

# Political Science in the Era of Post-Behavioralism. The Need for Self-Reflection

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## 1. The Post-Behavioral Revolution in Political Science

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Although Strauss and his school were famous within American political science, their impact on the development of the discipline was minimal at that time. It was even less influential when we think of the style of political science which was spread to other parts of the world after the Second World War. And it should also be noted in this respect that somehow Scandinavia was the area which turned out to be very susceptible to the American influence.<sup>2</sup>

But science is a part of society, and its development can be explained by different kinds of external (economic, political, cultural) and internal steering factors (the paradigms, organization, and so on) of science.<sup>3</sup> So it was not surprising that new trends became visible in political science in the 1960s – for this decade was a time of political crises. And these crises were most notable in the USA, the home of The Political Science. The war in Vietnam, the student revolt, the black revolt, the environmental crises, and so on, all came as a shock to some members of the profession, and they began to see that Rome really was burning and wondered if they had been fiddling.

David Easton tried to sum up this development within the profession by coining the term 'post-behavioralism' in his Presidential Address, delivered to the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in 1969.<sup>4</sup> According to him a new revolution was under way in American political science

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David Easton tried to sum up this development within the profession by coining the term 'post-behavioralism' in his Presidential Address, delivered to the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in 1969.<sup>4</sup> According to him a new revolution was under way in American political science

– a revolution of post-behavioralism – which tried to be relevant to social problems: it criticized behavioralism for concealing an ideology of empirical conservatism, for losing touch with reality and being over-sophisticated with research techniques; it demanded research about and the constructive development of values; and it encouraged the politicization of the profession.<sup>5</sup>

This was a courageous attempt to pull together all the different tendencies in American political science at the end of the 1960s. But like all abstractions, it lacked a concrete reality – and this deficiency was a very crucial one. This was especially evident in the eclectic make-up of the post-behavioral revolution. Easton was himself very well aware of this when he wrote:

Post-behavioralism is both a movement, that is an aggregate of people, and an intellectual tendency. As a movement it has many of the diffuse, unstable, even prickly qualities that the behavioral revolution itself once had in its own youth. It would be a serious mistake, indeed, a grave injustice, to confuse this broad, inchoate movement with any organized group either inside or outside the profession. Nor ought we to attribute any special political color to post-behavioralists in the aggregate. They range widely, from conservatism to the active left. Nor has this movement any particular methodological commitments. It embraces rigorous scientists as well as dedicated classicists. Neither does it appeal to any age group alone. Its adherents include all the generations, from young graduate students to older members of the profession. This whole improbable diversity – political, methodological, and generational – is bound together by one sentiment alone, a deep discontent with the direction of the contemporary political research.<sup>6</sup>

Within this movement there were at least three notable tendencies: those classicists, often conservative, who had opposed behavioralism from the beginning (for instance, Strauss and his followers); those with the new left orientation, who played a major role in the Caucus for the New Political Science, founded in 1967; and last, but not least, those who had been affiliated with the Committee on Governmental and Legal Processes, a committee which the Social Science Research Council in the USA had appointed in 1964 to succeed its Committee on Political Behavior.<sup>7</sup> Together they comprised the elements which moved the profession into the era of post-behavioralism.

If we look at this situation from our corner of the world, it seems at the moment that for Scandinavian political science the Caucus represented a rebellion, loud and inefficient; the Committee on Governmental and Legal Processes an evolution, silent and efficient. With this background, and also because of the influence of this development in Scandinavia, an attempt will be made in the following to point out some tendencies in this development; and because it appears that the nature of this development is not very clear to all political scientists, a plea is made for self-reflection in the profession, which, it is felt, is the only way to make conscious research policy.

