

Participatory Democracy and Corporativism: The Case of Sweden

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Two very different aspects of democratic theory are as a rule emphasized in the prolific and ever-growing literature on the problems of democracy. One concerns policy output: the content of policies should reflect the demands and wishes of the majority of the people to whom the policies apply. The second concerns policy making: policies should be made through the active participation of those affected by the policies. The degree of attention given to each of these two aspects varies. Sometimes the content aspect is emphasized, sometimes the participation aspect.

Attention of the late 1960s and early 1970s – in Sweden as well as in most other countries – has very clearly been directed towards the participation aspect of democratic theory. A wave of demands for more participation in decision-making has swept around the world, and these demands have been raised in very different walks of life.¹

It is important, I think, to make two rather simple distinctions in a discussion about participatory democracy. One pertains to the type of participants involved, the other to the methods used for participation.

More participation in decision-making can be demanded by single individuals or by aggregates of individuals. The latter can be of a rather formal character – for example, a political party or an interest organization – or groups of a less institutionalized nature based on common language, religion, race, locality, etc. The main importance in this connection is, however, the difference between single individuals at a grassroots level asking for more participation and aggregates of individuals. This distinction can be expressed in terms of *individual-oriented* and *group-oriented participation*.

The method used for participation can be of a direct or an indirect nature. This is the classical distinction between *direct* and *representative democracy*. Direct democracy, as has been frequently pointed out, can take two different forms:

referendum or physical presence at the very moment when the decisions are made. The latter, but not the former, presupposes fairly small decision-making entities. Representative democracy, on the other hand, is based on the principle that the decisions are made by representatives of others. A correspondence of views is assumed to exist between the representatives and their constituencies. The participation of single individuals in decision-making is limited to the election of these representatives.

There exists to some extent a correlation between the type of participants and the methods of participation.

To be sure, individual-oriented participation can be obtained both by direct and indirect methods. But many advocates of greater individual-oriented participation clearly envisage simultaneous extension of the principles of direct democracy. They nourish hopes of breaking up large organizations into smaller entities and of introducing decision-making of a town meeting type. As a consequence of these aspirations, the demands of the late sixties for more individual-oriented participation were often coupled with an admiration for small political systems such as the ancient city state, the Swiss canton, and the New England town of the eighteenth century. It is also true that group-oriented participation in principle can be obtained both by direct and indirect methods. But proponents of participation of groups in a decision-making process usually take it for granted that this participation has to be achieved through the principles of representative democracy.

Corporativism is an emotionally charged word. It was part of the fascist ideology and constitutional philosophy, and today it is frequently used for polemic purposes in political debate. When I use it here, I do not imply that a society displaying phenomena classified as corporatist thereby also is said to have traits of fascism.

The word corporativism as used in this essay encompasses two dimensions. First, it refers to groups formed according to roles and occupations of single individuals rather than according to beliefs. The groups I have in mind – to speak in specific structural terms – are interest organizations of different kinds, and not political parties. Second, the word corporativism refers to a situation where the interest organizations are integrated in the governmental decision-making process of a society, regardless of whether this takes place on a national or local level.²

This integration of interest organizations can take two different forms. The organizations can be empowered – explicitly or implicitly – to make decisions themselves on behalf of a government, or they can be without such functions but instead be represented, through their representatives, in governmental bodies that make these decisions. In this essay the discussion is limited to the latter form of integration.

Governmental bodies that include representatives of interest organizations can, of course, differ both in degree of formality and the scope of their jurisdiction. They can be institutions of a rather loose character or of a very formal nature. Furthermore, they can be institutions with an advisory capacity or institutions that make the final decisions in the name of the government. Examples of the lat-

ter type of institutions in the Swedish context are bodies such as the Parliament, the Cabinet, acting in the name of the King, and the great array of semi-independent administrative agencies. An inclusion of interest organization representatives in institutions of this kind must clearly, according to the definition used here, be classified as corporativism. An inclusion of such representatives in institutions of a more advisory character can at least be considered as a tendency towards corporativism. The difference between these institutions is often rather vague; in reality, advisory institutions may frequently make the final decisions.

What I am interested in are the relations existing between demands for participatory democracy – individual-oriented and group-oriented – and the tendency towards or the actual realization of the principles of corporativism.

