Resumé

It has been argued that the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent is declining
Western Europe. Whether this is true or not, it seems clear that support
the NATO alliance had reached a remarkably low level among Western
European political elites as the 1970s drew to a close. One possible alternative to
continued reliance on the Atlantic Alliance would be for Western Europe to develop
own independent defence capabilities. Certainly, in terms of economic
and technological resources, this option should be within reach of an integrated
European Community. And indeed there seems to be widespread support among
European political leaders for the principle of having Western Europe play a
more independent role vis-å-vis both superpowers. But there is no clear consensus
favour of the increased defence expenditures that such a policy would entail.
is there a consensus in favour of developing a unified West European
security system inside or outside the institutional framework of the European
Community. Our evidence in support of these conclusions is basedon interviews
carried out with candidates for the European Parliament in all nine member
countries during the months immediately preceding the first direct elections in
June, 1979.

Amongst West European political elites the issue of European security has been a source of continual disagreement rather than harmonious consensus.Similar are also to be found in closely related issue areas such as appropriate military arrangements and developments of European unification. To a considerable extent these differences have been underlyingthemes European post-war history. Examples could include disagreementswithin which have led to different foreign policies or within a larger area, like the European Community (EC). Security

considerations were of major importance in the founding of the three, predominantly economic, European communities in the 19505, while in the 1960s they were to provide the basis of outright disagreement between Britain, France, and West Germany (Harrison 1974, Goodman 1975). Arguably, they delayed the first enlargement of the EC by a decade and were of crucial importance in the ongoing debate in the 1970s about the nature of the European Community and its future development.¹

Discussions on the role of Europe in world politics, including the topic of European security, have been the subject of a variety of academic studies which focus on European unification efforts in the context of international politics (Weil 1970, Kohnstam & Hager 1973, Geusau 1974, Feld 1976, Twitchett 1976, Kramer & Rummel 1978). However, when dealing with in-depth analysis of European security problems, it has often proved more valuable and relevant to concentrate on the foreign policies of the dominant West European countries and their security considerations are initimately connected with the division of Europe and the so-called 'German problem' (Kaiser & Morgan 1971, Tint 1972, Calleo 1978, Sæter 1980). In addition to this approach, it is generally recognised in theory, and as a fact of life, that the European security issue cannot be separated from European-American interrelations covering diplomatic, military, economic, human, cultural, and other aspects (Kaiser & Schwartz 1977).

As one of several mechanisms to improve and widen the public debate on future aims and means of European integration, the nine member countries decided to elect the mainly consultative European Parliament by direct elections. Candidates were nominated to present the policies of their respective political parties in the electoral campaigns. Once elected, they would occupy a seat for five years in the new parliamentary assembly of 410 members. Present and former party leaders, ministers and parliamentarians, well as newcomers to the political arena, added up to several thousand persons standing as candidates in the first European elections in June 1979.² Interviews with the more prominent candidates presented a unique opportunity to acquire detailed knowledge about existing attitudes on political issues of vital importance such as European security. It also allowed the principal lines of division in the new European Parliament to be analysed as well as the major security perceptions of political parties in the nine EC countries. In this respect, the candidates were treated as official and authoritative spokesmen of their party's position.

It is a well known truism that the European Parliament is not a parliament:certainly,

ment:certainly,it does not have the authority to decide West European defence policy. Nevertheless, the respondents in our study constituted a cross-national sample of political elites in Western Europe. Consequently, an understanding of their attitudes will enable us to comprehend more clearly the major lines of cleavage concerning European security arrangements.

1. Methodological Considerations

The study reported here fits in very well with a political science tradition, methodologically based on systematic interviews with representative samples of political elites like parliamentarians, civil servants, and mediapeople, attempts to obtain standardised data about attitudes on political issues (Deutsch 1967, Lerner & Gordon 1969). When using this technique, we are well aware that political elites do not perceive complex subjects like European security in terms of'yes-no', 'positive-negative', 'very pro, fairly pro, less pro', etc. When interpreting and analysing our data presented in figures and percentages, we have tried to integrate the findings into patterns of thinking and reasoning. In general, this means that various answers to various questions are not mutually exclusive, but often form parts of what so aptly has been named 'belief systems' (Converse 1964; see also Converse 1975; Barnes et al. 1979, 203-380).