## 2. The Internal Bases of the Post-Behavioral Era: Fallacies of Behavioralism

As was already pointed out, Scandinavian political science was very eager to adopt behavioralism after the Second World War.<sup>8</sup> Since then, the basic principles of political inquiry were to discover invariances which could explain phenomena under investigation. One had to try to obtain these invariances through data quantification and the application of statistical methods – the tools used to verify hypotheses. All this was crowned by the demand for a value-free science; facts and values had to be kept apart because science could not prove or disprove values.<sup>9</sup>

It is important to note, however – as someone once pointed out – that while behavioralism gained currency in political science in the 1950s and the principles just mentioned came to be approved by a majority of political scientists, there were not many who really understood what those principles meant in practice and what they demanded of concrete research. The majority merely thought that the principles were to be accepted and went on to conduct their research as they were accustomed. The results of this situation were naturally not constructive.

The apparent unattainability of two of these principles in the credo of behavioralism contributed more to the birth of post-behavioralism than did the other factors. First, it soon became clear that the invariances behavioralists were seeking were hard to find, and the theory which could explain phenomena at all times and in all places was nowhere in sight. And the second problem – perhaps the most important one – was the fact-value distinction. This distinction, which leads to so-called value relativism, has been attacked from the right and the left because it provides no scientific grounds for resolving the question of what is a correct course of action. Scientific activity is conceived to be determined by voting.<sup>10</sup>

Behavioralists were not very analytical when considering this problem. As Easton has pointed out, the requirement that science be value-free is in itself a value statement leading to logical contradictions.<sup>11</sup> It should be stressed that values always play a part in social science. A distinction should be made between value-freedom, objectivity and the normativeness of the social sciences, as, for instance, Joachim Israel stresses.<sup>12</sup> When it is pointed out that there is no value-free social science, this criticism often asserts that the selection of research methods and data, the conceptualization of data, the concepts in general and the interpretation of research materials bring values into the research process. Objectivity, on the other hand, suggests how well our theory corresponds to objective reality. And by the third concept – normativeness – Israel wants to point out that ‘in all social sciences there can be found a set of sentences expressing propositions about (a) the nature of man, (b) the nature of society, and (c) the relationship between man and society.’<sup>13</sup>

By using these concepts one may note, for instance, that behavioralism conceives man as a passive object who reacts to external stimuli and whose behavior is a function of these stimuli. There is, however, another way of conceiving man: namely, as an active, learning subject, who can change his behavior according to stimulus, and who can also change society.

Thus it is easy to see how values have an effect on the study of politics – whether behavioral or not. It is also obvious that this is not a pure value question, but above all a question of using the correct method in political analysis, a process which is related in turn to the nature of causality in social science. (A more detailed analysis of this point will be touched on later in the article.) Further, there are many examples of how values have affected behavioralist research with respect to value-freedom. It is no secret that much of the research which has been produced under the label of value-free social science has spread conservative and, above all, liberal values.<sup>14</sup>

### 3. Evolution and Rebellion in the Post-Behavioral Revolution

As was mentioned, the Social Science Research Council in the United States appointed in 1964 a Committee on Governmental and Legal Processes to succeed the Committee on Political Behavior, which had been a major influence behind the behavioral revolution in political science. From this was born what is called policy analysis in political science, which is presently spreading into Scandinavia.<sup>15</sup>

There is no use going into the premises of policy analysis in this context, but there are a couple of aspects which are important to underline. First, the development of policy analysis can only be understood as a logical step forward within the discipline.<sup>16</sup> If we use the terminology of Easton's model of political system, we may say that when behavioralism concentrated its efforts on studying the political input and output as a process, it was only logical that the next step was to turn to an examination of contents – the outcomes (social effects) of political decision-making.<sup>17</sup>

This is not to imply that process was no longer to be studied, but rather that processes and contents were to be studied together in an attempt to study society as a whole. It is apparent, then, that policy analysis is primarily a change in the focus of research; it is not a new method of studying politics, as some have thought. This fact also has its side-effects, however. Because it is not explicit about the other principles of research, the field of policy analysis currently reveals more diversity than integration, as Ira Sharkansky has pointed out.<sup>18</sup>

There are a couple of features, however, which serve to explain why policy analysis belongs to the post-behavioral revolution in Easton's sense of the term (although it is an evolution, as has been stressed). In the first instance, its proponents usually agree that quantifying is not as important as results, there being, in other words, a tacit agreement that inexact and relevant knowledge is more important than exact and trivial knowledge.

