Resumé

In this article we analyze the representation of interest organizations in the Finnish
committee system in the post-war era, especially in the 1960's and 1970'5.
The theoretical point of departure is the concept of corporatization, by which we
mean that interest organizations continually participate in the making of authoritative
decisions in cooperation with public authorities. When trying to ascertain
whether corporatization has taken place in the Finnish committee system
we considered the development of four structural sub-dimensions: (1) different
kinds of arenas for cooperation, (2) legal regulation of interest representation, (3)
extensiveness of interest representation, and (4) concentration of interest representation.
The results show that corporative traits have increased in the Finnish
committee system during the period under consideration. Without investigating
in more detail the role of the representatives of interest organizations
vis-å-vis the output of committees and, further, the role of committees in societal
decision-making processes, we are not able to draw more far-reaching conclusions
about this phenomenon.

The aim of this report is to describe and analyze the participation of interest organizations in political decision-making in the Finnish administrative system since World War 11. It is related to a wider study in which we examine the responsiveness of the Finnish political system in general (Anckar 1977). The project follows a liberal view of democracy, according to which the authoritative allocation of values in a political system must be realized in accordance with the will of the people. The citizens' will comes into play when they elect political leaders through free elections. The political leaders, for their part, make authoritative decisions on behalf of the citizenry.

We assume that if a political system is to function in a responsive way, the transformation process takes place under the control of the elected political leaders. We also assume a party government; the political leaders who make authoritative decisions are selected from among the candidates nominated by political parties. When emphasizing the primacy of party

government we do not imply that other political powers, especially different kinds of interest groups, should take part in the shaping of the popular will in the political system. We stress only that steering in a political system must take place under the control of the representative organs. If the transformation process does not function according to these principles, we consider that it is functioning in an unresponsive way. In seeking to understand the responsiveness of the Finnish political system at the empirical level we have adopted an indirect research strategy. We seek to uncover 'bad conditions' and to make inferences on these foundations. Thus, we analyze unresponsive phenomena that have occurred in the transformation process of the Finnish political system since World War 11.

During the post-war era, the Finnish political system has experienced changes similar to those in other Western European systems (see for example Heisler 1974). This has meant that the focus of power has moved from the legislature to the government and also beyond it: the power and the duties of the bureaucracy have grown in the movement towards the welfare state. Thus, it has become more important to analyze 'bad conditions' in the domain of public administration preventing the responsive functioning of the political system.

In evaluating developments in Finnish public administration, researchers have paid attention to some general trends considered undesirable from the viewpoint of democratic transformation. Bureaucratization, technocratization, and corporatization have been regarded as such features (see Djupsund and Ståhlberg 1978; Ståhlberg 1976b:44-82; Heiskanen and Sinkkonen 1974). In this report we try to shed light on one of those trends, namely corporatization. By corporatization we mean that interest organizations continually participate in the authoritative allocation of values by being in direct contact with the public authorites. (About different kinds of definitions concerning 'corporatism', 'liberal corporatism', and 'corporate pluralism', see Schmitter 1974; Lembruch 1977; Kvavik 1976:19-28; Helander 1979). Contact takes place through a system or mechanism that gives access to decision-making arenas.

The Finnish political system offers several arenas and mechanisms through which interest organizations can take part in making authoritative decisions on cooperation with the public authorities. One such arena has been the line organizations of public administration. In some central offices new kinds of steering organs have been established. Some of these, called extended collegia, are, according to statutes, occupied by representatives of interest organizations. Another important means of linking organizations and public administration is the custom of public authorities

to request the opinions of an organization about matters under preparation. This kind of 'remiss' is usually taken into consideration when a committee makes its report. The so-called indirect state administration can also be regarded as a corporate arena in Finnish public administration. In this case the state has authorized an association to deal with a task of a public nature, either by giving it economic support or by regulating the activities of the association, or both. By far the most important arena for continuous cooperation between the public authorities and interest organizations, however, is the committee system. In this report we shall analyze if corporatization has occurred in the Finnish committee system after World War 11.