In the following analysis, findings are derived from 742 valid interviews with a sample of candidates for the European Parliament during the three months preceding the first European elections in 1979.³ When designing the study, we aimed at having; achieved interviews with all the 410 who would later be successful on the election day: however, we succeeded in interviewing only 256 or 62 per cent of those elected in June. In addition, we wanted to interview a control group of another 410 candidates who could have been elected if the seats in the European Parliament had been twice the number: for this reason, our sample includes 486 non-elected candidates.⁴

Comparisons between elected and non-elected candidates from a given party in a given country show no consistent or significant differences. Consequently we feel safe in using the broader data base available from the two groups combined. Moreover, the anonymity of our respondents can be protected as they were promised it would be. Furthermore, if we had had to limit ourselves to analyses of those elected, the sample would have been restricted to two or three hundred candidates leaving a number of cells with very few cases when distributing people across at least six party groupings in nine countries (see Table 1).

Recorded results of the 1979 EC elections are incorporated in two respects. Firstly, 70 of the interviewed candidates ran on party lists that won no seats in their country's delegation to the European Parliament. These candidates are excluded from the sample and play no part in this article, although they might be of interest in other investigations. Furihermore, who did not answer a particular question are deleted from the table for the purpose of analysis. This leaves us with a total of some six hundred interviews for use in the further analysis.

The second correction is a 'weight mechanism' in order to make the results reflect the actual strength of each party represented in the European until 1984. To illustrate the point: if too few candidates from the Communist party in country X were interviewed, each Communist in our sample from country X 'speaks' with a weight higher than 1. If, on the other hand, too many liberals from country X were interviewed, each liberal candidate in the samle from country X 'speaks' with a weight lower than 1. In Table 2, as an example, 602 responses are recorded and this total includes 71 French candidates, but the percentages are calculated on the basis of weighted responses according to the election results. In France, for example, the Socialist list won 27 per cent of that country's 81 seats, and France holds just under 20 per cent of all seats in the European Parliament. Accordingly, the French Socialists have 5.4 per cent of the seats and constitute 5.4 per cent of the weighted sample used in this article. Using the same method for all parties, the heavy-weights of the sample are the British Conservatives (14.6 per cent), the German Christian Democrats (10.5) and Social Democrats (8.5), the Italian Christian Democrats and Communists (5.8).

Comparisons between weighted and non-weighted results show clearly that the differences in general are very small and most often a matter of a few percentage points. However, when we present our findings in figures and percentages we feel obliged to be as accurate and correct as possible. We designed a research project linked to the first European Elections, but we did not decide the outcome of these elections and are not entitled to present the results of our research in a way that disregards the verdict of 111 million voters. By using a simple procedure of corrective weighting and thereby respecting election results in all nine EC countries, we hope to have avoided any unnecessary biases in the analyses that follow.

2. Europe in World Politics

At the most abstract level a first indication of the candidates' attitudes towards the future role of Europe in world politics can be found in Table 2. Responses are broken down by nationality, illustrating those who are 'for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe'. No less than 90 per cent of our sample gave a positive answer and as many as 69 per cent expressed themselves as being 'very much for' European unification, a rather overwhelming majority.

The most consensus-like support for unification efforts are found in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg, where opposition or critical attitudes were negligible or non-existent. In Ireland support for European unification seems to be more conditional, as well as in Denmark, France, and Britain where criticism or outright hostility can be found. Even in the Netherlands, a critical minority can be heard despite a two-thirds majority in support. In the original six EC member countries, with the exception of France, we find comfortable majorities supporting European unification efforts, while the three new EC countries as well as France represent a more mixed pattern. A further distinction may be drawn between a very outspoken support in Continental-Southern Europe apart from France, and a more recalcitrant attitude in Northern Europe including the Netherlands. findings only contribute to the confirmation of the obvious in the context of European politics.