The other feature is associated with values. As Heiskanen and Martikainen have pointed out, policy analysis has moved political science towards practically relevant application-oriented research.<sup>19</sup> This application-orientation implies that values are acknowledged in the research. They are not ignored, as in behavioralism,

but are implied in the specific goals which the researcher tries to achieve with his study.

Although policy analysis has taken a softer line than behavioralism in these matters, this does not mean that other behavioral objectives are necessarily abandoned.<sup>20</sup> There is, for instance, a strong demand for theory construction, which is actualized in the need for new concepts suitable for comparative research.<sup>21</sup> In Finland, for example, some policy analysts have even stated that they are neo-positivists.<sup>22</sup>

Leaving the methodological side of the question now, it should be stressed that even policy analysis can not avoid being labeled normative. It is not enough to say that research concentrates on processes and contents of political systems; the question of the theoretical framework is also important.

For instance, many of the policy-analytical studies bring to mind the principles of classical liberalism. In studying the production of public goods in Finland, Tuomo Martikainen and Risto Yrjönen begin their study with the following statement:

In the expansion process of the functions and areas of public power, we can make a distinction as a point of departure between two central and frequently interrelated forms:

- (1) The general regulation of automatic mechanisms and the control of private organizations; and
- (2) The production and allocation by means of the official or semi-official administrative apparatus of public goods realized by the collective resources of the public sector.

The aim of both public sector steering mechanisms is to explicitly straighten the skewed distribution of resources and benefits caused by the free operation of the automatic mechanisms. It is apparently obvious that capital and the work force in the automatic mechanism mode, unregulated by the central administration, always seek to locate in the most productive areas.<sup>23</sup>

If this statement is examined carefully, one begins to wonder whether it is any more than a modernized version of relations between state and society in classical liberalism. The state is a neutral referee with regard to societal contradictions, preventing 'the strong' in society from oppressing 'the weak'. Even John Stuart Mill had learned from Jeremy Bentham that there were certain vested interests in society, and that without some forms of intervention the balance of society was in danger.

If policy analysis represents an evolution in political science, there have also been some genuine revolutionary features in the post-behavioral revolution. These characteristics belong to the development which occurred under the banner of the Caucus for the New Political Science, and which were identified in the beginning as a 'new left orientation'. This movement was even more heterogene-

ous than policy analysis and included, among others, marxists, phenomenologists, socialists, left-wing liberals and plain moralists.

What these groups had in common, however, was a reaction against the perceived irrelevancy of political science with regard to social problems. There was also a general awareness of the implicit conservativeness of behavioral empiricism and a consciousness of the moral responsibilities of the scientist, leading to demands for politicization of the profession. All this amounted to a severe public criticism of prevailing orthodoxy in the discipline.

Because of the heterogeneity of this 'noisy rebellion', there is not much sense in trying to analyze this movement more explicitly in this context. It seems even less relevant to this discussion because at the moment its impact cannot be seen in Scandinavian political science as a coherent school of thought, as is the case with policy analysis. There are many reasons for this, the principal one being the simple fact that this kind of criticism has for some reason not been as prevalent in political science as has been the case in some of the other branches of social science, e.g., sociology. On the other hand, those who did rebel in Scandinavia focused their attention on the general criticism of positivism which had been developing in Europe. First the ideas of the Frankfurt School, then those of marxism (for instance, the French structuralists, theorists of state interventionism and state monopoly capitalism) became influential. The Scandinavian critics preferred to be political social scientists rather than critical political scientists.<sup>24</sup>

#### 4. The Need for Self-Reflection in Political Science

The picture drawn above is only a rough sketch of the whole situation. It would be important to make a more thorough study about the character of the behavioral study of politics, and about the change which has taken place in the discipline in the form of post-behavioralism in recent years.<sup>25</sup> This would suggest a study of the external and internal factors affecting the development of political science and their interrelationship. Here we have only focused on internal development in the field and conceived external development to be characterized by the political crises of the 1960s.

