

# The International System and Finnish Attitudes toward Nordic Cooperation

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## 1. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

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The purpose of this article is to study the effect of the international system on the attitudes Finns have adopted toward Nordic cooperation at different times and to clarify the general structure of these attitudes. We are interested in whether there are any differences between political parties regarding stands on Nordic cooperation, and, finally, what effect the international system has had on articulated Nordic conceptions.

The year 1935 has been selected as the point of departure, because it was then that a Nordic tendency began to appear in Finnish foreign policy, and we conclude with 1969, when the proposal for Nordic economic cooperation, Nordek, was under discussion.

The central features of the international systems concept used here were derived from general systems theory. To avoid the often mentioned weakness of systems theory, its lack of an explanatory function,<sup>2</sup> we have attempted to connect it with contextual analysis. It is a question of the analysis of contextual effect when differences in behavior and attitudes of individuals are apparent, cannot be explained by individual variables, but depend on the kinds of communities the individuals belong to.<sup>3</sup> In other words, there is a contextual effect when a community variable affects an individual variable. From the point of view of this study the individual-level variable – attitudes toward integration – is seen as the dependent variable, and the community-level variable – the international system – as the independent variable.

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'International system' is here defined as the sum of all international actors, intercourse between the actors, and factors affecting them, which exist in a certain state in a given historical period. The state of the system can be described by stipulating the values of certain basic variables.

The theoretical point of departure here is: individuals who are aware of international affairs perceive the contents of the international system (or, if one prefers, the state of the system) in question and perceive variables that characterize the system.<sup>4</sup> Since attitudes stem from experiences,<sup>5</sup> the individual-level perception of the contents of the international system implements the birth of an international attitude structure. In this case 'attitude' is not understood to refer to any private acts or opinions, but to a consistency in the reactions of many actors to a certain object.<sup>6</sup>

A general attitude structure in itself is naturally not a very interesting factor. It becomes important when we take into consideration its containing expectations concerning the behavior of international actors in different situations. This is what makes the contextual effect of the international system on individual-level attitudes an important factor for the political process and its explanation.<sup>7</sup>

'International system' as used here is very similar to Harold D. Lasswell's 'international mood,'<sup>8</sup> by which he meant a type of international frame of mind, a factor that often crops up in studies of international politics, even though it usually remains undefined.<sup>9</sup>

The attitude structure of each period acts as a sort of sieve, straining and selecting the information individuals get about international affairs. In the same way, the international attitude structure controls the formation and interpretation of received information.<sup>10</sup> Should a change occur in the state of the international system, the nature of the information the individual receives about international affairs also changes. If the new information constantly conflicts with the dominant attitude structure, a new international attitude structure will result.<sup>11</sup> In this way, a change in the state and content of the international system causes a change in the international attitude structure and the expectations regarding the international behavior of the actors.

On the basis of our definition of 'international system' it can be understood that a global international system may contain many sub-attitude systems, i. e. international attitude structures. 'International attitude structure' refers to similar attitudes only in an international entity, the members of which communicate within the limits of a common (although not necessarily identical) frame of reference. This means that members of the same international system of attitudes have certain fundamental conceptions in common, and they can mutually understand one another.<sup>12</sup>

Possibly the lack of these common conceptions has been caused in earlier times by, for example, geographical factors,<sup>13</sup> in recent years by factors stemming from different cultural backgrounds and ideologies. One result has been many different international attitude structures, and it is probable that, despite recent strong developments toward global integration, there still exist many different notions of

what international development is. As a result, there are naturally varying expectations regarding the behavior of international actors.

Any one international attitude structure cannot encompass all individuals. A very large percentage of people are not aware of international affairs at all and consequently do not have any opinions or ideas on international politics to speak of.<sup>14</sup>

One systems theorist, Morton Kaplan, has developed a list of distinct variables with which the state of the international system may be described.<sup>15</sup> Historical sociologists have also presented their views on fixed variables used to describe the system.<sup>16</sup> But since at present there is little information on the different international systems, and since we cannot foresee future historical developments, we should be rather critical of the final and definite selection of systems variables. Instead, we may clarify the variables that must be taken into consideration when we begin to analyze the basis of the expectations for the behavior of international actors. Examples of these variables are:

the form of the power structure,  
important ideologies and ideological conflicts,  
the form and degree of international interaction, and  
important processes from the system's point of view (e.g. changes in production systems, wars, etc.).

