Resumé

The article analyses survey datei on the role played by the issue of European integration
in the Danish Common Market referendum 1972. Despite a 2:1 vote in favor of membership,
support for supranational European integration was low; in fact, integration as
an issue was considerably more salient to opponents of membership than supporters
who tended to vote mainly for tangible, i.e. economic reasons. As many as one-fourth of
the sample voted for membership though being highly anti-integrationist, either because
of disbelief in the dynamics of integration, because of the higher saliency of tangible
benefits, or because of identification with strongly pro-market parties.

1. Introduction

The most characteristic feature of the Danish Common Market debate prior to the national referendum of 1972 was probably the extraordinary proliferation of values invoked by its participants to lend credence to and increase the persuasive power of their arguments for or against Denmark's membership. National and sectional, political and cultural, economic and social values were pictured as being respectively enhanced or jeopardized in the case of membership, depending, of course, on the particular market policy stand of the individual protagonist.

The actual role of this host of values in determining the final outcome of the referendum is therefore an important question. What values were instrumental in convincing the majority of voters of the merits of membership, and which motivations lay behind the votes of the minority of EC opponents? Specifically, we shall here discuss the role of attitudes towards European integration, i.e. those interactions between the EC countries whose scope goes beyond traditional intergovernmental cooperation. While most effects of membership were uncertain at the time of the

referendum, one consequence of Denmark's membership was certain: her need to adjust to the existing political regime in the European Communities. Acceptance of the Treaty of Rome and the extent of existing integration within the Communities was the sine qua non of membership. But the voters had also to consider potential future developments in integration, among them the possibility of a realization of the federalist programme of the 19505, i.e. the creation of a United States of Europe. After the Hague summit of December 1969 which revived the European debate and subsequently led to the formulation of such proposals as the economic and monetary union and the European political union, federalism did not seem quite as dead as it had during the de Gaulle era.

But other and more mundane considerations were equally relevant in the decision. For all the political overtones in the debate it should not be forgotten that the European Communities were essentially and primarily an economic association; and that Denmark had originally applied for membership almost entirely on economic grounds. To analyse the impact of the question of European integration we therefore have to see it in the context of the total array of issues that entered the Danish Common Market debate. What we need, then, is a comprehensive typology of relevant values. Integration and national soverignty were not the only political issues at stake. Security policy questions, perceived economic outcomes, ideological preferences and national sentiments were engaged as well.

2. A Typology of Values Relating to the EC

The most elaborate typology in the field of European attitudes is undoubtedly the one proposed by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) to measure public support for the European Community. Their typology rests on two main dimensions, level of interaction and basis of response. The first dimension refers to the object of support, whether it be the peoples of the community (identitive support) or the system itself (systemic support, itself further subdivided into support for 'community" and support for 'regime'). The 'basis of response' dimension distinguishes between two different sources of support, utilitarian and affective:

'The second pair, utilitarian and affective, permits distinctions between support based on some perceived and relatively concrete interest (utilitarian) and support which seems to indicate a diffuse and perhaps emotional response to some of the vague ideals embodied in the notion of European unity (affective)' (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970:40).

While we do not deny the theoretical value and the empirical justification of this distinction, its utility for empirical research purposes seems doubtful at best as it is presently formulated. The definitions offered, especially of the concept of affective support, are so vague and woolly ('support which seems to indicate a diffuse and perhaps emotional response to some of the vague ideals . . .', emphasis added) as to make them practically nonoperational (see Shepherd 1975:67). And in fact Lindberg and Scheingold hardly use the category of affective support as more than a residual category for support that cannot be interpreted as utilitarian; as they state themselves: '(t)he available data require a rather restricted definition of affect which essentially boils down to trying to figure out whether support for Community extended beyond, or was at all independent of, expected payoffs' (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970:58). The operationalization of utilitarian support seems also to be rather problematic. For instance, what is a 'relatively concrete interest'?

