'Environmentalism', 'New Politics' and Industrialism: Some Theoretical Perspectives

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Various conceptions of 'Environmentalism' and 'New Politics' are surveyed and their logical inconsistencies are identified. It is argued that only a conception of the crisis of industrial society, not the least evident in Eastern Europe, enables a consistent understanding of 'new politics'. From this conception, stressing the limits of man's mastery over nature on the one hand and the limits of the expansion of formal rationality on the other, the ambivalences in 'New Politics' between 'pre-industrial' and 'post-industrial' solutions are identified. The article sketches how the 'post-industrial' position can be developed. Neoliberalism and 'green' politics are identified not only as adversaries but rather as competing responses to the crisis of industrialism, and the compatibility of 'green' and social democratic politics is analysed.

During the 1980s, Europe has witnessed a surge of environmental concern and, more generally, of 'new politics'. 'Green' parties have mushroomed. In the European Elections, by June 1989, they won 7.7 percent of the votes, as compared to 2.7 percent by 1984 (Curtice 1989). At the same time, established parties, in particular 'new-left' parties, have been affected. A case in point is the Danish Socialist People's Party (SF) which has changed from a genuine working-class party in the 1960s to a party having its core voters among better-educated public employees of the postwar generations (Logue 1982; Goul Andersen 1988).[1]

It remains to be seen whether the 'Green' parties will break the 'freezing of the party systems' in Western Europe (Lipset & Rokkan 1967), or existing parties come to represent other interests, values and projects than they were originally designed for. But the fact that is has been possible to establish entirely new parties indicates that ecological politics is more than just another issue, temporarily creating some turbulence in the party systems.

In the first place, ecological problems *as such* have far-reaching implications: from an ecological perspective, a large number of policies in other fields can be deduced (Lowe & Rüdig 1986). Secondly, ecological politics is linked to a broader 'value change' (Inglehart 1971) and to new forms of political organization (Inglehart 1979; Gundelach 1988). Sometimes, the

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syndrome of changes is vaguely referred to as 'new politics' (Hildebrandt & Dalton 1978).

What is, then, this 'new' or 'green' politics? In the following, we present a brief survey of various perspectives with the aim of arriving at a more general conceptual framework. The presentation is structured around five general questions: firstly, what is *ecological* politics, i.e. the 'core' of 'green' politics? Secondly, how and why is this linked to a broader set of values and policies, or to new forms of political organization? Thirdly, what is the underlying societal change giving rise to this new political mobilization? Fourthly, how do the various perspectives account for the social composition of the adherents of 'new politics'? And finally, what are the consequences for the cleavage structures and the party systems?

The various approaches and perspectives may be summarized under four headlines: class perspectives, value perspectives, Marxist perspectives and industrialist perspectives.

New Classes

The label 'class perspectives' is to some degree a construct. Most analyses of new values have, of course, noticed the disproportional incidence of such values within the new middle class. And conversely, few class-centred analyses have neglected the importance of new values. Here we focus on theories assigning particular importance to the class factor.

However, the new middle class is far from homogeneous. It is not only divided according to a vertical dimension but also horizontally (Goul Andersen 1979, 1984; Knutsen 1983), in particular between (a) the 'productive', i.e. the primary and secondary sector, (b) the private service sector, (c) public administration and infrastructure and (d) public reproductive services (health and care sector, education and culture). Theories differ as to which groups they consider central.

To a large degree, vague references to the 'service sector' (b, c and d) have prevailed, frequently linked to the conception in the 1970s of the 'post-industrial' society as a 'service society'. Not least, the literature on post-materialist value change has been criticized for ignoring entirely the horizontal cleavages (Knutsen 1983).

Others have pointed to the interests of public employees in environmental regulation (Ward 1983). More frequently, however, it is the absence of interests in production that is underlined (Cotgrove & Duff 1980, 1981). As an interest argument, it overemphasizes the autonomy of the public sector from the rest of the economy (Lowe & Rüdig 1986). But as a value argument, it seems more plausible, at least if it is restricted to the public reproductive sector. The particular values of this 'new class' have already

been studied in Parkin's (1968) analysis of the middle-class radicalism of CND activists.

