Risto Alapuro: State and Revolution in Finland. Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1988, 315 pp.

The collapse of the three East European empires (the Ottoman, the Habsburg and the Russian) gave rise to all of twelve new states in Europe between 1830 and 1918. Among these, Finland occupies a special position through its political stability, democratic continuity and unbroken sovereignty. The present book is a major contribution to a broader understanding of the preconditions of this specifically Finnish path of political and social development.

The title of the book, and its cover design in particular, might lead one to believe that Alapuro has produced an intensive case-study of the 1918 Finnish Civil War. The study is, however, much broader in focus. The author wants to explain both the political mass mobilization of 1907, the rise and fall of the revolution in 1918 and the fascist-type reaction at the beginning of the 19305. Explanatory factors are sought in the processs of state making, in the external dependence of the county as well as in the Finnish class structure. The analysis is related to an East European, and to some extent a Scandinavian, comparison throughout the book.

The most obvious merit of this book is precisely this comparative design. The queries addressed by Alapuro have received ample attention in previous research; among other things, several solid English-language monographs have been published. Another one-country case study would hardly have been a major innovationin field. Comparative studies, on the other hand, have the quality of pointing at new and interesting aspects of previously known facts and sources, and this is precisely the case with Alapuro's work as well. At the same time the author has not, eminently knowledgeable as he is concerning the historical source material in Finland, entirely kept to the limits posed by the comparative logic. His analysis of the Finnish case contains a number of interesting and potentially important observations beyond the strictly comparative frame of reference. The temptation to present large portions of his previous Finnish research to a broader international readership may lie behind Alapuro's choice here. Be that as it may, the result is

that the study as a whole lies somewhere in between a case study and a thoroughly
comparative investigation.

The plan of the book accommodates a structural and a chronological analysis at the same time. Part one focuses on the process of state making since 1809, and Finnish class structure and the territorial integration of Finland. The next chapter analyzes the major social movements of the autonomy ('Russian') period (1809-1917) the political mobilization due to the Representative Reform of 1906. Here, a special focus is on Finnish nationalism and the development of the Finnish workers' movement into the strongest rurally based socialist party in the whole of Europe. Part three considers the abortive socialist revolution of 1918 and its consequences for interwar Finnish politics. The fourth and final part of the book is comparative throughout. Here, Alapuro confronts his major observations about Finland with a detailed East European and Scandinavian comparison.

In terms of theory, Alapuro relates mainly to the work of Charles Tilly and Barrington Moore. This means that Finland is placed in Eastern Europe as regards the politico-historical geography of the continent. Naturally, the major theoretical interest is with the question of whether the Finnish case complies with previous generalizations about state making, political mobilization and revolution in Eastern Europe. Theoretical propositions presented by Tilly and Moore provide the point of departure also regarding the more specific question of the preconditions of revolutions. Other theorists of relevance are Stein Rokkan, Immanuel Wallerstein and Perry Anderson. As to Alapuro's bibliography in general, he should be especially commended for the unusually large number of expert East European works cited by him.

Finland's position in the nineteenth century resembled that of the small East European nations in two respects. It belonged to a multinational empire, and its own elite (the Swedish-speaking upper class) differed ethnically from the vast majority of the population. Moreover, the position of Eastern Europe in the world economy was that of a source of raw materials to the more developed western parts of the continent. Most East European countries were dependent on their exports of grain to the West; as for Finland, the basic staple good exported was timber. This is, however, basically where the simillarities end. The autonomous position of Finland had, strictly speaking, no comparison in Eastern Europe. Thanks to this arrangement, Finland was already able to develop into a modern state in the nineteenth century. Contrary to the (largely German-speaking) upper class in Eastern Europe, Finland's Swedish elite turned to the Finnish common people in order to create a Finnish national sentiment as a shield for the autonomous position of the country. The fact that it was at all possible to bridge the gap between these classes was grounded in still another special feature: the strong position of the independent small and middle peasantry. This peculiarity of the Finnish class structure was an important heritage from the Swedish period, and it stood in a sharp contrast to the more or less feudal situation characteristic of Eastern Europe. The final feature marking the special position of Finland was the 'reversed development vis-å-vis the imperial power: Finland was, economically as well as socially, 'overdeveloped' compared with Russia, and it was able to profit vastly by the access to the enormous Russian market.

Consequently, both the emergence of capitalism and the social and political mobilization in the nineteenth century in Finland took a fundamentally different course than in Eastern Europe. Forests, by far the most important natural resource of the country, basically remained in the hands of the peasantry, thus drawing them into the process of a market-oriented modernization. The sawmill and woodprocessingindustry up in areas with vast raw-material resources rather than

in the largest towns. This contributed to there being little difference between the rural proleteriat and the industrial working class. Finnish nationalism became a moderately conservative, unifying force. In Eastern Europe, nationalism had a socially radical character, and it was frequently directed against the domestic elites. In Finland, the early working-class movement met with greater tolerance on the part of the national elite than probably anywhere else in Europe. Consequently, the movement did not become revolutionary in the national context. Rather, its activism was directed outward, against the imperial power.