We do not reject the idea that 'basis of support' (which is essentially a psychological dimension) may be a theoretically fruitful concept in the study of European attitudes and of foreign policy attitudes generally, but it should be more firmly based on attitude theory. One possible point of departure is the so-called functional approach to the study of attitudes developed originally by Smith et al. (1956), especially in the form given to it by Daniel Katz (1960). Katz's and Kelman's application of the theory to the study of nationalism (Katz et al. 1964; DeLamater et al. 1969, Katz et al. 1969, Kelman 1969) suggests that this approach is equally applicable to the study of people's attachment to political objects other than the national state, such as the EC and other extra-national political institutions or actors.¹

Here, we shall follow a different line by adopting a concept suggested by Rosenau (1966), namely the concept of tangibility, which relates to the character or content of the value engaged, rather than the manner of engagement. According to Rosenau all political issues can be classified into four 'issue-areas', according to the tangibility of the values (or ends) involved and of the means used to realize these values. In brief, the status issue area is dominated by such ends as power, influence, status, sovereignty, while the territorial issue-area is concerned with land and territory. The human resources area concerns the enhancement of such values as education and human well-being, while the non-human resources area is about physical infra-structure (roads, buildings etc.). Tangible values (ends) are therefore involved in the territorial and the non-human resources areas, while non-tangible values dominate issues belonging to the

status and the human resources areas. Tangible means dominate the
human and non-human resources areas, while the use of intangible means
are characteristic of the status and territorial areas.

Rosenau suggests a very simple (perhaps too simple) operationalization procedure for tangibility, namely whether the ends and means involved can be photographed. Tangible values are those that can be photographed, while intangible ends cannot. Money (and most things money can buy) and land can be readily photographed and therefore fall into the category of tangible ends/means, while equally coveted ends and means like influence, national independence, or international understanding belong to the unphotographable part of reality.

For the sake of economy we propose to simplify Rosenau's typology by applying only his distinction between intangible and tangible ends (values); thus we distinguish only between intangible values (mostly status area values) and tangible values (mostly of the non-human resources variety). This simplification seems justified in the present context. First, issues pertaining to the human resources area seem primarily to belong to the domestic rather than foreign policy arena.² Secondly, the territorial area was only marginally engaged in the EC debate, compared to all the status and non-human resources values. And thirdly, this simplification allows us to sidestep the classic problem of distinguishing between ends and means, which, incidentally, Rosenau fails to confront in his presentation of the typology.

In accordance with Brewer's (1973) finding that any given issue is likely to engage multiple ends, we shall make a further relaxation of Rosenau's model by allowing for the possibility that a given issue, in casu Denmark's relationship with the EC, can be viewed by different policy-makers as belonging to different issue-areas. In the EC case, there were those who viewed the issue as essentially a case of allocation of tangible values (agricultural exports, trade balances, etc.), while others saw it as concerning primarily intangible values (sovereignty, international solidarity, etc.). Or, to use Rosenau's terminology, some groups tended to view the EC issue as belonging to the non-human resources area, while others saw it as a status area issue. And, it can be surmised, this very disagreement on the basic 'coding' of the issue was very likely a factor in increasing the heat of the debate. Among intangible values one aspect stood out very clearly: the issue of integration. We shall therefore consider this a separate subcategory.

Another important dimension of the Danish debate was the time horizon
of the discussed effects of membership. Membership for Denmark meant

her accession to an already established system which (even if a 5-year transition period was foreseen) would require several short-term adaptations of policies, policy-making processes, etc. One point of argument was therefore what values would be effected, and in what way, by the very act of entering the Communities. A different issue was the long-term effects of membership on Danish values, taking into consideration likely lines of development in the EC. As Shepherd (1975: 101-02) points out, support or acceptance of the existing level of integration is not necessarily linked with support for or acceptance of further integration. We can now outline the typology to be used in the following to distinguish between different types of attitudes towards the issue of Denmark's membership in the EC, cf. Fig. 1. The analysis will concentrate on attitudes towards integration, including their prevalence in the Danish population and their role in determining the outcome of the Common Market referendum.