As we have already demonstrated, the central theoretical problem of this article is the analysis of the contextual effects of the international system on attitudes toward Nordic cooperation between 1935 and 1969. Expectations in regard to the integration behavior in question relate to the concept of the international attitude structure are presented. This is based on knowledge of the individual-level basic features of the international system. To enable us to form hypotheses concerning integration attitudes, we must be able to describe the states of the international system in the periods in question. Because of the nature of the subject, we will do this only briefly. But the above-mentioned values of the state variables, upon which the description of the states of the system must naturally be based, will be considered as precisely as possible.

With the study of available historical facts from 1935 to 1969, it is possible to distinguish three states of the international system (or, if one prefers, three consecutive historical international systems).<sup>17</sup> Using a rough determination of time, one may specify the dynamics of change in the period under study so that the state of the international system of the 1930's may be said to have been in a transition period during the 1940's, becoming a new state in the 1950's and again a third new state that began to stabilize toward the turn of the last decade.

The categorization of the states we use here is supported by an earlier study, which described how general international attitudes in Finland differed basically in the three periods – 1930's, 1950's, 1960's. It was also shown that the main features of the three different states of the international system were quite apparent

in the three different international attitude structures that emerged from the analysis.<sup>18</sup>

The first state described, the 1930's, was characterized by a strong nationalistic tendency. The pattern of thought appears clearly in both the politics and economics of that period, when many totalitarian countries were being formed. These countries emphasized the importance of economic independence, and were, with their self-assured and expansion-oriented foreign policies, the cause of the increased international tension. The threat of war and the fear of war breaking out were very much in the air. The prestige of the world organization, the League of Nations, which had been rather high in the 1920's and the early 1930's, sank quickly during the second half of the 1930's. Faith in the possibilities of the League of Nations did not diminish entirely though, and a certain type of League of Nations thinking remained, especially in the non-totalitarian countries.

During this decade international politics was ruled by many equally powerful major powers, and so a type of balance of power system was maintained. Of the later superpowers, the United States was very isolated, and consequently the world was to a large extent Europe centered. Typical of the time were many military and defensive alliances and guarantee-treaty systems.

Growing military tension in the 1930's led to the outbreak of World War II at the end of the decade. The next decade was branded very strongly by the war, and a transition period followed. The war and its effects caused a radical change in the field of international politics. At the end of the 1940's, a new international system (or a new state of the international system) began to take shape.

Without doubt the reigning major powers during and since the war have been the Soviet Union and the United States. The fact that these countries placed themselves at the heads of two opposing blocs caused a sort of division of the world, a division that dominated the state of the international system in the 1950's. This change in the system had its strongest effect on the old European major powers. The international political center shifted to a great extent away from Europe. This development was also influenced by the independence of former African and Asian colonies and the noticeable impact these countries had in international politics. This became especially apparent in the new world organization, the United Nations, whose membership grew very rapidly.

Even though the nonaligned states retained their influence in the international development of the 1950's, the world was clearly dominated by the two opposing major power blocs. The relationship between the two superpowers and their allies was typified by the cold war atmosphere at the outset of the decade. The arms race and the threat of nuclear war played their role in stiffening relations between the blocs.

In general, it can be said that a strong emphasis on territorial loyalties had already pushed aside the old nationalistic way of thinking by the end of the 1940's. Inside and beside the major power camps a network of different regional organizations developed. Many military and economic alliances came into being during the 1950's. Interaction between countries grew noticeably.

By the end of the 1950's a change in international politics began to develop and again caused a change in the state of the system. Disintegration within the two superpower blocs shook the dominating bipolarity, and the old bipartition yielded with the appearance of new international power factors. A conclusive factor was of course China, which, after disagreements with the Soviet Union, stabilized its position as an independent major power. Fundamental to the new polycentrism was also the growth in importance of the third world countries and their audible voices on international political issues.

The leveling and lessening of the East-West contrasts had a very noticeable effect on the change in the state of the system. A clear indicator of this has been the mutual understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union in regulating world security, with a definite easing of international tension. The actual possibility of global destruction, brought about by man's new arms systems, has had a prime effect on this development.