Here we focus mostly on the structural dimension of corporatization. We shall analyze the development of the structure of the Finnish committee system from four perspectives. The first is to look at the quantity and quality of different kinds of arenas the committee system has opened for interest organizations. From the viewpoint of interest associations, all committees are not equally valuable as arenas for contacts with other kinds of elites. Generally speaking, permanent committees are better for continuous contacts than ad hoc committees. Concerning this variable, we may simply infer that the more numerous and more permanent the units of the committee system, the greater the opportunities it offers for corporative contacts of interest organizations.

The second aspect of evaluation is associated with the fact that some of the mandates of the permanent statutory committees have been prescribed in the statutes by which they were established. At this point we can say that the more precisely regulated the representation of interest organizations in the establishing statutes of the permanent committees, the more corporative the committee system.

The third aspect of corporatization concerns the comprehensiveness of interest representation in the committee system. The extent of interest representation can be evaluated by two quantitative variables. First, we can examine the proportion of committees that have included interest organization representation at different points in time. Second, we can determine what portion of the committee mandates have been occupied by interest group representatives. As to the comprehensiveness of interest representation as a whole, we can infer that the more mandates the interest organizations have had and the larger the number of committees with interest representation, the more corporative the committee system has been.

The fourth aspect for evaluating the degree of corporatization of the

committee system is the concentration dimension. As an empirical measure of concentration we have taken the number of different interest organizations having access to the committees. Thus we can suggest that the smaller the number of interest associations occupying the organization mandates of the committees, the more corporative the committee system is.

To be able to draw comprehensive conclusions about the corporatization of the Finnish committee system, we ought to treat all the above mentioned aspects simultaneously. In this connection, however, we are only in a position to draw conclusions about these aspects separately. Therefore it is possible to make inferences about the corporatization of the Finnish committee system only according to the principle of ceteris paribus.

1. The Material of the Study

The Finnish committee system consists of agencies with different names: committee, commission, board, council, and delegation. Of these the first two, committee and commission, are of a temporary nature, while the last three, board, council, and delegation, are permanent.

According to a State Council decision concerning committees, the main difference between commissions and committees has to do with the appointing official and the task of the agency. By committee we mean an organ set up by the government. A commission, by contrast, is established by a decision of a ministry. Thus, committees execute inter-ministerial tasks, whereas a commission functions inside a ministry. Unlike the ad hoc organs, there are no differences in principle among the three permanent types of committees.

It should also be noted that there is an important difference in the way permanent committees are established. On one hand we have committees established by statue; on the other, there are committees established by decisions of the State Council. The first type of committee, called permanent statutory committees, may be established through either a law, decree, and/or a decision made by the State Council. Thus, the establishment of a new statutory committee takes place in two phases. First there must be a statute containing rules concerning the establishment of a committee. In the second phase, the State Council appoints the members and functionaries of the agency. As to other permanent committees, their establishment presupposes only the last-mentioned phase. The division into ad hoc and permanent committees is of great importance. Seen from

the administrative standpoint the former constitute project groups intended to perform a certain task, while the latter are rather like customary staff organs of administration, continually attending to some part of public administration.

In this report we shall analyze the main types of committees on the basis of several kinds of data. The empirical material on the permanent committees is mainly based on a data-system called the Committee Card Index, maintained by the Ministry of Finance. Because this Committee Card Index was established only in 1958, it has been very difficult to obtain data on the permanent committees before the 1960'5. For this reason we have concentrated upon the structure of these committees after 1958. Another restriction in the material on permanent committees is that it contains only information pertaining to agencies based on a statute of some kind.

The data on ad hoc committees are based mainly on the reports they have published. For a variety of reasons, not all have made reports. First, not all ad hoc committees were assigned the task of preparing a report. Also, a committee may not have made a report because, for example, it was established in order to 'bury' an unpleasant problem. (In this way the politicians gained time to remove the problem from the agenda). Third, it sometimes happens that a committee has interrupted its work without having been able to make a report.