3. The Level of Public Support for European Integration

In this section we shall discuss the distribution of attitudes towards European
integration, both in absolute terms and relative to the distribution of

similar attitudes in the 'old' EC-countries. The data are derived from the Danish EC referendum survey whose design and contents have been described in greater detail in Elklit et al. (1947a: 7-13).³ To measure attitudes towards the long-term and short-term aspects of European integration, two indices were created - the Federalism index and the Anti-Integration index, respectively. The Federalism index relates to the central features of the so-called federalist model of Europe: the creation of a United States of Europe complete with a federal president, a federal government, and a common directly elected European parliament. Four items tapping these aspects were originally adopted from the 1970 six-nation survey sponsored by the EC Information Service under the directorship of J.-R. Rabier: the same four items have also been used by Inglehart (1970:256) in his survey of British attitudes towards European integration. One of these - referring to the election of a common European president - was dropped later,⁴ while the remaining three items were used to construct the Federalism index (for the exact wording of these items, see Appendix). In accordance with the procedure used by Inglehart (1970:257) positive responses were coded 2; 'don't know' responses were assigned the value 1 (except for respondents with three such responses, who were placed in a special non-response category); and negative responses were coded zero. The index thus ranges from zero (completely negative) to six (completely in favour). To increase readability, only four categories are used in the following tables: low (values 0-2), neutral (3), high (4-6), and DK (consistent non-response).

The second variable, Anti-Integration, was designed to tap attitudes towards the short-term aspects of Denmark's potential encounter with the theory and practice of European integration. It is constructed on the basis of two Likert-type attitude items (for wording, see Appendix) which focus on the immediate implications of EC membership for national independence and self-determination, and both of which featured prominently in the debate as arguments against membership. It could perhaps be argued that the two items do not tap attitudes towards integration as such, but rather beliefs about the effects of membership which might be more or less independent of one's liking for integration or for the preservation of national sovereignty. However, in the context of the public debate of the time, both items are clearly identifiable as expression of anti-integrationist attitudes, not just as dispassionate statements of belief. Consequently we feel confident in treating them as such despite their format. We cannot, of course, treat negative responses to these items as indicators of positive support for integration - only as rejection of the anti-integrationist posi -

tion. Therefore, the index can only be interpreted as measuring antiintegration.

The two indices cluster reasonably well, at least as political attitudes go. The mean inter-item correlation coefficient (Spearman's r_s) is .42 for the Federalism⁵ and .54 for the Anti-Integration index. That the two indices tap different, though obviously related attitudes, is suggested by a mean inter-item correlation of-.23 between the two indices, and an inter-index correlation coefficient of -.26.

While our sample voted for Denmark's membership in the EC by a margin of 63 per cent for and 30 per cent against (a ratio slightly more positive to the EC than the national average), it was markedly cool in its attitudes towards Federalism. Table 1 presents distributions for the three 'federalist' items (plus another measure derived from Rabier and Inglehart) from the two interviewing rounds in April and October 1972 as well as from later surveys conducted by the European Communities. It shows

that at the time of the referendum there was a 'pro-European' majority on only one item, the question of direct elections to the European Parliament. Negative responses outweighed positive ones by a 2:1 margin on the question of creating a European government with power over the Danish Parliament. That these findings are not accidental is suggested by the findings of the European surveys between 1973 and 1976 which show that if there has been any change in the Danes' attitudes towards Federalism, it has rather been in a negative direction. Table 1 seems to show conclusively that the Danish population was and still is highly sceptical of a further development of European integration, and, moreover, that it differs significantly in this respect from the populations of the EC as a whole (and particularly of the old member-states) who are very much in favour of a European political union as well as of a popularly elected Parliament. To complicate matters further we note that when it comes to willingness to make personal sacrifices in order to achieve European unity, Danes are exactly as willing or rather as unwilling as their compatriots among the 'Six'.

The explanation of these differences is undoubtedly a very complex one. For historical reasons the saliency of federalist ideas has been and still is much lower in Denmark than in the old EC countries. During the heyday of European federalism in the 1950s Denmark kept aloof from Continental entanglements, and the Danish public hardly participated in the heated discussions of the time about ends and means of supranational European cooperation. And from about the time when Danish politicians decided to apply for membership (1961) until the tortuous negotiations with the EC were in their final stages, public attention was mainly focused on the question of whether the attempt of membership would succeed or not and on the more immediate problems of adaptation to the EC system in case of membership. Therefore, the question about directions and models for the future development of the EC remained a very academic one until the 1971 breakthrough in the membership negotiations. Low saliency of a notion is usually conducive to its rejection - and this to a large degree became the fate of federalism in the referendum campaign. This tendency was further reinforced by the main tenor of the EC opponents' campaign.

