Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 11 – No. 4, 1988
ISSN 0080–6757

Does Sex Matter to Democracy?

Anna G. Jónasdóttir, Örebro University

In order to isolate, theoretically, the vital mechanisms that constrain women as citizens in Western, democratic societies, it is necessary to go beyond explanations in terms of work, into sexuality. However, it is not the practice of sexual coercion which, though a serious wrong, is fundamental in subordinating women in the formally free society; it is rather the freely given – and taken – love. Furthermore, if scrutinizing pre-democratic, anti-feminist arguments can help to reveal the situation today, it is the *utilitarian* view of women's sexual resources, rather than arguments about sexually differentiated – and inferior female – *nature*, which is crucial. Secondly, the concept of 'difference', now so popular among feminist writers, is important, especially when used empirically to avoid oversimplifying unity thinking about each of the sex/gender groups. But it is not fit for conceiving the power transactions going on in the socio-sexual process. Furthermore, I suppose that one of the most important tasks of feminism is to balance the weights of (different) individuality and collectivity to mutually developmental values. Thirdly, women want more than 'equal chances', something other than 'equal results', and the 'different but equally valuable' must, to be women-worthy, be defined by women themselves. In a democratic society, if women are to be full and equal members, as leaders and led, then women and men have to be openly accepted as two fundamental, interested parties in society. Finally, women should not claim this citizen status first and foremost as mothers, but simply *as women*, i.e. as female, social 'incarnate subjects'.

The main question to be addressed in this article is how *citizenship*, *individuality*, and *sexuality* are connected in the contemporary Western, social context; that is, how the undividable/the individual – and yet divided into man and women – human being is, and could be, related to democratic citizenship. By 'could be', I mean: What would a 'free, equal, and secure' (the three classical justifying criteria of liberal democracy) membership for women in a democratic society be like? Naturally, the second part of this question cannot be answered in any detail.

As the social inequality between women and men has been increasingly considered in practice as well as in theory, during the last twenty years or so, the flagrant difference in political power positions between the sexes has also become highlighted. Recently, feminist scholars have begun to raise questions about sexually differentiated citizenship, and about women and men having different kinds of relationship to the state at large. This difference has taken on new forms under the welfare state, and has become accentuated and easier to observe. What mainly characterizes this difference is that in different ways women, to a much greater extent than men,

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 11 – No. 4, 1988
ISSN 0080–6757

Does Sex Matter to Democracy?

Anna G. Jónasdóttir, Örebro University

In order to isolate, theoretically, the vital mechanisms that constrain women as citizens in Western, democratic societies, it is necessary to go beyond explanations in terms of work, into sexuality. However, it is not the practice of sexual coercion which, though a serious wrong, is fundamental in subordinating women in the formally free society; it is rather the freely given – and taken – love. Furthermore, if scrutinizing pre-democratic, anti-feminist arguments can help to reveal the situation today, it is the *utilitarian* view of women's sexual resources, rather than arguments about sexually differentiated – and inferior female – *nature*, which is crucial. Secondly, the concept of 'difference', now so popular among feminist writers, is important, especially when used empirically to avoid oversimplifying unity thinking about each of the sex/gender groups. But it is not fit for conceiving the power transactions going on in the socio-sexual process. Furthermore, I suppose that one of the most important tasks of feminism is to balance the weights of (different) individuality and collectivity to mutually developmental values. Thirdly, women want more than 'equal chances', something other than 'equal results', and the 'different but equally valuable' must, to be women-worthy, be defined by women themselves. In a democratic society, if women are to be full and equal members, as leaders and led, then women and men have to be openly accepted as two fundamental, interested parties in society. Finally, women should not claim this citizen status first and foremost as mothers, but simply *as women*, i.e. as female, social 'incarnate subjects'.

The main question to be addressed in this article is how *citizenship*, *individuality*, and *sexuality* are connected in the contemporary Western, social context; that is, how the undividable/the individual – and yet divided into man and women – human being is, and could be, related to democratic citizenship. By 'could be', I mean: What would a 'free, equal, and secure' (the three classical justifying criteria of liberal democracy) membership for women in a democratic society be like? Naturally, the second part of this question cannot be answered in any detail.

As the social inequality between women and men has been increasingly considered in practice as well as in theory, during the last twenty years or so, the flagrant difference in political power positions between the sexes has also become highlighted. Recently, feminist scholars have begun to raise questions about sexually differentiated citizenship, and about women and men having different kinds of relationship to the state at large. This difference has taken on new forms under the welfare state, and has become accentuated and easier to observe. What mainly characterizes this difference is that in different ways women, to a much greater extent than men,

are dependent on the state, as employees, and as clients and consumers of the state's services – which also means that women and men are socially vulnerable in different ways. It means, too, that women as voters are more favorable to a large public sector. But at the same time, women are far less influential and have far less authority in the state than men have, whether through individual citizenship or through corporate organizational life. Thus, one of the ironies of history is that, at present, although most Western democratic governments carry out comprehensively backed up sexual equality programs, at the same time more women in proportion to men are victims of the undermining of the Welfare State that goes on in most Western countries.[1]

Feminist state theory is very much in its infancy (cf. note 1 above), and still less has been done by feminists in democratic theory.[2] To be sure, this last point is partly due to the fact that in feminist scholarship liberating conditions for women generally, have more often been discussed and investigated in other terms (such as equality, freedom, autonomy, power, etc.) than the more specified political-theoretical terms of democracy. And this, surely, reflects another fact, namely the dearth of women in general, and of feminist scholars in particular, among 'disciplined' students of politics and political theory.

As a critical point of departure for the problems raised in this essay, I will refer mainly to some recent, published and unpublished, work by Carole Pateman (1983a, 1983b, 1985), in particular to her questions and answers concerning the difficulties and possibilities for women *as women* to be full and equal citizens. With the help of this reference point, I want to extend, into the field of democratic theory, the lines of theoretical reasoning for understanding contemporary male authority and women's interests in formally equal societies, which I have developed in other contexts.[3]

Patriarchy in formal/legal, equal societies should be basically defined as a historically specific, *political* sexual power structure; definitions in terms of socio-economic, psychological or ideological power are not fully satisfying. In this particular power structure I conceive women *as women*, and men *as men*, as constitutive. And this power structure is supposed to condition or influence the relations between women and men in all other social contexts, for instance their activities as public persons.

What, then, is meant by 'women as women'? Is there anything left when we have defined women as 'workers', as 'mothers' and as 'citizens' (Siim 1988)? And also, directly related to the state, as 'employees', 'clients' and 'consumers' (Hernes 1984)? Are there any more roles that are relevant to a theoretical analysis of women's political situation today? What about women as 'human beings', as 'individual persons'?[3a]

This last question hints at the opinion, widely and for a long time taken

for given, that this creature, 'human being' or the 'individual', in general is irrelevant; particularly with regard to a political theory, which claims to be guided by principles of historical materialist method.

In her recent works on feminism and democratic theory, Carole Pateman (1983a, 1983b, 1985) argues that 'the great question that now faces us' is whether a form of 'democratic citizenship is possible that includes women *as women*' (1985, III, 4); she also claims that: 'We need a conception of universal, participatory citizenship that is grounded in the recognition of sexual difference, so that women, to become full citizens, do not have to attempt to become pale reflections of men, but can actively participate *as women*' (1985, II, 14).

