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A revival of political agitation by ethnic minority groups has been a conspicuous feature of the internal politics in advanced industrial societies since the late 1960's. This tendency has not gone unnoticed in the fields of political science and sociology. There is, in fact, an abundance of books and papers indicating and observing the rebirth of ethnic feelings. Many have emphasized ethnicity as the forgotten dimension in the analyses of society and politics in the 1950's and 1960's (see, e.g. Esman 1977; Anderson 1978, 128–143; Krejci 1978, 124–171).

The aim of this paper is to discuss and assess the societal implications of the renaissance of ethnicity in advanced industrial societies. The data and the examples used are restricted to the linguistic, territorial minorities in Western Europe. The central characteristics of ethnic groups will be discussed later but at this point it will suffice to emphasize that ethnic groups are socially constituted and maintained. The existence of an ethnic group is always related to some distinctive traits such as race, language or cultural tradition, but a category of people with certain characteristics does not become an ethnic group unless some social significance is attri-

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buted to the variation along these characteristics. In short, the existence of an ethnic group presupposes processes of categorization and self-categorization (Banton 1977, 1–9). Ethnic activism always has historical roots (Connor 1977, 19–29), but during times of ethnic revivals there is a heightening of the processes of categorization.

1. Common Elements in the Present Activization of Ethnicity

Despite the fact that the West European territorial, linguistic minorities have very different histories, experience different kinds of grievances, and express different kinds of demands, there are nevertheless uniformities and general traits in the present ethnic revival. It is possible to point out at least five general characteristics of the 'new' ethnicity: (1) the ethnic categorizations are not performed by the majorities but by the minorities themselves, (2) a coincidence of the timing of the revival of different ethnic groups, (3) a professionalization of ethnic activities, (4) a turning toward the left, and (5) increased ability to conflict management by governments. Some illustrations are in order.

1.1. The categorizations are performed by the minorities themselves

The present ethnic revival is typically a movement of people who strive to categorize themselves. It has by no means always been the case. Majority populations are often keen to keep a distance from different kinds of minorities and outgroups. This was a very prevailing pattern in Europe during the 1930's, exemplified in its most inhuman form by the Nazis hunting Jews and Gypsies. That majorities performed categorizations as acts of exclusion was by no means restricted to situations of physical violence. Bretons, Corsicans, Swedish Finns, Lapps, Welshmen, to mention just a few examples, were all defined as outgroups by majorities.

A fairly common pattern before World War II was the tendency to folklorization of ethnic traits. In its most obvious form it concerned small and exotic minorities such as the Lapps, but it has also been observable as regards large national groups such as for instance the Gaels from the Scottish Highlands. Today many of the folkloristic features have become politicized and are used for ethnic mobilization by the minorities themselves. Many epithets, originally used as slurs against the minorities, are likewise today emphasized as expressions of solidarity within the minorities themselves.

1.2. Coincidence in timing

It has been substantiated by many observers that there was a definite upsurge in ethnic feelings among the European linguistic minorities toward the end of the 1960's. One of the most illuminating cases is represented by the various minority regions in France. William Beer has pointed out how in France from the Liberation until 1968 there was very little indigenous ethnic political agitation. During the 1970's ethnic activism has been observed in all of France's minority regions (Beer 1977, 143–158). Similar observations have been made elsewhere. Also in the case of the Spanish Basques one can clearly speak about a proliferation of ethnic sentiments. The feelings of a Basque identity has been strong and alive for centuries but there has nevertheless during the 1970's been an increase in the militancy of the nationalist and radical organization of the Spanish Basques, the ETA. Also the nationalist movement of the French Basques, the Embata, decided to turn to direct action after 1968 (Anderson 1978, 136–137).

The ethnic revival has comprised many sorts of behavior but the coincidence in timing is striking. It has been observed that the inhabitants of the Mezzogiorno, Friuli, Brittany, Scotland, etc. during the 1970's have become more and more reluctant to emigrate to the traditional centers. They prefer to stay put and to assert their demands on behalf of their own region (Petrella 1977, 1–2). During the same period many regional languages have become activated and in some cases almost reborn. It is instructive to note that while Sardinia was granted regional autonomy already in 1948, some community councils actually started to use Sardinian only in the 1970's. Many other regional languages such as Frisian, Welsh, Breton, etc. became revitalized during the same period.