In the wake of the leveling of old contrasts and the disappearance of the old mode of territorial thinking, new and serious problems have appeared. The gap between the rich industrial countries and the poor underdeveloped countries of the third world has grown even more, and this contrast has been widely recognized. Not only the differences in standards of living around the world, but even more the differences in cultures and ways of looking at things have been recognized. The state of the international system in the 1960's can thus be called both polycentric and pluralistic. This is supported especially by the fact that, with the relaxation of strict bloc structure, formerly territory-oriented decision-makers in international politics have begun to stress their own national demands in international cooperation and intercourse. Good examples of this attitude are France's actions in the Western block and Romania's actions in the Eastern.

On the basis of the theoretical description above and the main features of the three states of the international system, we are able to formulate the following three hypotheses about the expectations of behavior in regard to Nordic cooperation. These appear in Finnish attitudes during the period under study:

1. In a system with many equal major powers dominated by strong nationalistic tendencies (in this study the period from the beginning of the 1930's to the end of World War II), a country is expected to act, in regional cooperation, as a nation-state, which emphasizes its own national qualities. One's own state's special interests and qualities are felt to be primary; the regional entity is held to be secondary; and cooperation is regarded as merely a means to some other end.

2. In a system characterized by the formation of large regional alliances and polarization into a few blocs (in this study the period from the end of the 1940's to the beginning of the 1960's) the actors, in regional cooperation, are expected to emphasize common features of the regional entity more than their own national characteristics. The state is regarded more as a part of a larger territorial entity than a separate nation-state, and cooperation in itself may be regarded as a goal.

3. In a system typified by disintegration within the international blocs by the appearance of many and to some degree overlapping regional and ideological con-

trasts and by a 'global cognition' – polycentric pluralism – (in this study developments from the beginning of the 1960's), the actor is expected to behave, in regional cooperation, as a part of a certain regional entity, but at the same time he is expected to take into consideration the circumstances and demands of his special situation and his special nature.

The hypotheses presented are very broad, and each of them contains many assumptions. They have been presented in this way, however, because the ideas expressed in them form a logical entity for which division did not seem necessary. Furthermore, the use of broad hypotheses fits very well with the method used here to test them, a method we will present later on.

## 2. Data and Methods

The data used here were collected by content analysis of party newspapers mentioned in Appendix 1. Material was collected from four three-month periods, in each of the three periods under study. The periods analyzed (see Appendix 2) were chosen to coincide with important Nordic events. Only editorials dealing entirely or largely with Nordic cooperation were measured. The final data include 517 editorials.

In the content analysis undertaken, the editorial as a whole is considered as one observation unit, which is measured by the 29 variables mentioned in Appendix 3. The variables were chosen so that they would contain both operational indicators of the theoretical factors in the hypotheses presented, and also other relevant basic factors concerning Nordic cooperation. Measurement of the observation units was done with standardized scoring methods.<sup>19</sup>

The method used to analyze the data must, naturally, be chosen so as to enable us to find answers to the problems of the study. Since this study is concerned with clarifying the basic structure of attitudes, the most suitable method was held to be principal component analysis, which allows us very comfortably to present the attitude structures we sought. In contrast to normal principal component analysis routine, the principal component computed will be rotated using normal varimax techniques.

With the aid of computed principal component structures for each period, we tested the hypotheses. We clarified the positions of different political groupings in the principal component structures by calculating the score each editorial received in the principal components and, next, the average of the principal component scores by party. The significance of difference in the scores was tested with the so-called t-test.<sup>20</sup>

## 3. The Finnish Party Press and Attitudes toward Nordic Cooperation in the 1930's

In order to describe the Nordic attitudes of the Finnish party press during the 1930's, we have computed five principal components. We have followed the general practice of not calculating new components after the eigen-values of the prin-

principal components drop below one. The principal component structure produced explains 68.9 percent of the variables' total variance, a result that may be regarded as very satisfactory. Also the variances of the individual variables seem to be explained rather well. Before calculating the principal components we have, naturally, discarded those variables from the analysis that either have a completely skewed distribution or do not correlate significantly with any other variable.

The varimax-rotated solution of the five principal components can be seen from Table I. In interpreting the principal components, the limit of interpretable loading has in general been set at .300, but in some cases somewhat lower loadings have been taken into consideration.

On the first principal component, variable 9 ('political independence') received the highest loading. Other noticeable negative values were computed for the variables 'emotion-laden patriotic vocabulary,' 'prevailing national special characteristics,' and 'national interest.' Significant positive loadings on the first principal component were computed for the variables 'direction of attitude-formation' and 'prevailing Nordic special characteristics,' but these do not have much meaning for the interpretation of the principal component, which can be seen to clearly reflect the nationalistic way of thinking of that period. Thus it is called *nationalism's principal component*.

