Resumé

This article explores the extent to which Danish membership of the European
communities has blurred the traditional distinction between international and
domestic politics. Based on data concerning the pattern of representation of
Danish ministries at EC negotiations, the article finds a strong decentralization of
negotiation competences among ministries and a spread of negotiation responsibilities
across hierarchical levels, types of organization, and types of civil servants.
The conclusion is that this blurring tends to maximize the influence of
domestic interests and that it accounts for much of the immobility of EC decision-making.

Introduction

The post-war generation has experienced a growth of international organization unknown before the end of World War 11. It is generally recognized that this kind of institutionalized international cooperation has in many ways changed both the conditions for and the instruments of the conduct of foreign policy (Beloff, 1961). It has thus been pointed out that the introduction of widespread cooperation among national states has changed the content of foreign policy. From being primarily concerned with the military security of the sovereign state, foreign policy has changed to deal in parallel with the relations among states within economic, social and technological fields, issue areas normally referred to as belonging to the sphere of domestic politics.1

In the perspective of the 1980's, the European Communities seem definitely to have lost the kind of integrative dynamics ascribed to them about 1960 by both political actors and scholarly analysts. Still, however, they represent the most wide ranging instance of international cooperation

that the world has ever seen. With this background it seems appropriate to investigate the relationship between the domestic politics of EC member countries and policy-making at the Community level. Based on data concerning Danish official representation at negotiations within the Community institutional system, it is my general proposition that the development of the EC policy-making system has totally blurred the traditional foreign-domestic politics distinction by introducing most branches of central administration and virtually all kinds of civil servants as official EC-negotiators acting on behalf of individual ministers; further, I should propose that precisely this breaking down of the established foreign-domestic politics distinction has made Community policy-making captive of all kinds of domestic political interests and of domestic rules of the game peculiar to the political systems of each of the nine member countries. To the extent that this interpretation can be tested empirically, the 'failure' of the Communities to develop in the direction predicted back in the 1960¹ s has to be explained not only by the disturbing effects of the 'high politics' game of particularly France and Britain, but also, and perhaps even more, by the political strength of domestic interests connected with 'low politics' issues within the social and economic field.²

My analysis of the extent and consequences of this blurring of the foreign-domestic politics distinction takes for granted some of the theoretical implications lying behind the concept of international interdependence. In some formulations, this concept stresses the multiplicity of channels connecting societies and the absence of a fixed hierarchy of issues in international politics (Keohane, 1977: 25-29). As a starting point I also accept it as a relatively well-stated fact that modern international relations, not only within the European Communities, are conducted by a plurality of national actors, e.g. any type of domestic administrative agencies, national interest organizations, national and multinational corporations ³

Some students, preoccupied by the growing role of domestic bureaucrats within international organizations, have hypothesized that there is a potentially strong influence from international experiences and international constraints on the behaviour of domestic civil servants in a national political context.⁴ The empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis, however, has not been convincing. Analytically, it might be fruitful also to take account of the well-established ties with domestic political forces influencing the behaviour of domestic ministers and their civil servants on the international scene, e.g. narrowing the field for Community compromising and transnational coalition building.5

Data

Empirically, the analysis is based on data concerning missions to meetings within the EC institutions by Danish ministers and civil servants. The source for data is the written requests for ticket and hotel bookings made towards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by people having to travel to, normally, Brussels on behalf of the Danish government. These requests, among other things, contain information on

1) the name of the person giving in the request
2) the hierarchical level of his position
3) the ministry/agency for which he works

4) the institutional setting of the meeting (i.e. primarily Commission/Council)
5) the subject or issue area due for negotiation

During the five-year period (July, 1973 to June, 1978) covered by the data collected, Danish ministers and civil servants undertook 23,153 missions to mainly Brussels to take care of Danish interests within Community negotiations.⁶ It is worth noting that these data only cover representation within issue areas covered by the EC-treaty framework, i.e. not the so-called political cooperation under the auspices of the European Council. In the same way it has to be noted that there is not in this material any information about missions to EC meetings made by civil servants employed by The National Bank of Denmark (Danmarks Nationalbank). This in no way means that the central bank does not take part in the representation of Danish interests towards the EC; it only indicates the formally independent status of the bank towards the Danish government and its agencies, a position constantly guarded by central bank management.