In view of the initial lack of saliency of federalist ideas it was natural for opponents to concentrate their propaganda on the negative effects of membership on Danish sovereignty and selfdetermination. In their view, membership would not only subject Denmark to the considerable degree of supra-nationalism already achieved in the EC: still worse, the level of integration was seen as bound to rise steadily, even exponentially, according

to the 'laws' of integration. As a result Denmark would be progressively stripped of control over her own economic, social, and ultimately political destiny. The opponents also focused on other intangible politicalideological values such as socialism and Nordism; on the other hand they rarely referred to tangible values, and, if so, to long-term rather than short-term values.

Supporters of membership tended to play down such intangible issues as sovereignty, and concentrated instead on the tangible economic benefits which in their view membership would entail. Only a few supporters rejected the goal of a United States of Europe outright, but even fewer went beyond a vague and uncommitted endorsement of it. Another characteristic difference between opponents and supporters lay in their evaluation of the existing level and potential dynamics of integration in the EC. As indicated above the opponents were much more in 'agreement' with the integration theories of, say, Jean Monnet or Ernest B. Haas, than the supporters who tended to minimize the degree of integration already achieved in the EC and especially its potential future dynamics. We can therefore surmise that during those few months in which the perspectives of European integration suddenly became salient to the Danish public, attitudes towards it tended to be negatively rather than positively reinforced. Thus we have the curious phenomenon that while most attitudes were changed in a pro-EC direction during the campaign,₆ attitudes towards federalism changed very little, and if anything, in a negative direction.

In contrast to the Danish public, the publics in the old EC member-states have been exposed to and have become familiarized with federalist ideology since the early fifties without the cross-pressure influence of an effective counter-ideology. This would seem to explain the very high degree of support for federalism. On the other hand, this support does not go so deep that people in the old EC are willing to sacrifice much more on the altar of federalism than the Danish public. Could it therefore be that the old federalist ideology has become a set of abstract goals and hallowed principles to which everyoiiie is supposed to pay due respect, but to which only a few believers feel a more than superficial commitment? This of course is not to gloss over the very significant differences in attitudes towards the EC which have been found, only to caution against exaggerating the degree of support for federalist ideas in the old EC countries when it comes into conflict with more tangible economic values.

Table 2 shows breakdowns of attitudes towards the two items in the
Anti-Integration index. Expectations that membership in the Common
Market could entail considerable curtailments of Danish sovereignty were

very widespread, though still in a minority. More remarkable is the fact that in contrast to the items in the Federalism index, there is a minor increase in the level of rejection of the anti-integrationist position during the campaign. The pro-integrationist position increased by 10 and 11 percentage points, mainly by the recruitment of those who were undecided at the beginning of the campaign, while the anti-integration position became a few percentage points less popular. This in itself is an indication of the higher saliency of these items, which of course is related to their direct connection with the membership issue and its potential effects on Danish society.

4. Attitudes to European Integration and the Referendum Vote

We shall now analyse the actual impact of attitudes on federalism and integration on the outcome of the referendum. To what extent were the voters motivated by such attitudes - positive or negative - when they cast their vote? As mentioned above, the EC issue tended to be viewed in different contexts by different members of the political elite. We therefore simply asked our respondents for their main reason for voting the way they did, in the expectation that we would find about the same divisions among the mass public as among the elite. More specifically, we expected to find a greater frequency of references to tangible values among EC supporters than among opponents, and a comparable overselection of intangible arguments among opponents.