This perspective is followed most consequently in Svensson & Togeby (1986) who view 'new politics' as an expression of the political mobilization of the new class of public-service workers, drawing parallels with the mobilization of the bourgeoisie, the farmers and the working class in the nineteenth century. They explicitly argue, however (Svensson & Togeby 1986, 32) that concern for the environment cannot be interpreted in an interest perspective (see also Gundelach 1988; 244–259). Instead it is the education and the nature of work that dispose the new class towards the values and concerns of 'new politics'.

The identification of values (rather than consciousness of class interests) as the relevant intervening variable between class position and behaviour is certainly an improvement. The conception of class-specific values also clarifies the relationship between environmentalism and other aspects of 'new politics', including new modes of political organization. And finally, of course, the stress on the process of mobilization reminds us that political movements have their own dynamics (which gave rise to a virtual left-wing *counterculture* in Denmark during the 1970s).

However, the weakness of this approach is also apparent. The nature of ecological problems are only vaguely identified as a 'conflict between economic growth and welfare' (p. 31). The underlying societal change is equally vaguely referred to as a more fragmentary class structure, growth in the public service sector and in public regulation, normative cultural conflicts and conflicts between men and women.

If all these new conflicts only marginally involve the *interests* of 'the new middle layers' but rather define broader *societal* interests to which these groups feel particularly committed, it is difficult to understand why they should give rise to a new cleavage line 'which more or less coincides with the conflict between "the new middle layers" and society at large' (Svensson & Togeby 1986, 31). Even though the 'new middle layers' appear as the avant-garde of environmentalism, this does not explain why environmentalism, or more generally, 'new politics', emerged, or what its future effect upon the party system may be.

A similar criticism can be directed against some early analyses of the German Greens, stressing the 'blocked' career possibilities for a generation of higher-educated (Alber 1985; Bürklin 1985). Like other class-related explanations, this frustration–aggression reasoning also disregards the *content* of green politics, i.e. the problems it expresses and the underlying societal change.

New Values

Here, Inglehart's influential theory of value change is more consistent.

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For Inglehart, the central underlying social change is *affluence*, i.e. the unprecedented economic growth since the Second World War.[2] Originally, Inglehart (1971) followed a Maslowian theory of human needs: the satisfaction of lower-order needs (such as physical and economic security) enabled people to direct attention towards higher-order, 'post-material' needs. More recently, the Maslowian argument has been replaced by a theory of diminishing marginal utility (Inglehart 1984, 1987) but at the individual level this means little revision.[3]

Through the conception of value change, it is possible to account for the association between otherwise logically unconnected issues, such as environmentalism, demand for disarmament or new forms of political organization, and so on.

According to the Maslowian theory of socialization and personality formation, the economic experiences during the 'formative years' are crucial for the individual's values (i.e. predispositions) later in life. From this, Inglehart is able to account for the generational and class variations on the materialism–post-materialism dimension.

Finally, Inglehart's model predicts that the socialist parties will face severe problems. Unless they change strategy they face an increasingly smaller constituency, as the materialist working class becomes smaller. If, on the other hand, the socialist parties *do* adopt a post-materialist strategy, this may alienate traditional core voters and prepare the ground for new right-movements appealing to the working class (Inglehart & Rabier 1986). Because of the cross-cutting conflicts between left and right and between materialism and post-materialism, the relationship between social classes and the party system may even become reversed (Lipset 1981; 503–521).

At first glance, the theory is convincing. Nevertheless, it suffers from serious weaknesses. We shall not discuss here the operational problems and the alleged confusion of a materialism–post-materialism dimension with an authoritarian–libertarian dimension (Flanagan 1982, 1987; Todal Jessen & Listhaug 1988). There are more deep-reaching theoretical problems.

First and foremost, Inglehart's theory also ignores the *content* of post-materialism, i.e. the nature of the problems and issues with which the 'post-materialists' are concerned. As far as the environment is concerned, it has in fact been argued that there *is* no causal relationship at all between environmental problems and the environmental movement. Inglehart would probably not join that argument. But implicitly he is forced to conceive of environmental problems as mainly 'aesthetic' problems. This corresponds, perhaps, with the recreational aims of the earlier nature-preservation movements. But if there really *are* ecological problems, such a conception is misleading (Lowe & Rüdig 1986).