1.3 The professionalization of ethnic activities

Many observers have pointed to the existence of ethnic activists of a new brand, that is university graduates with the special competence needed in a period of mass education and mass communication but also with a need of work and activities fitted to their training (Esman 1977, 374–375). A remarkable, systematic study of this phenomenon has been made, namely William Beer's study of ethnic activists in contemporary France. Since the near revolution in 1968 more than sixty ethnic activist groups have emerged with a certain stability over time and with some degree of formal organization. They are spread all over France's minority regions, Alsace-Lorraine, Westhoek-Flanders, Brittany, the French Basque country, French Catalonia, Occitania, and Corsica but there are of course regional

variations. The tendency has been particularly strong in Alsace-Lorraine where in 1975 there were nineteen ethnic regionalist organizations, only one of which existed before 1968. In Occitania at least twenty-six groups had been set up since 1968 while there were only eight such groups before that date (Beer 1977, 143–158).

1.4 Turning toward the left

In the 1930's nationalist and autonomy demands were usually related to conservative and bourgeois positions. The French terminology is in this respect revealing and instructive. Regional demands were conceived as directed towards the Jacobin third republic and the very word Jacobin implies a stand against regional separatism.

During the 1970's there has been a clear tendency among the European minority movements to take a Socialist stance, and at least to adopt conceptualizations borrowed from Third World nationalism such as 'internal colonialism' and 'cultural domination'. It has been maintained that in practically all those cases in which one can speak of a recrudescence of ethnic identities, some form of radicalization of the minority movement has occurred. Ethnic minorities in which no radicalization happened during the 1970's did not as a rule experience a strengthening of their ethnic feelings. This seems to have been true, for instance, of the German speakers in South Tyrol (or Alto Adige) which, in an overwhelming majority, have been conservative and strongly anti-Communist. In the 1930's the South Tyroleans were among the most vociferous minorities in Europe. The assertion of the minority claims in South Tyrol was also stronger in the 1950's and early 1960's than in the 1970's when the South Tyroleans appeared to have become more integrated into the Italian political system (Anderson 1978, 136).

1.5 Increasing efforts to conflict management by governments

Many ethnic minorities are today able to formulate their claims in terms of generally accepted policy goals. While their demands in earlier times were easily dismissed as obsolete and nationalistic fancies, there is an increasing pressure on governments both to regulate ethnic conflicts and to respond positively to minority demands. A scrutiny of the situation in present-day Europe also clearly indicates that there has been an increase in the responsiveness to the demands by the ethnic minorities generally. Many examples of the willingness either to grant autonomy or to organize plebiscites in order to gauge the support for autonomy can be mentioned. Thus, Italy granted autonomy to Val d'Aosta in 1944, to Trentino – Alto

Adige, Sicily and Sardinia in 1948, and to Friuli-Venezia Giulia in 1963. In the northern Atlantic the Faeroe islands and Greenland have obtained home rule in relation to Denmark. In Spain the province of Catalonia was granted an autonomous status in October 1977 although it still has to be implemented in practice, and a similar status has been envisaged for the Basque country (Krejci 1978, 146). The Spanish cases also highlight a common problem: the governmental responses do not go as far as the demands forwarded by the minorities. Yet in many instances the resistance to autonomy does not stem from the government but from other groups within the minority territories. An example is the Swiss Jura in which the French-speaking Jurassians in the Protestant South resisted separation from the German-speaking canton of Bern (Bassand 1976, 221–246). The situation in Austrian Carinthia provides likewise an example of resistance against the measures taken: rights granted to the Slovene minority by the Austrian central government have been resisted by the German population in the province (Anderson 1978, 134–135).

The question of the devolution of Scotland and Wales is illustrative for the responsiveness typically shown by governments to regional and linguistic minorities. The British Labour government committed itself to a devolution of Scotland and Wales but it is also clear that to a large extent this position was dictated by a need to protect both government interests and to secure that Scotland and Wales would not be lost for the Labour Party (Rose 1978).

Numerous other examples indicate how governments after the Second World War have tried to increase the rights of minorities. This is true for the Danish minority in the German South Schleswig (Stephens 1976, xxix), for the German minority in the Danish North Schleswig (Elklit et al. 1976), for the Lapps in Norway, Sweden, and Finland, for the Finnish speakers in the Swedish Torne valley, and also for the Slavonic Sorbs fo the DDR in the districts of Dresden and Cottbus (Straka 1970, 582–595; Stone 1972, 161–185). The increasing responsiveness does not mean that all the demands have been met or that all grievances have been eliminated. Yet, the situation is thoroughly different in comparison with that before the Second World War when most countries took measures to bring about a decrease in the number of speakers of regional minority languages.

