an associate member of EFTA. The 1960s was a time when the children of the 'bulge' years (i.e. born between 1945 and 1950) lived their most active youth. This was the first generation to experience improved opportunities of acquiring a university education. The doors to higher education were opened to increasing numbers of young people from the lower social classes, thus broadening the student base at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s somewhat more than previously (cf. Nevala 1991). A political generation consisting mostly of students developed in Finland during this period (Tuominen 1991; Siisiäinen 1990b). The opening up of university administration based on representative principles around the middle of the 1960s was particularly significant in this regard and led to an increase in student influence, especially at the departmental level.

The most important factor in the opening up of political institutions, however, was the rise of a leftist majority in the 1966 parliamentary elections, and a coalition government formed by the parties on the political left and centre, thus bringing to an end a period in opposition which had lasted 18 years for the Communists and eight years for the Social Democrats. This shift towards the left in Finnish politics opened up both of these political parties to newcomers from the student movement as well as political (state and municipal) institutions to issues initiated by youth movements. In conformity with the state-centred tradition of Finnish political culture, the movements of the 1960s and 1970s often addressed their claims to state authorities or to established political institutions. As the political system was now open to these claims, many questions raised by

social movements and organizations led to social and political reforms (cf. Kalela 1989; Siisiäinen 1990a).

During the cycle of the 1970s and 1980s many important ecological themes were placed on the political agenda by the protest movements. In Finland these new movements received much publicity on TV and in the press. Many themes were adopted by the dominant political organizations and existing associations. Only certain radical initiatives and claims exceeding the prevailing repertoire of collective action were clearly rejected (actionist demonstrations, violations of private ownership of forests or shorelines, and so forth). The political system once more proved to be open to new issues, even if much of its functioning was, in fact, only symbolic.

The Stability vs. Instability of Political Alignments

Dramatic changes in political alignments have also tended to bring marginal or unrepresented groups into the political arena. Such changes can most easily be operationalized via electoral behaviour. In Finland parliamentary history goes back to 1906 when Finland acquired a system based on universal suffrage. Within ten years, previously oppressed groups of the industrial proletariat, agricultural labourers and crofters became factors in political power, and the party representing them won a parliamentary majority in 1916. The rightist cycle of 1928–32 similarly took place at a time when the political arena was still in a state of flux on both the right and the left after the Civil War.

After World War II the changes in political alignments were also radical: the Communists became the most powerful political factor in Finnish society, yet remained so for only a few years. Political groups that had been excluded from institutionalized political processes in the 1920s and 1930s exploited the new opportunities as well as they could. The dilemma of Communist ministers in the 'people's front' government immediately after the war was how to prevent rank and file members from going too far in their claims (e.g. the nationalization of industry), which were often supported by their Social Democratic fellows (cf. Parikka 1988; Siisiäinen 1990a). Also on the bourgeois side, relations of power were changed to the advantage of the Agrarian Union (later the Centre Party), which was one of the main forces making for a new, more realistic foreign policy.

In the 1966 elections the Social Democrats and the People's Democratic Union (including the Communists) won a majority in parliament. The result of the elections led to a coalition government based on the Communists, Social Democrats and the Centre. In the 1970 elections the leftist majority changed into a bourgeois one, the central goals of the radical movement were defeated (e.g. university reform), and its earlier allies (the

Centre, the Social Democratic Party, and, in part, the People's Democratic Union) were seen as 'traitors'. A minority of the Communist party began to appear as the only uncompromised institutionalized political organization and thus a political ally for the radical movement in Finland.

As to the 1980 cycle, the situation has remained in general fairly stable. The second half of the 1970s and the 1980s was a time of decline in the communist movement in Finland and of increased strength among the three large parties (the Conservatives, the Centre and the Social Democrats). In the most recent period, in other words, the rise of the new social movements has not been so clearly connected with changes in party political alignments. Probably more important has been the growing estrangement of (young) people from party politics. Nowadays one in four voters do not exercise their right to vote, and in 1987 about 40 percent of the youngest age cohorts admitted to having no party affiliation (cf. EVA 1987; Siisiäinen 1990a).