The next problem is connected. If environmentalism is simply a question

of values, then the environmental conflict is a conflict without interests. The opposite pole to the environmentalists is simply people having other values, for example a preference for economic growth. From Inglehart's model it becomes impossible to understand why environmentalists have to fight so hard against economic (or bureaucratic) elites who should, according to the model, be the most post-materialist of all (Inglehart 1981). By the same token, it becomes impossible to understand the horizontal cleavages within the new middle class. Inglehart simply has no theoretical tools to account for such variations.

According to the model, it is furthermore surprising why the social elite has not always been post-materialist. And it can be argued that several of the 'idealistic' voluntary associations of *the past* (Rasmussen 1971), such as the nature-preservation movements, were in fact expressions of such an elite-based post-materialism.[4] Thus, it may be argued that the theory of post-materialism is correct but that it has little relevance for the understanding of such phenomena as it seeks to explain.

Finally, Inglehart's theory cannot explain why it is exactly the environment that has been the most decisive issue in the mobilization of the 'new politics' syndrome.

It is not wrong to point at the importance of values in creating consciousness about environmental problems. But it is misleading to assume that such problems are merely 'aesthetic', and its seems wrong to assume that affluence is the decisive underlying force. This also implies that the label 'post-materialist' is unfortunate. It should perhaps be reserved for the upper-class movements of the past. To characterize the new values of the 1970s and 1980s, the label 'post-industrial' would probably be more appropriate, even though this is perhaps too inclusive.

Structural Perspective I: New Problems of Capitalism

From a structural perspective, environmental conflict does not arise from affluence and aesthetic values. Rather, the point of departure is a notion of crisis, involving, ultimately, such basic problems as the survival of mankind. Two structural perspectives may be identified: a model of capitalism and a model of industrialism. As far as environmental problems are concerned, the two models are nearly coincidental.

The Marxist perspective identifies ecological problems as expressions of a fundamental contradiction between the capitalist exploitation of the means of production and the reproduction of these productive forces, i.e. nature as well as labour power (Castells 1978).

The analogy to Marx and Engels's analyses of the British factory laws is

obvious. Through the drive for profits and in their internal competition, the capitalists allegedly imposed such a worsening of the living conditions upon the working class that it was nearly threatened by physical extinction. Thus, regulation was in the long-term common interest of the capitalist class, even though it was only obtained during pressure from the working class. In the early *Staatsableitungsdebatte*, this was the basic argument of Müller & Neusüss (1973), and whether or not the historical account was correct, they arrived at a plausible (and in fact wholly uncontroversial) theory of (one source of) state regulation.

An equivalent perspective would seem applicable to the environmental problems. However, it is precisely the ambivalence between social conflict and more or less common long-term interests which tends to be neglected in Marxist accounts. This ambivalence does not mean that all interest conflicts have vanished but it does mean that ecological problems can be counteracted effectively within capitalist society.

The Marxist model implies quite another perspective on the *cleavages* involved in environmental conflict. Basically, the environmental conflict reinforces the class conflict of capitalist society, but not straightforwardly. The environmental conflict is not a conflict between wage labour and capital; rather it is a conflict between the 'people' and capital, involving new possibilities of class alliances between the working class and the new middle class – at least those segments of the new middle class not directly affiliated with the interests of capital (such as managers). Even the sector differences within the new middle class may be explained from this interest perspective.

To explain the generational and educational variations in environmental consciousness, there are powerful alternatives to the affluence/socialization model of Inglehart. Experiences during formative years may be important and may have a lasting impact, but it seems more likely that it is the *exposure* to the political struggles and the political mobilization during formative years that is the relevant intervening variable between generation and values. Exposure is, furthermore, linked to knowledge and thus to education which may also as such affect consciousness of distant problems such as ecological problems.

Still, exposure only explains individual-level variations. It does not explain the macro-level question of why ecological problems have become a central political issue. Rather than affluence, the structural perspective would point at the nature of the ecological problems as the relevant explanatory variable. What is new, according to the Marxist model, is not environmental problems as such, but rather the accumulation and globalization of ecological problems. The immense industrial growth has generated severe problems that are no longer restricted to a certain com-

munity or a certain class, not even to the single countries. The ecological consciousness is an adaptation to these problems.

Finally, the Marxist perspective does not rule out the influence of values. In particular, intellectuals – a basic category in the Marxist vocabulary – have always been concerned with broader societal interests. This may also help explain the special concern of some of the public reproductive workers for the environment.