Against this background, Alapuro views the upheavals between 1906 and 1918 as highly unlikely and surprising. In fact, theories of the preconditions of revolutions prove to be highly insufficient in the Finnish case. There was no general legitimacy crisis concerning the system as such. There were no deep cleavages within the elite; quite the contrary, the Finnish elite was unusually homogeneous and unified. The working-class movement was not oriented to revolution but to equal participation in social power. The upheavals in 1907 and 1918 were primarily due to external impulses, the revolutions in Russia and the ensuing power vacuum in Finland. The fact that the 1907 elections entailed a spectacular social-democratic mobilization is accounted for by specifically Finnish circumstances. Similarly, the character of the 1918 war - a ruthless class war - was due to internal factors in Finland. These factors as such did not, however, constitute the impetus behind the upheavals. Here, the explanation must be sought in external factors. Alapuro: 'In a word, the Finnish revolution was under determined: there were no deep endemic grievances among the masses that would have made them complete the destruction of the old order spontaneously' (p. 201).

Given the strong emphasis on structural factors in Alapuro's theoretical frame of reference, his main conclusion about the East European revolutions is both bold and paradoxical. The revolutions were far from self-evident given the structural preconditions in these countries. Quite to the contrary, they can best be explained in terms of a historical accident: events beyond the control of the countries happened to occur at a specific point in time. Had they taken place, say, a couple of decades earlier, their repercussions in the small East European countries would have looked entirely different. Consequently, the immediate domestic background of the various revolutionary attempts was far from identical throughout the region: (Finnish social democracy) 'basically attempted to retain the power it had gained in the February revolution. In the Baltic provinces, instead, the revolutionaries really seized power, and in Hungary they accepted it - in both cases only after the state machinery had been destroyed in the war' (p. 273).

Consequently, as concerns Finnish state making and class structure, the country must be ascribed to a different category than the East European countries which Alapuro uses for his comparative framework. Structurally and socially, Finland is a Scandinavian, actually a Swedish, state, and its political development cannot be properly understood without this necessary backdrop. An important lesson from this study might in fact be that the simple 'East/West' division common in the literature is insufficient when it comes to explaining why in political terms Europe has evolved in the way it has. There are specifically Nordic circumstances with an independent explanatory power beyond the 'Eastern' and 'Western' variables.

Alapuro's ambitious study is based on an impressive theoretical reading and a thorough historical knowledge. It helps place Finland in its proper place on the politico-historical map of Europe, and it contains several novel observations about major events in Finnish history. One such insight is his view of the 1918 war as a revolution, an attempt to (re)gain state power, rather than an uncontrolled process based on the desperation of the destitute masses. In the same context, Alapuro

contributes another interesting observation. The leadership of the Finnish Social Democratic party is usually regarded as helpless 'driftwood' in connection with the process after the dissolution of the Diet in 1917. Alapuro underlines that the party leaders in fact played an influential role in that they were able to retard the outbreak of the war by some six months.

My criticism concerns some aspects of the structure of the book as well as some details in the analysis. Some of the sections are clearly too extensive and fail really to contribute to Alapuro's comparative analysis. This is especially acute concerning his overview of the political and economic development in the various Finnish regions. As such, this presentation is highly interesting and well written, and it would certainly be worth a book. In my view, however, the present book is not the right one for these questions.

Alapuro exaggerates the unity within the social elite of the autonomy period and especially among bourgeois groups in interwar Finland. Had this unity in fact been as total as the author wants to suggest, the 1919 Form of Government would hardly have been preceded by the conflict which actually took place; nor would it have received the blueprint it came to have. Moreover, the outcome of the right-wing extremist current of the early 1930s seems difficult to understand if one accepts the monolithic view of bourgeois Finland depicted in this book. The author states quite correctly that the small peasants and the centrist groups turned against the Lapua Movement when it directed its activity against social democracy and the parliamentary system. Strictly speaking, however, he does not offer an explanation of this fact.

The political course of interwar Finland can best be understood in terms of a paradox. On the one hand, there was sufficient cooperation between the various bourgeois groups to prevent the 'ghettoization' of the right wing typical of many European countries in the period. This unity was symbolized by the Civil Guards, the existence of which pre-empted the creation of purely political paramilitary organizations by the right wing. At the same time, bourgeois Finland was split over the question of parliamentarism, language, economic policy and so on. This meant that the Civil Guards could not become clearly involved in politics if one wished to preserve their character as a common symbol for entire 'White Finland'. When in 1932 President Svinhufvud told the Civil Guards not to support the Lapua Movement in connection with the 'Måntsålå Revolt', his call was primarily followed by centeroriented The Lapua Movement had alienated the small peasants and their party, the Agrarian Union, by its attack on the parliamentary system. From the point of view of the peasantry, it would have been political madness to do away with the main channel through which they secured their basic economic interests: it was Parliament that decided about taxes, tariffs, duties and subsidies. When the fascist threat convinced the social democrats that the protection of the parliamentary system was an overarching concern to them, a broad basis of cooperation was created between the two parties. With the 1937 'Red-Green' coalition in Finland, the basic political constellations were identical throughout Scandinavia. Given Alapuro's previous emphasis on the political importance of the independent peasantry, it is somewhat surprising that he does not explicitly stress the political implications of the special character of the farming population here as well.

Despite these comments, Alapuro's study must be recognized as a major contribution
the field. For both a Finnish and an international readership, it will
remain a standard work on Finnish political history for many years to come.