The very fact that ethnic minorities can now speak in terms of generally accepted policy goals, as well as address their claims directly to the State, is hardly without consequences for the politics of ethnic groups. Instead of expressing their aggression directly toward other ethnic groups and toward the national majority populations, the minority can approach the

State which, in terms of its own policy goals, is forced to take them seriously. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that this new pattern is likely to have a sobering influence on ethnic conflicts.

2. Changes in the Nature and Social Significance of Ethnicity

As described above, since the late 1960's there has not only been an increase in regional, ethnic sentiments in Western Europe, but also a rapid development of new organizational forms based on territory and language. What is much less clear, however, is what this all means in the wider societal and political development. Does the growth in ethnic and linguistic sentiments also imply that the likelihood for strong ethnic conflicts has increased? Is it likely that the renaissance of ethnicity has made politics less predictable? In attempting to evaluate the societal and political implications of the ethnic revival, a scrutiny of the nature of ethnic groups and ethnicity would be fruitful. This can be done here only very briefly.

An opening can be found in the observation that ethnic self-categorizations have increased in importance in relation to ethnic categorizations made by others. There is a certain asymmetry between categorizations by others, and self-categorizations. Categorizations by others are always based on a specific criterion or criteria, be it a physical or cultural characteristic, attributed to those categorized. Self-categorizations may occur without references to specific external criteria. The crucial thing is an expressed will to belong to a certain ethnic group.

The increase in the relative importance of self-categorizations implies an enhancement of the subjective elements in ethnicity. Self-identification as a criterion has been strengthened in relation to more primordial elements such as descent and distinctive cultural traits. Modern education has also made many persons less dependent on just one particular language. The changes have generally meant a clear increase in the options available to the members of the minority groups.

Simultaneously with the enhancement of self-categorization and self-identification, formal ethnic organizations have grown in number and importance. As particularly the anthropologist Fredrik Barth has emphasized, there are in all ethnic, also in all linguistic groups, a set of rules regulating interaction and contacts with other ethnic groups. In other words, all ethnic groups have some forms of *social organization for inter-ethnic interaction* (Barth 1969, 16–17). The social organizations of the inter-ethnic interaction usually also contain rules for when, where and to what extent the diacritical marks of an ethnic group ought to be displayed. There are always both some social realms which are kept insu-

lated, and some social activities which the minority group members like to perform in their own language or within their own group. In today's Europe the social organization of inter-ethnic interaction has tended to become increasingly regulated by formal organizations and institutions. This is probably a natural result of the fact that inter-ethnic interaction over boundaries has strongly increased. The only way to preserve ethnic distinctions and the level of quality of life conditioned by the knowledge of one's own cultural heritage is to develop formal institutions and organizations.

It seems reasonable to say that ethnicity in earlier times, even in Europe during the 1930's, had a much stronger element of primordiality in the sense that people hardly had any options as regards the choice of their group memberships. Members of ethnic groups were faced with very strong constraints regarding contacts with the outside world. In earlier times descent and distinctive cultural patterns, often imposed by categorizations made by others, were of utmost significance, whereas members of ethnic groups had often difficulties in verbally articulating their ethnic identification. Today, self-categorization has become a dominating component in ethnicity together with deliberate and organized activities aimed at creating and maintaining ethnic consciousness.

The argument here is that while the changes in the relative emphasis of the different components of ethnicity have made it easier for people to assert their ethnic identities, they have nevertheless also diminished the likelihood of very fierce ethnic conflicts. When membership in an ethnic group is strongly related to subjective identification, it is also possible to leave the group and search for other attachments if the situation becomes really threatening. On the other hand, in a situation where primordial bonds and other ascriptive relationships are basic, threats against the group assume an almost absolute nature.

The position of ethnicity, and its impact on politics in the modern world, however, cannot be discussed solely in terms of the relative changes within a set of criteria for ethnicity. Neither can one base a discussion of the rule of ethnicity only on observations of the ethnic revival or of the behavior of the ethnic minorities themselves. A brief discussion of some of the organizing principles of modern society is also important.