It must be recognised that the term 'European unification' is a valueloadedexpression all kinds of positive as well as negative connotationsand assumes different meanings in various countries inside the European Community. In the academic literature on the subject, Europeanunification a much more well-defined concept connected with a certain degree of common policies vis-å-vis the world outside the Europe

of the Nine. In order to be more specific and accurate about the potential linkage between European unification and the possible consequences for relations with third countries, not least the United States and the Soviet Union, the candidates were asked 'how the European Community should develop its relationship to the superpowers'. The question allowed three options varying from a mere preservation of the status quo, suggesting more coordinated policies with either the United States or the Soviet Union, or more independence from both. The answers presented in Table 3 are rather surprising since they reflect almost complete agreement for the idea of a European Community of Nine or more member states speaking with one voice in world affairs along with a certain degree of independence from both superpowers.

It could be tempting to make some strong conclusions from the responsesin
3, especially as these findings are confirmed in Table 4,
which indicates absolute majorities in all six party groupings for an independentEuropean

pendentEuropeanrole in world affairs. However, there are good reasons not to overinterpret the figures, since the term 'relationship' could involve anything from cultural exchange programmes to military arrangements. Attitudes on sovereignty and nationalistic feelings may also be mixed up with references to 'independence', just as much as the concept of'Europeanunification'. must not be forgotten that a very outspoken and overwhelming desire to support independence for Europe in world politics is intimately connected with a range of issues covered by the headlines of European security arrangements and defence organisation. Suffice it to say here that attitudes are divided in Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,and with Denmark as a rather unique case of status quo orientation.

3. European Security Arrangements

It has been argued that a trilateral superpower concept including China is of high relevance to European security as demonstrated lately by the Afghan crisis. Others have emphasized that in terms of economic security another triangle consisting of the United States, Japan, and Western Europe is of utmost importance as demonstrated by the example of annual economic summits aiming at coordinating policies on economic affairs, monetary matters, energy and North-South problems. However, when interviewing a relatively large number of candidates for the European Parliament in no less than nine countries within a time-span of a few months, the number of questions to be included in a questionnaire must be restricted one way or another. Furthermore, we do not regard it as too simplistic to define the security configuration for Western Europe as being

linked to the policies of the United States versus the Soviet Union. This was the basis of Tables 3 and 4 on preferred relationships with both superpowers, and is also the basis of Table 5-7 on preferred security arrangements.

Ultimately, the status quo situation in Western Europe is dependent on American capacity and willingness to defend the North Atlantic area with all military means necessary. The credibility of the American guarantee; is linked to deployment of some hundred thousand soldiers in West Germanyand whose involvement in a potential war on European ground would be automatic. The current level of support for this 'NATO model' might be continued or increased, measured in higher military expenditures, a more supranational command structure, a division of

labour in arms production, and so on. According to Table 5 only 37 per cent of the candidates interviewed were inclined to accept the principles of the NATO model as the best possible military arrangement for Western Europe. They represented absolute majorities in countries like Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg and a frail majority in the Netherlands, as well as a considerable minority following in Ireland (which is not a NATO member), Italy, and the United Kingdom.

Both within and outside NATO there is no shortage of groupings dealing with improved arms cooperation, but results have so far been unimpressive. NATO a conference of national armaments directors was set up in the 1960s as well as the more important Euro-group consisting of European NATO members with the exception of France, which left the integrated command structure in 1966. A more effective group was created in February 1976 by the Euro-group countries, but independent from NATO in order to allow France to become a member (Kirby 1979). This Independent European Programme Group (lEPG) is one of several defence referred to in Table 5 and is called in short the EURO model. Other empirical examples may be the Western European Union set up in 1954 after the failure of the European Defence Community which collapsed when Britain refused to join and an unholy Gaullist-Communist alliance in the French Assembly shot it to pieces. To date, Western European Union has been a forum for debates on European security and an organisation monitoring German rearmament. In short, when speaking about European defence postures more independent from the United States or NATO, the theoretical possibilities make up a continuum embracing an lEPG-like organisation as well as a revival of the out-dated plans for a European army. Table 5 shows a 37 per cent support of the EURO model without specifying its organisational structure or political implications. Most enthusiasm is found in Belgium, France, Italy, and Britain; least in Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