Sweden has during the past decade experienced three different stages as far as participatory democracy is concerned: (1) A stage of little concern for individual-oriented participation but a further increase in group-oriented participation. (2) A stage of sudden and rather intense interest in individual-oriented participation. (3) A stage of a renewed emphasis on group-oriented participation, in response to the demands for individual-oriented participation. All through these different stages – Sweden is still in the third stage – signs of corporativism have been clearly visible.

My thesis, based on the Swedish experience during the past decade is twofold regarding the relations between participatory democracy and corporativism:

1. Corporativism tends to serve as a means for the attainment both of a group-oriented participation and, perhaps more surprisingly, an individual-oriented participation.
2. Corporativism, at the same time as it serves as a means for obtaining both forms of participatory democracy, tends to generate alternating demands for more of each type of participation.

1. Group-Oriented Participation

In the early sixties Sweden presented a picture, often commented on, of strong nation-wide groups and close relations between these groups and the government.³

In Swedish society most interests were organized. To take one example: employees were organized into four fairly centralized federations of trade unions; the manual workers belong to LO; the white-collar workers to TCO, the professionals with academic degrees to SACO, and, finally, a fairly small group of government employees to SR. Close relations existed – and still exist – between these trade union organizations and the national government, as well as between a series of other organizations and the government. Interest organizations were asked to pass judgements on different governmental proposals; they had informal contacts with representatives of different governmental bodies; and they were explicitly invited to nominate persons to become members, in an advisory or in a decision-making capacity, of different governmental bodies.⁴

These close contacts were particularly intense on the Cabinet level in the early sixties. It is true that representatives of interest organizations were not offered seats in the Cabinet itself. But they were given the possibility, as they had had for many decades, to nominate persons to different royal commissions whose task it is to submit reports to the Cabinet concerning proposals for future legislation. They were represented in an economic planning commission chaired by the Minister of Finance. They were also at this time asked to participate in informal discussions with members of the Cabinet concerning the economic situation of the country; these discussions usually took place at Harpsund, the residence of the Prime Minister, and were called 'Harpsund negotiations'.

On the level beneath the Cabinet – the level of the semi-independent national administrative agencies – the involvement of the interest organizations began to increase in the early sixties. First, representatives of these organizations were asked to participate in various commissions appointed by these agencies. Second, and most important, representatives of organizations were recruited as members to the actual boards of these agencies. The arrangement of laymen boards, instead of boards consisting of civil service personnel, spread rapidly from agency to agency in the sixties. And a substantial part of the laymen appointed were representatives of interest organizations. In the end of the sixties such representatives were to be found on most of the boards of national agencies.⁵

In other words, group-oriented participation, obtained through traditional representative methods, was well developed in Swedish national politics in the early sixties. Several explanations can be given for this development.

From the point of view of the government an inclusion of interest organizations in national politics appeared useful for at least two reasons (the governmental process itself had been dominated by the Social Democratic party since the fall of 1932). First, valuable *information* can be obtained through such an inclusion. The interest organizations possess expertise in many different fields; also, they can convey to the government the attitudes and wishes of different segments of the population. Second, valuable *mobilization of support* can be achieved. By including interest organizations in the political process they easily become responsible for governmental decisions taken. The process receives, one might say, an extra dimension of legitimacy. Attainment of consensual solutions is furthermore facilitated through this interest organization involvement. Potential opposition is pacified.

There is, however, another reason, seen from the perspective of the government, to involve interest organizations in the governmental process, particularly with regard to the national administrative agencies. The representatives of interest organizations, as well as other laymen, on the boards of these agencies have as one of their functions to supervise a bulging administrative apparatus and to guarantee that the work of the agencies is carried out in accordance with values and ideas held by a majority of the population. The interest organization can, in other words, be said to have been given the role of *protectors* of the interests of the common man against the possible misdoings and narrow-mindedness of bureaucrats.⁶

From the point of view of the interest organizations themselves, participation in the governmental process also appears valuable, for at least two different reasons. First, the possibility of an interest organization *influencing* governmental decisions are of course believed to be strengthened through such participation.⁷ Second, the *reputation* of the interest organization is thought to be favorably enhanced. The interest organizations, as most associations, are continuously involved in protecting and extending their own position. An invitation to become a member of a governmental commission or agency can be, and often is, looked on as a very visible sign of acceptability and status.