3. Ethnicity and Some Basic Organizatory Principles of Modern Society

Whereas it would be somewhat preposterous to assume that it is possible to formulate a comprehensive theory about all master tendencies in mod-

ern societies, it seems feasible to point to some trends with a clear bearing on the impact of ethnicity. Two aspects appear to be particularly pertinent. The first is that education, literacy and a certain amount of technical skill are primary requirements for citizen participation in today's advanced industrialized societies. This means that there is a more or less constantly ongoing testing of proficiencies and abilities, and that fewer and fewer can claim a right to their jobs and positions within the economy, politics, and culture on the basis of ascription instead of achievement. It also means that forms of monopolization or niches formerly held by certain ethnic groups have become strongly challenged and, in fact, impossible to maintain. The second aspect is that there is a constant movement and a great flexibility on the individual level: people have to be able to receive a constant flow of new information from the media, to occupy new positions, to perform new tasks, and to move to new neighborhoods. In fact, a certain kind of flexibility is a dominant feature, and as one may say, an organizatory principle.

In 'Thought and Change' Ernest Gellner has argued that nationalism emerged in the modern world mainly because the traditional social structure, with its system of ascriptive relationships, had been eroded by the forces of modernization. Nationalism based on common symbols and general ideas replaced, so to say, the old structure which was formed upon stable and ascriptive relationships (Gellner 1964, 153–157). Gellner's analysis focuses on the differences between the preindustrial and the industrial society, but his wording indicates that the erosion of stable structures and the increased importance of a generalized set of sentiments such as nationalism is a feature which is carried over to the postindustrial society. It is remarkable that nationalism since the end of the 1960's has been most visible in the peripheries and among the minorities. In terms of Gellner's argument it is logical to assume that this depends on the fact that the structures in the peripheries have by now also become eroded. Like other regions and groups the peripheries and minorities are in need of a generalized medium, in this case, ethnicity, which provides the common bond.

In the analysis of the change in the nature of ethnicity and in the review of the observations about the ethnic revival in Western Europe, it was maintained that there is both an increase in self-asserted ethnicity and decreasing likelihood for truly fierce ethnic conflicts. An analysis of two crucial organizatory principles of the modern society, on one hand the increasing importance of knowledge, literacy and technical skills, and on the other the demand for great individual flexibility, point clearly in the

same direction. These two principles can here, when their influence on ethnicity is examined, be discussed under the headings of the weakening of the cultural division of labor, and the increasing importance of multiple identities.

4. Weakening of the Cultural Division of Labor and the Pattern of Multiple Identities

One of the most debated schemes to explain ethnic conflicts in terms of relationships between social stratification and ethnic divisions in recent years has been Michael Hechter's model for internal colonialism and its related idea of the *cultural division of labor* (Hechter 1976, 214–224). Hechter's original study concerned the Celtic fringe in Britain from 1536 to 1966, and it is true that several British researchers have exposed Hechter's attempts to ignore many historical facts in order to force an argument upon 400 years of history of the British Isles (see, e.g. Page 1977). Yet, his conceptual scheme is useful as a frame of reference just because of its simplicity. Hechter assumes that ethnic differentation and conflicts always presuppose that individuals with different cultural markers are unevenly distributed in the occupational structure. The degree according to which there is a connection between ethnicity and occupational specialization also determines the strength of the cultural divison of labor. However, a cultural division of labor can exist in primarily two forms. If all members of one ethnic group have high ranks whereas the members of another ethnic group occupy low ranks, we have *a hierarchical division of labor*. If the members of the two ethnic groups do not differ on the average in their social ranks, but merely in their occupational specialization, *a segmented cultural division of labor* prevails.