Although self-reflection is important in many ways, there has not been much of it in political science. Further, it seems that what little thought has been given to the problems of reconstruction is losing momentum. One reason is that many of those who some years ago raised the question of the nature of political science have moved on to conduct concrete research on society, recognizing that science needs empirical research if it is to develop – that no real advances can be made by discussing the priorities of research. Since the heaviest criticism has come from the left, it is illuminating to read a statement by Lucio Colletti, an Italian marxist famous for his philosophical studies of Marxism. He proclaimed that marxism can survive only if it revives the empirical tradition and does not produce any more books of the sort he wrote.<sup>26</sup>

However, as the analysis of post-behavioral revolution should reveal, political

scientists should at least be conscious of the tendencies relating to and prevailing in their discipline. Without this kind of self-awareness the discipline is easily lost. Of course, there can be no real unity of thought in these matters, which is due above all to political differences within the profession. There will be different conceptions of how the society functions, how it appears, what the right method to use is, and so on. But these are not great problems. What we are trying to suggest is to raise these different conceptions to the level of consciousness and to try to make people realize how their research is dependent on many different factors.

We may take some examples which illustrate what is meant by this. The discussion on behavioralism and post-behavioralism above seems to suggest that there are three important questions to consider in this context: societal development, the international relations of political science, and, of course, the problem of the proper method.

#### *Societal development*

We have pointed out how the 1960s was a decade of political crises and how post-behavioralism was a reaction to this. This situation led to new priorities in research, and those who could not see how times were changing could not keep pace with the development of the discipline.

What will the future bring? We do not know, but many have argued that if the 1960s was a decade of political crisis, the 1970s will probably be a decade of economic crises. For political scientists this should imply that it will be increasingly necessary to study the relations between politics and economics, a trend which is already visible in the discipline.<sup>27</sup>

#### *The international relations of political science*

It has already been noted a couple of times how Scandinavian political science was susceptible to the American influence after the Second World War. It is but one example of how important it is to know one's place in the whole. The situation had led to nearly complete isolation from other patterns of political science, which cannot be considered beneficial. We need only observe that, for instance, political science in the United Kingdom and on the Continent of Europe has followed patterns quite different from American behavioralism, although behavioralism has also had its impact in these countries.<sup>28</sup>

For the sake of the future, however, an analysis of the international relations of political science needs to be undertaken. There should be many important themes to study: foreign guest lecturers, scholarships and grants to various countries, international organizations, etc., all connected of course to general policies of the countries concerned.

We can take one interesting example which characterizes the importance of international relations, and which should make every Scandinavian political scientist more aware of the direction toward which he wants his discipline to develop. It is quite clear that the role of the International Political Science As-



sociation has pretty much been a handmaid of American influence. Now the situation in IPSA is changing, however, as more and more researchers from socialist and developing countries have come along. But now it seems that IPSA is no longer the most important international network of political scientists for Scandinavians. Its place has been taken over by the European Consortium for Political Research, whose nature and plans make one sometimes wonder what there is in common between this organization and the development of the European Community.<sup>29</sup>

### *The problem of the right method in political science*

The awareness of methodological variety should automatically belong to the political scientist's arsenal. Unfortunately, this is often not so, one of the reasons being the orthodoxy of behavioralism, which has tried to deny the scientific status of other methods, terming them metaphysics. When choosing the right method, one can not concentrate only on the logical structure of theories, but also on the relations between science and society.

Apparently science has to be useful for society in some way in order to survive. This has to do with the application of scientific results. If we look at the problem from the viewpoint of science and society, different conceptions of this relationship can be seen, which are related in turn to specific methodological principles.<sup>30</sup> We may illustrate this by focusing on behavioralism and its most important critics.

The starting point for behaviorists is clear: there should be a clear difference between basic and applied research. The task of science is to find lawlike statements in nature and society, to describe the world as it is. It is not the task of science proper to consider the application of these results – this function is to be left to those in need of results. Because the scientist tries to discover the truth, there are neither moral nor other types of problems to trouble him in his research. He is certain that the truth, whatever it is, will be useful to society in the long run.