These quantitative data are to some extent supplemented with interview data. From late 1977 through 1978, interviews were made with top civil servants of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministries of Agriculture, Industry and Trade, Labour, Taxes and Tariffs, Fisheries, and the Environment. The aim of these interviews, which took place without a structured questionnaire, was to gather information about the conduct of EC affairs in central government after the first five years of membership.

The Dominance of Domestic Ministries as EC Actors

According to the proposition, the established pattern of representation tends to maximize the influence of Danish domestic interests in matters subject to EC negotiations. The reasoning behind this proposition is that domestic bureaucracy represents the most important and most consistently

working connection between relevant domestic interests and policy-making within given issue areas subject to EC cooperation. This is a consequence both of those interests having been virtually built into the general structure of central government and of fairly well-established norms making prior consultation of affected interests indispensable for policy-making success, including success in matters negotiated by Danish representatives within the European Communities (Christensen, 1980: 33-70, 327-354).

The testing of this proposition implies some further questions. The first is to what extent ministries with traditionally domestic responsibilities and close interest group relations have taken over the representation of Danish interests in EC negotiations. To investigate this problem, ministries have been divided into four categories according to their general societal functions. The four functional categories are:

1) Ministries with functions of universal regulation, i.e. ministries with legal regulative
functions directed towards the society as a whole, e.g. the Ministries of the Environment,
of Taxes and Tariffs, and (in most areas) of Justice.

2) Ministries with functions of specific regulation, i.e. ministries with legal regulative functions
directed towards a specific, typically economic, sector of society, such as agriculture,
fisheries, industry and commerce, and the labour market.

3) Ministries with the responsibility for the production of public goods and services, e.g.
Ministries of Education, Social Affairs, Public Works and Transport, Health, and Defence.

4) Ministries with the responsibility for general interdepartmental coordination, as e.g. the
Ministries of Finance, Economics, and Foreign Affairs. The Prime Minister's Office and
the division for legislative affairs of the Ministry of Justice also belong to this category.

Ministries within each of these four categories are not only supposed to be distinguished from ministries of other categories by characteristic differences in the use of policy instruments (e.g. legal rules vs. financial incentives), they are also expected to show varying behavioural traits in the policy-making process. This hypothesis is explained by the varying degrees to which ministries of different types are exposed to interaction with external interest organizations and dependent upon their support, to the demands of public employees and their organizations, and to the critical interest of political parties, perhaps making the policies of a ministry a decisive issue as regards coalition building in parliament (Christensen, 1980: 311-319).

Some preliminary analyses of the participation of external actors in public decision-making in Denmark have so far confirmed the analytical validity of this four-fold classification of ministries. Thus, external interest organizations representing farmers, industry, employers, and wage-earners

are particularly involved in contacts with ministries regarding functions of specific regulation; the same is true of the organizational and institutional representatives of public employees and public sector institutions within the area of public goods and service production. In contrast, the kind of contacts with interests outside the ministerial organization cannot be shown to play the same role for the ministries taking care of functions of universal regulation or, particularly, functions of general interdepartmental coordination (Buksti & Johansen, 1979; Kristensen, 1979; Jarlov et al., 1979; Damgaard & Eliassen, 1979; Damgaard & Eliassen, 1980).

Table 1 shows the distribution of Danish EC negotiations by type of ministry and functional category. Apart from the tremendous and rising number of travel missions to take care of Danish interests, the information given in the table shows evidence of the unequivocal decentralization of EC affairs within central government.

This comparatively high level of decentralization is seen from both the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only covers about 10 per cent of all negotiations, and from the fact that the only ministries not taking part in EC negotiations on a continuous basis are the Ministries of Defence, of Church Affairs, and of Cultural Affairs.

Secondly, however, it is also seen that Danish membership of the European Community, due to Community preoccupation with the establishment and operation of the internal market, the common agricultural policy and the common labour market, has first of all given the activities of ministries with functions of specific regulation an international dimension. More than half of all civil servants negotiating at Community level come from these ministries. Within the category of specific regulation, furthermore, the Ministry of Agriculture covers 26 to 32 per cent of all EC negotiations as measured by the number of missions per year. For the Ministry of Industry and Commerce the corresponding share is 16 to 19 per cent.