For both the permanent and the ad hoc committees we have used
cross-sectional data for the years 1965 and 1975. In addition, we have used
cross-sectional data from 1945 and 1955 for ad hoc committees.

2. Main trends in the Finnish Committee System as Cooperation Arenas

The main trends in arena-building for the interest groups in the committee system are examined here. In other words, we try to evaluate developments in the committee system from the point of view of continuous cooperation between public authorities and interest organizations. Two main tendencies can be seen in the development of the Finnish committee system after World War 11. The first is expansion, the second stabilization. By expansion we simply mean that the number of committees has increased, thus forming more arenas of interaction. By stabilization we refer to the fact that the arenas have become more permanent. (For more on general tendencies in the Finnish committee system, see Suomen Komitealaitos 1976 and Ståhlberg 1976a).

If we look at the development of the number of committees, we can, generally speaking, note a growth during the post-war era. This has not taken place in a linear manner, however. Despite the fact that the number of these agencies began to increase as early as the war, the rate of the growth was quite slow during the first decade after the war. The most conspicuous growth took place during the first half of the 1960'5. Between the mid-1960's and the mid-1970's the number of committees increased slowly. Thereafter it actually began to decrease somewhat (Table 1). When trying to find causes for the growth in the number of committees and especially the explosive growth during the 1960'5, we can point to some general factors. First, there was the need for expert knowledge for planning and preparing decisions in a welfare society. In this connection, setting up a committee has often been a cheap and flexible means for solving special problems.

Second, general tendencies can be seen in 'administrative ideology', which have presupposed closer contact between the bureaucracy and its clients. In other words, administration must be more open in its relations to the public. The technical aspects of administration have also been relevant: as the public bureaucracy has become increasingly differentiated, there has also appeared a greater need to coordinate the functions between different units. Committees have often been suitable for this task.

But these factors are not sufficient to explain why the number of the committees grew so rapidly just before the 1960'5. One possible explanatory factor may be found in the bureaucracy itself. The line structure was inadequate for planning necessary changes in the public sector. The most flexible means for meeting this need for planning societal changes was to set up committees.

Planning needs seem to apply especially to those sectors of bureaucracy
that are most closely connected to the idea of a welfare state. In the

Finnish committee system this tendency has appeared above all as a need to expand the social and cultural sectors. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Affairs, in particular, contributed to the increase of committees during the 1960's (Table 2).

Perhaps as important a structural factor as the growth in the number of committees has been the development in the committee system itself of what we called stabilization. By stabilization we mean the shifting of emphasis from ad hoc to more permanent types of committees. This tendency has appeared in two forms. First, the share of the permanent agencies, boards, councils, and delegations has grown at the expense of ad hoc committees and commissions. Second, stabilization has taken place among the permanent committees; while earlier these were mostly set up through a decision of the State Council, lately they have been established mostly by a statute of some sort. The second type of agency is more stable than the first, because their discontinuance presupposes a repeal of the statute through which they came into being. Thus, especially in the case of committees set up by law, a decision of the parliament would have to be repealed, while the termination of a permanent committee set up by a decision of the State Council can be brought about simply by the failure of the government to appoint new members to it.

Though some permanent committees were established before World

War 11, their number was quite low compared with ad hoc committees. This continued to be the case up to the 1960'5. Until the mid-1950's the share of permanent committees remained approximately one tenth of all committees. It was only in the first half of the 1960's that the number of permanent committees began to grow rapidly. At first the growth was concentrated among agencies set up by decisions of the State Council. Later, the committees were established by statute. At the same time that the number of permanent committees increased, the number of ad hoc committees began to stabilize or even decrease. Thus, the emphasis has, in the 1970'5, shifted more and more to the permanent committees.

The main reason for the stabilization tendency seems to be found in the public bureaucracy itself. There has been a need to establish administrative units for taking care of new tasks. The creation of permanent committees has proved a flexible way of establishing new administrative units. Through permanent committees it has also been possible to make use of the outside experience interest organizations are able to bring to the bureaucracy. Not infrequently, agencies originally of a staff nature have been converted into a stable part of the bureaucracy.