According to Pateman, this would be the only solution to the oppressive and degrading fact that 'women have never been and still are not admitted as full and equal members and citizens in any country known as a "democracy"' (1983a, 204). On the contrary, she asserts that: '"The" individual is sexually particular and liberal democratic values, practices, and institutions accordingly reflect masculine attributes' (1985, III, 3). This means, from Pateman's point of view, that the social barriers restraining women's status as citizens must be sought and combated not just in the public sphere itself, or simply in women's double-burdened and ambiguous work situation; rather 'women's status as workers is as uncertain and ambiguous as our status as citizens, and both reflect the more fundamental problem of our status as "individuals"' (1983a, 215).

All this results in her claim that: 'The assumptions and practices which govern the everyday, personal lives of women and men, including their sexual lives, can no longer be treated as matters remote from political life and the concerns of democratic theorists' (1983a, 213).

What exactly does Pateman mean by 'women *as women*'? And what does she infer by 'individuality', in its prevailing masculine form and as potentially feminine and human/universal? What is the 'fundamental problem' of, and the political relevance of, the difference in women's and men's status as 'individuals'? Furthermore, what content or capacity does she select from the, obviously multiple, womanhood, that would – and should – function as the vital condition for developing a truly universal democratic society? *Is* there something beyond the role-set which my commentators in the workshop listed (cf. note 3a), a role (I would say a position or capacity) which is relevant to the solving of the – to quote Pateman again – 'fundamental problem' of individuality and, therefore, important to conceive of theoretically? In that case, does Pateman's solution cover this 'role', or does it not?

Women *as women*, for Pateman, seem to be split into two separate figures with no obvious connections between them: women as victims of male, sexual and political coercion, and women as potentially dignified civil

mothers. Furthermore, her concept of sexually differentiated individuality is grounded on her assumptions about feminine and masculine identities, derived from the more than three-centuries-old patriarchal convictions and practices, still prevailing today, by which women are claimed to be subject and inferior to men by *nature*.

However, she does not think that the way to a better future for women should lead us to still more appeals for a masculinist-defined reason of nature (as many liberal feminists have done since at least 1650) or, even to the ideal of *sameness*. Neither does she perceive a way through a new confirmation of *separate spheres*, the ideal which many feminists and suffragists in the nineteenth century shared with anti-feminists and anti-suffragists. She believes that conditions for a third alternative now prevail, although she is rather pessimistic about the possibilities of its realization in practice and even in theory.

In short, what has to be done, according to Pateman, is to transform the now prevailing separation between the personal and the public spheres, without necessarily breaking down everything that distinguishes each of these spheres. Furthermore, women should be accepted in political theory and practice as concrete individuals who differ from men primarily on one crucial ground, that of the ability to give birth. Therefore, Pateman thinks that the way to a truly universal democracy must be redirected and completed by women in virtue of motherhood. In the following some of Pateman's central points will be questioned and discussed.

My article is organized around three main themes. First, if women's citizenship has been and still is constrained by individuality, how should this be understood and explained? Secondly: What is the explanative value of the concept of 'difference', now so popular among feminist writers? and: How far is (different) 'individuality' politically relevant for feminism? Thirdly, in the light of the prevailing confusing views on Western society and democracy, what do women want? If it is equality, what kind of equality? If a new kind of different citizen status, on what capacity should that status be founded?

My main conclusions are that Pateman's thesis about the appeals to reason of *nature* being the most powerful of the anti-feminist arguments from the seventeenth century onwards has to be modified. What was the most treacherous in anti-feminism, that had already begun in the late seventeenth century and that was definitely established in the eighteenth century, was rather the appeals to *utility*; women's place being defined after the good they should do to the thrift of private property, to the order and stability of the state, and to the pleasure of men. Furthermore, while I see it as an advantage that Pateman refers to sexuality, and not only to work, in order to explain the contemporary social barriers to women's full and equal membership in political society, she falls into a radical-feminist

fallacy when viewing sexual coercion as essential for such explanation. The fundamental sexual conflict concerns freely given, and taken, love.

Like many other feminist writers I believe that the concept of 'difference' and differentiated individuality is both theoretically and politically important. But the deepest layers of our present social reality we can only capture with a processual and relational way of thinking. Concerning individuality versus collectivity, a non-oppressive integration of these states of social being is, perhaps, the most important political goal of feminism. Finally, my conviction is that women have to demand citizen status simply as womankind, if we are to be able to act for our own purposes.

Women's Citizenship as Constrained by Individuality

In what way does individuality, as the basis for liberal citizenship, constitute a hindrance for women? What does it mean to say, as for instance Pateman does, that the 'individual/citizen' has always been a male category, and that citizenship is still sexually particular, not universal in any true sense? What exactly is it about individuality *today*, in the formally free and equal society, that restrains women from becoming 'full and equal citizens and members' of this society?

One mode of answering these questions is, of course, to look at the empirically based explanations of women's, still prevailing, subordinated social and political status, especially the explanations delivered by contemporary feminist theory; and, if found insufficient, to attempt to develop this theory further. Another mode of answering the questions above, is to look at the various philosophical arguments that have been used historically against women's equal public status with men.

Such arguments have flourished abundantly and intensely from the very beginning of Western political thinking. They reached their modern heyday during the revolutionary period of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; at the time of Enlightenment when freedom, equality and brotherhood (protected or not protected by a state) were demanded for all 'men'. Moreover, in some countries, during the period of struggle for women's suffrage the bearers of anti-feminist arguments united and organized to oppose women becoming full and equal members of political society (Harrison 1978).

The anti-feminist arguments so forcefully carried on in political history are interesting not only as an antiquated curiosity (even if they often *are* curious) but for other reasons, too. Firstly, they functioned as operative principles in jurisprudence and were carried out in practice without mercy, when put to the test, as was often the case. And, presumably, as many

feminist students of law assert, there is still much in the making and practice of law that, more or less non-intentionally, functions oppressively for women. Secondly, the deep-rooted devaluation of women might continue to function as ideological power, as so-called historical rests, and thus continue to influence the attitudinal structures of men today, even after the disappearence of the legal foundation of this devaluation. Or, as Hume wrote in his *Treatise on Human Nature*, when a convention or a general rule 'is once establish'd, men are apt to extend it beyond those principles, from which it first arose' (here, quoted after Agonito 1977, 126).

Thirdly, there were many women among the anti-suffragists, women who obviously thought that equality between women and men in public life would be destructive for women. Thus, there might be some keys in the motives of these women that might reveal the tricky question, actualized today, if and/or why the barriers to equality with men are partly produced by ourselves.

Fourthly, as Pateman (1985) interestingly underlines, perhaps over-emphasizes, the arguments of the anti-suffragists and the pro-arguments of suffragists themselves overlapped on a fundamental point, let alone the two protagonist parties drew different conclusions from it. The point of unanimity between anti-suffragists and, at least the social – or cultural – feminist part of the suffragists was to underline the importance of *difference* between women and men. It was different needs and interests which should be protected (by men in the one case, by women themselves through the state in the other); and men and women were supposed to have different capacities and values with which they should enrich their own family and marriage *or* the whole society. As is well known, sameness versus difference is still a problematic pair in feminist debate.

'Nature' and 'Utility' in the Legacy of Anti-Feminism

A growing literature on feminist research shows more and more details, and unsolved problems, in the history of philosophical anti-feminism and its feminist challenges.