Hechter argues that ethnicity and ethnic conflicts have prevailed in the modern world because there exists a cultural division of labor (Hechter 1978, 293–318). He makes two very reasonable assertions: (1) the stronger the cultural division of labor, the stronger the ethnic conflicts, and (2) a hierarchical cultural division of labor is apt to cause stronger conflicts than a segmented division of labor. Yet, the very same ideas can be suggested in order to emphasize the lessening likelihood of truly fierce ethnic conflicts. It seems correct to assume that structures of a hierarchical cultural division of labor have become more and more eroded in modern societies. To be truthful, opinions in this respect do vary. Yet, it seems warranted to say that situations of a cultural division of labor are very difficult to defend,

and that most governments are willing or at least feel themselves pressed to take measures in order to diminish the cultural division of labor. In the United States a hierarchical cultural division of labor still exists between whites and blacks, but it is also hard to deny that a considerable emancipation of the black population has occurred in recent times, and that this emancipation is at least partly the result of deliberate policy measures. The guest workers in Western Europe have definitely found themselves at the bottom of the stratification system but, in contrast to earlier epochs, this is a problem of which both decision-makers and politically important segments of the public are aware, and to which they feel pressed to respond. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that there are clear tendencies toward a lessing of the hierarchical division of labor.

The same arguments can be presented as regards the cultural division of labor generally. It has become increasingly harder to base occupational specialization on ethnic recruitment and to restrict access to certain fields on ethnic grounds. The Hechter argument about the source of ethnic conflicts in the cultural division of labor is sometimes extended also to cover territorial distinctiveness. The assumption is then that the preservation of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts is due either to occupational specialization on ethnic grounds, or to territorial distinctiveness of the ethnic groups. It seems obvious that also territorial borders and bonds have become less rigid in the industrial society. The modernization processes affect different regions unevenly, but the boundaries between different regions are generally easier to cross than during earlier epochs.

As a crucial feature of modern life it is commonly agreed that individuals tend to have a multitude of group memberships and a highly varied repertoire of associations with other people. Since human beings usually create images of themselves based on those with whom they interact and feel companionship, one may say that it is typical of modern man to have multiple identities. A large body of social psychological literature shows how individuals need possibilities to evaluate their opinions and performances, and how these possibilities are provided by comparisons with persons similar to the individuals in need of self-evaluation. Generally, the easier it is to perform the comparisons and the evaluations, the more attractive is the situation, and the more attachment the individual is likely to feel for those with whom he has compared himself. Since individuals in today's societies have to be able to perform many tasks and to operate in many separate realms of life, the result is multiple identities.

Some of the consequences of the pattern of multiple identities are strongly related to the processes of ethnic group formation. It seems

reasonable to assert that patterns of multiple identities will stimulate the maintenance of ethnic loyalties on one hand, but also weaken conflicts on the other. In a traditional situation in which group memberships and options are few, the awareness of an ethnic identity is likely to be undeveloped and diffuse. Self-awareness is not necessary because social bonds of a primordial nature provide strict rules for conduct and for the prediction of social events. The eroding of the traditional bonds necessitates self-awareness and explicit group identities.

5. The Fight Against Discrimination, and the Fight for Recognition

In the 1960's in particular, a great upsurge of studies aimed at formulating social goals for public policy and at constructing social indicators of citizen well-being occurred. A general assumption in almost all the indicator systems of well-being was that we need indicators not only of the level of living and of material resources, but also of the quality of life in a wider sense, for instance indicators of people's relations to each other, to the society, and to nature. In indicator systems intended to measure the satisfaction of basic needs in national populations, some assumptions, usually attributed to Abraham Maslow, were often advanced. It was assumed that basic needs can be classified in a hierarchy of prepotency in such a fashion that, when the basic material or physiological needs are met, then the needs for safety, for belonging, for esteem, and for self-realization in turn and in this order become the most urgent ones. Some very large scale analyses of the development of political behavior in West-European populations and electorates have likewise assumed that in the post-industrial society there has been a major change from concerns about material well-being to concerns about the fulfillment of the needs of belonging, esteem, and self-realization (Inglehart 1977, 21–53).

It does not seem fruitful to try to develop yet another indicator system especially geared to the conditions of linguistic minorities in industrialized societies. Yet it seems worthwhile to point out that the historical development of the position of ethnic and linguistic minorities displays a pattern somewhat similar to the one envisaged by the Maslowian need-hierarchy and its application to studies of well-being. The first, and one might add the worst, stage in the field of majority-minority relations is that of *discrimination*. The categorization is performed by the majority, or the group possessing the privileges. The social functions of the ethnic categorizations are usually to exclude the members of the minority from