The Marxist perspective is not without problems, however. In the first place, some environmental problems such as the pollution caused by households are difficult to subsume under the Marxist headline. Secondly, it is difficult to explain why environmental problems have tended to be most serious in the socialist countries. And even if this could be 'explained away', the Marxist model would not be able to account for the association between environmentalism and a broader set of new values, i.e. for the scope of 'new politics'. Here an industrialism/post-industrialism perspective seems more relevant.

Structural Perspective II: Industrialism and Post-industrialism

From the perspective of industrialism, it is perfectly understandable why ecological problems have been worse in the state socialist countries. In these countries, the rationality of industrialism was developed *ad absurdum*, and more generally, the present problems in Eastern Europe signify the end of industrialism rather than a victory of capitalism.

Otherwise, the perspective of industrialism largely confirms the Marxist arguments above, including the notion of political exposure. But the perspective of industrialism is more far reaching: it conceives of the entire syndrome of 'new politics' as a reaction against the negative side-effects and counter-productive nature of industrialism. Thus 'new politics' could be labelled 'anti-industrial' politics. The basic argument below, however, is that the reaction against industrialism is linked to a general transformation of industrial society to a 'post-industrial' society[5] or at least to a very different type of industrial society.[6] Thus, the label 'post-industrial' politics is preferred, in the first place to underline the fundamental break with the previous developmental logic of industrialism, and secondly to avoid connotations of *pre*-industrial romanticism.

However, the balance is delicate, and 'green' or 'new' politics is loaded with ambivalences and contradictions. In the environmental struggle, two positions may be identified. The first contends that industrialism is based on an economy of *growth* and advocates zero growth, negative growth or even a 'return to nature'.

The second position argues that an even more basic trait of industrialism is a belief in *human control over nature* and a lack of concern for the externalities. This belief is now challenged by such problems as pollution of open waters, ozone problems, possible 'greenhouse' effects and so on. It becomes evident that human control over nature is not unlimited; a sort of accommodation or 'harmony' has to be found. However, this does not *necessarily* preclude the possibility of economic growth.[7]

Both positions are equally consistent with the notion of a major break with the developmental logic of industrial society. But it does seem that the 'post-industrial' position is the more likely to survive, not only as compared to pre-industrial positions, but also as compared to the narrow growth philosophy of industrial society.

However, 'new' or 'green' politics is more than ecological politics. From the conception of industrialism, it is possible to derive a relatively coherent green discourse. The outline of this discourse below is not an account of the typical demands of green parties but an effort to abstract from current political ideas and practices an *ideal-typical* model or reconstruction of green politics.

Towards the Reconstruction of a Green Discourse

Environmental politics is one main aspect of green politics. The other aspects may perhaps be summarized as *life-world politics*. The common denominator of life-world politics is the attack on the rationality of the economic and the political-administrative system from the perspective of a life-world rationality, centred around such values as autonomy (Gorz 1981; Touraine 1981) and communicative rationality (Habermas 1981).

Like the environmental struggle, life-world politics may take several directions. One direction is the vision of an informal economy based upon self-service, local networks, mutual assistance and so on, and a decline of the welfare state in favour of revitalized civil society networks. This direction may be labelled 'pre-industrial' as it is concerned with autonomy *from* system-world organizations.

The 'post-industrial' direction is more concerned with incorporating life-world 'communicative' rationality *within* system-world organizations. This position is developed below. The outlines of a 'green discourse' may be sketched as a coherent set of values and ideas expressing the crises and contradictions of traditional industrial systems.

What, then, are the basic logics of industrialism, now allegedly facing limits and undergoing change? Several of these characteristics were identified by Weber, himself critical towards industrial society but unable to see any possibility of fleeing the 'iron cage' of the expansion of formal rationality (Scaff 1987; Bild 1989):

(1) The expansion of formal, 'system world' rationality:
   (a) The expansion of hierarchical structures and impersonal rules and routines *within* existing organizations (in administration: rational bureaucracy; in (mass) production: taylorism)
   (b) The expansion of such 'system world' organizations, i.e. the state and the economy, at the expense of 'civil society' – the 'colonization' of the 'life world' by the 'system world' (Habermas 1981)
(2) The disregard for the social externalities of this expansion of 'system world' rationality.
(3) The disregard for ecological externalities and the belief in human mastery over nature.[8]

The last-mentioned trait was discussed above. As with the other elements, the basic argument of the green discourse is that the rationality of industrial systems has come to a limit where it becomes counter-productive (Kumar 1978; Loftager 1985). However, if this is correct, it also follows that the systems themselves will tend to adapt. And such a transformation of the logics and structures of industrialism may indeed be identified, signifying a transition to post-industrial society, or at least a transition to 'post-fordism' (Hirsch & Roth 1986), or a 'second industrial divide' (Piore & Sabel 1984).