Pateman argues that 'after three centuries of controversy about individualism, women and citizenship [the fundamental question that remains unanswered] is: what exactly is the political relevance of sexual difference?' (Pateman 1985, I, 15). In her own search for an answer, she asserts that: 'To understand why, in the 1980s, there are special difficulties about women and democratic citizenship, and to understand what form these difficulties take, it is necessary to see how the problems developed out of the first feminist challenge to the new individualism of the seventeenth century, and in the feminist reaction to Rousseau's participatory but patriarchal arguments of the eighteenth century' (Pateman 1985, I, 2). According to her, '[t]he anti-suffragists' arsenal of arguments consisted largely of

recapitulations and elaborations of arguments used since the seventeenth century to maintain the sexual particularity of citizenship'. And, she continues: 'The arguments ultimately came down to the claim that women, by virtue of their *nature* (emphasis added), lacked the capacities required of free and equal individuals and citizens and so posed a threat to the state' (Pateman 1985, II, 8). She also claims (Pateman 1983a, 212) that the conviction that wives are inferior to their husbands by nature still prevails today.

I fully agree with Pateman on all but the last points, which I think have to be modified. Already in the late seventeenth century, and definitely in the eighteenth and the nineteenth century, the general dominating ideology, used by some people to keep other people down, shifted; from a stance where applications to the *reason of (differentiated) nature* were central to a stance that justified itself by applying to various aspects of *social utility*.[4] My point is that anti-feminism, although resting on its own grounds, also was transformed in this direction.[5] In another context (Jónasdóttir 1983) I argue that already in Hobbes' and Locke's analyses of the true nature of power relations in the various spheres of society, a utility view of women's subordination becomes clear; and that this utilitarian embryo became fully developed and extremely honestly delivered in Hume's arguing for the sake of 'the interest of society'.

Even if many anti-feminists continued to refer to women's inferior nature, and feminists, from Mary Astell onwards (cf. Pateman 1985), steadily had this ideological construction of women's nature as a target (still today, we find ourselves sometimes involved in mostly confusing disputes over the social consequences of sex-differentiated nature), it was increasingly the utilitarian kind of arguments that set the terms of the combat. And this, I believe, is at least a part of the reason why the otherwise so surprising overlap of standpoints emerged between anti-suffragists and suffragists in the nineteenth century, both parties asserting sexual difference and separate spheres as fundamental in their arguments.

Assertions about inferior female nature could in principle be falsified on the grounds of rational thinking and empirical evidence. This was what Hobbes did; and this was, of course, what both Mary Astell and Mary Wollstonecraft did. And for Hume, the conviction that women being deviant 'had no foundation in nature' was 'so obvious a subject' that, as he writes: 'I believe I may spare myself the trouble of insisting on [it]' (from *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. III, Part 2, Sect. 12. Here quoted from Agonito 1977, 123). For Hume it was as perfectly clear as it was for Astell and Wollstonecraft, that 'such notions [about women's inferior nature] arise from education, from the voluntary conventions of men, and from the interest of society' (ibid., 124). The arguments about women's inferior nature were problems of true or untrue claims, which were relatively easy

to solve, particularly in this period when people turned from God and the Bible to Nature and their own rational thinking for founding truth. Moreover, it was relatively easy for women to get furious at such ideas and to reject them, in theory as well as in practice, in an era of widespread beliefs in individual equality and of revolt against all unjust masters and their oppressive ideas.[6]

The utilitarian masculinist arguments about the necessity of keeping women in private enclosures were not in the same clear-cut way possible to test against a truth-value. The more such notions became elaborated (which does not necessarily mean the same as more logically clear) they became a treacherous mixture of a seemingly pro-women ideology, that emphasized the value of women's specific capacities and virtues, *and* degrading definitions of the powers of womanhood as being politically destructive if let free. So the 'peculiarly feminine', which was explicitly defined as 'inherently subversive' of social order and the state if willed freely and aptly by women with a purpose of their own, was *also* declared to be the absolutely unecessary creative and recreative source to the existence and well-being of the modern equivalent to Divinity, that is, to Humanity.[7]

It is not easy to keep clear boundaries in a debate where the empowered party is telling the subordinated party that what is wrong with them is precisely the same as that which is necessary for doing good to others – and therefore also to themselves.

Such ideas were degrading for women given the new standard of dignified Humanity, which, following Harold Berman (1983, 31 f.), implied a kind of 'religious [. . .] belief [not] in God but [. . .] in Man, individual Man, his Nature, his Reason, his Rights'. According to Berman, this belief in Man, which emerged as a conscious notion with Lutheranism and which was embraced by the 'great revolutionary minds [of] men like Rousseau or Jefferson' (ibid.), was also the guiding principle for the transformation of the Western law system brought about from the sixteenth century onwards. So what was characteristic of the new 'l'espirit de lois' was the concept of 'the power of the individual, by God's grace, to change nature and to create new social relations through the exercise of his will [. . .] and intent' (ibid., 29 f.).

During the period when 'the world [was] turned upside down' two lines of reasoning concerning women emerged which, if viewed logically, flagrantly contradicted each other. But, what is logical is not always sociological. Thus, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, women were conceived, by some of the most influential philosophers and political theorists ever, to be men's equals; and if there was a difference in the gifts of nature, women rather than men were endowed with more vital powers (cf. Hobbes). The same theorists, however, declared that women had to

be kept under men's sovereignty and moulded for this status from infancy to old age. Hume and several others made this point extremely clear (cf. Thomas 1959).

This resulted in that women were philosophically and judicially, i.e. in theory as well as in practice, moved out of the new sanctified concept of Man, out of Humanity, out of – perhaps we could say – the new 'chain of being'.[8] The different links in this chain, or the states of this new being, each with its own peculiar unit of being, were Humanity and its Man, Society and its Individual, and the State and its Citizen. Women were, together with the rest of God's creation, expelled to a status exclusively of use- and exchange-value to be harnessed by Humanity. In the previous, medieval and less abstract hierarchical chain of being the various links of the chain had been the different species of God's creation – mankind, the animals, the plants, etc. – each placed after the ordering principle of closeness to God's image. Now, all the links are instead different aspects of the human being itself; and as soon as these links are concretized and made socially valid, they are all male and/or masculine. To be sure, even in the older world-view the male part of mankind had been standing closest to God. But a fundamental difference is that the female part had its own place in being which was not so totally dependent on the arbitrary will of individual Men. Men had to negotiate with God for the control over women and were subjected under His Judgement. Now, when Man was sovereign, and dignified by God 'to change nature and to create new social relations through the exercise of his will', not only nature – as Berman points out – but also women 'became property' and as such liable to men's use and regulation.[9]

The core of my argument is that what was so effectively oppressive of women in the new powerful metaphor of modernity was the unrestrained utilitarian rights Men entitled themselves with vis-à-vis women, and that definitions of natural, female inferiority were of secondary importance. This double-faced understanding of the early modern anti-feminism – which later on became idealized and romanticized, and thus more opaque, in its continental variants – is more important as a background for perceiving the ideological conditions today than only to maintain the 'appeals to nature'. The crucial point is that it did not really matter whether women were seen – in the state of nature – as being equal or inferior to men; the specific capacities of women's sexuality and love were thought by 'the great revolutionary minds' to be uniquely valuable as a *useful resource of nature* and, therefore, self-evidently to be exploited.

If we look at the pro-equality arguments today in public policy documents, I guess that the most usual kind still implies a utilitarian view of women. This should be revealed and criticized by feminists.

Since women became citizens, the male-dominated political philosophy,

theory, and science have been ambivalent to women and sex-related questions. Issues that hinted that Man (and Man was 'the goal' of science, according to 'the great revolutionary minds' of the behavioralist era) was also Woman, and that this sometimes made things complicated, tended to be seen more as *troubles* than as *problems*. And as troubles they were to be settled with as little costs as possible, rather than invested in with serious interest.