The second alternative security arrangement to the principles of the Atlantic Alliance is indicated in the option of seeking 'to reduce the need for a strong defence through greater accommodation with the Soviet Union¹. A minority group in Belgium wanted to combine this option with a more independent European defence posture, while minority groups in France and Denmark preferred to talk about disarmament and detente. In order to cover most aspects of these points of view, the second alternative to the NATO model is called the model of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, referring both to the perspectives of the socalledHelsinki and the parallel negotiations on mutual and

balanced force reductions in Central Europe. This ECSC model is supportedby per cent and represents a drastic revision of the status quo, aiming at a change of the very raison d'etre behind the system of military alliances as a valid security arrangement for Europe. In Ireland a majority of the candidates are willing to support a development of this sort which is met with a certain sympathy in most countries, notably in Italy and the Netherlands.

The findings in Table 5 are surprisingly inconsistent with the data in the first three tables, pointing to an overwhelming will to create a unified Europe with a more independent role in international relations. Table 6 confirms the fundamental disagreements on the exact nature of an independentrole speaking about military security arrangements. Twothirdsof Communists prefer the ECSC model, two-thirds of the Progressive Democrats, strongly supported by the Conservatives prefer the EURO model, and an absolute majority of the Christian Democrats are loyal to the NATO model as are most of the Liberals. Only the Socialists are almost equally divided between all three options, which makes it necessary to cross party and nationality when looking for more details. As far as support for the NATO model is concerned, the results can be seen in Table 7. One year after the interviewing took place, the strong supporters of NATO and the American guarantee of European security are the representatives of Governmental parties in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Furthermore,

they represent the main opposition parties in Denmark, Germany, Ireland and to some extent Britain. Only France and Belgium seem to be stripped of almost any support of NATO as the best possible security arrangement for Western Europe, which is a well-known fact of French political life arid a sensational result for Belgium. The only reasonable explanation of this odd phenomenon is the eagerness of Belgian politicians to stress the European identity when forced to make their priorities explicit.

4. An Integrated European Security Policy?

The first three tables reflected a strong and outspoken willingness to create a more independent role in world politics for a unified Europe. The next three tables indicated that care was needed when speaking of military security arrangements, where only 37 per cent gave highest priority to the creation of some European defence posture more independent of the United States and another 37 per cent expressed their support of the Atlantic Alliance. In the following tables we will examine the potential support for integrated defence and foreign policies within the framework of the European Community, implying a higher level of commitment than normal inter-governmental cooperation with respect to diplomatic consultations, planning, arms production, etc.

The findings in Tables 8-11 are derived from a very specific question on the willingness among the candidates to transfer authority on security policy from the national decision-making centres to varying degrees of cooperation within the Community's institutional framework. To eliminate misunderstanding they were asked about their support both for integrating defence policy as well as foreign policy. Three levels of cooperation were defined as follows: consultation among national governments, taken by an EC Council of Ministers with a right of veto for each member state, and decisions taken by a majority vote. As far as defence policy is concerned, the findings can be seen in Tables 8 and 9.