The political implications of the dominant position of these ministries in EC negotiations are fully seen when the procedure used by them in the preparation of their positions is considered. Before deciding on questions of any general or specific importance, affected interest organizations are consulted by the ministry. The procedure has to a certain degree been formalized. According to the legislation voted by the Danish parliament just before entry into the Community, special consultative committees - the so-called § 2-committees - have been set up within the fields of the common agricultural policy, of fruit and vegetables, and of fisheries policy

⁷ Among the interdepartmental coordination committees for EC-affairs, the committee responsible for labour market questions furthermore is the only one in which interest organizations take part in committee meetings. As an insider has put it, even if the representatives of the employers and of the trade unions are not formally members of the committee, they will often have the decisive word in the discussions leading to the formulation of the official Danish position.

Interest organizations also play an active role at the more informal level.

Thus, it is a well-established procedure for civil servants from the Ministry of Agriculture to make contacts with their counterparts in the secretariats of the farmers' organizations before and after negotiations in Brussels. Similar informal procedures have been established to facilitate contacts on EC matters between the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and the organizations representing industrial and commercial interests. Specialized panels with representatives of these interests and in some cases experts acting in an individual capacity, e.g. university professors, have been established by the ministry as fora for such consultation.

The described pattern of close government-interest organization contacts within the areas of specific regulation implies that the practices known in domestic politics within exactly those issue areas have been transferred to decisions on Danish EC policy (Buksti, 1980). However, to a large extent a similar practice is to be expected for ministries with functions of universal regulation and for ministries responsible for the production of public goods and services as far as EC related questions are concerned.

The explanation of this must, as regards the ministries of universal regulation, be found in some peculiar traits of administrative activity undertaken by the Ministry of Taxes and Tariffs and the Ministry of the Environment. Even if it is true that the activity of both ministries is directed towards the regulation of society at large, essential aspects of the regulation within the area of indirect taxes have specific implications for well-defined branches of the economy. Therefore, it is also seen that within this field of its competence, the ministry maintains contacts with the organizations of these branches, at least to consult them in the more technical aspects of its policy. For the Ministry of the Environment, the same kind of political logic is seen to work. The generally formulated provisions of its legislative acts are very often perceived as having very specific implications for, e.g., agriculture or different industrial branches. In an EC context, this fact is even more evident because the distinction between environmental policy and other issue areas, e.g. technical trade barriers limiting the efficiency of the internal market for industrial goods, has been blurred politically by national governments.⁸ Therefore, both in domestic and EC affairs the ministry maintains close contacts with the representatives of economic interests.

For the ministries with functions concerning the production of public goods and services the explanation is slightly different. Those ministries have within their areas of competence the political responsibility for the specific regulation of different trades, e.g. the teaching profession, doctors

and pharmacists, road transport. In the general context these functions are quite marginal to the overall functions of the ministries within this category. As is seen from Table 2, this is not the case when it comes to the question of those ministries' involvement in negotiations with the European communities.

For three of the ministries (Interior, Social Affairs, and Public Works) the predominant part of the EC activities falls within the area of specific regulation. For the Ministry of the Interior the three main issue areas are labour market policy and rules of establishment, in both cases fields where initiatives of importance for health sector personnel have been taken, and industrial policy where the ministry is affected because of its responsibility for the regulation of pharmaceutical production. In the same way the Ministry of Social Affairs is mainly affected by the EC labour market regulations, while the issue areas of importance to the Ministry of Public Works are transport and industrial policy. Only the Ministry of Education takes part in negotiations outside the field of specific regulation.

In all cases where ministries with responsibility for the provision of
public goods and services engage in functions of specific regulation -

however marginal they may be compared with the main responsibilities of the ministries - they find themselves dealing with questions of great importance to specific educational and occupational groups represented by interest organizations and/or institutions with well-established contacts to the ministries. In most cases, this will be the base of a close-knit alliance between the minister, his bureaucracy, and the interest organizations concerned.

The close interaction between economic interest organizations and their counterparts within the different branches of domestic bureaucracy normally tends to bring about agreement as to what is to be the Danish point of view in negotiations within the European Community. For the interest organizations, the corollary is that they will normally be most efficiently and often fully satisfied at the national level, leaving no need for them to try to build up transnational coalitions at the EC level, which would have been at least theoretically possible (Averyt, 1977: 57-58). For Danish negotiators at EC working groups, committees and the Council of Ministers, the corollary is that they speak with the political weight and within the political constraints which follow from having coordinated their positions to include the interests working in close connection with the ministry within the particular issue area.