Contemporary Explanations of Women's Inferior Citizenship

According to Pateman, feminist critics have shown that 'post-war political science has largely ignored women as citizens; [and] when women have been mentioned, their presence has been noted through empirically unsupported and male supremacist assumptions' (Pateman 1985, II, 1). She contends that the connection between women's position in public life and their social situation was ignored by political scientists until feminist scholars themselves began to question this connection.

Even with her reservations (cf. quotation above) this is not quite so simple. It is right that women were ignored at large in the discipline. But women *were* considered as voters, and their behavior as voters *was* related to social conditions. They were also considered as presumptive voters in socialization studies. The shortage was, as was the case with most political science research under the behavioralist era, that social conditions as an explanatory context were so insufficiently elaborated theoretically.[10] And – precisely as Pateman herself certifies from inside – democratic theory, whether revisionist or critical/participatory, did nothing to make this shortage better. On the contrary, the silence about women in democratic theory, since Berelson et al. (1954) in an influential chapter had declared sex to be almost 'a-priori meaningless', legitimized the frequent abuse of the sex-role explanations in voting studies and socialization studies. Before 1970 there did not exist any sex-concerned parallel to Marxist class-analysis or to the analyses of the social conditions of the working class, a problem which, compared to the sex problem, was given much more interest especially in critical democratic theory. Neither were women self-evidently noticed within stratification theory.[11]

While women were noticed in voting studies and in socialization studies, the absence of women within the political authorities – to use Easton's vocabulary – was almost totally ignored. And what is not questioned is no reason to explain.

If the questions posed and the explanatory frameworks used by conventional political scientists before 1970 left much to be done, feminist scholars, from the late 1960s onwards, have done immeasurably much more to deepen and broaden the empirical as well as theoretical knowledge about how the social conditions of women influence their political situation.

However, this deepening and broadening of explanations has very much been limited to already conventional factors or fields. This may sound provocative, and I shall account for this statement. Let us begin with a summing up of the conventional arsenal of explanations.

Conventionally, the discussion about the different nature of men's and women's way of exerting, or not exerting, their citizenship most often runs in terms of lack of, or of insufficient *competence* of women; in formal education, in socialization, and/or in practical training in other contexts supposed to foster political competence. This is what was often summed up in the formula: the social sex role determines the political sex role (cf. for instance *The American Voter*, 1960). Secondly, at least since Lipset's *Political Man* (1960) *situational hindrances*, which meant women being too busy with housework and children, became a given. A third explanatory framework came into use in empirical voting and participation studies in connection with the more general shift, or displacement of weight, within the discipline from so-called deterministic (i.e. socio-economic) to intentional or *rational choice* explanations. Thus, for instance, the absence of women in bodies of political power, if not ignored, could be explained simply as reflecting women's own choices.

I want to underline very strongly that all these kinds of explanations are and/or have been more or less valid. But, even when used seriously, they are limited. For example: Nobody, after Gosnell in his *Democracy: The Threshold of Freedom* (1948), until some exceptional studies in the 1970s, asked about the conditions, in political life, for women who, by evidence, *were not* less competent in any obvious sense of that word, who *were not* hampered by either housework or children, and who *had chosen* to exert their citizenship actively and visibly in public arenas side by side with men.

Feminist studies have approached the social conditions of political women both much more and otherwise than before. But still, when it comes to the questioning and explaining or interpreting the prevailing *sex-specific* difficulties for women, an overwhelming weight of interest is still directed to the same background fields and background variables as before, let alone, as I wrote above, broadened and deepened. Thus, explanations of the type *work-situational hindrances* – now broadened to encompass the gender division of work both at home and at work outside the home – are still those by far the most usual. And, I want to underline again, that the working conditions *are* important restraining social realities. The *rational choice* explanation is also highly tenable, given the often very unbalanced division of work burden between women and men. It is not only that women work more than men, and more often in inconvenient hours. They have also less free or uncontingent leisure-time, and they more often have a kind of work where it is extremely hard to leave for political meetings or otherwise to practice political obligations; just to mention a few points.

It is in the *competence* field that perhaps the most important new things have happened. Feminist scholars as well as – and that is crucial, of course – women citizens themselves question more and more consciously the onesidedly posed lack-of-competence perspective. They content, instead, that women, for some reason or another, tend to have different competence from men's. But it *is* competence, and competence which is not more incomplete than men's in any simple sense. Perhaps it is not better either in any simple meaning of the word. This 'different voice' expresses itself in the so-called gender gap among voters,[12] in what women politicians are engaged in and how they handle their tasks, how they speak, and, at the extreme, in the fact that women have begun to shift for themselves, so to speak, in the political party system.[13]

In connection with the challenging of the lack-of-competence view, feminist scholars also report that women politicians criticize the characteristic sound of the dominant voice; as for instance the lack of pertinent political discussions and how such serious discussions are steadily substituted by more or less empty rhetoric.[14]

What about questioning and explaining situations as that mentioned above, when no lack of competence, no work barriers and no choice is in the way, and still women citizens do not manage, compared to men? In other words, what about 'the unexplained variance' of the 'sex variable' in such situations? As far as I can see, feminist scholars have not isolated this kind of question clearly enough, and, perhaps therefore, not pushed themselves strongly enough to take issue with the sex variable – or sexuality – itself, as an explanatory context.

Sexuality as a Social Condition

Sexuality is a field that has to be addressed more consciously in political theory, if we want to answer the kinds of question which arise as soon as we realize that the conventional variables, even when scrutinized and revised by feminists, do not explain the whole variance in men's and women's political behavior. Furthermore, arriving so far, we have to confront the possibility that such kind of theoretical explanations has to be developed on more than one level; so that the most abstract explanation might not be *immediately* applicable in a language of variable concepts or even *directly* testable. My point is, however, that such a kind of 'deep-theoretical' analysis, where the men/women relationship is isolated, is necessary if we want to make progress, and to satisfy demands from women to interpret situations where less obvious barriers than housework and children or lack of competence are at work. In the next section, I will come back to the question of abstraction levels and different modes of conceiving reality.

Sexuality, as a multifaceted social relationship and a process of pro-

duction of people, has been almost invisible in that part of feminist theory which has aimed at comprehensive, historically and empirically oriented explanations and interpretations of women's situation and of male dominance. Essay after essay, book after book has been written searching for specific grounds for the oppression of women, without ascribing any decisive weight to sexuality. This has only very recently and very slowly begun to change.

Therefore, it is an advantage when Pateman contends that there is something peculiar about the 'individual' which runs behind both the 'citizen' and the 'worker', and that this something concerns sexuality as practiced and interpreted in our society. Particularly interesting is her investigation of *consent*, how this holy principle of liberal theory loses its very meaning when applied to women within marriage and in sexual relationships with men. What is also plausible in her approach is that she focusses on women and men as agents in a specific authority structure, i.e. the structure of sexual relations in general and the institution of marriage in particular. And, for her, it is urgent that the 'connection between the structure of sexual relations and problems of democratic citizenship' (Pateman 1985, III, 7) shall be identified and investigated. However, from my perspective, she misses the point. We shall look closer at this.

The real problem is not that *no* feminists have written about sexuality. Rather, it has been done compartmentalized and onesidedly. After the first years of the second wave of the women's movement and the beginning of the new feminist scholarship, sexuality as a field of experience and a context of discovery has more and more appeared to consist of nothing but violence and coercion, at best of lesbian friendship or love. Normal (simply statistically, if in no other sense normal) heterosexual relationship, not to speak about love, has so effectively been thrown out with the male-chauvinist smelling bathwater, that we have to go to a male, sex-role sociologist from the late 1950s to encounter a scholar who raises questions about, for instance, '[t]he theoretical importance of love' (cf. Goode 1959). The only relations between ordinary women and men that seem to be theoretically relevant for empirically oriented feminist scholars are relations of work; sexual power relations are reduced to questions of economic dependence and/or needs of capitalism, and when not, they are reduced to sexual violence: rape, sexual harassment, pornography, etc. The closest to 'ordinary' sexuality that feminist theory has come is in its socialization theories, i.e. the theories of gender construction that reveal – and often very strikingly – how females and males are formed into different units of gender.