In Denmark, France, and Ireland absolute majorities prefer defence policy to be handled by their national governments acting independently. These perceptions correspond with the special status of France within NATO, the position of Ireland outside NATO, and the strongly expressed status-quo orientation of the Danish section of candidates, where rather a large number simply refused to discuss defence policy in any other context than NATO. Absolute majorities in both Luxembourg and Britain prefer defence policy to remain within the authority of national governments, but consulting each other in an EC context aiming at concerted action. For

Luxembourg, this position is consistent with the clearly expressed supportfor while the British support of some independent defence posture apparently must be complementary to the principles of NATO and as a consequence kept at the level of consultations between the European NATO member states. The Dutch candidates also tended to accept an upgrading of European consultative mechanisms without damaging the American connection.

Belgium, Germany, and Italy wish to see the creation of an integrated European defence policy handled by the Community institutions. An absolute majority of the Belgian candidates and close to absolute majorities in Germany and Italy would even be willing to leave authority entirely in the hands of the Community institutions making decisions by majority votes. The Belgians represent the most ardent Europeans, opting

for an independent European role in world politics and willing to let the Community perform as an actor in international politics. German preferencesare only if an integrated European defence policy is regarded as a supplement and not an alternative to NATO principles. For some Italians the same argument is probably valid in a reverse direction - harmonisation between a European defence community and accommodationwith Soviet Union.

In Table 5 strong support of a more independent European defence posture was expressed by candidates in Belgium, France, and Britain. The Belgians are willing to make use of the Community structure, as are NATO supporters in Germany and Italy, while Britain would prefer consultative not involving a transfer of sovereignty. France, however, would like defence policy to remain at the national governmental as well as the creation of a more independent European defence posture. From Table 9 we see the unholy alliance between Communists Gaullists or Progressive Democrats, who killed the European Defence Community in the 19505, and are still strongly opposed to any kind of sovereignty transfer within the issue area of security. At the other end of the spectrum, we find the staunch backers of a European Community with defence matters among the Christian Democrats, while the British Conservatives are strongly opposed to any cooperation that implies an erosion of national authority. Both the Socialists and the Liberals are split between all four options, reflecting national interests and leaving the European Parliament without any majority point of view on an integrated defence policy.

The only viable compromise solution seems to be some sort of consultativemechanism
with defence matters in much the same way as

the consultative set-up on foreign policy - the so-called European Political Cooperation (See Kramer & Rummel 1978). The EPC is based on two reports accepted by the member states and designed as a purely inter-governmentaltype cooperation, which gradually has developed throughout the 19705. It is supported by countries like Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg,the and Britain, to some extent opposed by France, while Belgium, Germany, and Italy would like to integrate the EPC into the legal structures of the European Community (Table. 10). Also on a cross-party basis we find much the same pattern of attitudes to an integratedforeign as to an integrated defence policy. The main differenceis existence of the EPC and its well-known practices, which attract a higher degree of support than a parallel construction within the defence area as a purely theoretical possibility.

This impression is reinforced when looking at Table 11. The Communist-Gaullistalliance still alive, but a little weaker, and the Christian Democrats are still the most pronounced pro-integrationists. The main difference is the strong support among Socialists and Liberals for the EPC construction together with the Conservatives. Speaking in terms of majority and minority in the European Parliament, there is no prevailing trend, but some 35 per cent have declared themselves in favour of a

common EC policy based on the strict rules of inter-governmentalism.

So far we have analysed the wishes, ideals, and expectations of the candidates with respect to the creation of an integrated European security policy. To test their willingness to provide adequate military defence measured in terms of budgets, personnel or equipment, they were confrontedwith questions making a distinction between Western Europe and the national context. In Table 12 we find absolute majorities in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and Britain agreeing that 'Western Europe should make a stronger defence effort' as well as support from no

less than 49 per cent of the French section. This figure helps to explain the apparent contradiction between an integrated EC policy implying a transferof authority and cooperation among Western European countriesat inter-governmental level as preferred by French as well as British candidates. Opposition to stronger defence efforts by the countries of Western Europe can be found in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and to a certain extent in France and Italy. On a party basis the resistance against stronger defence efforts is expressed by the Socialists and especiallythe contrary to the Christian Democrats and Liberals, who agree, and the Conservatives and Progressive Democrats who tend to agree strongly (Table 13).