The second principal component is obviously bipolar. At one end of the principal component scale the variables 'cultural policy,' 'interest groups and special groups,' and 'language policy' have noticeable loadings. At the other end the variables 'general security policy,' 'neutral policy,' 'peace policy,' 'third party,' and 'world organization' get significant loadings. The dimensions described on the principal component scale seem to point clearly to the sphere of subjects that different groups have emphasized in Nordic cooperation. Because of this, we call the negative end of the principal component scale *language policy*. Interpreting the other end is, on the other hand, slightly more difficult. On the basis of the variables we find there, though, it seems to be primarily a question of strengthening Finnish external security with the help of a Nordic neutrality policy. The positive end of the second factor scale can be called *neutrality policy* after the variable with the highest loading.

The third principal component also seems to be bipolar. On one end of the scale the variables 'emotion-laden Nordic vocabulary,' 'prevailing Nordic special characteristics,' 'peace policy,' and 'cultural policy' get a high loading. On the other end are the variables 'national interest' and 'defense policy.' The positive pole of the principal component, which in many respects is like the second principal component, is best described by the term *emotional Nordic orientation*. The other pole seems to refer to observations concerning the ordering of national defense, put forth by some quarters in connection with attempts at Nordic cooperation during the 1930's. *National defense policy* seems to be a good label for this way of thinking.

On the fourth principal component, significant loadings were computed for the variables 'direction of attitude-formation,' 'common Nordic interest,' 'defense



policy,' 'general security policy,' and 'neutrality policy.' The label *common Nordic defense interest* seems apt for the way of thinking described by this principal component. The variables 'party policy' and 'third party,' which get a significant loading on the plus side, cannot be held to describe any special dimensions of attitude.

An interpretation of the fifth and final principal component was determined by the variables 'defense policy,' 'general security policy,' and 'peace policy.' This seems to indicate a way of thinking in which the essence of Nordic coopera-

Table I. The Varimax-Rotated Principal Components for the 1930's

	1	2	3	4	5	****
4. Direction of attitude-formation	.678	.017	.285	-.347	-.088	.669
5. Emotion-laden patriotic vocabulary	-.820	-.028	.088	.190	-.003	.716
7. Prevailing national characteristics	-.780	-.173	-.076	-.069	-.003	.650
8. National interest	-.647	.054	-.367	-.162	-.100	.592
9. Political independence	-.863	-.019	-.128	.017	.052	.764
10. Emotion-laden Nordic vocabulary	.273	.099	.828	-.060	.092	.781
12. Prevailing Nordic special characteristics	.329	.225	.717	-.125	-.119	.717
13. Common Nordic interest	.091	.250	.067	-.717	-.041	.591
15. Economic policy	.004	.112	.098	-.201	-.751	.628
16. Defense policy	-.115	-.030	-.548	-.391	.460	.679
17. General security policy	-.151	.453	-.137	-.398	.432	.592
18. Neutrality policy	.157	.537	-.205	-.301	.278	.523
19. Peace policy	.127	.466	.436	-.172	.470	.674
20. Cultural policy	-.110	-.357	.645	-.005	-.234	.610
22. Party policy	-.042	.060	-.003	.786	.027	.625
23. Interest groups and special groups	.004	-.819	-.207	-.067	.209	.762
24. Language policy	-.149	-.815	-.063	-.135	.164	.735
27. Third party	-.294	.342	-.246	.373	.242	.462
28. World organization	-.002	.520	-.020	-.174	.114	.314
****	3.293	2.750	2.533	2.004	1.503	12.083

tion is *military cooperation to further peace and security*. The fact that the variable 'economic policy' gets such a strong negative loading refers to the fact, understandable within the context of the 1930's, that even a factor as important as economic cooperation was not emphasized when talking about military cooperation plans.