The pattern of group-oriented participation in Swedish national politics in the early sixties must be said to have shown clear signs of corporativism. Criticism was eventually leveled against these tendencies. The critique originated in two very different circles; the content and implication of the criticism was also very dissimilar.

Non-Socialist groups, particularly the Liberal party, constituted one – and the earliest – of the two circles. The focal point of the non-Socialist critique was the position of the Parliament. Its influence was said to have been curtailed owing to the close and direct contacts between the Cabinet and different interest organizations. The critique grew out of a feeling among the ‘bourgeois’ opposition parties that they had less influence in the national decision-making process than the interest organizations. The opposition parties represented, it was implied, wider and more varied interests than many of the interest organizations that now were given much weight.⁸ The non-Socialist, mainly Liberal, critique of the traits of corporativism touched on a classical theme: an integration of different interest organizations in the governmental decision-making process tends to endanger the principle that the will of a majority, as expressed through voting for political parties at general elections, shall be supreme.

Left-wing people, inside and outside the Social Democratic party, constituted the other circle leveling criticism against the features of corporativism. Their criticism was based on the view that the position of the Social Democratic party, as well as the working class, was fairly weak despite the strong position of the Federation of Labor and the strong electoral support given the party. The weakness was a function of these organizations operating in a society based on a capitalist form of economy. Opponents of the working class organizations were said to have access to resources not available for these organizations themselves. The weakness in these organizations’ position, caused by the economic system, was thought to be undermined even more by the close cooperation, in the making of governmental decisions, between them and representatives of the employer side of the society.⁹ This type of critique against signs of corporativism touched also on a classical theme: an integration of different interest organizations in the governmental process threaten to sap, tranquilize, and even harness the revolutionary strength and vitality of the working class.

The pattern of group-oriented participation on a national level changed somewhat during the latter part of the sixties. The close relations existing on the Cabi-

net level were somewhat weakened; the number of representatives from interest organizations appointed to royal commissions diminished but did not disappear;¹⁰ the annual discussions between representatives of interest organizations and members of the Cabinet were brought to an end, etc. On the other hand, the close relations existing on the level of the national administrative agencies were strengthened. As has already been mentioned, the number of representatives of interest organizations on the boards of these agencies kept growing.¹¹

2. Individual-Oriented Participation

Suddenly the demands for more individual-oriented participation burst forth, in Sweden as well as elsewhere, in the late sixties. These demands were voiced in most areas of society. The citizens wanted more of a say in the daily operations of local government; the workers wanted to participate in the management of factories; employees of governmental agencies wanted to exert more influence on the direction of these agencies; students wanted to take part in the administration of the universities, as did patients in the administration of the hospitals, the soldiers in the army, the prisoners in the prison, etc. This grassroots 'revolt' extended also to the very organizations whose task it is to represent people. The leadership of the well-established political parties and interest organizations came under attack, although in very modest forms. The rank and file were said to have too few possibilities of influencing the policies of their own organizations.

This outburst of a new type of demands, furthermore, often meant a shift of interest from macropolitics to micropolitics. The issues that now began to gain attention were those that intimately affected individuals in their daily life: the state of affairs in their neighborhood and its future, school and recreational facilities for their children, the conditions prevailing at work places, and so forth.¹² Issues of a nation-wide and more abstract character – except for foreign policy issues – tended to appear less important.

Many factors can be designated, and have been suggested, as explanations for this suddenly emerging preoccupation with the participation opportunities of individuals at the bottom of different hierarchies.

Two such factors are the willingness and competence of the individuals themselves to participate. The affluence of the Western world increased rapidly in the sixties. It is easier for individuals to find the time and energy needed for engagements of different kinds in periods of prosperity than in those of hardship. At the same time, educational opportunities increased. Knowledge is obviously a valuable, although not a necessary, prerequisite for participation.¹³

Two other factors concern structural developments. The various types of organizational entities that individuals were part of tended to grow and expand. In Sweden this development was particularly striking with regard to both different organizations and municipalities. At the beginning of the fifties, for example, there were about 2,500 municipalities in Sweden, all entrusted with con-

siderable independent decision-making power. Today, owing to mergers, about 270 municipalities exist. In large-scale organizations it is more difficult for individuals to participate actively and meaningfully than in small ones.¹⁴ Furthermore, the subject matter of decisions often increased in complexity and the bureaucratic elements often increased in size and importance. Thus the decision-making processes also tended, regardless of the size of organizational entities, to appear more indistinct and mysterious. All in all, the possibilities for individuals to participate seemed to be become more restricted at the same time as their willingness and competence to participate seemed to grow.