Thus, when Pateman identifies a central mechanism in the sexual relations that she assumes exerts a vital influence on individuality and citizenship, she only sees coercive sexuality, namely rape. According to her, democratic theorists must pay attention to 'the practice of rape and the interpretation

of consent and non-consent which define it as a criminal offence'. And, she continues: 'The facts about rape are *central to the social realities which are reflected in and partly constituted by our use of the term "individual"*' (Pateman 1983a, 212). I agree that the sociosexual authority structure and in particular the institution of marriage[15] must be focussed on. But we should not put rape into the centrum of that focus. It may seem strange, but I think that it is the 'freely given' – and taken – love that should be centered. It is the 'freely contracted' empowering care and ecstatic experiences in intimate love relations; and it is the 'free exchange' of socio-existential, i.e. personal, genderic confirmation, at work and in other public contexts, that *now* are 'central to the social realities which are reflected in and partly constituted by our use of the term "individual"'. It is in these 'free' affairs of transactions of existential power, power than creates and recreates individual identity and strength for agency, that men tend to exploit women. And women, we let ourselves be exploited, because we love; that is, not only 'in the name of love' as if this process was only a question of a 'false consciousness', or a lack of (the right kind of) 'desire'. We know we are doing good to others and that does good to us.

Of course it is true that men's abuse of women's consent is most glaring in cases of rape. It is also true that women, especially in sexual relations, often 'find that their speech is persistently and systematically invalidated [and that such] invalidation would be incomprehensible if the two sexes actually shared the same status as "individuals"' (Pateman 1983a, 213). I also think that the exposure of and the struggle against the widespread practice of sexual violence in all its various forms and social surroundings is one of the most important achievements of the women's movement.

But, still, coercion cannot be taken for the vital mechanism of the sexual authority structure prevailing in the formally free and equal, contemporary societies. Assuredly, in these societies, where women also now, in principle at least, are economically independent of individual men, sexual coercion and violence occur often, and, moreover, incredibly often end in murder. But coercion cannot be seen as *constitutive* of the historical form of sexual relationship which is characteristic for the type of society described above.

This does not contradict the salience of the assumption that legitimate and/or illegitimate physical force is a steadily present possibility, even in this formally free, equal and protected society. However, coercion and violence is as little or as much central as a vital cause in the reproduction of today's liberal male authority as it is in the reproduction of liberally embedded capitalism.

Pateman is not quite correct when she thinks that the assumption still prevails that wives are subjects to their husbands by nature. To the extent it still does prevail, it is giving way to other more complicated beliefs.[16] The legal right of husbands to rape their wives has also been banned in

many states and are under attack in still more. Even after this legal right is suspended, and since old-fashioned attitudes about female natural inferiority have essentially given way: the last struggle is still here – to put it a little poetically. This is the struggle over the creation and confirmation of a self-evident authority of women; a struggle for and against the self-evidence of a woman/human status as what women are – both similar to and different from mean – as embodied humans, as 'incarnate subjects'.

My reason for bringing in this Merleau-Pontyan concept, without being able to account for it any further in this essay, is that the utmost argument for equality, that holds for concretization, has to be established on the level of ontology. And the socio-material ontology of Merleau-Ponty seems to be in tune with the other theoretical views which I attempt to apply on women and men being in the (formally free and equal) world. This does not mean that ontology comes instead of empirical, historical social analyses. Those are necessary if we want to know how the sexually differentiated *and related* humanity – women and men – continuously 'change [their ontological] nature', and how they steadily 'create [the] social relations' between them.

The Relevance of 'Difference' and 'Individuality'

The concepts of 'difference' and 'individuality' have been in focus above. Pateman, for instance, claims that democratic theory must reject a unitary (that is masculine) conception of the individual, and be grounded in a conception that recognizes sexual difference (Pateman 1985, III, 4). Let us look a little closer at these concepts.

If *sameness* was the ideal and the goal in the sex-role debate in the early 1960s, a new women-centered *separateness* characterized much of the feminist discussions in the 1970s. In the 1980s the notion of *difference* seems to have taken over as a loosely uniting basis of the various branches of feminist thinking.

'Difference' is a theoretically and empirically as well as politically important concept, and I have argued for this especially in my work on women and interest theory (Jónasdóttir 1985, 1988c). But I do not share the belief, which is so widespread today, that this category is The utmost deliverer of conceptual clarifications. The main advantage for feminist studies of paying special attention to difference seems to be its promises to help to transcend implausible dualisms concerning the men–women relations and to get away from an oversimplifying homogeneous perception of women and men as groups. In other words, taking difference into consideration in theory promises to guarantee that empirical diversity is not made intellectually (or paradigmatically) invisible by a-priori closed categories. For me

(Jónasdóttir 1987, 1988a, 1988b), however, this is fully consistent with the claim that we should – *at a basic theoretical level* – conceive of women and men as two separate sexual groupings.

I have also argued elsewhere (Jónasdóttir 1985, 1988c), from the point of view of *historically structured* sex/gender, that feminist critique of the liberal notion of 'individuality' as well as of the Marxist notion of 'class', challenges some very important theoretical and historical fundamentals in the prevailing view of modern society. We have to introduce into our conception of society a new basic analytical level: that of the sexually and genderically related individual.

This last statement implies that it is not enough to recognize sexual 'difference'. If we want to *explain* the different power positions in which women and men tend to be situated, the character of the structured *relations* between the sexes has to be revealed theoretically. And for this project the usefulness of 'difference' as a core concept is limited.

In the first section above, I contended that it was not primarily on the strength of defining women as *different* that the anti-feminist philosophy of the early modernity contributed to enforce male sovereignty over women. It was first and foremost by legitimating, by means of scientific confirmation, a new form of oppressive *relationship* between the sexes. What constituted this relationship was thought to be that women's essence as well as existence *was in the world to be used* by the new state-society in general and by men in particular.

To follow this up in the study of women and men today it is important to make explicit a similar distinction between 'difference' and 'relationship'.

The Importance and Limits of Different 'Differences'

There are obviously many different ways of using 'difference' which invite to confusion of concepts which should be kept apart. In an article about the concept of 'difference', Michèle Barrett (1987) distinguishes three particular uses of the term in recent feminist writing and debate. She stresses that 'sexual difference, positional difference and experiential diversity are best identified separately' (Barrett 1987, 39).

In a comment on essays from the *Signs*, special issue on Feminist Theory (Spring 1982), Judith Kegan Gardiner (1983) is worried by the ubiquitous use of the conceptual triangle: *power – desire – difference*. Even if clearly useful words for her, they are also problematic: 'In particular, our ideas about both power and desire are hampered by the dualistic and polarizing thinking connected with the concept of difference' (Gardiner 1983, 735). And she quotes both French (Kristeva and Cixous) and American (MacKinnon) feminists on this critical point.

According to Gardiner, the category difference conflates three logically separate kinds of difference which it is important not to equate or confuse.

First, there is the kind of present/absent; as for instance being male or not, having white skin or not, being competitive or not being competitive. Secondly, difference can mean one extreme/another extreme; as for instance powerful/powerless or competitive/cooperative. And thirdly, difference refers to 'items selected out of an indefinite series, as in competitive/cooperative/solitary' (Gardiner 1983, 737).