In a national context, the candidates were confronted with various goals that had been discussed as possible goals for the EC countries for the next decade, and among these they were asked about their agreement to making that your country has adequate defence forces'. On an overall basis, this particular goal was given the lowest priority among twelve societal goals, indicating a low degree of saliency compared with, for example, economic stability and controlling inflation. On a party basis the known pattern of attitudes was reflected, apart from the agreement of the French Communists. However, broken down by nationality our findings emphasize a line of division between bigger countries like Germany, France, and Britain, all giving top priority to their own defence forces being adequate, and other EC countries apparently preferring a concentration resources in issue areas other than defence.

When we compare Tables 12 and 14, only Luxembourg shows an identical pattern of defence preferences, be they European or national, while Belgium is strongly in favour of a West European effort and almost resists a stronger national effort. This brings Belgium in accordance with

other smaller EC member states, all varying between 12 and 17 per cent
giving top priority to adequate defence forces in contrast to between 41
and 57 per cent for the three bigger countries, with Italy in between

5. Conclusion

A cross-national analysis differentiates the three bigger Community member states - Germany, France and Britain - in separate perceptual strata as far as European security is concerned. The German point of view is closely linked to ideas of Atlantic Partnership between two pillars, an American and a European. European unification may enhance the future role and status of Western Europe, but ties with the United States will be of crucial importance in the foreseeable future. This fundamental assumptionpermits Germans to support a more independent role for Europe in world politics and even advocate a European defence policy regulated within the institutional framework of the European Community on the crucial condition that common policies will not be contrary to a European security arrangement based on the principles of NATO. Furthermore, European unification in the military field may improve the total strength of the Atlantic Alliance as a necessary condition for negotations with Eastern Europe aiming at disarmament, detente, and ultimately a revised security system embracing both Europés. To a large extent this way of perceiving

European security options is met with sympathy in Italy and Belgium as
long as it will not be too costly in terms of national defence efforts.

The British view has strong similarities with the German on the subject of the role of Western Europe within the Atlantic Alliance, but it does not share German confidence in the Community institutions. Any kind of sovereignty transfer within the security field may be a contribution to building up a supranational European Community. Instead, a Western European defence posture could be feasible if using the model of European Cooperation. Also Luxembourg and, to some extent, the Netherlands would approve consultative and flexible institutional mechanisms, while Denmark and Ireland would like defence policy to remain within the sphere of NATO or handled by national governments. None of these countries could approve any sort of European defence policy designed as an alternative to NATO and all, apart from the British, are unwilling to increase defence efforts nationally.

The French perception reflects a determination to stress the sovereignty and independence of the nation-state in security affairs. Its allies within NATO may have accustomed themselves to French non-membership of the military structure and the International Energy Agency dealing with issues of importance to European security. However, the determined French disapproval of attempts to instill a touch of supranationalism into the Community institutions is shared by several other member countries: Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. French version of an independent role for Europe in world affairs is combined with a willingness to pay the price for stronger defence efforts both nationally and in Western Europe, but any future European defence organisation must be independent from NATO and strictly intergovernmental making decisions. A transformation of the lEPG into a ministerial council assigned a minor secretariat might offer itself as a theoretical illustration.

Any cross-party analysis would be virtually impossible if not connected with the party groupings of the European Parliament where most parties fit in very well. On the other hand, the groupings are very different regarding homogeneity and composition. The Socialist and Liberal groupings have members from most EC countries, the Conservatives and Progressive Democrats are dominated by British and French members respectively, and Italian and French members make up the Communist party grouping. In these cases, any analysis of parties grouped in accordance with practices the European Parliament will inevitably be linked to the predominant of nationality.