The Integration of EC Matters in Domestic Administrative Structures

The extent to which the handling of EC affairs is integrated in domestic politics can also be measured by the way these ministries deal with questions to be negotiated within the EC. The problem is to what degree domestic ministries treat the actual conduct of EC negotiations as a field for internal specialization. Or, from the opposite view, to what degree organizational units, normally at the level of bureaus, and individual civil servants who specialize on other lines, e.g. subject areas, also take care of the possible EC aspects of their activities, including the representation of the ministry in negotiations within the EC.

Among the domestic ministries in the first three of the four functional categories outlined above, 12 had specialized international offices or international advisors at the end of the 1970's (Christensen, 1980: 238-239). This means that all ministries, apart from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, in the above-mentioned categories in some way use the international dimension of their activities as a criterion for internal specialization.

The importance of this faet should not be overestimated. Firstly, it seems to be a development which has its roots before entry into the EC. Secondly, and more importantly, specialized international units or advisors have no exclusive responsibility for the international relations of domestic ministries. On the contrary, their functions are restricted to a broad staff-like responsibility for the proper transfer of communication between their ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the permanent representation at the EC, and the Commission. Normally they will only be drawn into more substantial policy-making at the international field in a loosely coordinating function, e.g. as the permanent representative of the ministry in interdepartmental coordination committees such as those established for the different issue areas covered by EC cooperation (Christensen, 1978).

The assumption, therefore, is that when it comes to the actual preparation of Danish policy, to presenting this policy in negotiations at the EC-level, and to the execution of EC policy, responsibility has generally been placed with those units of central government and those individual civil servants that normally deal with matters of the same substantial kind at the domestic level. This assumption is tested in two ways. Firstly, I look at the spread in the representational pattern, across types of organizations and hierarchical levels; secondly, I look at the number of individual civil servants negotiating on behalf of their ministries. In both respects, the hypothesis is that the greater the spread of representation, the more intensive will be the integration of individual negotiators in the domestic political and administrative environment.

Table 3 presents the patterns of representation at EC negotiations in 1974 and 1977.⁹ In both years all types of organizations and civil servants at all hierarchical levels have taken part in negotiations. However, it is seen that civil servants coming from the departments, i.e. the organizations referring directly to the minister, dominate the pattern with a share of more than 60 per cent in both years. In so far any change can be observed from 1974 to 1977, it is observed how the share of mid-level generalists has decreased from 16 to 10 per cent and how the share of specialists at both levels has increased from 29 to 33 per cent.

The general tendency to have Danish policy represented by relatively low level generalists of departmental origin covers a wide range of variance between different ministries. Thus, the Ministry of Agriculture has during the period of investigation put greater weight on departmental representatives than the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, which has placed greater weight on using agency employees. Furthermore, the Ministry of

Industry and Commerce has generally been represented at a higher hierarchical level than the Ministry of Agriculture. Similar differences can be observed between the Ministry of Taxes and Tariffs and the Ministry of the Environment. In all cases the variations can be explained by the different organizational structures of the ministries, meaning that the line between the spheres of competence of the departmental level and the agency level is drawn differently, and that they have different practices for the delegation of responsibility for external negotiations. Their differing patterns of representation as far as negotiations within the Communities are concerned therefore fit into the pattern to be expected from the

differences between them in terms of their internal organizational structures.

Even if Danish ministries are not organized on the same general principles, and even if actual organization structures differ from one ministry to another, departments, however, will normally take care of external relations with some political content, leaving the often technically directed day-to-day execution of political decisions to agencies placed below departments, without direct access to ministers.¹⁰ A parallel philosophy lies behind the predominant use of civil servants with a generalist background, normally in law or social science, in the departments, and the use of specialists in agencies.

In the context of EC negotiations this means not only that departments are almost exclusively represented by generalists at mid- and low levels, but also that more than 60 per cent of the civil servants coming from agencies are specialists at those levels. A breakdown of the patterns of representation according to the character of the negotiation furthermore reveals a much stronger dominance by civil servants with a departmental background (72 per cent for the whole period) in negotiations conducted under the auspices of the Council than in negotiations under the auspices of the Commission; in this case the share of civil servants with a departmental background drops to 50 per cent as opposed to 30 per cent with an agency background (Christensen & Sørensen, 1981: 48-49).