Gardiner claims that the main wrong of some of the most popular feminist theories today is that they 'have absorbed a polarized male view of sexual difference as present/absent as the one model of difference', or they perceive women and men exclusively as opposing extremes. What is worse, they often equate these two different kinds of difference with the consequence that woman 'is always the empty chair'. But, as Gardiner puts it, the effects of being enslaved or oppressed may be very different from the effects of being absent (Gardiner 1983, 736 f.). She seems to think that everything is said and done about the usefulness and fallacies of 'difference' as soon as we cease to confuse or to equate the various aspects of this very notion, and especially when we learn to be aware of the third kind of difference ('items from an indefinite series').

As I have already stated, 'difference', whether or not distinguished into dissimilar concepts, does not fit to capture the essentialities of all the levels of abstraction which feminist theory has to develop (cf. also pp. 310 f. above). The problem is not to be locked in simplistic binary thinking of difference. In observations of directly, empirically accessible reality, experiential diversity as well as other kinds of difference between women and men, among women, and among men, have to be accounted for. (Of course, there is always the empiricistic risk of not seeing any wood, only a lot of more or less different trees.)

What I doubt is whether this very mode of conceiving, the mode in which the notion of 'difference' is a core (perhaps we can call this mode the logic of variable concepts) is at all fit to capture the very mechanisms that produce and reproduce the inequality between the sexes. Certainly, to say 'inequality' is to speak about differences, in some sense or another. But if we want to explain these differences, i.e. the socially and politically relevant differences between women and men, we have to reveal their generative sources, the sources of power which produce them. And for this we need the help of another mode of thinking which we might call processual thinking. Instead of variable concepts we have to apply relational concepts. Furthermore, this way of a basic-level theorizing about the relational processes in question seems to be meaningful only within the context of a materialist view of reality, and a realist view of power and causality (Sayer 1983; Isaac 1987).

To sum up: it is not enough to be conscious of the limitations of binary, present/absent thinking – 'the logic of the digital computer' – as Gardiner

points out. The usefulness of thinking in 'an indefinite series' is also limited. Not only the logic of the computer but the logic of variable concepts as such is insufficient when it comes to the question of conceiving, qualitatively, the process in which empowered human agents relate to one another through materially substantial, transactional practices.

This is also the reason why it is necessary to handle the explanations of women's (and men's) political behaviour more seriously than has been the case in conventional political science; that is, if students of politics are interested in other types of knowledge than 'positive' descriptions and probable prescriptions. Plausible explanations of social and political differences *and* similarities presuppose a theory which is not possible to work out exclusively with the help of good schemes of variables, however. To take just one general example: if we are to know when it is the differences between women and men and when it might rather be the similarities which are the most interesting outcome of a survey of, for instance, political behavior, we have to relate the issues in question to a theory on another level. This has to be a theory about the, historically understood, social mechanisms of sexuality; which means the social processes of producing people, not only new people, but also the processes through which women and men produce the socio-existential conditions of each other as well as those of their own. Furthermore, the crucial feature of this composite relationship, as it tends to be practiced in Western societies today, is an inherent conflict between love and authority.

Individuality versus Collectivity

Given some theoretical relevance of acknowledging the sexual difference within a problematic individuality, what about the relevance of individuality itself, constrained or not? Should we not question this concentration on individuality both on theoretical and political grounds? Does is not lead only, in theory, to hopeless attempts either to legitimate women's status by establishing a similar abstract 'Womanity' hierarchy of being, as that which has served '(Hu)Manity', or to still more hopeless trials to get a place in the masculinist one?

Another objection, which for instance Nancy Fraser (1986) has recently actualized by directing it against Seyla Benhabib (1986), is that focusing on individuality implies that the political relevance of the analyses is essentially reduced. For Fraser, it means to concentrate on the intimate voices of individual women without necessarily reflecting the collective voice of women.

Fraser's critique is fruitful to a certain extent. But, for me, it also expresses a tendency to reproduce that kind of Marxist way of viewing things that was developed in connection with class and the economy, without really reflecting over whether it also fits questions related to sex.

It reminds us for instance of how David Held interprets Marx on human nature, freedom, individuality and collectivity, in his recent book *Models of Democracy*. He writes: 'For Marx, it is not the single human being who is active in the historical process; rather, it is the creative interplay of collectivities in the context of society: human nature is, above all, social. By "species being" Marx referred to the distinctive characteristics of humans, as compared with other animals' (Held 1987, 122).

Perhaps this is plausible as long as the class-question alone is in focus. On the other hand, still following historical materialsm, but shifting the fundamental theoretical point of view so that the problematique is founded on the 'sex-question', the individual becomes relevant in a different way than before. The individual actualizes itself – not as an atom – but as the needy and potentially creative, social existence she/he necessarily is, enmeshed in relations with other individuals.

One of the problems for feminism and the women's movement is precisely that women's collectivity is steadily objected against in politics, on theoretical and/or practical grounds (Jónasdóttir 1985, 1988c). There is, at present, no other realistic way for women than to keep on striving for what they are already doing, namely that women and men somehow should be acknowledged as interested parties in the more and more firmly established corporate democracy. But this does not contradict the belief of mine that one of the most important things feminism has to say and do, is to make clear and effective the perception of reality that collectivism and individualism need not and must not exclude each other. To be sure, several voices of socialism have asserted this. But to the extent they have been allowed to be heard, they have more often than not come down, when concreticized, to mean only the collectivity of individual brothers.

Sexual Equality and Women-worthy Society

Many people think today that we are in the middle of a fundamental transformation from 'modern times' to something post-modern, and that this transformation includes the whole Western/modern legal tradition, the modern state, church, philosophy, university, literature, 'and much else that is modern' (Berman 1983, 4). If this is right, it means both an end of an era and a beginning of a new, and the most difficult problem of a presence in the transitory period is the future (cf. Halsaa, this volume). Against such a background there is an endless number of questions to be asked concerning women's situation as citizens.

What happens with women's position as the basic institutional pillars of society change; institutions such as Monogamy, Family (status of parents and children), Private Property, Inheritance, Contract – to follow Brecht's

definition (1959, 148 f.)? What are the new and becoming 'specific social tasks' to be performed? What values are to be backed with what power (cf. Berman's 1983, 5; and Stinchcombe's 1968, 182 definitions of 'institution')?

A key concept of value and one of the main sources of law in the Western legal tradition is *equity* – defined initially as 'reason and conscience' (Berman 1983, 11). The multiple meaning of this word today – 'fairness' referring to substantial values as well as formal 'disinterestedness' and 'justice' in general – shows that it has framed itself after the changing needs of the time. What, then, would the post-modern third kind of justice or equity be like?

Equity also connotes equality. If equality is what women want, what kind of equality would be realistic – given the changing social context – *and* what kind of equality would be women-worthy? In Sweden 'equal rights' versus 'equal results' are often put as the two possible alternatives; the first seen as reflecting the liberal, the other as the social-democratic ideal types of equality. 'Unlike but equally valued' is a well-known sex-role maxim which has long been shared in many ideological camps. In the West, we seem to be leaving behind us all these entries into the equality question as not being fully satisfying. What else could there be? What do women want? Or, rather, what is relevant for women and for feminism in the confusing view of the present and future of democracy?