I would like, however, to suggest an additional factor of particular relevance in this connection. It concerns the relations between a well-developed group-oriented participation, obtained through representation, and demands for individual-oriented participation. Does a pattern of group-oriented participation, such as the one existing in Sweden during the sixties, militate against or generate demands for more individual-oriented participation?

It is natural to assume that inclusion of a group in a decision-making process, through representatives of the group, may give a sense of participation also to the rank and file of the group. After all, one of the reasons for a group wishing to be included in a decision-making process must be a hope of being able to influence this process in accordance with views held by the membership.

An opposite case can, however, also be made. As a consequence of inclusion of representatives of an interest organization in a governmental decision-making process, there is bound to emerge close contacts between these representatives and other participants in the process; the other participants can be representatives of other interest organizations, as well as politicians or bureaucrats. These different types of participants might, as a result of these close contacts, appear to coalesce in a national elite. Such a development might estrange the leadership of an interest organization from the rank and file of the organization. As a result of this successful integration of their organization in the governmental machinery, the leaders might further begin to perceive problems from a governmental point of view rather than from the vantage point of the rank and file of their members. If this happens, the interest organizations tend to be transformed into governmental agencies rather than lobbying groups. The members of well-established organizations may begin to feel alienated, not only from their own leadership but also from the governmental decision-making process itself, which they were supposed to feel part of through their representatives.¹⁵

It would certainly be an exaggeration to state that the group pattern of Swedish politics in the sixties was one of the central reasons for the 'revolt' of the grass-roots at the end of the decade. On the other hand, there exists some evidence that this elaborate pattern added some fuel to the flames. I shall limit myself to two examples.

One example concerns the workers in the iron ore belt in northern Sweden. They engaged in a much-publicized wildcat strike at the end of 1969, the first major strike for a very long time to occur in Swedish industrial life. Many tradi-

tional factors have been listed as explanations for this strike: a lagging increase of wages, bad working conditions, strained relations between workers and management, etc. There is, however, one more factor, often referred to by those involved, that directly bears on the problems of a too successful integration of groups in a decision-making process.

Many of the striking miners in the north were dissatisfied with the behavior of the trade union movement. The local trade union leadership was accused of being too dependent on advice and instructions from the National Union of Miners. The union was in turn accused of being too dependent on advice and instructions from the Federation of Labor (LO). Trade union leaders at different levels in the highly centralized Swedish trade union movement were said to be indifferent to demands 'at the bottom', and leaders 'at the top' were viewed as cooperating too closely with their adversaries. A political dimension was added to this sense of distance between bottom and top. Many of the striking miners were Communists; the trade union leadership was at all levels Social Democratic. Furthermore, the top management of the iron ore industry, governmentally owned, was also Social Democratic. In the view of many striking miners the trade union leadership, the management, and the government tended to coalesce into a remote, closely knitted elite.¹⁶

The second example concerns the students at the Swedish universities. The National Federation of Swedish Student Unions (SFS) had in the middle of the sixties developed into an organization of a strength and a stature probably unparalleled in the Western world. The relations between this national association and the governmental authorities were very similar to those between other well-established Swedish interest organizations and the government. The SFS had good access to different ministries, particularly to personnel at the Ministry of Education; the SFS was asked to submit its opinions on different legislative proposals; the SFS was invited to nominate representatives for membership in different governmental bodies; young men and women who had been in a leadership position in the SFS were often recruited to jobs in the administration, and so forth.