One possible reason for the decrease in the number of ad hoc committees during the 1970s may also be found inside the bureaucracy. Especially since the beginning of the 19705, committees have been replaced by other types of ad hoc staff units, called project groups of officials. These groups have been used as planning and preparatory bodies, to perform the same kinds of tasks as the ad hoc committees. An indication of this trend is the fact that the number of ad hoc committees has decreased at the same rate as the number of project groups of officials has increased in some areas of public administration.

3. The Regulation of Interest Representation in the Permanent Committees

The stabilization of the committee system has had direct effects on the representation of interests in the committees. When a committee is established by statute, the same law or a statute of lower degree customarily contains provisions for its composition.

The degree of regulation varies greatly. Sometimes, only a provision that the organ under consideration must include 'special expertise in the field' is included in the statute. But the statutes may also be much more specific. It has been quite usual to prescribe that a committee must include representatives of the interest organizations in a certain subject area. This

kind of clause may in some cases include an order to take representatives from a certain organization, without, however, directly mentioning the name of this organization. For instance the law may include a clause - when appointing members to the agency in question - that 'the most representative organizations of the labour market' must be represented. Thus, it would be impossible to leave out the Confederation of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) and the Confederation of Finnish Employers (STK). In some cases the organizations to be represented have been mentioned explicitly; this is, however, relatively uncommon (see Table 3).

From the viewpoint of corporatization, it is symptomatic that the share of committees about which there is an explicit statutory clause of organizational representation has increased in the 1960s and 19705. It is important to note that the committees for which organizational representation has been prescribed have had important societal tasks to perform. Partly for this reason, they have also shown great stability. Thus, the share and importance of these types of permanent committees have grown continuously.

The statutory references concerning different kinds of organizations have changed somewhat from 1965 to 1975. The most visible feature in this development has been the clear increase of references concerning labour market organizations. This development seems to be an indirect or direct consequence of the incomes policy system.

4. The Extensiveness of Interest Representation in the Committee System

As noted above we can distinguish two main factors in the extent of organizational representation which are to be operationalized. First, we can count the number of agencies through which it has been possible for interest groups to take part in committee work. Toward this end we shall calculate the number of committees with representatives from interest organizations. Second, we can also show the strength of such representation by looking at the share of the committee members from interest organizations.

If we look at the development of interest representation in different kinds of committees we can see that the permanent organs have been more open than the ad hoc committees. This has been the case in general, but it holds true especially for the 1970'5. And the fact that at the same time the share of the permanent committees has increased means that the committee system as a whole has opened channels for interest associations much more during the 1970's than previously.

The differences between various kinds of committees in terms of interest representation can be explained mainly by the different functions the committees have fulfilled. The ad hoc committees have mainly had tasks of scrutiny and technical character. This is especially so for the commission type of ad hoc committees; the representation of interest associations is lowest in commissions dealing with problems without extensive social importance (Ståhlberg 1976a). On the other hand, the permanent committees nearly always perform functions with far-reaching social significance. These kinds of committee often fulfil functions that

presuppose extensive coordination of public and private activities. It is only natural that they be composed of representatives both from administrative units and interest organizations. At the same time that interest organizations have gained representation on more and more committees, their share of committee mandates has also increased. This has been the case with regard to both ad hoc and permanent committees (Table 4).

The increase in interest representation in ad hoc committees may be explained by the functional changes these committees underwent during the decade under examination. More and more, they have acquired the character of coordinating bodies, while at the same time a new kind of ad hoc group, the project groups of officials, have replaced many of the investigative commissions. The growth of interest representation in the permanent committees is at least partly due to the central role played by interest organizations in Finnish society. The status of interest associations in power relationships in the Finnish polity has especially strengthened the roles of the central economic interest organizations in the incomes policy system.