Interpreting these differences it seems fair to conclude that negotiations are conducted by civil servants, who, due to their generalist functions in departments, normally will be strongly involved with the domestic forces determining the political latitude of the ministries. The difference between representation at negotiations under the auspices of the Commission and those of the Council, points to the importance given to this consideration when negotiations move from a preliminary to a politically committing stage.

To an even higher degree negotiators coming from public institutions which do not take part in the current business of central government follow this pattern. Thus, on the one hand, public servants from special research institutions, placed outside the university milieu, research fellows from university institutes, and public servants with other positions outside the departments and agencies of central government (e.g. civil servants from regional administration or public service institutions) are mainly drawn into the preliminary and technically defined negotiations in committees and working groups set down by the Commission (Christensen & Sørensen, 1981). On the other hand, it is mainly the ministries where

participation in EC affairs represents a rather marginal field of activities that make use of partially external negotiators to represent their views at the EC. This is especially true of the Ministry of Education, which during the period as a whole in 55 to 65 per cent of the cases was represented by persons working outside its own central organization; also the Ministry of the Interior makes use of this kind of representatives to a very high extent (Christensen & Sørensen, 1981). A plausible explanation of the deviant behaviour of exactly those ministries with functions concerning the provision of public goods and services might be that representatives of the type used often combine specialized insight in the issues to be negotiated with a capacity to represent the institutional and organizational interests involved within these areas. Because of the relative marginality of the issues dealt with by the EC to those ministries, they have simply left their representation at EC negotiations to employees coming from the institutions concerned by the measures. A prominent example would be university professors drawn into negotiations on Community research policy and doctors or other health sector personnel drawn into negotiations on Community measures aiming at the harmonization of the rules of establishments for the health sector.

Similar conclusions as regards the integration of EC-related issues in the existing organizational structures of central government are reached when analyzing the number of civil servants who on one or more occasions between 1973 and 1978 have acted as negotiators. In Table 4 the total number of these civil servants has been broken down according to their number of missions during the period.

Nobody knows the exact number of civil servants employed by central government departments and agencies. A fair estimate at the end of the 1970's would be some 5000 civil servants with generalist or specialist functions at all hierarchical levels.¹¹ Several factors make an immediate comparison between this figure and the 2734 civil servants who have negotiated at Brussels according to Table 4 haphazard. First, we have no information on the career mobility of Danish civil servants in general. Over a five year period such mobility probably means that several individual civil servants may have acted in the same functional capacity; for this reason it has to be assumed that an unreserved comparison of the two figures may lead to an excessive estimate both of the proportion of civil servants involved in the conduct of EC affairs and of the spread of responsibility for such affairs across central government. In this context, the effect of this factor, however, is more or less neutralized by two additional factors. One is that some ministries (defence, church, and

culture) are not involved in the conduct of EC affairs at all; another is that a fully correct picture of the implications of EC participation for the civil service can only be drawn by also taking into account the number of civil servants involved in the drafting of Danish EC policy and in the implementation of EC policy. In spite of this lack ofinformation allowing for more exact interpretations of the total given in Table 4, it is a justifiable conclusion that a very high proportion of all civil servants are drawn upon as EC negotiators and in all likelihood that an even higher proportion have experienced that their current activities have acquired some kind of a European dimension.

The extremely high proportion of all civil servants having at some time during the five year period acted as representatives towards the EC for their ministry, by itself is evidence how administrative responsibility for Community affairs is not perceived as a reason for distinguishing between domestic and international affairs. This interpretation finds support in a closer examination of the distribution shown in Table 4. An overwhelming majority had only one or up to five missions (70 per cent), while only 5 per cent have been registered for 31 or more missions over the five year

period. This skewed distribution of the civil servants according to their number of missions is a clear evidence of the fact that the decision as to which individual civil servants will have to represent their ministry is made mainly on the substantial merits of the matter put on the Community agenda.

EC Relations as an Extension of Domestic Politics

Entry into the European Communities from the beginning of the 1960's constituted one of the most controversial and divisive issues in Danish politics. Common Market membership was perceived as a dangerous threat to national sovereignty, to national culture and to Danish welfare achievements.

The acute sensitiveness of Community relations created a favourable atmosphere for the establishment of strong coordination procedures both at the interdepartmental level and between government and parliament, which has set up a Common Market Committee backed up by detailed formal procedures. This apparatus was seen as a political guarantee against a gradual undermining of Danish sovereignty due to domestic ministers' expected acceptance of any Community measure, giving short run profits to their clientele, but disregarding more long range immaterial consequences for national sovereignty and Danish identity.