When applied to the social sciences, however, this viewpoint may lead to serious problems. As has been pointed out in recent criticism of positivism (behaviorism), one crucial feature stands out: the social sciences are different from the natural sciences because of man's capacity to learn and change his surroundings. This leads to the fact that no distinctions can be made between basic and applied research because the application of results is a part of the research process.<sup>31</sup>

That is why critics of positivism have stressed that a scientist has a responsibility to disseminate his results as widely as possible. After this general starting point in the criticism of positivism there are, however, different tendencies. Two of the most important of these could be called critical social science and partisan social science.<sup>32</sup> Both begin with the premise that the knowledge possessed by a researcher has certain impacts on his research. Everybody has certain conceptions of the nature of society in general, and the specific problem in particular which one is going to study. This is precisely what Israel means by the normative aspect of the social sciences. The next step is then a concrete analysis of society which

introduces the problem of value-freedom, relating to the selection of research topics, the conceptualization of data, and so on.

Thus far the programs of critical and partisan social science agree in principle. But then a crucial difference appears. Critical social science aims at a so-called criticism of ideologies – to emancipate people from the quasi-structures of society and history and permit purposeful action in accordance with their needs. This criticism is related to ethics and philosophical anthropology.<sup>33</sup>

Partisan social science, on the other hand, tries to tie itself to the objective analysis of society, suggesting how well theory corresponds to reality. This is measured by political struggle, which means that verification of theory does not happen by referring to subjective sense data, but rather by man's social praxis.<sup>34</sup> This praxis has to be bound to the interests of a certain social class, the selection of which results from the objective analysis of society. Because the social sciences cannot operate above the classes in society, the researcher is always promoting some group's interests in his research. To be able to conduct objective research in this kind of a situation, he has to become aware of his partisanship or his research will remain a part of ideology.

There will be a different strategy for carrying out research, depending on whether one wants to be a behavioralist, a critical social scientist, or a partisan social scientist.<sup>35</sup> Let us take one concrete example. It is often maintained that the goals of social science are social engineering and social criticism.<sup>36</sup> If we consider these goals, there will of course be different solutions to them depending on the methods employed. A behavioralist would try to help the decision-makers of society by sharing the results of his research, and/or, if he would like to take part in social criticism, he would be most likely to take an abstract position pointing out what the general outlines of society are. A critical social scientist, in turn, would concentrate on conducting research for perhaps the 'underdogs' of society, since they do not have the same opportunities to use scientific knowledge as the 'topdogs'; and perhaps he would abstain from doing research for the decision-makers of society all together. A partisan social scientist would depart from these two approaches by first analyzing society as it is. Then he would decide whom his research is to serve, whom he is to criticize, and to whom he is to loan his talents – perhaps even for the benefit of social engineering.

This methodological survey has been very general and the difficulties which each method faces have not been specified. Neither has there been any real presentation of what these different scientific methods are, what the process in concrete research is, what techniques are suitable for each, and so on. The aim of this brief discussion has been primarily to point out that there are different ways of conducting research, and that in the true scientific spirit there should be a serious study of all approaches if a true basis for rational scientific work is to be found. Further, this self-awareness should also be directed to levels other than that of methodology. As was indicated earlier, political scientists should also try to analyze the other steering factors of their discipline, which are indeed more numerous than those dealt with in this article. There is no reason to let the discipline be governed by factors which do not correspond to scientific principles, and

there is no need to approve all the new developments in the discipline without at least trying to place them under close scrutiny. Only in this manner can political scientists be scientists performing work guided by scientific analysis not mere ideology.