Regarding the share of other participant groups in the committee system, we can note that the increase of interest organization representation has taken place chiefly at the expense of bureaucrats (Ståhlberg 1976a). This is so especially for administrators at the central level. By contrast, the share of local administration has increased in the same period. The share of politicians has varied over time. Politicians were important participants in the ad hoc committees which reported just after the war. There were even some committees which consisted only of politicians - primarily of parliamentarians. Subsequently, the politicians' share of power seems to have declined considerably. By the middle of the 1950'_5, a politician on the committees was an exception.

Especially since the lS>6o's, the share of politicians has begun to increase on both types of committees. A new kind of committee, the parliamentary committee, has in fact become common. In addition to the 'pure' parliamentary committees, there are mixed committees on which all positions are filled with members from the bureaucracy, complemented by representatives from interest organizations and parties. In these cases the party representatives usually serve as a complementary element, balancing the political composition of the committee or giving the parliamentary level better possibilities to steer the preparatory activities of the committee (Table 5). In addition to membership, it has also been possible for the organizations to gain other kinds of contacts with a committee. This has usually taken place through committee secretaries and/or experts.

The position of secretary is very important in Finnish committee practice. Usually it is the secretary that collects material and prepares drafts of committee reports, making his work or that of the secretariat important for the contents of the committee report. The share of ad hoc committees with a secretary or secretaries from interest associations has been around or over ten per cent in the post-war era. The significance of this channel has declined rather than grown as the number of secretaries per committee has increased; for secretaries from interest associations usually constitute only a part of the secretariat, which is composed mainly of bureaucrats. Nearly all the secretaries of the permanent committees have come from the central bureaucracy or from universities throughout the period. Thus the influence of the associations seems to have become less in the 1970's than it had been earlier.

One contact channel for interest groups has been opened by the use of occasional or permanent experts on the committees. The status of expert has varied somewhat. It is quite usual, however, that a permanent expert has the rights and duties of ordinary members. The expert function has only been meaningful for the organizations in the ad hoc committees (Table 6). In these types of committees, the use of experts has increased continuously, thus simultaneously extending the possibilities for organizations to maintain contacts with other elite groups. Some permanent committees also have consulted experts; this has, however, been the case

only in about ten delegations. A practice perhaps more meaningful for interest associations than using outside expertise has been the division of permanent committees into subsection. It is usual that outside participants are invited to join the work of a subsection. Thus, the permanent committees recruit more representatives from organizations than was originally intended.

When evaluating interest representation in the committee system as a whole we must keep in mind that we have in this study omitted the permanent committees based on single decisions of the State Council. One cross-sectional analysis for 1975 shows that interest organizations have been somewhat less represented on this type of permanent committee than on statutory permanent committees (Helander 1978). Thus, the first type of committee is situated somewhere between the permanent statutory and the ad hoc committees.

5. The Concentration of Interest Representation

When trying to answer the question whether there has been a concentration of interest representation among a small number of interest organizations of large size, the role of labour market organizations and others central to economic life has been the primary focus. From the figures in Table 7 we can see that labour market organizations have gained representation on more and more statutory committees. As to the share of different kinds of labour market organizations, there are clear differences to be found between them. The organizations of salaried employees have representatives on the ad hoc committees, while both the organizations of

manual workers and employers have gained a stronger foothold on the
permanent committees.

One evident cause for the strengthening of the representation of the organizations of salaried employees in the ad hoc committees may be their greater social status, especially in the 1970'5. Another and more evident reason, however, may be the fact that the problems of the salaried employees have become - as a consequence of the incomes policy system - more acute. (About similar developments in the Danish committee system, see Johansen and Kristensen 1978).

The increase of the representation share of the organizations of manual workers and employers can be directly associated with the incomes policy system. Especially the 'giants' of the labour market, the SAK and the STK, have come to be represented on these committees. Only since the middle of the 1970's have the other participants in the incomes policy system - on the one hand, the confederations of the salaried employees and officials, on the other the employers of the public sector and business - strengthened their positions in these agencies (Helander 1979).