This tendency has increased during the past two to three years at the same time as there has been a loss of confidence in politicians. From the perspective of the 'political alignment' aspect of the political opportunity structure, this situation opens up prospects for future movements. It is also true that the new 'social movement sector' in Finland began to decline at the turn of the 1990s, but it must be remembered that the movement also started later and that the position of the Greens in parliament has been strengthened, having gained 10 seats out of 200 in the 1991 general election (cf. Berglund 1991).

Political Allies and Conflicts within Political Elites as Opportunities

According to Jenkins & Perrow (1977, 251; cit. Tarrow 1989, 87) 'success comes when there is a combination of sustained outside support and disunity and/or tolerance on the part of political elites'. These conditions were certainly evident in the cycle of 1905–18. The Tsarist system of Russia, for example, had been weakened at the beginning of the 20th century by internal conflicts and the war lost to Japan. The Finnish elite, furthermore, was divided between Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking groups and between those who were more willing to cooperate with the Russians and those who came closer to ideas of independence (also flourishing in the Socialist camp). By the beginning of the 20th century the favourable position of Finnish industry was also threatened by the Russian capitalist and Pan-Slavic movements and this accelerated strivings towards Finnish autonomy within bourgeois circles as well. The achievement of independence required the support of the working class and the landless for the bourgeois-nationalist programme and, hence, as a means to this end, the raising of the (national) consciousness of the masses. These tendencies gave impetus to the rapid diffusion of a network of voluntary associations

among the 'common people' under bourgeois leadership, including those of the workers' movement at the beginning of the 20th century.

The rise of the semi-fascist movements of the 1920s and 1930s was from the very beginning connected with the outside support which they received from certain central social groups (capitalist groupings, the clergy, certain academic groups, and the wealthy peasantry in some regions) and political organizations (sections of the National Coalition and some other political organizations, the Civil Guards and other voluntary military associations). And it is clear that the loss of this support or sympathy led to the collapse of the fascist movement.

Important preconditions for the rise of the communist movement and the temporary success of people's front politics in 1944–46 were the divisions in the former political elite on the one hand and new networks of allies on the other. Finnish dominant groups were split for the simple reason that some elements within them were, in response to Soviet demands, on trial for 'war crimes'. The main subject of dispute was the kind of attitude that bourgeois groups should adopt towards the Soviet Union and the Communists. This question divided the Social Democrats, too. The same factor also had an impact on alliance formation. The protest movements led by the Communists were able to develop a network of voluntary associations to realize their people's front strategy. The development of cooperation with Social Democratic associations and workers in many places was important in this regard. Their activities were also supported (more or less directly, partly politically, partly spiritually) by the presence of the Soviet Control Commission in Finland for a short period immediately after the war.

Again during the 1960s' cycle, international factors played their role. Relations with the Soviet Union were very cool at the beginning of the 1960s and this divided both the bourgeois and the Social Democratic political elite. The Social Democratic Party was split into two independent parties. New coalitions were created in different spheres of the political system. The leftist parliamentary majority and a new government coalition (1966) offered new possibilities for alliances between student and youth movements on the one hand and institutions and the leaders of the three main parties on the other. The development of the cycle of protest also contributed to a process of radicalization within all the political parties. During the upswing of the cycle radical divisions developed in all the major parties. A major 'ally' for the radical movement in its earlier phases was Finnish President Kekkonen, who showed some sympathy for certain tendencies of cultural radicalism, always, however, from the perspective of social integration.

The radical movement proceeded through various phases. It lived its time of cultural radicalism from 1966 to 1967. During the phase of political

leftism (1968–70) the Social Democratic party was felt to be its closest ally among many activists, but many also turned towards the People's Democratic Union (Communists). After 1970 the cycle acquired a more party-political character, a 'proletarian turn' which cut off many previous perspectives and alliance possibilities and directed its mainstream toward the Communist Party. The goals of the movement became more general and absolute – and soon dogmatic (cf. Siisiäinen 1990b; Tarrow 1989; della Porta & Tarrow 1986). At last the only ally left was the orthodox minority of the Communist Party.

