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While competent as expositors, the authors of the individual chapters of the Leftwich volume offer relatively few new and exciting insights. The collection can, however, be recommended as a clear and lucid survey of issues and problems in several areas of the political science discipline. The book by Nevil Johnson can be recommended as a highly provocative and by no means uninteresting contribution to the everlasting debate on the character, quality and future of political science. The books are not indispensable, but they are engaging additions to the literature on the prospects of political science and the obstacles that the discipline will have to overcome.

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Hans Mouritzen: *Finlandization: Towards a General Theory of Adaptive Politics*. Aldershot: Avebury, 1988. 463 pp.

For more than two decades the writings of James N. Rosenau have served as an exceptionally rich source of inspiration for students of foreign policy and international politics. One of his ideas that have been pursued also by Scandinavian scholars is his conceptualization of foreign policy as (different modes of) *adaptation*. At least two attempts by Danish scholars at refining this notion can be listed among the major contributions to the development of this particular approach. One is the reformulation and extension suggested by Nikolaj Petersen in two articles published in the late 1970s (Petersen 1977, 1979). The other and also the most ambitious contribution is Hans Mouritzen's study of 'Finlandization'.

The title might lead some potential readers to expect a book about Finland's precarious relationship to its super-power neighbour. In fact, however, Mouritzen has little to say about the specifics of Finland's predicament. His empirical analysis focuses mainly on the foreign policies and adaptation strategies pursued by Sweden and Denmark before and during the Second World War. His main interest, though, clearly pertains to the *general* phenomenon of 'adaptive acquiescence', defined as a particular 'give-and-preserve' pattern of behaviour, expressing readiness on the part of a regime to accept a 'negative value account' in relation to some other actor or to its external environment more generally (the latter being referred to as concessions to a 'non-actor').

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adaptation in general and of the acquiescent mode in particular. Among the questions addressed here are: *who* is to be considered the 'adaptor'? (answer: the regime); *on what basis* do we distinguish one mode of adaptation from another? (criterion: patterns of behaviour [= regime 'orientations'], expressing intended value accounts); are modes of adaptation to be seen as orientation towards the external environment in *general* or are they issue- or relations-specific patterns? (answer to be determined on the basis of empirical evidence). The pay-off of this conceptual groundwork includes not only an elaborate definition of 'adaptive acquiescence' (Chapter 6); it also enables the author to distinguish *mode* of adaptation from the *strategies* whereby it is pursued (Chapter 9), and to identify four basic sub-categories of acquiescence (chapter 7) and five policy strategies which seem particularly germane to the acquiescent mode.

The author then (in part II) applies his conceptual tools to give an account of the 'Finlandization' of Denmark and Sweden during the Second World War. This empirical analysis is undertaken with a dual purpose in mind: first, the author simply wants to determine whether or not these cases actually satisfy the defining characteristics of 'adaptive acquiescence'. He concludes that they do, although to varying degrees. Second, he explores in considerable depth which (combinations of) strategies and tactics were being used in order to protect regime values against different kinds of challenges and under different circumstances. These case accounts are largely descriptive in form, and should be of considerable interest also to readers whose main interest pertains to the specifics of the historic events themselves. But in Mouritzen's study they also serve another important function; viz. that of providing an empirical testing ground for general propositions about the *dynamics* of adaptive acquiescence.

Mouritzen's ambitions clearly go beyond 'merely' developing a conceptual framework for describing patterns of behaviour and demonstrating the applicability of his tools to historical records. One purpose of the study is to identify the main factors producing change (part III) as well as inertia (part IV), and to understand the mechanisms through which these factors affect regime orientations and the choice of strategies. Building mainly on studies by Kjell Goldmann (1979), Mouritzen conceives of change in patterns of behaviour as a function of change in two principal determinants: the level of tension, and the balance of power between the actor(s) receiving concessions and the opposite pole of power. Assuming intendedly rational behaviour on the part of all actors involved, Mouritzen formulates seven hypotheses which are all tested against evidence from the cases introduced in part II. Mouritzen finds substantial support for some of his propositions, but also several instances where the historical records do not corroborate his expectations. Deviations from expected behaviour are then accounted for partly by introducing some 'residual dynamic factors', and partly by referring to 'factors of inertia', which are supposed to prevent, modify or retard policy change.

Mouritzen's analysis of inertia is deeply indebted to Goldmann's research on foreign policy stabilizers (Goldmann 1982). But Mouritzen again develops his own typology – containing no less than eighteen categories. He first distinguishes between factors serving to stabilize *any* regime orientation and those that are *mode-specific* (in his study: working to preserve the acquiescent mode of adaptation only). One interesting proposition pertaining to the latter category is the hypothesis that '... the foreign policy bureaucracy is likely to have a special penchant for adaptive acquiescence' (p. 317). Within each of the two broad categories, he goes on to identify three *types* (cognitive, institutional and vested interests) and three *sources* of inertia (the domestic society, the regime itself and the external environment).