From the viewpoint of corporatization, it is interesting to note that the representation of the labour union movement and employers has to a considerable degree been concentrated in the same agencies. Thus, if the labour unions, more and more often represented by the information technologists of the SAK, have become represented in an agency, it is probable that representatives of employers' organizations (mainly represented

by the officials of the STK) have received membership in the same agencies. If, in addition, we take into account the fact that these agencies are mainly staffed by the representatives of organizations, it is all the more justified to speak of the strengthening of parity in the representation of the leading interest organizations in the committee system.

Another feature to be noted in the interest representation of labour market organizations in the widening of their interest areas. The representation of these organizations was formerly limited only to the sectors of economic and social policy, but since the late 1960's it has also begun to encompass areas of cultural policy. An indication of this is the fact that the representation share of these organizations has grown markedly also in the committees of the Ministry of Education (see also Suomen Komitealaitos 1976:81).

In addition to labour market organizations, the representation of organizations from some other fields has also grown. The organizations of the municipal communities have especially increased their representation in the committee system since the 1950'5. This kind of development has been natural from the viewpoint that the duties of local authorities as implementors of public decisions have been steadily increased.

The representation share of industry and trade organizations on the permanent committees has declined during the period under investigation. This decrease can be explained at least partly by developments in the committee system. At the same time as the number of committees has increased, the number and proportion of committees performing local or other tasks of limited concern has also increased. Because business organizations have representatives mainly on important committees functioning at the national level, the decrease in their share in the committee system as a whole has not necessarily marked a decrease in their influence.

Although there are clear signs of the concentration of committee representation in the hands of some large interest organizations, we must not draw far-reaching conclusions from this. Many important committees also include representatives from associations from specific problem areas. This is so especially on the ad hoc committees. Often the representatives of so-called 'one-cause-associations', including both small economic organizations and cultural and nonmaterial associations, have taken part as experts in preparing committee work. But it cannot be denied that the shift from preparatory and analytic ad hoc committees to permanent coordinating and advisory bodies has strengthened the position of large economic organizations as clients and 'interessents' of the bureaucracy.

6. Conclusion

We have assessed the development of interest representation in the Finnish public administration by analyzing it from the point of view of some sub-dimensions of corporatization. We have been able to analyze this development primarily for the peak of the Finnish committee system, the 1960's and 1970'5. The empirical analysis has touched on several aspects of corporatization. First, the arenas available for interest representation have increased and above all have become more permanent, enabling continuous interaction among different kinds of elites. Second, certain organizations or associations concerned with specific subject areas have gained a legitimate and legal status in the committee system. Third, the use of representatives of interest organizations has increased both with regard to the extent and the strength of the interest representation, principally in the most permanent part of the committee system. Fourth, interest representation has been concentrated - especially in the permanent committees - largely in the hands of the large economic organizations.

In addition to the development in the committee system we must take into account the trends pertaining to developments in other parts of the Finnish organization structure and governing mechanism. As to the organization structure, there have been signs of a concentration of power in large organizations; the founding of new top organizations of industry and business has been a conspicuous phenomenon in the Finnish interest organization structure, in addition to the development that has taken place in the area of the labour market (see Heiskanen 1977).

The most notable pattern of change in the governing structures has been induced by the development and continuity of the incomes policy system. With the assistance of the incomes policy mechanism, the top organizations of the labour market and of commercial and industrial life have had opportunities to influence major national decisions. Through this mechanism, the participating interest organizations have been able to influence decisively a large portion of legislation (Myllymäki 1979). Naturally, this development has made it easier for the interest organizations also to gain a foothold in the domain of public administration.

As to interest group influence through the committee system, we must keep in mind that the representatives of organizations are usually able to take part in authoritative decision-making only indirectly. Therefore, the structural factors analyzed in this connection have not uncovered the actual influence the organizations have had oh the authoritative allocation of values in which the committee system takes part. In order to draw more

comprehensive conclusions about this, we should have analyzed also the functions of committee work and its effects on the final results of decisionmaking. In the light of the developments that have taken place in the Finnish committee system in the post-war era, it seems that interest organizations have become a more important element in the authoritative decision-making processes. This does not, however, necessarily mean that parliamentary authorities have lost their steering powers in this part of the decision-making system.

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