The efficiency of large hierarchical organizations and the system of mass production has been questioned. Negative side-effects include for example, red tape and lack of motivation, initiative and innovation. In Eastern Europe where industrial structures were developed most thoroughly, studies of the labour process have identified exactly these structures as the cause of low productivity (Thompson 1984, 221). By the same token, America's declining competitiveness is frequently explained by the maintenance of the organization and mentality of taylorist mass production in America (Dertouzos *et al.* 1989).

The response to such problems has been a gradual change from coercive towards more consensual management techniques (Thompson 1984; 153–179; Kern & Schumann 1984). In management (or at least in management theory), increasing stress has been put upon delegation, decentralization, autonomy, network or even 'organized anarchies' (Cohen & March 1974; Larsen 1986). Even though such changes should not be overestimated, it does indicate an increasing incorporation of communicative life-world rationality and more spontaneous life-world modes of organization into the system world. Even though this has happened only as a means of enhancing system-world ends, it nevertheless appears that the tendency towards a 'colonization of the life world' has been reversed.

The organizational ideals of the new social movements exhibit striking parallels which may be seen as somewhat extreme illustrations of general

organizational changes in society. Their decentralized, informal organization signifies an incorporation of 'life-world' values into the organization, including the ideal of 'communicative consensus' in decision making (Gundelach 1980).

What also needs to be stressed is the organizational *efficiency* of the new social movements. The organizational structures are suitable for mobilizing the only important resources such organizations have: the participation of adherents. This requires motivation, and motivation requires autonomy. 'New social movements' may be seen as odd species of 'organized anarchies', sometimes with anarchy prevailing over organization, at other times with strong informal co-ordination. On the balance sheet, however, they are probably drawing optimal use of the resources they have.

Furthermore, new social movements have adapted very rationally to the requirements of post-industrial 'information society'. In the first place, public opinion seems to have an increasing impact upon political decisions. Frequently, it may become more rational to influence public opinion than to influence political decision makers directly. Secondly, influence on public opinion requires access to the media, and access to the media requires 'events' with news value, entertainment value, or both. 'Unconventional political behaviour' is one response to these demands. Analyses which can be communicated to the general public, constitute another. Grass-roots organizations frequently combine both.

In short, organizational changes within private firms as well as the relative success of new social movements may be seen as an indication that 'fleeing the iron cage' is indeed possible and not just a romantic dream; alternative organizational structures incorporating life-world values and modes of organization are able to function efficiently.

Another target of green criticism is the welfare state. At the micro level, it is argued that the welfare state, imposing its professional standards and/or its bureaucratic control mechanisms upon the clients, limits the autonomy and the freedom of its clients. This does not only put clients under the tutelage of the welfare state; it may also be counter-productive if the clients become too socialized into the roles designed for them. An even more far reaching although somewhat romantic critique has been launched against the health system by Ivan Illich (1975), accusing the system of generating as much illness as it cures, and, more generally, of 'hospitalizing' society at the expense of people's autonomy, self-determination and personal responsibility.

At the macro level, the 'green' discourse expresses a fear that the welfare state's increasing responsibility for problems of a communicative nature will eventually lead to counter-productive social pathologies, e.g. declining interpersonal responsibility (Habermas 1981; Wolfe 1989). Marx and Weber identified the fundamental dependence of the market upon the

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state: without a state enforcing the basic legal preconditions of the market, the rationality of the market would not be rational at all. By the same token, it is argued that a society based on purely impersonal actions would not be able to function at all (Brubaker 1984; Bild 1989); a precondition for the market and the state is a vital civil society ensuring the 'moral cohesion' of society.

To sum up, industrialist structures and the rationalities of industrialism seem to have reached its limits. This may be considered the structural basis of the 'new value' set. Apparently disconnected phenomena such as alternative medicine, environmental concern, anti-authoritarian beliefs and demands for more say in government are logically related as responses to the crisis of industrialism.