It is more difficult to find such clear-cut ally relations for the cycle of the 1970s and 1980s, or its relations to conflicts among the political elites. We can, perhaps, conclude that the late start and modest speed of the cycle were connected with the absence of powerful factors creating allies or splitting elites. One fact, to be dealt with more thoroughly in the next section, is the rupture between the movements of the previous cycle and those of the new social movements. Even though sociological studies (e.g. EVA 1987) have shown that there prevailed, and still prevails, a very favourable 'opinion pool' for the development of new social movements (cf. Snow et al. 1986), the direct advance of 'real' alternative movements has been limited. As to potential alliances, common goals can mostly be found between the Greens and the Left Wing Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto). It is also probable that the supporters of new social movements see corresponding movements all over the world as their allies.

The Interaction Between Social Movements and Formal Associations

In considering social movements there are at least two questions of a general character which may be raised: (1) What is the role of voluntary associations (including party organizations) in the birth of social movements? and (2) What are the impacts of social movements and protest cycles on the system of voluntary associations and, through them, on the state? From the time of Weber and Michels, formal associations and social movements have often been seen as exclusive opposites. In this section their juxtaposition is questioned and they are dealt with as moments of the developmental dialectic of the political system and/or different ways of reacting to social tensions.

The System of Voluntary Associations and the Rise of Social Movements

An examination of Finnish cycles of protest confirms the idea that social movements are born out of 'multi-organizational fields' (cf. Klandermans

1990), and that they bear the mark of national political traditions. As to earlier cycles of protest in Finland, a combination of antecedent social movements and processes contributed to the formation of the preconditions for the protest of 1905–18. Its dominant force, the workers' movement, was preceded by many bourgeois movements and voluntary associations – e.g. educational, cultural, temperance, religious, sports and so forth. According to Irma Sulkunen (1987), the temperance movement was in fact the first workers' movement in Finland. Central activists of the 1905 cycle had been trained earlier in bourgeois associations led by priests, teachers, merchants and burghers. During the Civil War in 1918, both sides – the Reds and the Whites – recruited from various associations and movements.

In large part the same can be said of the rightist cycle of 1928–32. Activists of the Lapua Movement and IKL were often trained in the White Civil Guard, which was an armed organization of 100 000 men (its sister-organization, the Lotta Svärd Association, had even more members), by academic clan organizations (the Academic Karelian Society), and by established political parties (the Conservatives). Although it might not have been officially organized by them, even the rightist terror against communists and socialists was carried out by trained members of rightist organizations. Many of those who participated in violent actions were trained for them in the White Guard during and after the Civil War.

In 1944–48 communist movements and organizations mushroomed. Communist organization and leadership had been very weak during World War II. The party had been founded in 1918 in Moscow and its leaders mostly remained there until the end of World War II. Local party organizations had been banned and activists arrested. However, communist activities continued to smoulder in trade unions, as well as within Social Democratic organizations and other voluntary associations. Thus, notwithstanding organizational weaknesses, the rise of the cycle was very rapid after the war. The movement had also been able to keep its core supporters in many industrial regions and in some rural districts.

In Finland academic Marxist traditions were very weak until the 1960s. There were some student organizations with traditions going back to the first decades of the 20th century. But the leftist parties, especially the Communists, did not in fact have any academic traditions. There were only a few traditional intellectuals as party members, and party influence on the intelligentsia and students was weak. It is illustrative of the beginning of the 1960s, for example, that the journal of the socialist student organization ceased to appear for some years. The 1966–76 cycle of protest started among academics, young intellectuals and students. It was initiated at the level of ideas via the cultural radicalism and modernism of the late 1950s and early 1960s, but the boom occurred during the structural changes in the 1960s. The first new-type movement was the Finnish Committee of

One Hundred, which was founded in 1963 and soon followed by a few so-called 'one-issue movements' on behalf of such issues as sexual equality, social welfare, traffic. Traditional student associations, especially those run by social scientists, also began a more critical and radical phase mediating international radical ideas at the end of the 1960s.

Because the links between traditional leftist organizations and intellectuals were weak, the role of existing organizations in buttressing the protest movement of the 1960s was not as strong as in some other European countries. For the same reason, leftist organizations did not compete strenuously with the other movements for members and did not operate in the same field. Competition came later in the 1970s. There were also strong conservative traditions in the Finnish academic world. Many professors during the 1960s were former members of the 'ardently Finnish' Academic Karelia Society, for example.