substantial material advantages, but the categorizations can also be performed in order to find scape-goats, etc. Discrimination and categorizations enforced by the majority can lead to attempts at genocide, as in the persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany and of the Gypsies through a large part of European history. More common is that discrimination and ethnic categorization have been exercised by the majority or the privileged group in order to safeguard their own material privileges. Many historical forms of majority-minority relations have originally been based on categorizations performed solely by the majority and the privileged groups. This was the case in North America where the whites classified slaves brought in from different parts of Africa under the labels of 'Negroes' and 'blacks'. There are of course many degrees of severity of discrimination. The borders between the privileged and the nonprivileged can vary immensely in strength and exclusiveness. In many historical situations the privileged group may want to adopt a certain number of new members into their own group. In multicultural and multiethnic societies history abounds in examples of the rise of new categorizations and new alliances between ethnic groups. It is well known how the variation in skin color in many Latin American countries has led to fine gradations of people of mixed descent, but that also these gradations may change in the course of history (Banton 1977, 4–13). At any rate, the early and worst stages in the history of many minorities consist of *discrimination*. It has always at least some material consequences, and it is based on *exclusion*.

If one looks at the present-day situation of the West-European territorial, linguistic minorities it does not seem reasonable to say that they mainly fight against discrimination. Rather they *fight for recognition*. It was already emphasized that in today's Europe self-categorizations have tended to be more important than categorizations by others. Callousness and aggressiveness by majority populations today mainly take the form of unwillingness to consider the ethnic minorities as distinct groups worthy of special consideration. The reasons for denials by majorities or members of the majorities to extend recognition to minorities are of course manifold. They may be economic because the recognition of special minority needs usually invokes additional costs; they may be nationalistic because the majority wants to stress national unity; and they may be political in that people within the majority want to stress categorizations other than those based on ethnicity. At any rate, European ethnic minorities are today involved in struggles for recognition. The problem of recognition has a resemblance with the general problem of well-being in the sense that the fight against discrimination and its hard economic consequences come

first. It seems also reasonable to say that discrimination and exclusion of people from advantages of different kinds tend to lead to the worst forms of need deprivation. Yet, when a certain amount of levelling has occurred or when the minority has roughly the same level of affluence as the majority, the main problem becomes that of recognition. It is self-evident that there are many mixtures of the two problems, and that also members of the same minorities may conceive the priorities differently. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to keep the strivings against discrimination and the strivings for recognition as two analytically separate categories.

It might be argued that the striving for recognition and the quest for categorization will cease as soon as there are no differences in privilege between the majority and minority populations. Under the assumptions that ethnic identities and divisions always presuppose categorizations, and that these are made in order to obtain net advantages, one might wind up with the conclusion that problems of recognition are of lesser importance. Suffice it to say here that man is a historical animal, and that both his personal history and the history of his ethnic group are of utmost importance for his quality of life. Not only are past experiences of the individual himself important for him, but actions and experiences of his group are crucial.

Most specialists of identity formation have emphasized the ethnic and historical elements in identity. In many works, Erik Erikson has underscored the ethnic connotations of the term identity. Identity is related to consistency in one's own conception of self, but it is also always rooted in one's own 'communal culture', in the 'unique history' of one's group, in 'the shared sameness' with others in the group, as some of Erikson's sayings go (Erikson 1968). Anselm Strauss has used the term *collective memories* in order to describe how identities are rooted in the histories of groups, nations, or social classes (Strauss 1969, 167–158). Social psychologists continue to show how a reasonably well structured identity – or a structured set of multiple identities – is a necessary condition for a balanced functioning of the individual, and how this identity is always meshed with both individual and collective memories.

Information about present-day territorial, linguistic minorities in Western Europe clearly indicates that the major concern of many of them is to obtain recognition as distinct ethnic groups. As already indicated, the claims made by the minorities take a variety of forms, such as demands for independence, quests for home rule, suggestions for education in the minority language, etc. There are definitely also territorial groups which are being discriminated against and underprivileged. Yet, many of the

territorial minorities struggle primarily for recognition, and the negative attitude of the majority is mainly displayed as unwillingness to grant them recognition.

6. Some Problems of Language Policy

Today a vast literature exists on language policy, and about policy-making in multilingual and multicultural situations. This literature is often written from a conflict management point of view. Conflict management is part of public budgeting, and it has even been made into a key element in arguments for incremental budgeting. The realization of autonomy demands involves public expenditure, and there are also systematic studies of the costs involved in meeting different demands for autonomy. There seems to be good grounds to assume that advanced, industrial states are usually able to meet the costs for a certain degree of *dédoublement* of administrative agencies, schools, etc. which almost always results from a positive response to autonomy demands (Heisler and Peters 1978, 12–13). In developed economies with a high amount of international trade, public expenditures for minority languages are often apt to give economic returns, but it is usually easier to calculate the expenditures than the benefits of multiculturalism and multilingualism.

