Leif Lewin: Det gemensamma basta. Om egenintresset och allmånintr_esset i våsterlåndsk Stockholm: Carlsson Bokforlag, 1988, 160 pp.

The incumbent professor of the old chair in 'politics and eloquence' at Uppsala University has once again produced a new book. It is well written and indeed very readable. The theme is public interest versus self-interest as motivating forces in political life; or, it could be argued, the harmful and deplorable effects of economic

public-choice theory applied to political behavior. Public-choice theory has introducedan
sound of cynicism into political science.

The point of departure is the question of whether self-interest or public interest dominates political life. That question cannot be answered by simple assumptions and associated parsimonious theories; it must be answered through a number of empirical tests. Lewin's purpose is precisely to review the available empirical evidence.

The basic assumption of public-choice theory is that man is an egoistic, rational utility maximizer, and upon this foundation, theories of political behavior have been erected. Lewin is interested in the behaviors of voters, politicians and bureaucrats. introductory chapter presents the various theories, and states the three core questions of the book. The three questions are: Do voters decide primarily according to economic self-interest or to a concern for the public interest?; Do politicians primarily attempt to maximize votes or to implement their programs?; Do bureaucrats primarily attempt to maximize their budgets or loyally to implement political decisions?

Chapters 2-4 then take a closer look at the empirical research tindings pertaining to each of the three questions. The overall conclusions are fairly unequivocal: a large number of empirical studies show that the assumption '. . . that voters primarily should be guided by their self-interest cannot be retain' (p. 80). The idea of politicians as being short-term vote maximizers '. . . has just as limited empirical support as the idea that voters primarily vote according to the pocket-book' (p. 98). And finally: 'The budget-maximization hypothesis, in short, is not supported by the empirical research' (p. 125).

The conclusions are probably correct and appear to be well founded. Thus, Lewin has shown that elegant theories are actually wrong. If, as Anthony Downs maintained, theories should be tested primarily by the accuracy of their predictions, they have clearly failed the test. In addition, the theories often lack plausibility and realism. In sum, we need new and better theories that are not based on egoistic utility maximization.

Lewin does not reject rational-choice theory entirely, however. On the contrary, he assumes that voters and political leaders are rational beings who can rank order their preferences and act in order to achieve them (pp. 39, 136-142). His concept of rationality is broader than the narrow pursuit of egoistic interests. Human beings are capable of foreseeing unhappy consequences of egoistic behavior and of acting according to such insight. Lewin is also aware of the importance of organizations, such as parties and interest groups, intervening between citizens and collective decisions. Collective decision making is not just a matter of aggregation of individual preferences.

Lewin's arguments and evidence are usually convincing. However, in the final chapter the author tends to push his findings a bit too far. That egoistic publicchoice is flawed does not necessarily mean that public-interest motivations prevail, but this seems to be Lewin's position (p. 126). How do we know that that public interest plays a larger role in politics than does selfishness? To answer that question may require yet another book.

Leif Lewin's contribution is primarily an eloquent antidote to narrow conceptions
of rational-choice theory. As such it is highly useful and valuable.