#### NOTES

1. Leo Strauss, 'An Epilogue', in Herbert J. Storing (ed.), *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962), p. 327.
2. This is explicitly revealed in 'Political Research in Scandinavia, 1960-65' in *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 1/1966 (Helsinki: Kilama Oy, 1966). For Denmark, see p. 257, for Finland p. 260, for Norway p. 268, and for Sweden p. 281. Of course there are differences between these nations in this respect, but this does not change the general pattern.
3. For information on different kinds of steering factors, see Håkan Törnebohm, *Perspectives on Inquiring Systems*, Reports from the Department of Theory of Science, University of Göteborg, No. 53/1973 and Aant Elzinga, *Objectivity and Partisanship in Science*, Reports from the Department of Theory of Science, University of Göteborg, No. 55/1973.
4. David Easton, 'The New Revolution in Political Science', *The American Political Science Review* 63, No. 4/1969.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 1052.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 1051-1052.
7. For more on the Caucus see, for instance, Marvin Surkin and Alan Wolfe, 'Introduction: An End to Political Science', in Marvin Surkin & Alan Wolfe (eds.), *An End to Political Science* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970). For the Committee on Governmental and Legal Processes see, for instance, Austin Ranney, 'Preface', in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago: Markham, 1968).
8. This may also be seen in some representative Scandinavian introductory political science textbooks. See, for instance, Jan-Magnus Jansson, *Politikens teori* (Borgå: WSOY, 1969); Erik Rasmussen, *Komparativ Politik 1-2* (Lund: Berlingska Boktryckeriet, 1969); and Jörgen Westerstähl, *Att studera politik* (Stockholm: Tidens förlag, 1970).
9. See, for instance, David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 7.
10. See, for instance, George W. Carey, 'Beyond Parochialism in Political Science', in George J. Graham, Jr. and George W. Carey (eds.), *The Post-Behavioral Era. Perspectives on Political Science* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1972), and Elzinga, *op. cit.*, p. 35-36.
11. David Easton, *Continuities in Political Research: Behavioralism and Post-Behavioralism*, paper presented at the 8th World Congress of Political Science, Munich, 1970, p. 9-12.
12. Joachim Israel, 'Is a Non-Normative Social Science Possible?', *Acta Sociologica* 15, No. 1/1972.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
14. See, for instance, Carey, *op. cit.*, Lewis Lipsitz, 'Vulture, Mantis, and Seal: Proposals for Political Scientists,' in Graham and Cary (eds.), *op.cit.* and Erkki Berndtson, 'Arvot, tarpeet ja yhteiskuntatieteiden metodologia' (Values, Needs and the Methodology of the Social Sciences), *Politiikka* 15, No. 3/1973. It should be noted that values have had an impact on the study of politics even when defining what political science is. 'Politics' has been given a connotation which is in near accordance with that concept, for instance, in classical liberalism. The scientific rationality of this procedure may, however, be doubted, because it should be obvious that 'politics' has a different meaning in other schools of thought, e.g., in Marxism.
15. For a discussion of policy analysis see, e.g., Ranney (ed.), *op.cit.*, and Ilkka Heiskanen-Tuomo Martikainen, 'On Comparative Policy Analysis: Methodological Problems, Theoretical Considerations, and Empirical Applications', in *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 9/1974 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1974).