One direction of green politics is an idealistic, basically pre-industrial, reaction demanding zero or negative growth, informal economy and restoration of civil society and its former functions. A post-industrial green discourse, on the other hand, is based upon the notion of counter-productivity, thus suggesting that society will have to adapt to the problems reflected in the demands of the greens. This does not at all eliminate interest and value conflicts; but it does mean that the demands of the greens are realistic.

Furthermore, this version is materialist in the sense that it does not only present a model of a 'better society'; it also identifies the social forces which will bring about the change. One of these social forces, it was argued above, is simply the market. Other forces are identified below.

A change from industrialism towards post-industrialism does not necessarily entail a change in the relations of ownership or in the mechanisms of the market. A green discourse based on capitalism and a regulated market economy is certainly imaginable. In the economic field, the post-industrial version of a green discourse is more ambiguous than the pre-industrial directions. Nevertheless, 'post-capitalist' models of the economy may be identified.

Two aspects are relevant. The first aspect is concerned with 'post-capitalist' alternatives to private ownership and control of the means of production, e.g. co-operative societies, economic democracy, collective ownership of capital via pension funds, and so on. The other aspect is perhaps the more interesting. Before industrialism and the anonymous market economy, the dominant economy was a *moral economy* (Macpherson 1985). Basically, the green discourse advocates a moral economy as an alternative to the anonymous market forces of capitalist industrialism. And in fact a resurrection of a moral economy may be identified in recent economic developments.

In a modified market economy, collective interests are ensured by governmental regulation imposed from above. Basically, the anonymous market

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rationality is intact within the framework of governmental regulation. However, more far-reaching alternatives are imaginable. In the first place, private ownership of capital is increasingly modified by collective pension funds who may incorporate broader societal interests in their investment decisions.

The second possibility has even more far-reaching implications. In recent years, consumers, contrary to neoclassical economics, seem to become increasingly concerned with broader social interests in their individual consumption decisions. Apparently, the figure of a 'moral' or *'sociotropic consumer'* is becoming less fictitious. In particular the increasing demand for 'green' products is impossible to explain only in terms of self-interest. Furthermore, as a reaction, companies become increasingly occupied with improving their moral image, in particular in the environmental field. This requires more than image campaigns. A trustworthy image frequently requires behavioural changes, too.

This may, of course, be a temporary phenomenon. But if consumers become increasingly oriented towards collective goals in their individual consumption decisions and if companies adapt accordingly, it certainly becomes necessary to deconstruct the microeconomic foundations of current economic theories. At the same time, the moral or sociotropic consumer may also answer our question concerning the social forces contributing to the realization of the 'green project'.

The Political Sociology of the Green Discourse

From the conception of green politics outlined above, there is no genuine social basis of green politics as it expresses societal interests. At best, the *resistance* against green politics has a specific social base. Still, some social groups may be more likely to support the green ideas than others. Generational variations can be expected as a reflection of exposure to the mobilization of green politics. Educational variations are explainable in terms of exposure as well as knowledge. Furthermore, the better-educated may also be more inclined to act out of sociotropic concerns for society rather than following narrow personal interests (see below).

Class variations are more basic. In the first place, as immediate interests of private firms (including farms) are affected by environmental regulation, such groups should be expected to be more negative towards ecological politics. Workers may develop positive attitudes towards environmental regulation but may be less likely supporters of the other aspects of the green project: The working class is, basically, a product of capitalist industrial society. Even though the working class is also the prime victim of the alienating structures of industrialism, it has never developed an

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alternative to these structures, i.e. a historical project transcending industrialism. Rather, it has adapted to this situation (Gorz 1981) via an instrumental attitude towards work and a stress on leisure time and the sphere of consumption (Goldthorpe, Lockwood et al. 1968), i.e. via a class-specific way of life (Højrup 1983).

A conception of alternative modes of social organization incorporating life-world values is more likely to develop within the new middle class (experiencing a larger degree of autonomy at work), and in particular within the reproductive sector working with people on a non-commercial basis. This may explain the class variations in 'new politics' values.