Table 3 shows responses of yes- and no-voters when asked for the main reason for their voting. Several significant differences between the two groups are immediately apparent. For one thing, supporters of membership were less issue-specific than opponents, i.e. more prone to give very

broad and general reasons for their vote. Secondly, they were considerably more prone to refer to tangible values (rows 2 and 3) than opponents were. Thirdly, issues related to European integration were much more salient to opponents than to supporters: nearly one-third of the opponents referred to issues like sovereignty, selfdetermination, or independence, while only 6 per cent of the supporters mentioned arguments which could be unmistakably coded as indicating support for European integration as such (row 4) - or 12 per cent, if we include a wider and vaguer category of responses indicating support for international cooperation in general. A final salient characteristic of the responses is that opponents of EC membership were much more likely than supporters to choose political or ideological arguments other than those concerning integration proper: the most widely used arguments referred to alternatives to EC membership, such as increased Nordic cooperation (4.3 per cent) and opposition to being drawn into great-power and bloc politics (7.5 per cent). In total, therefore, tangible values were mentioned as the first reason by 45 per cent of the supporters but only by 22 per cent of the opponents; 56 per cent of the opponents mentioned intangible values as their main reason against only 17 per cent of the supporters.

This general picture becomes even clearer when we divide supporters and opponents into 'old' and 'new' ones (Table 4). 'Old' supporters/opponents are those who had already taken their final stand on the EC when they were interviewed in April 1972 before the referendum campaign had gained momentum, while 'new' supporters/opponents are those who made their final decision some time after April, during the campaign. As could be expected we find significantly more persons giving no or not issue-oriented reasons among the new converts on both sides than among those with 'old' convictions. Among supporters, however, the balance between tangible economic reasons and intangible reasons is not much different between the two groups: the 'old' supporters were more prone to cite the integration issue (in its wider sense) than new converts, but they were also more prone to stress tangible values. Among opponents differences were somewhat more pronounced: in particular 'old' opponents were more likely to stress the integration issue, while the new converts tended to stress the economic drawbacks of membership.

These findings strongly suggest that supporters and opponents of membership tended to view the basic issues differently at the mass level as well as at the level of the political elite. To supporters the main issue involved was a tangible one: to secure for society as a whole or for sections of it, such as agriculture, the economic benefits which membership was seen to entail. To opponents the issue was political-ideological, involving restrictions

in national self-determination as well as other political drawbacks. Our earlier, more impressionistic, hypothesis that 'integration' was a negative, rather than a positive symbol in the EC campaign therefore seems to be substantiated by our data.

We shall now consider the direct relationship between Federalism/AntiintegrationAnti- and actual voting behavior (Table 5). Here we note a marked difference in the referendum vote between those who score low on Federalism and those who score high. While low-scorers were about evenly divided between support of and opposition to EC membership, the profederalists' were highly supportive of EC membership. We therefore find a clear positive relationship between federalism and support for the EC. This becomes even clearer when we control for time of decision: 50 per cent of the 'old' supporters were 'pro-federalist' as against 30 per cent of the 'new' supporters, 16 per cent of the 'new' and 5 per cent of the 'old' opponents. The really interesting feature of Table 5, however, is the fact that even in the anti-federalist group there is a slight preponderance of yes-votes over no-votes. Or to put it differently, 26 per cent of the entire sample voted for EC membership irrespective of their total or almost total rejection of federalism.

This seemingly inconsistent and paradoxical finding can be explained in different ways. For one thing, respondents in this group may have voted for membership despite their rejection of the federalist model for Europe because they did not believe in the probability of the model being realized, i.e. they considered their anti-federalism to be more or less irrelevant to the issue at stake. Table 6, which shows the relationship between federalism and referendum behaviour when controlling for belief in the probability of the Common Market evolving into a political union, lends considerable credence to this hypothesis. First, the table indicates a clear positive relationship between such beliefs and anti-federalism; the more our respondents

believed in an eventual political union the more reluctant they were to vote for membership. This finding confirms the observation made above that in Denmark there are more believers in the dynamics of European integration among opponents than among supporters of the EC. Secondly, those 'anti-federalists' who do believe in the probability of political union were markedly more anti-EC than those 'anti-federalists' who do not believe in it. This suggests that beliefs about the feasibility of the federalist programme may have been an important intervening variable in the relationship between federalist attitudes and referendum voting. Strangely enough, this same tendency can be seen - but to a much lesser degree - among the 'pro-federalists'; those who believe in the inevitable evolution of the EC into a political union were slightly less positive towards the EC than those federalists who doubt its feasibility. This finding is confusing as one would normally expect that doubt in the probability of a cherished goal would tend to reduce rather than increase its impact on overt behavior. These differences are not very large, however, and it is therefore unwise to draw too many inferences from them. Nevertheless, they might suggest that the pro-federalist attitudes we have found are of a rather half-hearted or uncommitted character when compared to the depth of European attitudes in the old EC countries.