The discontinuity of academic traditions and the lack of academic Marxism were among the main ideological reasons which later led the Finnish movement into an orthodox Soviet-type ideological direction. Political traditions probably explain a part of this development: in Finland the central conflicts since the Civil War have always included a Soviet (or Russian) component. For the extreme political right the threat has always come from the East, for the extreme left the Soviet connection has been either a potential source of support or a more or less invisible ally. Thus the patterns of political conflict and protest have often tended to acquire an ideological colouring, filtered through these traditions.

As to the protests which started at the end of the 1970s, the links with antecedent movements and associations can clearly be seen even though such continuity was not as direct or clear-cut as in many other countries (cf. Berger 1979; Tarrow 1989). Three different types of new social movements can be used for illustrative purposes here: (1) new middle-class movements with a national character (the Green party; EVY, i.e. the Finnish anti-nuclear movement; and the feminist movement); (2) local (middle-class) citizen initiatives for the conservation of nature and the environment; and (3) local citizen initiatives carried out by 'mixed' social groups (the middle classes, farmers, summer cottagers).

Studies of the Finnish Greens and EVY have shown that their social base resides in the new middle classes and students (Lampinen 1984; EVA 1987).¹ The best example of a Finnish alternative movement is EVY, founded in 1977. In 1981 55 percent of its members were 20–30 years of age, half of its members lived in the province of Uusimaa (around Helsinki), and 41 percent were academic people (Lampinen 1984, 32–35). The movement's members were not isolated persons but held many memberships in other voluntary associations; only 6 percent of them were without any other memberships as against 24 percent of the whole population in 1986

(Lampinen 1984, 39; Siisiäinen 1991, 16). Fifteen percent were members of political parties, and 26 percent of the social assistance arms of charity associations, etc. (Lampinen 1984, 39). In 1984, by comparison, 27 percent of Green municipal councillors had previously been members of other parties: 17 percent in the Social Democratic Party, 13 percent in the National Coalition (the Conservatives), 25 percent in the People's Democratic Union (& Communists), and 21 percent in the Liberal Party (Jalonen 1986, 47).

The first new feminist movements were founded from 1973 onwards. In 1976, with the end of the earlier cycle of protest, these movements became stronger and the revival of earlier women's organizations also took place. It was easier to develop feminist movements among the Swedish-speaking middle class where the grip of party political and dogmatic movements during the earlier cycle was not so firm. As observed in other European countries (cf. Tarrow 1989), the creation of new social movements in Finland must also be seen against the background of the 1966–76 cycle. The dogmatic turn of the earlier cycle and the dominance of its leading organizations retarded and weakened the first wave of a number of new movements in Finland. They were thus partly subordinated to new movement paradigms, but nonetheless remained a negative indication of the influence of older movements and associations on new movements. This peculiarity has in many ways affected the movements of the 1970s and 1980s: (1) it has been more difficult for (ex)radicals who stayed on in an orthodox Marxist–Leninist movement to join the new alternative movements as activists or 'ideologues'; (2) it is probably one of the reasons for the vagueness of social and political analysis in the new Finnish movements and for an almost total lack of Marxist analysis and 'red' colouring within the Finnish Green movement.

However, when the new movements at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s arose, the promoters and activists were often people with a background in earlier movements and voluntary associations. Many prominent leaders of the early green movement had a liberal background. Young people with a leftist (often People's Democratic Union) background were active in founding a vegetarian restaurant and association in Turku in 1979 (cf. Järviö et al. 1982, 5). In alternative social policy projects (such as self-help programmes) in the 1980s, many organizers were part of the 1968 generation (cf. Matthies 1990).

One indication of the importance of the system of voluntary associations is that registered voluntary associations have generally organized even the most dramatic and untraditional movements, for example the majority of struggles for the conservation of natural or city environments (cf. Litmanen 1990). The same also holds true for Finnish squatters: registered associations can be found behind the majority of occupations of buildings during

the 1980s (Eronen 1990). The most famous of these organizations is probably the Oranssi ry ('Orange') movement, connecting more than 500 young 'members'. Activists in Oranssi are young people of 13–28 years of age, some of them students, others working adults. A large proportion of the 'members' are 'multi-activists' trained in the peace movement, nature conservation movements, the Shell boycott movement, and similar movements (Eronen & Ristimäki 1991, 29).