On a general inspection of the principal component structure of Nordic attitudes during the 1930's, as outlined above, we are naturally first faced with the question of the ability of the computed attitude dimensions to describe the expectations of the actors' behavior concerning Nordic integration, set forth in the first hypothesis. Of the attitude dimensions obtained, especially the first principal component, 'nationalism,' may be said to reflect a way of thinking in which a state, in regional cooperation, is expected to emphasize its own special national characteristics. The fourth and fifth principal components, *common Nordic defense interests* and *military cooperation aimed at peace and security*, refer, on the other hand, to the fact that Nordic cooperation in itself is not regarded as important, but only as a means to some other goal: ensuring security and neutrality through military collaboration. One's own state's special interests and characteristics are clearly primary, and

the regional entity in itself is regarded as a secondary value. It thus seems as if the main features characterizing the international system of the 1930's were clearly reflected in the attitudes and expectations connected with a state's integration behavior, while the computed principal component structure corresponds to the integration expectations set forth in the hypothesis presented. The expected contextual effect has thus been shown, and the first hypothesis can be accepted on a general level.

As already noted, the location of the different party press groupings in the attitude structure described will be examined by calculating the principal component scores for each observation on the different principal components and next, the means, by party, of the scores. The scores computed are standardized values, with a standard deviation of 100 and a mean of 500. Because of the scale structure used, a low score symbolizes a strong placement on the principal component in question, as long as the interpretation is based on the positive end of the principal component scale, while a high score symbolizes a strong placement on the principal component in question as long as the interpretation is based on the negative end. The mean score values of the principal components of the party press groupings are shown in Table II.

Upon examination of the position of the party press groupings in the principal component structure used to describe Nordic attitudes during the 1930's, many interesting differences can be seen in the ways of thinking shown. The picture of the Patriotic People's League is very nationalistic and emphasizes national defense policy. Papers belonging to the Conservative press are not as nationalistic as those belonging to the PPL press, but defense policy is central to their way of thinking too. The difference between the two lies in the fact that while PPL stressed the importance of national defense policy, the Conservative Party also took into account common Nordic defense interests. Agrarian papers, for their part, resembled PPL's way of thinking in one way and the Conservative Party's in another. The Agrarian Party also stressed language policy when talking about Nordic cooperation, which is understandable when we remember that the Agrarian Party and the Swedish People's Party were the main adversaries in the language debate that went on in Finland in the 1930's.

Roughly speaking, we might say that the three parties mentioned form one group, the attitudes of which differ in many essential respects from the brand of Nordic thought that appeared in the papers of the remaining three parties, the Liberal Party, the Swedish People's Party, and the Social Democratic Party. It should be emphasized, though, that we cannot present any clear typology, because each party differs very clearly in at least one respect from each of the others. The papers of the PPL particularly form their own special group. The divergence of this party from the rest is again brought forth upon examining the information concerning the direction of attitudes in regard to Nordic cooperation, as presented in Table III. As may be seen, the PPL's are the only party papers to show negative views on Nordic cooperation during the thirties, and their papers contain noticeably more anti-Nordic than pro-Nordic editorials.

The Liberal, the Swedish People's, and the Social Democratic Parties' papers formed their own distinct group in the sense that they were less nationalistic compared with other party papers, and it was also in these papers that emotion-laden Nordic thinking was found. The papers belonging to this group were much more in favor of Nordic cooperation than the other papers; most favorable of all toward cooperation were the Social Democratic papers – *all* their editorials dealing with Nordic cooperation were favorable.

Table II. The Means of the Principal Component Scores of the Party Press for Each of the Principal Components of the 1930's

Party	Principal component				
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
PPL	655	492	541	408	509
Conservative	496	474	502	540	499
Swedish People's	449	543	484	525	500
Liberal	461	446	485	514	497
Agrarian	551	528	514	527	508
Social Democratic	419	526	488	428	487

Table III. Direction of Attitudes in Regard to Nordic Cooperation in the Editorials of the 1930's

Party	1. Very positive		2. Somewhat positive		3. Somewhat negative		4. Totally negative		Total	
	absolute	%	absolute	%	absolute	%	absolute	%	absolute	%
PPL	0	0.0	4	14.3	17	60.7	7	25.0	28	100
Conservative	29	76.3	9	23.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	38	100
Swedish People's	39	83.0	8	17.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	47	100
Liberal	34	77.3	10	22.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	44	100
Agrarian	17	48.6	18	51.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	35	100
Social Democratic	23	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	23	100
	142	66.0	49	22.8	17	7.9	7	3.3	215	100