In her article, 'Private Rights and Public Virtues: Women, the Family, and Democracy', Carol Gould (1983, 6) argues that freedom, meaning self-development, reciprocity, and democracy should build the value framework for feminism. Reciprocity, the most highly developed form of which is mutuality, presupposes and goes beyond equality 'in that it involves the recognition by each agent of the differences of the other, in terms of the other's own projects and goals'; and in the mutual form of reciprocal relations 'each agent consciously endeavors to act in such a way as to enhance the agency of the other'. And, according to Gould, for these values to be effective, both material and social conditions must be available through which agents can achieve their purposes (Gould 1983, 5).

Sharing Gould's arguments at large, I am carrying on a thesis that goes one step further than hers concerning how the material and social conditions should be politically structured. Women (and even men) are already demanding an active presence in politics *as women* (and *as men*) (Jónasdóttir 1985, 1988c). This means that demands for not only particular material issues but for a certain shift in 'the requirements for the system' (Berelson et al. 1954) are being addressed to the gate-keepers of Western political democracy. This means to demand that sexuality should be acknowledged at the side of economy as a fundamental generative, material source of society, a nutritive 'trade and industry' which, for centuries, as is the case with economy, has been organized on a cleavage basis. This

means to demand that the participatory membership of women and men in society is somehow to be arranged – openly and consciously – with sex as a basis of interest.

In virtue of what specific capacity should women claim to be an interested party in organizing, leading, and governing society? In their capacity of motherhood, seems to be the most usual feminist answer. This answer is at least partly founded on the fact that the ability to give birth is the most obvious point of difference between the sexes; and because motherhood obviously also implies a kind of vital power, not to mention all its positive values, this answer appears to be very plausible. Even if I deeply share Ruddick's (1984) case for 'maternal reason', and that this reason has to be voiced largely in the women-worthy society, I do not think this is precisely the way. Demanding a new form of citizenship for women as mothers would be to claim space in the public communicative action for still only one aspect of womanhood, let alone a concrete one. This is why I think we have to conceive of 'women *as women*' as purely sexed beings, as simply the human womankind. Sex itself is the only capacity that relates *all* women to one another, even if this relation is often weak. And, perhaps the most important argument: even since the dawn of patriarchy, until its change into its prevailing free and equal form, women were excluded from equal standing with Mankind, not in capacity of any particular aspect but *as such*; moreover, the social conditions of many competent, not work-hindered, choice-potent women, ever since the so-called breakthrough of democracy, indicate that what, still, is wrong with women is – that they are women.

Women have too long been used oppressively – for their own good. Now women are mobilizing all over the world to use their own powers – for their own purpose.

NOTES

1. About women and men having different relations to the state, especially the welfare state, see Hernes (1984, 1987). About women and various state interests, see Randall (1982, ch. 4, esp. pp. 129 ff.). The earliest writings on women and the welfare state underlined the oppressive and controlling state function, see e.g. Wilson (1977). Later works tend towards a more nuanced view; besides Hernes ibid., see e.g. Siim (1988). About inherent contradictions in the Swedish equality policy, see Eduards (1986).
2. Besides Pateman's work in this field (cf. reference lists and the discussion in the text) and the references in note 1 above, see Lange (1976), Gould (1983), Gutmann (1988).
3. My project, with the working-name *Sex/Gender, Power and Politics*, is planned to result in a dissertation and a book. Thanks to a grant from The Commission for Research on Equality Between Men and Women/The Swedish Ministry of Labour, I was able to concentrate on this project for two years, Cf. list of references.

3a. This paragraph is a summing up of a discussion in the ECPR workshop, *Political Theories of Gender and Power*, 1986, in Gothenburg, where I was asked: 'What, exactly, do you mean by "women as women"?'

4. Robbins (1955), for instance, discusses these two strands of thought (under the heading '"Natural rights" and utility') in connection with his presentation of the classical

English liberal view of individual freedom versus state authority. Kraditor (1971) also writes about a similar shift in arguments in American history and within the suffragist movement. My point is that we should look closer at these two lines of thought when analysing 'women's freedom versus male authority'.

5. Compared with Susan Moller Okin (1979), who argues that from Plato onwards a functionalist view of women has prevailed in Western political thought, I want to stress the point of being observant to historical shifts in types of arguments related to other societal changes.
6. See for instance Thomas (1958) on women's emancipatory efforts within the Civil War Sects in the seventeenth century in England.
7. About the ideological shift from Divinity to Humanity, see Vernon (1986), parts I–II.
8. My reasoning here on the aristocratic *chain* image being substituted by a modern masculine one was inspired by Vernon (1986); his own analysis reflects a seemingly sexless world.
9. About the idea, 'deeply rooted in England for many centuries' of the importance of men having property in women, see Thomas (1959). See also Hirschon (ed. 1984).
10. See, for instance, Dolan (1988).
11. See, for instance, Crompton & Mann (eds. 1986).
12. Interestingly, Stoper (1988) argues that a gender gap has in fact existed for many decades in American politics within several issue areas but been concealed 'due to certain peculiarities of the American political system'.
13. Here I have in mind especially the Women's List in Iceland which now holds 10% of the seats in the Icelandic parliament.
14. See, for instance, Hedlund 1986.
15. In my article (1988a) I introduce 'marriage society' as a conception to be developed in order to substitute the problematic concept of 'patriarchy'.
16. See, for instance, Haavind (1984).

REFERENCES

Agonito, R. 1977. *History of Ideas on Woman. A Source Book.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Barrett, M. 1987. 'The Concept of "Difference"', *Feminist Review* No. 26, Summer, 29–41.

Benhabib, S. 1986. 'The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg–Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory', *Praxis International* 5:4, January, 402–424.

Berelson, B. R. et al. 1954. *Voting.* Chicago & London: Phoenix Books, The University of Chicago Press.

Berman, H. J. 1983. *Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition.* Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press.

Brecht, A. 1959. *Political Theory. The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Crompton, R. & Mann, M., eds. 1986. *Gender and Stratification.* Cambridge: Policy Press.

Dolan, F. M. 1988. 'Postwar Political Science and the History of Metaphysics: The Rhetoric of Rationality in David Easton's Behavioralism'. Paper. The Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, Ca, March 10–12, 1988.

Eduards, M. L. 1986. 'Kön, stat och jämställdhetspolitik' ('Sex, State, and Equality Policies'), *Kvinnovetenskaplig tidskrift* (3).

Fraser, N. 1986. 'Toward a Discourse Ethic of Solidarity', *Praxis International* 5:4, January, 425–429.

Gardiner, J. K. 1983. 'Power, Desire, and Difference: Comment on Essays from the *Signs* Special Issues on Feminist Theory', *Signs* 8(4), 733–737.

Goode, W. J. 1959. 'The Theoretical Importance of Love', *The American Sociological Review* 24, 38–47.

Gosnell, H. F. 1948/1977. *Democracy. The Threshold of Freedom.* Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers.

English liberal view of individual freedom versus state authority. Kraditor (1971) also writes about a similar shift in arguments in American history and within the suffragist movement. My point is that we should look closer at these two lines of thought when analysing 'women's freedom versus male authority'.