There is also an intrinsic connection between green values and women's values. As pointed out by Bernard (1981), referring to Tönnies, women basically remained in a 'Gemeinschaft' world after the transition to modern industrial society ('Gesellschaft'). And womens' values can be regarded as exactly a concern for the communicative values related to inter- and intragenerational reproduction (Peterson 1984). Thus, from this conception of women's values, women should be expected to be somewhat more positive towards 'new politics' than men. As far as women's *interests* are concerned, on the other hand, a similar *logical* connection with the discourse of the greens cannot be derived.

However, first and foremost, the political goals of the greens express collective, societal interests. And it is noteworthy that electoral studies have developed the concept of the *'sociotropic voter'* in order to describe that voters appear to be more concerned with collective, societal goals than with narrow self-interests (Lewin 1988 summarizes some of the findings). In Denmark a similar irrelevance of immediate self-interests is found, even as far as welfare state attitudes are concerned (Goul Andersen 1990a).

Thus, the subjective orientation of voters seems to correspond increasingly with the communicative ideals of the greens. And if people become increasingly concerned with collective goals both in their role as voters and in their role of consumers, this may complete our search for the social forces behind the 'green project'.

The Green Discourse and its Relationship to Neoliberalism, Socialism and Social Democracy

Of course, the ideal typical construction of a green discourse set out above amounts only to a brief sketch. Hopefully, however, it is sufficient to demonstrate the coherence and the potential scope of green politics. In this penultimate section, this is completed by a brief discussion of the relationship between the green discourse, neoliberalism and socialism.

Inglehart (1987), lacking a structural perspective, is forced to see the

greens and the neoliberals as adversaries, and to see the neoliberal discourse simply as a ghost from the past. However, this ignores that both projects may to some degree be seen as an answer to the same basic problems of industrial society. There is a certain kinship between the two discourses, not in terms of mutual sympathy but in terms of common enemies.

In the first place, the greens and the neoliberals are characterized by a shared disbelief in central planning. Stated simply, the neoliberals are concerned with protecting the market from a central economic planning that does not work, whereas the greens are concerned with protecting civil society from a central steering that does not work. But both seem to agree that because of a decline of predictability, calculability and control over negative side-effects, central steering tends to become counter-productive. In this sense, both discourses might be conceived as 'post-industrial'.

Secondly, both neoliberals and the greens are concerned with such values as autonomy and freedom. But here, the waters divide. Neoliberals, regarding the market as the ideal, want to release the forces of the market against and within the state (e.g. by giving individuals more choice with respect to consumption of public services). The greens, on the other hand, want to release the forces of civil society against and within the state, e.g. by means of decentralization, democratization and self-organization. Furthermore, the greens are highly critical of the market. Whereas the neoliberals are concerned with enhancing the pursuit of self-interests, the greens aim at expanding a more 'sociotropic' or communicative orientation, even at the market.

Nevertheless, the similarity between the neoliberal and the green critique of the state is striking (Offe 1984). Not infrequently neoliberals have been able to draw directly upon the 'green' critique of the state, and some Marxists have even pointed at the possibility that the new social movements may be abused in a neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state (Hirsch 1989).

This pushes the similarities too far. The greens are not aiming at a diminishing of the welfare state but rather at a transformation of its institutions. But to view the neoliberals and the greens as simple adversaries and the neoliberals as simple reactionaries is far too simple.

Nevertheless, the kinship between the greens and the socialists or social democrats is closer. Whereas neoliberals and the greens may share to some degree the critique of the welfare state, the greens and the socialists share to some degree the critique of the market. Not least in the environmental field, an alliance is possible. Furthermore, the demand for lowering working hours derivable from the leisure-oriented way of life of the working class converges with the green demand for lowering working hours as a precondition for revitalizing civil society.

But ideal-typically, the greens do not share visions with the socialists or

with social democrats when it comes to alternatives to the market. The greens would join Weber's conviction that socialism, i.e. centralized economic planning, would only make things worse as it enables an even more far-reaching expansion of the 'system world' and formal rationality. The social-democratic ideals of state control and centralized economic co-ordination between the state, the employers and the trade unions are almost equally far from the ideals of the greens.

And the difference goes further. At a very fundamental level, the labour movement is the product of industrial society, and it has always tended to build organizations and institutions based on the fundamental principles of industrialism. Basically, the labour movement has always believed in the dominant rationality of the 'system world', i.e. in planning, steering, control, centralization, science and experts, growth, and so on. In these respects, the difference between Eastern Europe and Western European Social Democrats is more a matter of degree than a difference in kind. Thus, visions of a 'red–green alliance' are plausible but such an alliance is loaded with contradictions.