There are, naturally, clear differences within the group in question. While the Swedish People's and Social Democratic Parties stressed language policy in connection with Nordic cooperation, the Liberal Party preferred to talk about neutrality policy. As already indicated, the Swedish People's Party was one of the adversaries in the language debate of the 1930's, and the Social Democrats expressed a conciliating point of view. It should be mentioned that the Social Democratic newspapers did not stress common Nordic defense interests nearly as much as did the Liberal Party's and the Swedish People's Party's newspapers. Defense policy and military matters were little discussed in the Social Democratic Party during the 1930's, and Nordic cooperation was no exception in this respect. On the other hand, it is very interesting and worth noting that the Social Democratic papers got the highest loading on the last principal component, the one called 'military cooperation for peace and security.' It was particularly this type of military

cooperation thinking that the Social Democrats, who did not talk about defense policy, found easy to accept.

It has been noted above that the hypothesis for the 1930's can be accepted on the general attitude-structure level. But on examination of the positions of the different political press groups on the attitude dimensions of the principal component structure, we find that the Social Democratic, Swedish People's, and Liberal Parties' papers do not get a very high loading on the theoretically important *nationalism* dimension. In other words, upon elaboration of the international systems' contextual effect on the individual-level integration attitudes in the different categories of the party variable, we are faced with the fact that the international system has not affected the integration expectations of the parties in the same way at all.

However, it is easy to show the effect of intervening variables in this case. First of all, the integration attitudes of the Swedish-Finnish press cannot be nationalistic in accordance with the dominant feature of the period, because identification with other Nordic countries on the linguistic and spiritual dimensions were especially strong. In the same way as the Swedish Finns, the Social Democrats identified themselves with the other Nordic countries, and so they did not expect Finland to act, in Nordic cooperation, as a state which emphasized its special national characteristics. In contrast to the Swedish-Finnish view, the Social Democrats' Nordic-mindedness appeared specifically on the level of the Nordic labor movement and not so much in connection with the language question. The organs of the Liberal Party were, in general, very internationally oriented, and they were very strongly in favor of international cooperation. It is consequently understandable that these newspapers did not show any nationalistic attitudes in connection with the Nordic countries.

Taking into consideration the effect of the intervening variables noted, we still maintain that the international system of the period affected the integration attitudes adopted, and thus we accept the first hypothesis of the study.

#### 4. The Finnish Party Press and Attitudes toward Nordic Cooperation in the 1950's

In order to describe the Nordic attitudes of the Finnish party press during the 1950's, we have computed four principal components. These explain a total of 61 percent of the total variance, again a very satisfactory result. The varimax rotated solution of the four principal components can be seen in Table IV.

The first rotated principal component, variable 10 ('emotion-laden Nordic vocabulary'), gets the highest loading. The following variables also have very significant loadings: 'traditional Nordic special characteristics,' 'prevailing Nordic special characteristic,' 'common Nordic interest,' 'party,' and 'direction of attitude-formation.' A negative significant loading was also computed for the variable 'peace policy.' It may be seen that the principal component very clearly reflect an area-identified Nordic way of thinking, and it will be called '*Nordichness*.'

Significant positive loadings for this principal component were also received for the variables 'party policy' and 'existing regional cooperative organizations and attempts.' It does seem natural that party policy and other regional entities were not set forth in connection with the type of total Nordic identification represented by the attitude dimension described in the first principal component.

On the second principal component, significant loadings were computed for the variables 'prevailing national special characteristics,' 'national interest,' 'economy policy,' 'neutrality policy,' and 'existing regional cooperative organizations and attempts.' The dimension described by the principal component refers to the discussions of economic integration held during the 1950's, and because of its content it is best described by the label *Finland's interest and special characteristics in economic cooperation attempts*. The negative loadings for the variables 'cultural policy' and 'party policy' simply tell us that these subjects were not discussed while examining economic integration progress.

The third principal component for the 1950's is bipolar. On one end of the dimension the variables 'defense policy,' 'general security policy,' 'neutrality policy,' 'existing regional cooperative organizations and attempts,' 'third party,' and 'position during period under study' get significant loadings. This, the positive pole of the principal component, reflects the importance of the view that Finland