Another possible explanation for the high incidence of pro-EC votes among the anti-federalists might be that the issue of federalism was less salient to this group than for example to those anti-federalists who voted against the EC. Their low score on the Federalism index might very well be a function of the low saliency of its items, or alternatively the saliency

of their anti-federalism may have been lower than the saliency of other factors disposing them towards support for membership. It can be shown that the group of anti-federalist supporters was more likely to cite general or tangible reasons for their vote than either the more federalist supporters or especially the opponents o I" membership. Conversely, only 5 percent of this group referred to the 'integration issue' as the main voting reason compared to 20 per cent of federalist supporters and 31 per cent of opponents.

Anti-integrationist attitudes show a predictably high relationship with referendum vote (Table 6): 73 per cent of those who scored high on this measure voted against membership, and more than 90 per cent of the low-scorers voted in favour. This does not permit one to conclude anything about causal relationships between anti-integrationist attitudes and referendum vote, but at least we can say that there is a very good fit between attitudes and overt behavior.

Party preference is usually a powerful predictor of voting behavior. Probably in most political issues the political party acts as the primary reference group, depending, however, on the clarity of the signal which emanates from it: the less clear and unambiguous external clues are, the more the individual will be forced to act on internal clues, in casu federalism etc. We therefore expect that the clearer the party's policy stand is, the less impact attitudes towards federalism will have on the individual's vote, and conversely the more blurred the policy stand is, the more difference will it make. Table 7 seems to support this hypothesis to a

considerable degree. Support for federalism did make a difference in all parties, but much less so in those parties (the Conservatives and the Moderate Liberals) whose official pro-EC line was clear, consistent and uncontested, than in those with a vocal internal opposition like the Radicals and especially the Social Democrats, 12 of whose 70 M.P.s voted against the membership bill. While federalism makes a difference of 11 and 18 percentage points in the level of support for membership among the first two parties, the difference among the Social Democrats is 54 percentage points.

Another way of analysing the role of federalist and anti-integrationist attitudes in determining support or opposition to EC membership is to connect them with the relative preference for membership or for a looser (economic) association with the EC. It could be argued that if the issue of integration was the main stumbling block as far as the opponents were concerned, then quite a few of them might be tempted to accept a looser trade association between Denmark and the EC that would not entail the dreaded effects of full membership. Table 8 lends some support to this hypothesis; only 9 per cent of the anti-federalists rejected both membership and a looser association, while 33 per cent accepted a looser association, but not membership. This indicates that opposition to EC membersship meant a total rejection of any connection with the EC only in very few cases. The same applies - perhaps a little more clearly - to the Anti-Integration index; only 20 per cent of the anti-integrationists were against any

connection with the EC while 51 per cent could accept a looser relationship
with the EC, but not full membership.

At the time of the referendum it was widely believed that the yes-votes to a considerable degree represented preferences for a looser relationship than that of full membership. However, this was hardly the case. In total, 27 per cent of the yes-voters would have preferred a looser association had this been possible, while a large majority of 57 per cent had full membership as their first priority. But, of course, the relative preference for the two modes of relationship differs with acceptance of federalism as well as anti-integrationism; pro-federalists were twice as likely to prefer full membership as anti-federalists. Even so, there was still in the anti-federalist group of yes-voters a clear majority of respondents who preferred full membership to a looser relationship. We have seen above that this group was more likely to cite tangible reasons for their vote than either pro-federalist supporters or opponents, and, as at least some of the expected material benefits (in the important agricultural sector) would accrue only in the case of full membership, we may have some explanation of this slightly illogical finding.

On the whole the two alternatives of full membership and a looser association were about equally popular (37 and 38 per cent of the sample respectively), though, if we hypothesize that those who opposed both would have preferred a looser association as a lesser evil, we may say that this alternative may have been the more popular one. This says very little of what might have happened in the hypothetical situation where a genuine three-cornered choice had been put to the voters, but it serves as still another indication of the general lack of support for supra-national integration in the Danish population at the time of the referendum.