The third type of movement consists of citizen initiatives in both urban and rural areas. It is typical of both types of movement that activists command a large amount of cultural, social and organizational capital. In the 1970s political organizations, especially leftist associations, were often among the organizers of these movements. For example, in Helsinki the 'quarter 358 movement' in a worker residential area was organized by a local Communist party organization. Also in many other environmental struggles in the 1970s political organizations played a central role (cf. Sinko 1976).

During the 1980s many campaigns has been carried out in rural districts against potential ecological catastrophes feared by local people. In these movements the activists had usually been trained in parties or other associations. Quite often the social basis was a combination of local political activists (e.g. party activists), threatened occupational groups (e.g. fishermen), local intelligentsia (often teachers) and summer cottagers (who often have a high social status and command of cultural capital) (cf. Litmanen 1990; Häivälä & Janatuinen 1983; Lätti 1987). In cases where only local ecological systems have been threatened, citizen initiatives often cannot be classified as 'new' social movements at all, and neither do the participants themselves identify their activities as a part of an ecological movement (Lätti 1987, 59).

Protest Movements and the System of Voluntary Associations

The impact of social protest movements on the development of voluntary associations is twofold: first, in Finnish history expanding social movements have always led to the foundation of a plethora of associations as part of their developmental cycle; and secondly, towards the peak of a protest cycle, the spirit of protest has also 'infected' many previously existing associations.

All cycles of protest have resulted in an increase in the number of new voluntary associations. Around the General Strike of 1905 Finland was united into a political and ideological whole by a flood of different kinds of voluntary associations. After 1905 the protest spread from the Socialist movement to other ally organizations at an accelerating rate leading up to the revolution of 1918. The period was highly political. Before the revol-




Fig. 1. Registration of New Voluntary Associations in Finland 1919–89. (The figure is based on the register of associations which was founded in 1919. Associations from the earlier period were registered at the beginning of the 1920s, which to a large extent explains the first peak in 1920–21.)

ution, both parties which sought to set up a dominant hegemonic bloc (Red vs. White) were grouped around the 'organic' movements of the main classes. This brought about a bipolarization of interest organizing and associations: as the cycle developed, more associations joined the workers' movement or were split into the bourgeois and socialist organizations. This division continued long after the Civil War and its remnants can still be found in a modified form in the voluntary organization sector in the 1990s.

An overview of the formation of new associations after the Civil War is contained in Figure 1. As we see, the semi-fascist cycle of 1928–32 reached its peak in terms of association formation (1930–31) when rightist movements registered their local organizations. Ultra-rightist influences were transmitted to some of the rightist student organizations, clan associations and youth associations. At about the same time, however, more than 3000 leftist associations were abolished, so that no real increase in associations took place. The spirit of the cycle is manifest in the large share of military associations of all those registered – as much as 12 percent in the 1920s. This is reflected in the comparatively large percentage of 'war and peace' associations for the 1919–44 period as indicated in Table 1.

The 1944–48 cycle, by comparison, gave birth to a large number of associations on the left (e.g. 2500 organizations of the People's Democratic Union & Communists) and the so-called 'associations of democratic cooperation' between the communists and other political forces (e.g. the Finnish-Soviet friendship societies; the Finnish Peace Defenders, sport clubs of the Workers' Sports Union (TUL), etc.). Communist influence on other

Table 1. Registration of Different Types of Voluntary Associations in Finland 1919–89 (in percent).

Type of Association	1919–44	1945–64	1965–79	1980–89	1919–89
Political	21	26	27	13	23
Economic and professional	31	31	28	22	29
Social welfare	5	5	6	7	6
Culture and education	7	10	10	18	10
Sports	8	8	8	16	10
Other hobbies	10	10	12	14	11
Religion and conviction	4	2	2	2	2
War and peace	9	2	4	2	4
International	—	2	1	2	1
Other	5	4	3	3	4
Sum	100	100	100	100	100
N	28 680	43 820	34 335	22 432	12 9267
Associations/year	1 103	2 200	2 300	2 243	1 821

associations was restricted to trade unions, certain Social Democratic organizations and old workers' hobby associations and temperance associations. On the other hand, the system of voluntary association was also thoroughly renewed on the bourgeois side. The high leftist peak in 1946–48 is also moderated by the fact that almost 3000 rightist associations were prohibited. The formation of substitute associations for the banned ones can be seen in the formation of many non-leftist associations at the end of the 1940s and at the turn of the 1950s. It can therefore justifiably be said that it was only at the beginning of the 1950s that the development interrupted by the Civil War could continue according to democratic principles.