The point of view here is not that of conflict management or public budgeting but rather that of the well-being of the minorities. This point of departure does not imply a stand according to which public budgeting or the views of the majority populations are insignificant. The point here is only that even when the well-being of the minorities forms the major social concern or policy goal, very different public policies are needed in various historical situations. In fact, certain measures seem to have almost reverse effects in different situations. The discussion here concerns only those reverse effects. Even if the discussion will leave many ambiguities – a more specific discussion can be pursued only by considering the historically specific conditions within each minority – some very crucial principles of language policy are touched upon.

The point of departure is that the problem of discrimination and the one of recognition are quite distinct and require different kinds of public policies. In the case of discrimination there is a majority or a privileged group performing the categorizations in order either to safeguard their material privileges or to persecute the minority. Sometimes these aims are combined. At any rate, a primary aim of the categorization is *exclusion*. The main performer of the categorization is the majority even if the

minority as part of its defense develops its own criteria for *inclusion* and belonging. In such a situation, the doubling of facilities, schooling, administrative practices so that the discriminated or persecuted minority has separate facilities leads to a maintenance and enhancement of the discrimination. In this situation there is what Michael Hechter has labeled a hierarchical, cultural division of labor (Hechter 1976). Individuals with certain cultural markers such as a specific language, race or national origin, occupy lower ranks or positions in the social structure than individuals with other cultural markers. Separate facilities in a situation of discrimination result in a strengthening of the cultural division of labor. Since the minority or the group with lower rank or position is restricted to its own facilities and areas of competence, its members will not be able to compete for the positions possessed by the privileged majority.

In the United States the official policy in racial matters has since the 1960's and especially since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 been that of integration. The aim was to fight discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and other ascriptive categories (Kilson 1975, 236–266). A successful policy of integration is certainly also apt to eliminate or substantially weaken the existing hierarchical cultural division of labor. In a situation of a cultural division of labor, a policy of integration is often the only possible one. The very goal of all policy efforts on behalf of the nonprivileged group is to eliminate the existence of separate facilities. Yet, with the success of a policy of integration the minority will experience an increase in its need of recognition as an autonomous group. With increasing equality between the earlier very unequal groups, there will arise a need for separate institutions. Psychologically, this is based on the fact that in most populations there exists a clear need for roots and for an ethnic identity.

As stated above, the territorial, linguistic minorities in today's West European societies are mainly asking for recognition. It implies that they are asking for some degree of autonomy, be it then political independence, home-rule, devolution, or separate institutions in the fields of education, health, welfare, and mass communication. The political discussion is often focused on whether such demands possess political credibility. At least part of the problem of credibility consists in an assessment of whether the autonomy granted is likely to lead to a betterment of the living conditions of the minority or not. It is fairly obvious that on this count considerable change has also occurred. Some earlier peripheries are now in a better position than before. Certain forms of autonomy are not likely to hurt them.

In the West European societies, guest workers are generally in a much weaker position than members of the territorial, linguistic minorities. Guest workers occupy clearly the lower ranks and the lower positions in the national occupational social structures. There are differences between groups of different national origin but, for practically all of them, a hierarchical, cultural division of labor prevails (Giner and Salcedo 1978, 96–108). In most European countries with an influx of foreign workers the problem of whether children of foreign origin should get instruction in their own language has been discussed. Partly because the territorial minorities forward this claim for autonomy and separate educational facilities, the new groups of immigrants have followed suit. It can hardly be over-emphasized that the effects of educational policies will depend on the prevailing state of the cultural division of labor. If the cultural division of labor is of a very hierarchical nature with the immigrant workers mainly in low status or low income positions, separate educational facilities with instruction primarily in their own language are likely only to enforce or enhance the existing cultural division of labor. It seems that government policies aiming at improving the welfare of the immigrant workers would have to start with the economic conditions. Many host countries have tried to follow a policy according to which instruction is mainly given in the historical languages of the nation with provisions for additional training of the immigrant children in their own languages.