The pattern of attitudes does not correspond to the groupings of parties, but three ways of reasoning may be said to be viable in the directly elected European Parliament, reflecting to a certain degree the traditional leftright of politics. The status quo model is intimately linked to a continuation of the NATO alliance and a will to provide adequate defence efforts nationally and at the European level. It is supported by the Christian to some extent by the Liberals and the Conservatives, arid not rejected by the Socialists. A European defence posture improving the potential of a more independent European role vis-ä-vis the superpowers is given full support by the Progressive Democrats who are willing to accept the ultimate consequences of political and military independence. The Liberals and the Conservatives, however, would like a European arrangement, but would neither break up ties with the United States nor denounce the feasibility of the Community institutions handling such an arrangement. On these terms the Christian Democrats might also lend their support.⁵

A third perspective can count on support from parts of the Communist and Socialist groupings. The need for stronger defence efforts is to be reduced through a process of accommodation with the Soviet Union. It is recognised that the present system of military alliances would be made invalid by a successful accommodation paving the way for some sort of collective security system in Europe or at least detente and disarmament. But neither the potential role of a unified Europe nor the necessity of stronger defence efforts are regarded in the same way by French and Italian Communists, and only a fraction of the Socialists is inclined to support a European security arrangement of this sort.

Events since the 1979 European elections have fully demonstrated and proved the validity of our study, but at the same time events might have influenced and even changed the elite attitudes. In this respect two cases must be explicitly mentioned, one dealing with the military aspect of European security and one emphasizing the divergent foreign policy perceptions Western Europe and America.

For obvious reasons France and Ireland did not take part in the NATO decision to modernise and strengthen the Unites States' medium-range strategic arsenal in Europe and offer at the same time to negotiate arms control with the Warsaw Pact countries.

Discussions within various NATO countries and negotiations between governments, prior to the NATO Council decision in December 1979, revealed a pattern of attitudes in seven EC countries not very different from the findings above. Several European countries obviously acted as

critical partners seen from the American point of view, but, on the other hand, the actual decision to introduce so-called 'theatre nuclear forces' (TNF) once again confirmed a loyalty towards the American guarantee of Western Europe, which is given higher priority than national or even common European considerations. A viable or well defined West Europeansecurity to the Atlantic Alliance does not exist.⁶

European reactions to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, combined with developments in the Persian Gulf area and the Middle East, point out differences and even disagreement with the American partner, but at the same time European hesitance and cautiousness has not been consistent and homogeneous enough to form a common policy. European perceptions the very basis of their security might be strikingly different from that of the American as was the case during the American diplomatic offensive in 1973, the so-called 'Year of Europe', which created more problems than it solved. Anyway, the Afghan-Iranian crisis has signified a change of the climate in international politics, from a period of detente to a situation of aggravated super-power confrontation.

The division between West and East European states could be deepened and their individual freedom of manoeuvre limited, when total loyalty is demanded by their protective super-powers. So far, the West- European countries have reacted to this challenge as reluctant allies, giving support to the main conclusion of our analysis, the double rejection: a refusal of a too strong commitment with the USA when European security can no longer be encapsulated geographically but tends to become integral part of world politics; and a refusal of a common defence policy within or outside the EC institutional framework but leaving the door ajar for inter-governmental cooperation adapted to the fundamental principles of the Atlantic Alliance.

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NOTES

1 The best examples of this debate are reports authorised by the European Council of heads of states and governments in the member countries. See Leo Tindemans, 'The European Union', Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/1976; Barend Biesheuvel, Edmund Dell and Robert Marjolin, Report on the European Institutions, October 1979, Brussels. Scandinavian readers can find a detailed account of this debate in Sørensen, 1978.

2 The first direct elections of the European Parliament have been described and analysed in a number of articles contained in a special issue of the European Journal of Political Research, 8 (1980), pp. 1-164.