Table IV. The Varimax-Rotated Principal Components for the 1950's

	1	2	3	4	****
1. Party	-.517	.226	-.241	-.430	.569
3. Time of editorial in regard to important Nordic occurrence	.023	.168	-.046	.534	.316
4. Direction of attitude-formation	-.737	.105	-.491	-.014	.796
7. Prevailing national special characteristics	-.067	.747	.179	-.074	.600
8. National interest	.091	.682	.050	.228	.528
10. Emotion-laden Nordic vocabulary	-.799	-.235	-.011	-.048	.697
11. Traditional Nordic special characteristics	-.533	-.012	-.350	-.301	.518
12. Prevailing Nordic special characteristics	-.778	-.107	-.147	-.022	.639
13. Common Nordic interest	-.609	.079	-.036	.259	.446
15. Economic policy	.044	.407	-.707	.098	.677
16. Defense policy	.295	.273	.794	.019	.793
17. General security policy	.261	.158	.717	.394	.763
18. Neutrality policy	-.155	.374	.665	.262	.674
19. Peace policy	-.315	-.144	.184	.724	.679
20. Cultural policy	-.249	-.301	-.074	-.384	.306
22. Party policy	.373	-.537	.076	.374	.573
26. Existing regional cooperative organizations and attempts	.320	.652	.325	.191	.670
27. Third party	.254	.247	.554	.262	.501
29. Position during period under study	.278	.103	.853	-.152	.839
****	3.470	2.487	3.754	1.870	11.581

must say outside of formed military alliances. It may be called *defense-oriented neutrality*. At the negative pole of the third principal component, the variables 'direction of attitude-formation,' 'traditional Nordic special characteristics,' and 'economic policy' have high loadings. Referring to the variable with the highest loading, we may call this end of the principal component scale *Nordic economic policy*.

The fourth and final principal component is also bipolar. At the positive pole, the variables 'general security policy,' 'peace policy,' 'party policy,' and 'time of editorial in regard to important Nordic occurrence' get high loadings. We will label this mode of thought *peace policy*, in accordance with the variable with the highest loading. On the negative end of the principal component scale, the variables 'party,' 'traditional Nordic special characteristics,' and 'cultural policy' get a high loading. The most descriptive name for this pole seems to be *traditional Nordic cultural policy*.

After a general examination of the principal component structure of the Nordic attitudes during the 1950's described above, we are again faced with the question of the ability of the attitude dimensions computed to describe the expectations of the behavior of the international actors as set forth in our second hypothesis. Again it seems as if it is the first principal component that corresponds to the theoretical assumptions presented. Upon examining its contents, it seems apparent that in regional cooperation, the state is regarded more as a part of a larger regional entity than as a separate nation-state, and it is very possible that cooperation was regarded as a goal in itself. In regional cooperation, in such circumstances, a state is expected to emphasize common characteristics of the regional entity more than her own special characteristics. We may therefore say that the characteristic central features of the international system of the 1950's are very clearly reflected in the attitudes to and expectations for integration behavior of a state. We have thus discovered the assumed contextual effect, and we may, generally speaking, accept our second hypothesis.

The position of the different political press groups in the principal component structure used to describe Nordic attitudes during the 1950's will be described in the same manner as before. The means of the principal component scores are presented in Table V. The most important feature here is the noticeable change that has occurred in Nordic thinking in newspapers belonging to, first of all, the Conservative Party, but also in those belonging to the Liberal Party (the Finnish People's Party) and to the Agrarian Party, as compared to the 1930's. During the 1930's, it will be remembered, the Conservative Party, the Agrarian Party, and also, to some degree, the Liberal Party did not regard Nordic cooperation as a goal in itself, and cooperation was regarded as necessary only in resolving Finland's security needs. During the 1950's, on the other hand, the Conservative Party seems to be the most 'Nordic' party, and also the Agrarian and Finnish People's Parties' newspapers seem to represent a way of thinking, according to which Nordicism is in itself a goal and which forms a framework for complete identification with the Nordic entity. The same type of thinking appeared during the 1930's, to a great

extent, in the newspapers of the Swedish People's Party and the Social Democratic Party.