The next peak in association formation, occurring from 1972 to 1976, is a result of the 1966–76 cycle of protest.² The cycle not only activated leftist associations, but also had a general activating impact on the opposing sector. Bourgeois student organizations, for example, developed in quite close interaction with the leftist ones (cf. Siisiäinen 1988). The partisan development of this protest cycle peaked in 1972 and thus represented a decisive step in its 'proletarianization'. It was only then that communist voluntary associations started to flood *en masse* onto the political scene. Previous allies (real or potential) were distanced from each other and the leading force – the Communist youth and student movement – began turning into a more orthodox and dogmatic organization. This made it more difficult to negotiate issues with other ideological movements, or with the dominant political institutions.

From the perspective of the leading movement, the boundary between supportive and opposing sectors (cf. Klandermans 1990) in this period began to run between organizations allied with the minority of the CP and all other organizations. In Italy, according to della Porta and Tarrow (cf. della Porta 1987; della Porta & Tarrow 1986), this kind of competitive situation led some extremist organizations along the road to terrorism. In Finland, by comparison, competition led to the foundation of hundreds of new associations. It is somehow typical of Finnish political culture that, in politically and ideologically difficult times, movement activists try to beat their competitors by bureaucratic organizational methods, founding new organizations as proof of the strength of the movement. Final decline awaited this movement at the end of the 1970s.

The same kind of development can be seen in all the ally associations of the radical movement. Large segments of the national student federations (both in secondary schools and universities) were 'captured' by young communists and their allies in the course of the 1970s. Following a general trend of the protest cycle, the largest youth organization in Finland, *Teiniliitto* (Teenagers' Federation), which united all secondary school pupils from 15 to 18 years of age, began a process of transformation from an expressive leisure association to a radical movement. It was firstly politicized under the leadership of the young communists and then around the middle of the decade drifted into a crisis which it could not manage and was finally officially abolished with the aid of its public opponents (cf. Tirkkonen 1987). The same holds true for many other ally organizations of the communist movement: many student organizations, the bureaucratically organized peace movement, Finnish-Soviet friendship societies (in the 1980s), and many 'progressive' organizations of professionals (teachers, doctors and social workers, artists). Traditional associations which only to a lesser degree had been infected (some Christian student and cultural associations) could more easily turn back onto their traditional courses.

One important impact of protest movements on voluntary associations was the training of active cadres by the movements which political parties and other organizations received as members from the beginning of the 1970s onwards. This can clearly be seen, for example, in the membership of the Finnish Communist Party. A study made in 1987 shows that 82 percent of the academic members of the CPF had joined the party in the 1970s. When the cycle of protest was over the flood of academic members also stopped (Valvee 1987, 20). The same also holds true for certain other associations (cf. Siisiäinen 1990a).

In comparison with earlier cycles, the changes in the development of voluntary associations during the most recent cycle of the 1970s and 1980s were not as dramatic. Many of the ideas taken up by ecological movements

have been adopted by established political organizations and thus have had a concrete effect on Finnish politics (e.g. opposition to the building of more nuclear power stations in Finland). Alternative movements have also had a radicalizing effect on certain established associations with officially recognized status. Hence, for the first time in its history Suomen Luonnonsuojeluliitto (the Finnish League for the Protection of Nature) supported the use of an illegal disruptive repertoire in the early 1990s against road-building in one of the national parks.

It is also in accordance with the traditions of Finnish political culture that the development of alternative movements has quite regularly led to the establishment of registered voluntary associations that continue the work of these movements and lay a firm foundation for their achievements. This was the case with the city-movements of the 1970s which often led to the founding of neighbourhood associations (cf. Sinko 1976), in rural citizens' initiatives during the 1980s which tended to lead to the establishment of village associations (cf. Litmanen 1990), and in squatters' movements that have often ended up as registered associations (cf. Eronen 1990). A further example of the influence of new movements on formal associations is the election of a squatter activist (Oranssi ry) as the new chairman of the youth organization of the Left Wing Alliance, which continues the activities of the former socialist/communist youth movement.