Despite all this, the Swedish students became a vocal part of the participatory democracy movement of the late sixties. Some unrest occurred also at the university campuses, although not with the violence experienced in many other countries. A part of student criticism was explicitly directed against the SFS itself and against the relations between the SFS leadership and the government. These relations were allegedly too close. The leadership, it was argued, had tended to lose touch with the rank and file opinions and to look instead at student matters from the perspective of the government. The student leaders were denounced by some of their own constituencies as being governmental bureaucrats rather than spokesmen for the students.¹⁷

The striking miners in the north and the dissatisfied students had another thing in common: they were suspicious of the traditional forms of representative democracy. The miners in the north, at different stages of the strike, gathered at large meetings to make decisions about their next moves; the students at various university departments wanted departmental decisions to be made at meetings where

all the teachers and students concerned could be present. The demands for more individual-oriented participation was, in other words, coupled with demands for more direct democracy.

3. Renewed Emphasis on Group-Oriented Participation

The sudden demands in Sweden for more individual-oriented participation brought about a rather intensive discussion. The question asked was very simple: What can be done to give single individuals more say on issues that daily and intimately affect them? The discussion encompassed all the different areas of society where dissatisfaction had been seen or heard. Across the whole spectrum, several specific reform proposals were presented: some of them have already been implemented, some are in the process of being carried out.

Here I shall limit myself to the public sector. The participatory democracy reform activity in this sector has mainly been concentrated in three different groups of individuals: (1) employees of national agencies, (2) employees of similar agencies on the municipal level, and (3) employees and students at the universities.

So far, the reform activity in the public sector has been most far-reaching at the level of the individual universities; these are all part of a rather centralized system, with the Office of the Chancellor of the universities serving as a central agency for the whole system. Earlier, the right to make decisions on behalf of these universities was exclusively in the hands of professors with tenure. Other groups of university employees, as well as the students, were formally not involved in the administration. This does not mean, however, that students were wholly without influence in university matters. The National Federation of Student Unions was, as has already been pointed out, part of the central policy-making process; the local student unions had had a long tradition of self-government on issues like housing, eating facilities, athletics, counseling, etc. Since 1969 the students, along with teachers without tenure and other groups of university employees, have had the right to take part, on an experimental basis, in the administration of the individual universities. This participation covers all three levels of a university: the board, the schools and the departments.¹⁸

Changes towards more participatory democracy have also occurred in several national agencies. The so-called *företagsnämnder* – committees formed in the 1940s as channels of communication and information between management and personnel – have in many cases been given new and wider functions; the personnel in some agencies has been invited to participate in making appointments and promotions and has furthermore, in some other agencies, been given the right, on an experimental basis, to elect members of the agency's board, with the same decision-making powers as other board members.¹⁹ Now – the fall of 1973 – a royal commission wants to go further in this direction. The commission, called STRU, proposes that two representatives of the employees shall always be members of the board in all governmental agencies with more than 100 employees.²⁰

Finally, participatory democracy reform activity has also affected the local administration. In Sweden there exist on both the regional and local levels – the levels of *län* and *kommuner* – rather large agencies dealing with schools, social services, health, transportation, etc. Parliament passed a law in the spring of 1972, as a further development of earlier experiments, stating that the local agencies have the right, after permission by the central government, to let representatives of the employees participate in the board meetings of these agencies. However, the participation entails only the right to be present and to discuss and not, as is proposed for the national agencies by STRU commission, the right to participate in the actual decision-making.²¹

All this reform activity in the universities as well as in the agencies shows some very familiar features.

First, the reform activity is becoming strongly group-oriented, despite the fact that the aim of the reform is to increase the possibilities for single individuals to participate in the decision-making. This tendency is particularly pronounced at the universities. Attention and energy has been devoted to issues such as: which groups inside the universities should explicitly be represented in different university committees? Which matters should different groups be entitled to deal with? How many seats should different groups have on a university committee? In other words, how many professors, lecturers, teachers without tenure, administrative personnel, and students should there be in the decision-making?

This group orientation has, however, gone one step further. The different national federations of trade unions have also become a part of the participatory democracy reform activity. The local trade union branches – at the universities as well as in the national and municipal agencies – have become spokesmen for single individuals in their wish to participate in decision-making. At the universities the local organization of LO, SACO, and TCO elect people to become members of the university board; in the municipal agencies the local trade union organizations, according to the law passed by Parliament, are similarly entitled to nominate representatives of employees to sit in on the board meetings; the STRU commission is also very explicit in proposing that the trade unions elect employees to become board members of the national agencies.