Mouritzen pursues this part of his analysis largely in general terms, but towards the end he once again returns to his particular cases in order to determine which factors have been at play there.

Mouritzen's book clearly is a significant contribution that will serve as a standard reference for future efforts at developing and refining this particular approach to the study of foreign policy. One of its major virtues is the fact that it offers a rare combination of conceptual sophistication, explicit and non-trivial propositions, and in-depth empirical analysis exploring the applicability of new constructs as well as the tenability of interesting hypotheses. Students of foreign policy will probably find his conceptual framework and his derivation of propositions to be the contributions most relevant to their own concerns. But it bears repeating that Mouritzen's study also provides empirical 'meat' on many of its conceptual 'bones'.

In such an ambitious undertaking the reader will most probably find some statements unclear or puzzling, and some arguments less convincing than others. I also suspect that even the diligent reader will occasionally find his/her memory put to a trying test in following Mouritzen's empirical analysis in parts III and IV. Let me briefly point to some of my own question marks, focusing on those pertaining to Mouritzen's conceptual contributions.

Despite Mouritzen's conceptual sophistication, it is not always clear where the definition of a concept ends and explanatory remarks begin. Thus, in his definition of 'adaptive acquiescence' we also find the following statement: 'It [the regime] cannot be expected to gain "new" values . . .' (p. 62). This seems to be offered as a defining characteristic, but it certainly looks more like an elaborative remark. Furthermore, I have to admit balking at the implications of operational statements like 'Any actor that publicly declares an ambition to safeguard each of these values [autonomy, identity, control over a certain territory] can be seen as representing a regime' (p. 42). I also have some difficulties with the author's elaboration of his concept of regime 'orientation(s)'. We are told that the concept of 'orientation' refers to *patterns* of behaviour and accordingly '. . . express[es] policy at a super-aggregate level' (p. 27), and also that it expresses an 'intended value account' (p. 58) or '. . . the value account that the regime is prepared to tolerate . . .' (p. 59). I shall not quibble about the purely semantic question of whether or not 'intended' and 'prepared to tolerate' can be considered synonyms. A more important and intriguing question is to what extent 'policy at a superaggregate level' can be conceived of as 'intended', i.e. as a product of rational choice. Regimes presumably choose their *actions* and *strategies*, but in what sense and to what extent do they also choose their aggregate *patterns* of behaviour? In other words: to what extent is the pattern itself a subject of choice, and to what extent does it emerge as some 'superaggregate' result of a series of 'micro-decisions'?

More generally, it strikes me that the relationship between a regime engaged in adaptive acquiescence and specific actors in its external environment can be conceived of as a process of *bargaining* – sometimes pursued as explicit negotiations, at other times taking the form of tacit bargaining. (Formal) theories of negotiation can offer precise formulas for determining bargaining power or outcomes. One possible extension or refinement of Mouritzen's analysis could therefore be to try to integrate one or more of these theories into the existing framework of the adaptation approach. One likely pay-off from such an effort would be that of enhancing our ability to derive precise propositions about the 'exchange rate' characterizing the relationship between a particular regime and its 'concession-receiver'. More precise propositions might in turn enable us to design *empirical* tests that penetrate deeper or discriminate better.

Mouritzen's study can itself be seen as an encouraging piece of evidence that such a strategy of research *can* yield significant dividends.

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Nielsen, K. & Pedersen, O. K. (eds.): *Forhandlingsøkonomi i Norden*. Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1989, 306 pp.

Researchers from Denmark, Norway and Sweden have recently come out with an anthology on 'the negotiated economies' of the Nordic countries. Their approach is not a brand new one. The editors emphasize that they are attempting to revitalize the debate and further develop the concept of the negotiated economy which was first advanced in the research project on the distribution of power in Norwegian society initiated in the early 1970s. In my opinion, the approach, or rather the tradition within which it stands, is much older and goes at least back to, for example, the 1953 book by Dahl & Lindblom. Therefore, it would have been wise to point more directly to the scientific 'forefathers' in order to stress both their previous shortcomings and why there is today a strong demand for 'reforms' and elaborations.

However, none of the contributors seem to have severe problems endorsing the ideas behind the negotiated economy and all find convincing evidence of its existence. It is argued that the era of both the free-market economy and the mixed economy is gone and that the economy is today predominantly governed by negotiations. A number of so-called institutions – more specifically, policy institutions, discourse institutions, campaign institutions, negotiation institutions and arbitration and sanction institutions – all perform vital and complementary functions in this game where all actors are consciously or unconsciously working according to different types of rationalities although they do share a mutual understanding.

The theory developed is rather comprehensive and the introductory chapter must definitely be read twice. All its elements are far from used and tested in the individual empirical contributions. The intention here is logically not to comment on all ten papers and it is also far more tempting to discuss the relatively fresh theoretical work done. In the following I shall therefore raise a few questions hoping to encircle at least a few general ideas behind the theory of the negotiated economy.