5. Conclusion

To sum up, we have found a rather low level of support for federalism and European integration in general, both at the time of the referendum, and in the years since then. Support for the federalist ideology has been and still is significantly lower in Denmark (as it is in Britain and - to a much lesser extent - in Ireland) than in Ihe old EC-member-states. It was suggested that these differences can be explained at least in part by the differences in exposure to the federalist ideology over a generation, but obviously many other variables have to be taken into account before anything more definitive can be said on this matter.

With support for federalism in a minority, it cannot obviously explain

the 2:1 majority in favour of the EC in the referendum. Characteristically, we found that the issue of integration was more salient to opponents than to supporters of the EC. Nearly one-third cited opposition to integration as their main reason for voting against the EC, while support for European integration was the prime motivation for only 6 per cent of the supporters. On the other hand, supporters were twice as likely to cite tangible reasons for their vote than opponents. A rather high correlation between anti-integrationist attitudes as defined here and referendum vote was found: threefourths of those who feared drastic curtailments of Danish sovereignty voted against membership, while those who did not harbour such fears voted overwhelmingly in favour of the EC.

The relationship between federalist attitudes and voting was less straight-forward. Nearly all supporters of a United States of Europe voted for Denmark's membership in the EC, and nearly all EC opponents were anti-federalist, but in between these groups stood about a quarter of the sample who voted for membership while at the same time having very little sympathy for federalism. Three possible explanations for this fact were suggested and shown to be at least partially substantiated: belief or disbelief in the dynamics of European integration, saliency of federalism in relation to other values, and political party preference. Non-federalists who did not believe in any automatic integrative process, who were mainly interested in the tangible aspects of the EC question, and who identified with parties with a clear positive stand on the EC were much more likely to vote for the EC than those non-federalists who did believe in a continued process of integration, who focused upon the intangible aspects of the issue, and who identified with parties which were split on the membership issue. Finally, it was shown that opposition to membership was only to a limited extent tantamount to opposition to any connection at all with the EC; in fact, a looser association with the EC than formal membership was the most preferred alternative among the non-federalists and perhaps in the total sample.

The EC issue was thus a multi-faceted issue meaning different things to different people. Clear differences could be seen between those who viewed the issue in tangible economic terms and those who tended to treat it as an issue of intangible values, primarily those values engaged by the notion of European integration. Not unnaturally the short-term aspects of integration seemed to be more salient and more closely linked with referendum vote than the longer-term aspects inherent in the pure federalist ideology. Support for federalism was rather low with only a few indications of potential growth. The Danish politicians did not obtain any mandate

for a federalist or integrationist EC policy in the 1972 referendum -
but neither did they seek one.

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NOTES

1 For an attempt in this direction, see Hansen and Petersen, 1978.

2 In a study of the behaviour of American foreign policy elites in 65 cases involving threats to American objectives concerning Europe, Brewer (1973: 94-95) found 24 cases to belong primarily in the status area, and 41 cases in the non-human resources area. No cases were found which could be coded into the human resources and territorial areas.

3 The survey is basedon a cross-national sample of initially 844 respondents who were interviewed twice: the first time in April and May 1972, about 4 months before the referendum, and then in October immediately after the referendum. The questionnaire used and marginals can be found in Elklit et al. (1974b).

4 The main reason was that this item seems to engage universal democratic ideals, such as voting for a candidate's platform rather than for his (national) background, and only to a lesser degree the specific federalist-democratic ideal. Furthermore, the item is utterly unrealistic in its underlying assumption of a Danish politician campaigning for the presidency of some 250 million Europeans.

5 This can be compared with the inter-item mean correlation of about .30 reported for Inglehart's parallel measure (Inglehart, 1970: 257).

6 From April to October the percentage of respondents in favour of Denmark's EC membership rose from 45 to 63 per cent, while the percentage of opponents rose from 24 to 30. Correct answers to four knowledge questions on the EC rose during the same period by an average of 13 percentage points (from 47 to 60 per cent).

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