16. On the other hand, one must point out that there has been a general move towards this kind of analysis in all of the social sciences. Most notable tendencies in this development (the quest for more reliable knowledge for decision-makers of societies) are the attempts to find social indicators and the birth of the special policy science. See, e.g., J. P. Roos, *Welfare Theory and Social Policy. A Study in Policy Science* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1973), pp. 8–19, 186–193.
17. See, for instance, Easton, *op.cit.* (1970), p. 21, where Easton points out that 'Recent concern for the generation of social indicators to estimate more reliably the effect of outputs on bringing about changes in society – on crime, poverty, safety, political apathy and involvement, health, and the like – represents a first step towards formally differentiating output (laws) from outcomes (social effects).'
18. Ira Sharkansky, 'The Political Scientist and Policy Analysis. An Introduction' in Ira Sharkansky (ed.), *Policy Analysis in Political Science* (Chicago: Markham, 1970), p. 1.
19. Heiskanen-Martikainen, *op.cit.*, p. 9.
20. See, for instance, Easton, *op.cit.* (1970), p. 3, where Easton points out that 'Many post-behavioralists are turning from the problematics of method to unsettling questions about the subject matter of research and from the quest for explanation to doubts about the uses of political knowledge. Priorities for research are being reassessed without behavioral objectives necessarily being abandoned.'
21. See, for instance, Lewis A. Froman, Jr., 'The Categorization of Policy Contents' in Ranney (ed.), *op.cit.*
22. Tuomo Martikainen-Risto Yrjönen, *Kollektiivihyödykkeiden tuotanto ja jakelu poliittis-hallinnollisesta näkökulmasta* (The Production and Distribution of Collective Goods from the Politico-Administrative Viewpoint), Research Reports, Institute of Political Science, University of Helsinki, Series C, DETA 10, 1974, p. 22.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
24. This point is also made, however, in some American writings. See, e.g., Surkin & Wolfe, *op.cit.*, p. 7.
25. For a more complete treatment see Berndtson, *op.cit.* and Erkki Berndtson, *Politiikan tutkimuksen keinoista ja päämääristä* (On the Means and Ends of Political Science), (forthcoming).
26. 'Lucio Colletti: A Political and Philosophical Interview', *New Left Review* 86, 1974, p. 28.
27. See, for instance, Erik Allardt, 'Valtio-opin ajankohtaisesta tilasta ja tutkimuspolitiikasta' (On the Present State and Research Policy of Political Science) in Raimo Lintonen (ed.), *Kuudennet politiikan tutkimuksen päivät Helsingissä 10.–11.1.1974* (The Sixth Conference of the Finnish Political Science Association in Helsinki 10.–11.1.1974), Research Reports, Institute of Political Science, University of Helsinki, Series A, No. 32/1974. In this article Allardt characterizes the change within political science from political sociology to political economy.
28. For different patterns of political science, see W. J. M. MacKenzie, *The Study of Political Science Today* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1971), pp. 32–38. It should be noted that on the European Continent the study of politics is generally on a very high level. See, for instance, a basic textbook from the Federal Republic of Germany, Gisela Kress und Dieter Senghaas (hrsg.), *Politikwissenschaft. Eine Einführung in ihre Probleme* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1972).
29. The ECPR may be seen as part of a general European development, but it also has other functions. It is evident that there is a tendency to try to group together the political research of the leading capitalist countries of the world. The organization was founded with American money and it has maintained good relations from the beginning with the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research at the University of Michigan and other institutions, and at the moment there are plans to extend the scope of collaboration to Japan. See, *European Consortium for Political Research* (European Consortium for Political Research, 1974), p. 18.
30. See, for instance, Sverker Gustavsson, *Debatten om forskningen och samhället* (Debate about Research and Society), (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971).
31. See, for instance, Israel, *op.cit.*, p. 77.
32. Critical social science refers above all to the thoughts of the Frankfurt School, but there are also other tendencies which may be put under this label, for instance, the works of

- C. Wright Mills. Partisan social science refers principally to marxism, but it could also be thought to apply to non-marxist approaches.
33. See Elzinga, *op.cit.*, p. 37.
  34. Elzinga explains this in the following way: '*Objective knowledge* in this context is a knowledge that gives a correct epistemic mapping correspondence (reflection) of objective reality. The final touch stone for objectivity in this sense is not some subjectively conceived world picture, but social practice in the real world . . . A theory is said to be corroborated when practice—on the basis of the plan designed in the light of the theory—repeatedly yields the results that were anticipated. If practice contradicts the theory by yielding results other than those anticipated, this may be signal for a process of error-correction whereby the theory ultimately may become modified or even replaced.' Elzinga, *op.cit.*, p. 40.
  35. For more on these tendencies, see Ingvar Johansson, Ragnvald Kalleberg, Sven-Eric Liedman, *Positivism, Marxism, Kritisk teori* (Stockholm: Bokförlaget PAN/Norstedts, 1972). For a short but illuminating summary, see Aant Elzinga, *Vetenskapsteori* (Theory of Science), Research Reports from the Department of Theory of Science, University of Göteborg, No. 48/1973.
  36. See, for instance, Eugene J. Meehan, 'What Should Political Scientists Be Doing?' in Graham and Carey (eds.), *op.cit.*