As indicated in Figure 1, the first part of the 1980s was also a period of rapid increase in the number of associations. There are some interesting factors underlying these developments. The share of new political organizations collapsed during the 1980s whereas the number of associations that grew out of way-of-life interests increased most quickly of all, particularly in the field of sports, hobbies, nature and the environment, and cultural pursuits. These leisure associations are an essential part of the Finnish 'silent revolution'. The development of this cycle is still incomplete, but will presumably continue during the 1990s.

Conclusion

Social protest movements have in Finnish history been a means of institutional change. Many new issues and claims have been introduced into the political arena as challenges presented by such movements. These have tended to be transformed into issues that can be dealt with within the existing political system and through formal voluntary associations. The system of voluntary associations covers a large variety of organizational types from informal and loose groupings to proper interest organizations. Through their activities these associations have given rise to many institutions which, with increased prosperity, have later been taken over by the

state. This is a typical model of the development of the Finnish welfare state.

To effect change in the political system, social movements are indispensable tools, agents which reform and radicalize the political scene and the issues that surface in it. It is via the actions of social movements and formal voluntary associations that cycles of protest develop. At the peak phase of a protest cycle, those involved in its course may experience the mood of the time as a 'moment of madness' when virtually anything seems possible (cf. Zolberg 1972). Movements that carry the protest renew the language used, repertoires of collective action, and forms of experience, and give birth to new collective identities. And as cycles mature these innovations diffuse, lead to reforms in political and social institutions, and are tempered and/or repressed. After the cycle is over³ institutional forms, repertoires of action and the system of voluntary associations are richer than before: 'the long, slow curve of innovation in the forms of collective action is produced as disruptive moments of madness are translated into long-term change by the cycles of protest within which they occur' (Tarrow 1987, 6). This holds true for the three Finnish cycles (1905–18, 1966–76, and 1970s–1980s) and to some extent also for 1944–48. The semi-fascist cycle of 1928–32 is the only genuine exception.

It can also be said that protest movements are (diachronic) tools by which the conflicts and tensions of civil society shake the (synchronic) system made up of more or less institutionalized subsystems and selective mechanisms maintaining the stability of the political system. In political democracies institutions tend to change quite slowly. At the micro level of tensions between protagonists, however, pressures for change are produced when conflicts accumulate and turn into a cycle of protest (cf. Siisiäinen 1986, 1990a). The Finnish welfare state has developed through interaction between social movements (and voluntary associations) and state institutions. Social problems and the shortcomings of social welfare have initially been taken up by social movements. During the next stage, formal associations have been founded to advance that objective in the institutional political arena. Negotiations have often produced reforms in state apparatuses, led to the formation of new institutions, and so forth. Thus the border between the state in the broad sense and the civil society runs across the system of voluntary associations, often within a single association (as when the leadership and bureaucracy belong to the state apparatus and the membership does not). Seen from the (functionalist) perspective of system stability, (new and old) social movements can function as an alarm, alerting the system to new impulses that compel change in order to avoid disaster. The ecological movements of the 1990s warn of the threats to the environmental basis of social life, while in the 19th century movements to regulate factories were necessary to protect the health of workers. Both are examples

of processes producing the necessary conditions for the future development of (post)industrial society.

NOTES

1. Activists of the first demonstration to receive large publicity, the Koijärvi movement against attempts to drain a famous bird lake in 1979, also came from middle-class youth: 65 percent of the participants were under 25 years of age, 64 percent came from middle-class families, 58 percent from Helsinki. Farmers' and workers' children were under-represented among the activists (cf. Järvikoski 1982, 178–179). In both movements students were the main active group. The movements of the early 1990s have also had a similar social base (cf. Järvikoski & Nykänen 1991, 22–23).
2. The lag between the official registration decision and the time since the association has commenced its activities can be estimated as 1–1.5 years.
3. Provided that the cycle is not a reactionary one, e.g. fascist or Stalinist.

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