It goes without saying that no concrete solutions can be presented without a careful study of the particular social conditions in each majority-minority situation. What seems to be clear, however, is that the problems of discrimination and those of recognition call for different kinds of language policies. Under certain conditions a policy successful in one context will have reverse effects in another.

7. Major Types of Linguistic Majority – Minority Relations

The discussion above has been carried out by deliberately focusing on broad conceptions and applying general categories. The major problems facing minorities, the problem of discrimination and the problem of recognition, have been discussed in terms of two theoretical variables, coined by Michael Banton and Michael Hechter, respectively. The first one is the *mode of categorization*, and the second one the *cultural division of labor*.

In order to give a slightly more systematic picture of the kinds of concerns discussed here, the two explanatory variables can be cross-classified in order to obtain a typology of concerns.

As regards the mode of categorization it seems worthwhile to distinguish between three major forms:

(1) categorizations mainly performed by others (usually the majority), (2) both categorizations by others and self-categorizations, and (3) mainly self-categorizations.

Also, as regards the cultural division of labor, three types are distinguished: (1) a hierarchical cultural division of labor, (2) territorial distinctiveness, or a segmented division of labor, and (3) no clear division of labor.

A segmented cultural division of labor usually presupposes that different ethnic and linguistic minorities live in different territories, but the very fact of territorial distinctiveness may itself be considered as a form of segmented cultural division of labor. A cross-tabulation gives a property space presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Types of Majority-Minority Relations

	Categorizations by others dominating	Categorizations by others and self-categorizations matching	Self-categorizations dominating
Hierarchical cultural division of	1. Problems of discrimination	4.	7. Relatively unlikely type of combination
Territorial distinctiveness, or occupational segmentation	2.	5. Greatest likelihood to obtain a spontaneous balance	8.
No cultural division of labor	3. Relatively unlikely type of combination	6.	9. Problems of recognition

It is assumed here that the cells along the main diagonal (cells 1, 5 and 9) represent the major types from a language policy point of view. Where a hierarchical division of labor exists, the majority or the privileged group is the one that performs the categorization (cell 1). If there is no cultural

division of labor, the minority will encounter denials of its distinctiveness and it will, accordingly, experience some difficulties in being accepted as a distinct group (cell 9). The best match between categorizations of others and self-recognition probably occurs in a situation where each group has a distinctive territory, but where the groups are fairly even economically and politically (cell 5).

The cells along the diagonal were indicated to be the most important ones from a language policy point of view. It does not mean that the problems encountered in the situations denoted by these cells can be solved by policies related solely to language, race or other kinds of ethnicity. If there is a hierarchical cultural division of labor, considerable economic inequalities always occur. Policies aiming at eliminating a hierarchical division of labor will have to contain measures directly aimed at reducing economic inequalities also. However, the contention that the cells along the diagonal are the most important from a language policy point of view implies that the problems existing in these situations cannot be remedied without policies directly focusing on ethnicity or language.

Although the cells along the main diagonal are emphasized, most of the other cells roughly describe situations existing in real life. The most unlikely situations are those of cells 3 and 7. Cells 4 and 8 have been fairly typical situations in the history of many minorities. The combination of territorial distinctiveness and self-categorizations dominating (cell 8) is something typical of isolated ethnic groups before they grow dependent of other groups. Thus, cell 8 depicts *a pre-peripheral* situation. Cell 4, on the other hand, denotes a situation of a poor minority, usually a *traditional poor periphery* which is recognized as such both in the centre and the periphery. Such poor peripheries have been abundant in Western Europe, and many of them still exist (Petrella 1977, 7–16). This situation could very well be placed by the side of cells in the main diagonal as one describing some of the crucial political problems of linguistic majorities and minorities. The reason why this was not emphasized above is the fact that the situation in cell 4 clearly calls for regional rather than language policies. It is also obvious that the present economic development in Europe has tended to raise the economic level of several former peripheries. Differences in unemployment and income per capita have been narrowing as regards the centres and peripheries in many countries (Stephens 1976, xxviii), although there are still many instances of regional imbalances (Barzanti 1965, 39–76). The point is, however, that the narrowing of the gaps does not usually eliminate the ethnic or linguistic cleavages and conflicts.

It cannot be overemphasized that the typology presented above is crude and simplifying. The rationale for presenting it lies in the hope that it will sensitize observers to some of the crucial variations in linguistic majority-minority situations.

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