The movement for more participatory democracy also included dreams about more direct democracy. Almost nothing has materialized from these sentiments; traditional representative methods are instead being used. One might even argue that the system of representative democracy has been both extended and further developed as a consequence of the demands for more individual-oriented participation. Existing bodies have been broadened to accommodate new representatives; totally new bodies have been constituted to stimulate and facilitate participation in the decision-making by individuals through their representatives.

This relapse of the reform activity into traditional organizational forms – emphasis on groups and on representative democracy – also meant a strengthening of earlier tendencies towards corporatism in Sweden.

There are several reasons for this. The very existence of strong organizations

with the task of promoting and defending the interests of different groups of individuals makes it quite natural to utilize these organizations in attempts to increase the possibilities for individuals to participate in decision-making. In addition, the organizations have announced their willingness on behalf of their members to take part in the administration of institutions that employ trade union members.²² Such an arrangement also seems to have advantages from the point of view of the government. Elections organized by local trade unions guarantee that those elected have a constituency behind them and do not merely represent themselves. The elected can discuss and participate in decision-making on behalf of a larger group. Furthermore, elections organized by local trade unions mean that all those elected are members of nation-wide organizations. One trade union branch is not expected to diverge too much from other branches in its outlook on different policy matters. The trade union membership of those elected to leadership positions in different types of public institutions can, in other words, be regarded as a cementing device. Guarantees are attained, despite the inclusion of representatives of the employees in the decision-making processes, against too great deviations and inconsistencies in policy outputs.

Criticism is now beginning to be voiced against this new wave of corporativism. Objections are still of rather modest proportions, but they are both more explicit and more philosophically oriented than the criticism of the sixties. Furthermore, the objections pertain mostly to the proposals concerning board representation of employees in national and municipal agencies; the situation at the universities with their tradition of self-government is somewhat different.²³

The governmental agencies on a national as well as a municipal level have as their function to implement and administer policies in accordance with directives decided on by politically elected bodies. The trade union representatives appointed to the laymen boards of the national agencies in the sixties and early seventies can, as has already been pointed out, in a sense be seen as a complement to these bodies. Their task was not only to provide expertise but also to control and check the expanding bureaucracy in the name of the population of the country. The new group of trade union men who now are ready to enter the board rooms of the governmental agencies have a different commitment. They are there because the employees at these agencies are regarded as having a right, because of their employment, to influence all decisions taken by the agency.

The critics of including employees on the board of governmental agencies react against these wide powers given the representatives of the employees. It is right and proper, they say, that the employees should participate, through their representatives, in making decisions concerning their own working conditions. But employees have no more right than other tiny minorities in the community to influence the actual subject matter of the policies decided on by the boards of the governmental agencies. These policies are and shall be pursued in the name of the whole political community. This is again, on the part of the critics of this new wave of corporativism, a repetition of a classical fear: the fear that the majority will of an entity – a nation or a commune – as it is expressed through voting for

different parties at general elections will be jeopardized through the integration of other interests in the decision-making process.

The reliance on trade unions as organizers of the election of employee representatives is also criticized. Both at the universities and the governmental agencies there are employees who do not belong to a trade union organization. It is wrong, it has been stated, to force an individual to join a trade union in order to be able to influence matters affecting his or her daily work. It can, furthermore, happen that even trade union members are not represented. The proposal concerning the national agencies only implies that two trade union representatives are going to sit on the boards. It is proposed that the seats be occupied in each case by two unions representing the largest proportion of employees. The small trade unions, and thereby also their members, are to be left totally unrepresented.²⁴

This critique against the involvement of local trade union organizations in the governmental process has not yet touched on the possible effects of this involvement on relations inside the trade union movement. The trade unions are now preparing themselves for a dual role. They were founded to defend the interests of employees against employers; this is, of course, still to remain a central role. However, now they are also ready to take part in the administration of the institutions that employ their members in the hope of thus increasing the possibilities of influence for the rank and file. The trade union organizations themselves are not unaware of this dual role facing them. In a report by The Delegation for Democracy in the Administration, a royal commission with representatives of all the central trade unions as members, it is explicitly stated: 'The representative of the trade unions is given a double role. He shall objectively and with due concern to the interest of the agency in question participate in the decision making of the agency at the same time as he effectively shall represent the interests of the employees'.²⁵

At a higher level the integration of interest organizations in the governmental process seems to have a tendency, as was pointed out before, to produce feelings of alienation among rank and file, both in relation to the 'integrated' central leaders and to the process that they have become a part of. The lines of communication are long and often tenuous between these leaders and the rank and file. On the lower level, which we are now discussing, the distances are of course far shorter between representatives, integrated in the governmental process, and those whom they represent. The former are, however, through their membership of the boards of governmental institutions, bound to appear as superior to the latter. Those who are supposed to be the spokesmen of the rank and file appear at the same time as the bosses. The risk exists that such a situation might produce further feelings of estrangement among the rank and file.