Conclusions

The conception of industrialism solves some of the basic analytical problems of other perspectives. From a class perspective, it is difficult to see how general *societal interests* can unite a single class, perhaps even against all other classes. The Marxist perspective seems unable to explain the *scope* of 'new politics'. And the explanatory variable of the post-materialist value perspective – experience of *affluence* during formative years – is problematic.

On the other hand, the value approach does give an inner coherence to the 'green project' not entirely dissimilar from the picture derived from the concept of industrialism. In some respects, even the political implications converge. But there are differences. Seeing 'new politics' as a response to problems of industrialism enables an identification of the pre-industrialism/post industrialism ambivalence. The perspective of industrialism furthermore predicts that it is the 'old values' rather than the 'new values' that are economically counter-productive, referring to Eastern European experiences.

As far as the political sociology of green politics is concerned, the two perspectives also give rather different perspectives on the reconcilability of working-class politics and 'new politics' and on the relationship between the green discourse and another major ideological current, neoliberalism. Finally, the identification of the ambivalent directions of green politics also points at the fact that political articulation may be important in determining

the political consequences. Depending upon the discourse of the greens, the strategy of the labour movement and, more generally, upon how the environmental problems are discursively constituted in the general public, alliances between 'red' and 'green' may be more or less troublesome.

NOTES

1. The SF was certainly a 'new left' or 'left-libertarian party' (Kitschelt 1988) even prior to its 'greening', and it has not dispensed with its socialist ideology. Furthermore, it should be underlined that the changing social base does not imply that the SF voters are 'affluent'. In terms of consumption possibilities, they range among the poorest (Goul Andersen 1988).

2. Originally, Inglehart (1971, 1979) linked his argument to a vague conception of 'post-industrial' society. However, it is difficult to see why increasing affluence should be tantamount to a wholly new societal order, and Inglehart now, more consistently, speaks of 'advanced' *industrial* society.

3. Inglehart has also applied the argument at the societal level where he argues that the logic of diminishing marginal utility will gradually change the political agenda towards non-economic issues. However, despite the unusually strong post-materialist sentiments in the general public, this at least remains to be seen in Denmark: since 1975, some 80 percent of the voters have spontaneously mentioned unemployment, balance of payment problems or unspecified economic problems when they are asked about the most important problems the politicians should handle (the remaining answers mainly concerning inflation, taxes, social problems, and so on). However, the salience of such materialist problems has not prevented the development of a strong environmental consciousness.

4. It could furthermore be argued that the Danish Radical Liberal Party (traditionally based on an odd alliance between smallholders and urban intelligentsia) has always expressed the post-materialist concerns of the upper middle classes in Denmark – in this case even a post-materialism which comes closer to the present meaning of the word.

5. The term 'post-industrial' is loaded with unfortunate connotations. In the 1970s, the term 'post-industrial society' was frequently used to describe the vision of a 'super-industrial' society (Kumar 1978; Loftager 1985), characterized by unprecedented affluence (as in Inglehart) or by growth in the service sector, by the increasing application of scientific knowledge and so on (as in Bell 1976). Negative visions of similar tendencies summarized in the label 'programmed' society (as in Touraine 1971, 1981) is subject to the same criticism. None of these visions involve any kind of a 'break' with the previous development of industrialism. The conception of industrialism in this article involves a 'break' but by no means implies that manufacture is becoming less important (Cohen & Zysman 1987).

6. Marxists typically use the term 'post-fordist' in order to underline that the economy is still capitalist. In some respects, this concept is preferable. But if the concept of 'post-industrialism' is too wide, the concept of 'post-fordism' seems too narrow as it is entirely unable to account for such phenomena as environmental problems or 'sociotropic' voters and consumers discussed below.

7. For instance, Poland is reported to consume twice as much energy per capita as Denmark, despite its much lower level of consumption.

8. The basic logic of *massification* underlying industrialist organizations (e.g. Toffler 1980) may be added to the list. However, as its inclusion would entail a complex discussion which is only marginally important for the basic arguments, it has been omitted. On a concrete level, its implication for the organization and counter-productivity of the health sector is discussed in Goul Andersen (1990b).

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