With this background, the results presented in this paper may be surprising. Not only have we found support for the proposition that EC relations are primarily a matter for domestic ministries. The evidence presented also gives support to the proposition that dealing with the EC is not a specialized administrative function, but an international dimension added to the primarily domestic functions of civil servants. Both when analyzing the patterns of representation according to hierarchical level and type of administrative organization and according to the individual distribution of negotiating task, this is without question our conclusion.

Even if this conclusion may be surprising at first glance, a number of factors contribute to its explanation. Firstly, the quantity and the scope across issue areas make any other distribution of tasks than a highly decentralized one rather impractical and resource demanding. Secondly, the EC has not kept any of its integrative dynamics; therefore, the assumptions lying behind much of the opposition against European integration have lost some of their potential weight in the decision-making process. The politically sensitive problem demanding coordination at the national level in this case is not only the question of subordinating sectorbased

points of view under the general principles of Danish EC policy; as this policy, because of the lack of integrative dynamics within the Community, has not been challenged, the politically relevant problem of coordination is just as much that within sectors, aiming at the satisfaction of the organized interests at this level. As shown above, the system established has a great capacity for this kind of coordination.

This analysis has only focused on the Danish way of dealing with the European Community. As far as other member countries of the Communities have established similar systems, we probably have much of the explanation for the lack of dynamics and huge use of resources both in terms of manpower and in terms of time spent in Community decisionmaking. It is a system which, for good and for evil, tends to make negotiators at all levels the captives of well-defined sectoral interests at the domestic level. It is also a system putting effective brakes to the widespread initiatives which the Commission has taken and continues to take in an attempt to broaden EC cooperation to new issue areas. But because of the integration of these issues put on the agenda of the Communities with the domestic politics of the nine member countries, the only safe outcome of such initiatives will in many cases be a further rise in the number of domestic bureaucrats having to go to Brussels to defend policies which nobody at the domestic level would accept being changed.

Extended international cooperation may well have given domestic bureaucracy an international outlook not existing before. But this in no way seems to imply that international constraints have come to prevail over domestic preoccupations.

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NOTES

1 The attempts to formulate a theory of international interdependence, which have been made during the 1970'5, point unequivocally to the failure of realist approaches to grasp the nature of foreign policy in the modern international system; cf., e.g., Morse, 1976: BOff., and Keohane & Nye, 1977: 23-24.

2 As to the high vs. low politics debate, cf. Hoffman, 1968, and the criticism of the validity of the distinction, Keohane & Nye, 1977: 23-24.

3 For some recent evidence, see Hopkins, 1976; East, 1980; Christensen, 1978.

4 To some extent, this was one of the points of both functionalists and neofunctionalists. More specifically, this has been the focus of much research, see Scheinman, 1966; Feld, 1971; Pendergast, 1976.

5 This pragmatic hypothesis about the effect of Danish participation in the EC finds support in Mørch, 1976, who does not find any connection between bureaucratic interpenetration and integrative attitudes of Danish civil servants.

6 Data collection took place during the autumn of 1978 in cooperation with Carsten Lehmann Sørensen, Institute of Political Science, University of Aarhus. A first report has been published in Danish: Christensen & Sørensen, 1981.

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7 Cf. § 2 in Act No. 595, December 22, 1972, concerning the administration of EC regulations for agricultural products (Lov om administrationen af Det europæiske økonomiske Fællesskabs forordninger om markedsordningen for landbrugsvarer); § 2 in Act No. 596, December 22, 1972, concerning the administration of EC regulations for fruit and vegetables; § 2 in Act No. 562, December 21, 1972, concerning the administration of EC regulation of the fisheries sector.

8 For this reason, delegations negotiating technical trade barriers often have representation from several ministries, viz. industry and commerce, labour, and environment.

9 1974 and 1977 were chosen as typical years, respectively, at the beginning and the end of the period; the latter half of 1973 and the former half of 1978 are the two periods where Denmark has had the chair in the Council of Ministers.

10 A full account of the different structures of the internal organization of Danish ministries is given in Christensen 1980: Chapter 5.

11 This estimate, which excludes clerks and other public servants with pure routine functions such as typing and routine data processing functions, is basedon the information contained in a register established in 1979 at the Institute of Political Science, University of Aarhus, before sending out questionnaires to all civil servants at the central level.

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