4. Concluding Comments

The different stages of participatory democracy that Sweden has passed through in the last decade produce a rhythm of a rather paradoxical nature. There existed

a system of well-developed group-oriented participation, obtained through representation, in the governmental process. Demands suddenly emerged for more individual-oriented participation. As response to these demands, a process was set in motion towards a further integration of the large organizations in the governmental process. However, this integration is now taking place at a different and lower level. The demands for more individual-oriented participation may to some extent be seen as a reaction against a too successful integration of interest group elites in the governmental process. Now, however, the responses to these demands imply again the creation of an integrated elite, although on a lower level, in the process. A reaction might again occur. We seem to some extent to be involved in a vicious (or virtually self-flagellating?) circle. Traits of corporativism evoke dissatisfaction that evokes more corporativism, and so forth.

NOTES

1. Examples of recent books on democratic theory that dwell on the participation aspect are T. E. Coole and P. M. Morgan (eds.), *Participatory Democracy*. San Francisco, Canfield Press, 1971; R. A. Dahl, *After the Revolution*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1970; and C. Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory*. London, Cambridge University Press, 1970. Cf. O. Ruin, 'Dagens demokratidebatt', *Tiden* 1969:7.
2. For a discussion in Swedish political science concerning the concept of corporativism, see N. Elvander, *Intresseorganisationerna i dagens Sverige*. Lund, C.W.K. Gleerups bokförlag, 1969, and G. Heckscher, *Staten och organisationerna*. Stockholm, Kooperativa förbundets bokförlag, 1951. For a contemporary marxist debate see *Häftet för kritiska studier* 1970: 2-3, 4, and 6, *Zenit* 1970: 16 and 17.
3. Good examples of books by non-Swedish observers in which the strength of groups in Sweden is stressed are J. Board, *The Government and Politics of Sweden*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970, and D. Hancock, *Sweden The Politics of Postindustrial Change*. Hinsdale, Ill., Dryden Press, 1972.
4. Cf. Elvander, op. cit., and L. Foyer et al., 'Organisationer. Beslutsteknik. Valsystem'. *SOU* 1961:21.
5. See B. Molin, L. Månsson, and L. Strömberg, *Offentlig förvaltning*. Stockholm, Albert Bonniers förlag AB, 1969. In 1946, 28% of the agencies had such representation; in 1968 64% had it.
6. Cf. S. Rylander, 'Om demokrati och statsförvaltning', in C. A. Hessler (ed.) *Ideer och ideologier*. Uppsala, Skrifter utgivna av Statsvetenskapliga föreningen i Uppsala, no. 50, 1969.
7. See for example a book written by the managing director of SACO, B. Östergren, *Makten och ärligheten*. Örebro, Askild och Kärnekull Förlag AB, 1970.
8. See a summary of this debate in Elvander, op.cit. pp. 302-306.
9. See for example S. Rylander, 'Förvaltningens korporativisering', *Konkret* 1969: 8/9, and J. Svensson, 'Korporativismen i Sverige', *Zenit* 1969: 11.
10. Cf. H. Meijer, 'Bureaucracy and Policy Formulation in Sweden' in O. Ruin (ed.) *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 4/69. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1969, pp. 103-116.
11. It can also be added that the contacts between the interest organizations and the government increased in frequency in the late sixties owing to a more selective economic policy. For a criticism of this trend, see K. Samuelsson, *Den förvirrade jämlikheten och andra essäer*. Stockholm, Raben och Sjögren, 1972, pp. 179-184 and 198-207.
12. S. Häggroth, 'Byalagsrörelsen i Stockholm 1968-1970', *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* 1971:2. For an account of personal experiences in individual-oriented participation activity see I. Olausson, *Vara med och bestämma*. Stockholm, Raben och Sjögren, 1973.
13. R. Inglehart, 'The silent revolution in Europe: Intergenerational change in post-industrial