5. Compared with Susan Moller Okin (1979), who argues that from Plato onwards a functionalist view of women has prevailed in Western political thought, I want to stress the point of being observant to historical shifts in types of arguments related to other societal changes.
6. See for instance Thomas (1958) on women's emancipatory efforts within the Civil War Sects in the seventeenth century in England.
7. About the ideological shift from Divinity to Humanity, see Vernon (1986), parts I–II.
8. My reasoning here on the aristocratic *chain* image being substituted by a modern masculine one was inspired by Vernon (1986); his own analysis reflects a seemingly sexless world.
9. About the idea, 'deeply rooted in England for many centuries' of the importance of men having property in women, see Thomas (1959). See also Hirschon (ed. 1984).
10. See, for instance, Dolan (1988).
11. See, for instance, Crompton & Mann (eds. 1986).
12. Interestingly, Stoper (1988) argues that a gender gap has in fact existed for many decades in American politics within several issue areas but been concealed 'due to certain peculiarities of the American political system'.
13. Here I have in mind especially the Women's List in Iceland which now holds 10% of the seats in the Icelandic parliament.
14. See, for instance, Hedlund 1986.
15. In my article (1988a) I introduce 'marriage society' as a conception to be developed in order to substitute the problematic concept of 'patriarchy'.
16. See, for instance, Haavind (1984).

REFERENCES

Agonito, R. 1977. *History of Ideas on Woman. A Source Book.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Barrett, M. 1987. 'The Concept of "Difference"', *Feminist Review* No. 26, Summer, 29–41.

Benhabib, S. 1986. 'The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg–Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory', *Praxis International* 5:4, January, 402–424.

Berelson, B. R. et al. 1954. *Voting.* Chicago & London: Phoenix Books, The University of Chicago Press.

Berman, H. J. 1983. *Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition.* Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press.

Brecht, A. 1959. *Political Theory. The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Crompton, R. & Mann, M., eds. 1986. *Gender and Stratification.* Cambridge: Policy Press.

Dolan, F. M. 1988. 'Postwar Political Science and the History of Metaphysics: The Rhetoric of Rationality in David Easton's Behavioralism'. Paper. The Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, Ca, March 10–12, 1988.

Eduards, M. L. 1986. 'Kön, stat och jämställdhetspolitik' ('Sex, State, and Equality Policies'), *Kvinnovetenskaplig tidskrift* (3).

Fraser, N. 1986. 'Toward a Discourse Ethic of Solidarity', *Praxis International* 5:4, January, 425–429.

Gardiner, J. K. 1983. 'Power, Desire, and Difference: Comment on Essays from the *Signs* Special Issues on Feminist Theory', *Signs* 8(4), 733–737.

Goode, W. J. 1959. 'The Theoretical Importance of Love', *The American Sociological Review* 24, 38–47.

Gosnell, H. F. 1948/1977. *Democracy. The Threshold of Freedom.* Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers.

Gould, C. C. 1983. 'Private Rights and Public Virtues: Women, the Family, and Democracy', *Beyond Domination. New Perspectives on Women and Philosophy*. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld.

Guttmann, A., ed. 1988. *Democracy and the Welfare State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Haavind, H. 1984. 'Love and Power in Marriage', in Holter, H., ed., *Patriarchy in a Welfare Society*. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.

Harrison, B. 1978. *Separate Spheres: The Opposition to Women's Suffrage in Britain*. New York: Holmes and Meier.

Hedlund, G. 1986. 'Varför ska just gruppen kvinnor öka sin representation i beslutande organ?' ('Why should just women increase their representation in decision-making bodies?'). In *Hit – men inte längre? Rapport från seminariet 'Kvinnor och politisk makt' (This Far – And No Further? Report from the Seminar 'Women and Political Power')*. Delrapport från utredningen om kvinnorepresentation (Official Report on Women's Representation) Stockholm: Ds A 1986:5.

Held, D. 1987. *Models of Democracy*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Hernes, H. M. 1984. 'Women and the Welfare State. The Transition from Private to Public Dependence', in Holter, H., ed. See Haavind.

Hernes, H. M. 1987. *Welfare State and Woman Power. Essays in State Feminism*. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.

Hirschon, R., ed. 1984. *Women and Property – Women as Property*. London & Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press.

Isaac, J. C. 1987. *Power and Marxist Theory. A Realist View*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Jónasdóttir, A. G. 1983. 'Hon för honom – han för staten: Om Hobbes och Lockes kvinnosyn' ('She for Him – He for the State: On Hobbes' and Locke's View of Women'). In Eduards, Maud, ed., *Kön, makt, medborgarskap: Kvinnan i politiskt tänkande från Platon till Engels. (Sex, Power and Citizenship: Woman in Political Thought from Plato to Engels)*. Stockholm: Liber.

Jónasdóttir, A. G. 1985. 'Beyond "Oppression": On Exploitation in the Sex/Gender System'. Unpublished paper presented at the ECPR Conference, Barcelona, March 25–30.

Jónasdóttir, A. G. 1987. 'Patriarkat, marxism och tvåsystemteori' ('Patriarchy, Marxism and Dual System Theory'), *Häften för kritiska studier* 20(4), 34–57. (Translation into English in manuscript.)

Jónasdóttir, A. G. 1988a. 'Common Oppression and Specific Experiences: The Problem of Different Levels in Feminist Theory', Paper prepared for presentation at the Feminist Theory Conference, June 23rd, at The 2nd International Feminist Book Fair, Oslo, 1986. Published in a revised Swedish version in *Häften för kritiska studier* 21(2), 35–45.

Jónasdóttir, A. G. 1988b. 'Sex/Gender, Power and Politics: Towards a Theory of Patriarchy in the Formally Equal Society', *Acta Sociologica* 1988:2, 157–174. (Swedish version, 1986.)

Jónasdóttir, A. G. 1988c. 'On the Concept of Interest, Women's Interests, and the Limitations of Interest Theory'. In Jones, Kathleen B. and Jónasdóttir, Anna G., eds., *The Political Interests of Gender. Developing Theory and Research with a Feminist Face*. London: SAGE Publications (forthcoming). (The first Swedish version in *Kvinnovetenskaplig tidskrift*, 1985, no. 2.)

Kraditor, A. S. 1971. *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement 1890–1920*. New York: Anchor Books.

Lange, L. 1976. 'Reproduction in Democratic Theory', in King-Farlow, J. & Shea, W. R., eds., *Contemporary Issues in Political Philosophy*. New York: The Canadian Contemporary Philosophy Series. Science History Publications.

Okin, S. M. 1979. *Women in Western Political Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pateman, C. 1983a. 'Feminism and Democracy'. In Duncan, G., ed. *Democratic Theory and Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pateman, C. 1983b. 'Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy', in Benn, S. I. & Gaus, G. F., eds., *Public and Private in Social Life*. London & Canberra: Croom Helm.

Pateman, C. 1985. 'Women and Democratic Citizenship'. The Jefferson Memorial Lectures, delivered at the University of California, Berkeley, February. Unpublished manuscript.
Randall, V. 1982. *Women and Politics*. London: Macmillan.
Robbins, L. 1955. *The Theory of Economic Policy in English Classical Political Economy*. My ref. here the Swedish version, Stockholm: Natur och kultur.
Ruddick, S. 1984. 'Maternal Thinking', in Trebilcot, J., ed., See Gould.
Sayer, A. 1984. *Method in Social Science. A Realist Approach*. London: Hutchinson.
Siim, B. 1988. 'Towards a Feminist Rethinking of the Welfare State', in Jones, K. B. & Jónasdóttir, A. G., eds., forthcoming. See Jónasdóttir.
Stinchcombe, A. L. 1968. *Constructing Social Theories*. New York/Chicago/San Francisco/Atlanta: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
Stoper, E. 1988. 'The Gender Gap Concealed and Revealed: 1936–1984'. Paper. The Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, Ca, March 10–12.
Thomas, K. 1959. 'The Double Standard', *Journal of History of Ideas* 20, 195–216.
Vernon, R. 1986. *Citizenship and Order: Studies in French Political Thought*. Toronto/Buffalo/London: University of Toronto Press.
Wilson, E. 1977. *Women and the Welfare State*. London: Tavistock.