3 Fieldwork for this research was supported by the Volkswagen Stiftung, the Commission of the European Communities, and the European Parliament. We take this opportunity to eeexpress our thanks. We also wish to thank the candidates for the European Parliament for their gracious cooperation in these interviews, despite the pressures of the ongoing electoral campaign. This project is part of a broader set of studies of the European elections coordinated by Rudolf Wildenmann, Paolo Farneti, Dusan Sidjanski, and Henry Valen. The interviews were carried out by the following organisations and individuals: Germany - Zentrum fiir Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA); Great Britain - Market Opinion Research (MORI); Italy - Instituto per le Ricerche Statistiche e l'Analisi dell 'Opinione Pubblica (DOXA); The Netherlands - Nederlandse Stichting voor de Statistiek; Ireland - Irish Marketing Surveys; Belgium - DIMARSO/INRA; France - a group led by Patrice Manigand and Dominique Rémy of the Centre d'Etudes de la Vie Politique Francaise, and the University of Paris I, respectively; Denmark - a group from the University of Aarhus, directed by Carsten Lehmann Sørensen; for Luxembourg, all interviews were conducted by Mario Hirsch. The cross- national coordination was undertaken by Karlheinz Reif, Mannheim university.

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3 Fieldwork for this research was supported by the Volkswagen Stiftung, the Commission of the European Communities, and the European Parliament. We take this opportunity to eeexpress our thanks. We also wish to thank the candidates for the European Parliament for their gracious cooperation in these interviews, despite the pressures of the ongoing electoral campaign. This project is part of a broader set of studies of the European elections coordinated by Rudolf Wildenmann, Paolo Farneti, Dusan Sidjanski, and Henry Valen. The interviews were carried out by the following organisations and individuals: Germany - Zentrum fiir Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA); Great Britain - Market Opinion Research (MORI); Italy - Instituto per le Ricerche Statistiche e l'Analisi dell 'Opinione Pubblica (DOXA); The Netherlands - Nederlandse Stichting voor de Statistiek; Ireland - Irish Marketing Surveys; Belgium - DIMARSO/INRA; France - a group led by Patrice Manigand and Dominique Rémy of the Centre d'Etudes de la Vie Politique Francaise, and the University of Paris I, respectively; Denmark - a group from the University of Aarhus, directed by Carsten Lehmann Sørensen; for Luxembourg, all interviews were conducted by Mario Hirsch. The cross- national coordination was undertaken by Karlheinz Reif, Mannheim university.

4 3,692 candidates ran for seats in the European Parliament. Available resources did not permit us to interview all of these candidates, so we adopted a sampling procedure designed to obtain interviews with a large share of those most likely to be elected, as well as ensuring that all significant political tendencies were represented in the sample, even if they were unlikely to win seats. In order to attain these two goals, we first estimated the number of seats each party was likely to win, on the basis of the share of the vote won in the most recent national election. In the eight countries having party lists and some form of proportional representation, we drew out a sample from the top of the party lists, working downwards in proportion to the number of seats the party was expected to win, with the target of obtaining about twice as many interviews as the number of seats expected to be won. In the remaining country (Great Britain) our samples were basedon performance in the last election, deliberately ignoring the first-past-the-post system. Despite the fact that the Liberals (in particular) seemed unlikely to win any seats in Britain, they represent a significant segment of the British electorate that will be of interest in future analyses. In all nine countries we also set the goal of obtaining at least one interview with candidates from each party expected to win at least one per cent of the national vote, regardless of whether or not they were likely to win any seats.

5 A pattern of attitudes along these lines was discernible in. the European Parliament's debate on the possibilities of a European arms procurement policy as an integral part of a common industrial policy. The discussion took place during the September plenary session in 1979 and rapidly turned into a heated debate on the feasibility of a common European defence policy.

6 The cleavages and lines of division in the TNF decision were perhaps even more visible in the 1977-78 debate on the neutron bomb: see Glass (1979). The TNF-decision is described by Ruehl (1980). The decision was to go ahead with the plans to deploy on European soil US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing Pershing I-A, and 464 ground-launched Cruise missiles, all with single warheads. From 1983 the missiles will be stationed in selected countries, the major part in Germany, Italy, and Britain, and a minor part in Belgium and the Netherlands. Both the Belgian and Dutch governments, however, had reservations over the plans.

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