- societies', *American Political Science Review*, vol. LXV, no. 4. For a different view see O. Petersson. 'Political Orientations and Participation in Demonstrations among Swedish Students', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 1, No. 4.
14. The same tendency towards large entities can be seen in the trade union movement. See for example B. Abrahamsson. 'Organisationerna och demokratin' in N. Akerman (ed.) *Demokratibegreppet*. Stockholm, Prisma, 1972.
 15. There does not exist an investigation of this kind with scholarly ambitions and based on Swedish data. However, this point has been eloquently made in contemporary fictional criticism of Swedish society. Cf. P. C. Jersild. *Djurdoctorn. Roman i femtiotre tablåer*. Stockholm, Bonniers, 1973.
 16. For a journalistic account of the strike see Anders Thunberg. *Strejken*. Stockholm, Raben och Sjögren, 1970. For a sociological analysis see E. Dahlström et al. *LKAB och demokratin. Rapport om en strejk och ett forskningsprojekt*. Stockholm, Wahlström och Widstrand, 1971.
 17. For the position of SFS in Swedish society as well as for the strains inside the student movement see O. Ruin. *Studentmakt och statsmakt*. Unpublished manuscript. Cf. A. Mellbourn. *Konflikten vid institutionen för statskunskap i Stockholm våren 1968*. University of Stockholm, Department of Political Science, 1969, mimeograph.
 18. The Office of the Chancellor of the Swedish Universities has published a series of publications concerning the experiments with new forms for decision-making at single universities. Cf. 'Nya samarbetsformer på universitetsområdet', *UKÄ-aktuellt* 1971/72:10. 'Universitetsdemokrati. Fortsatt försöksverksamhet med nya föreskrifter', *Ibid.*, Special issue, January 1973; *Så fungerar universitet och högskolor, Informationsmaterial för bl. a. nyanställda och studerande*. UKÄ 1973; B. Sandqvist-Örnberg. *Rättsliga frågor i universitetsdemokratin. Spelregler för beslutsförfarandet*. Stockholm, Utbildningsförlaget, 1973. A summary in English was written in the beginning of this reform period by E. Ringborg. *University Democracy in Sweden*. The Office the Chancellor of the Swedish Universities, mimeograph. See also, for a comparison between Sweden and the USA concerning the student participation in the administration of single universities, O. Ruin. 'Universitetsautonomi och studentparticipation i Sverige och USA', *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* 1972:4.
 19. Cf. 'Förvaltningsdemokrati – en lägesbeskrivning, Rapport 3' and 'Medbestämmanderätt för statsanställda, Rapport 4'. *Delegationen för förvaltningsdemokrati (DEPP)*.
 20. 'Styrelserepresentation för anställda i statliga myndigheter', Betänkande av Styrelserepresentationsutredningen (STRU), *SOU* 1973:28.
 21. *SFS* 1972:829. Concerning the legislative process leading up to this bill, see *Riksdagen* 1972, Prop. 1972:97, *KU* 1972:31, and *Protokoll* 95, pp. 72–92.
 22. Most of the big interest organizations published reports on more individual-oriented participation at the places of work. For LO see 'Demokrati i företagen', *Rapport till LO-kongressen 1971*; for TCO see 'Demokratisering av arbetslivet', *Delrapport 1970* and *Primärkommuner och landsting* 1972; for SAF (Svenska Arbetsgivarförbundet) see *Om samarbete i företagen*, 1971.
 23. For example, a debate of this kind took place in the daily paper *Dagens Nyheter* October 9 and 17, 1973. Furthermore, criticism has been expressed by some of the administrative agencies that have to give opinions ('avge remissvar') on the proposal of STRU. See, for example, opinions by *Regeringsrätten, särskilt yttrande av regeringsrådet Petré*; *Riksrevisionsverket; Universitetskanslersämbetet, särskilt yttrande av byråchef Poppius; Skolöverstyrelsen*.
 24. 'Styrelserepresentation för anställda i statliga myndigheter', op.cit.
 25. 'Medbestämmanderätt för statsanställda', Rapport 4. *Delegationen för förvaltningsdemokrati (DEPP)*, p. 12.