On the second, third, and fourth principal components, the parties seem to be very efficiently divided into entities interested in different subject sectors. The profiles of the Social Democratic and Agrarian newspapers are, surprisingly, closest to one another. Both parties were interested in peace policy and, in connection with Nordic cooperation, wished to stress neutrality in defense policy. Also both parties

*Table V. The Means of Principal Component Scores for the Political Party Newspaper Groups for the Different Principal Components of the 1950's*

Party	Principal components			
	1	2	3	4
Conservative	552	467	507	545
Swedish People's	524	498	531	556
Liberal/Finnish People's	536	500	540	483
Agrarian	501	490	484	466
Social Democratic	507	492	483	483
FNDL/FCP	375	554	449	428

*Table VI. The Direction of Attitudes toward Nordic Cooperation in the Editorials of the 1950's*

Party	1. Very positive		2. Somewhat positive		3. Somewhat negative		4. Totally negative		Total	
	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%
	Conservative	25	73.5	9	26.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	34
Swedish People's	26	78.8	7	21.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	33	100
Liberal/Finnish People's	15	71.4	6	28.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	21	100
Agrarian	9	42.9	12	57.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	21	100
Social Democratic	8	42.1	11	57.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	19	100
FNDL/FCP	2	7.1	11	39.3	4	14.3	11	39.3	28	100
Total	85	54.5	56	35.9	4	2.6	11	7.1	156	100

stressed the importance of taking into consideration Finnish interests and special characteristics in planned economic cooperation attempts. As may be seen in Table VI, the attitudes of the Social Democratic and Agrarian papers are very similar on the positive-negative dimension. One's attention is drawn to the fact that the complete sympathy toward the Nordic countries shown by the Social Democrats in the 1930's diminished very noticeably by the 1950's.

Another very close pair are the Swedish People's Party and the Conservative Party. Both were very strongly Nordic parties, and besides general Nordicness they both emphasized Nordic cultural policy and trade policy. These parties also had the most favorable attitudes toward Nordic cooperation. The Conservative papers were, however, more interested than the papers of the Swedish People's Party in Finnish interests and special characteristics, in general, and in international eco-

conomic cooperation attempts. The Swedish People's Party was, on the other hand, more interested in Nordic trade policy.

The Finnish People's Party's newspapers were very similar to the newspapers of the Swedish People's Party and the Conservatives in their attitudes toward Nordic cooperation during the 1950's. The only noticeable difference seems to be the fact that the Swedish People's and Conservative Parties emphasized traditional Nordic cultural policy, while the newspapers of the Finnish People's Party stressed peace policy.

The views of the Communist press differed sharply from the other parties' newspapers with respect to Nordic attitudes during the period studied. They did not, like other papers, stress general Nordicness. Instead, the Communist papers discussed neutrality in defense policy and peace policy, in connection with Nordic cooperation, more often than the other parties.

Also, the Communist newspaper group was the only one whose behavior seems to differ very clearly from the premises set forth in our hypothesis. Because the FNDL/FCP papers have an unusually weak weight on the first principal component, which was demonstrated to be the most important theoretically, it seems that the international system did not have the same contextual effect on the integration attitudes of this party's papers that it had on the corresponding attitudes of the other parties' papers. This does not, however, affect acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis presented. As may be seen from Table VI, the attitudes of the Communists toward Nordic cooperation are overwhelmingly negative during the 1950's. Because of this, it is not possible to test the hypothesis for the Finnish National Democratic League/Finnish Communist Party with the data available. This is due to the very understandable fact that it is not possible to identify with a regional entity, if the attitude toward cooperation among the countries in question is negative. To be able to test the hypothesis in the case of the Communist press, we need more information about the stands of these papers on some aspect of regional integration on which positive attitudes were shown.

## 5. The Finnish Party Press and Attitudes toward Nordic Cooperation in the 1960's

In the attitude analysis of the 1960's, the computing of principal components was discontinued after four. The principal components computed explain, in this case, 61 percent of the variables' total variance, again a very satisfactory result. The rotated principal components are presented in Table VII.

The first rotated principal component is bipolar. On the positive end of the principal component scale, the variables 'emotion-laden Nordic vocabulary,' 'traditional Nordic special characteristics,' 'prevailing Nordic special characteristics,' 'cultural policy,' 'position during period under study,' and 'time of editorial in regard to important Nordic occurrence,' get a heavy loading. On the minus end of the principal component scale, the loadings are considerably less, but still significant. Noticeable loadings were computed for the variables 'prevailing national



Table VII. The Varimax-Rotated Principal Components for the 1960's

	1	2	3	4	****
1. Party	.011	-.046	.045	.384	.152
3. Time of editorial in regard to important Nordic occurrence	.718	-.207	-.003	-.136	.577
4. Direction of attitude-formation	-.010	.180	-.293	.739	.664
7. Prevailing national special characteristics	-.352	-.130	-.082	-.516	.414
8. National interest	-.355	-.597	-.023	-.187	.518
10. Emotional-laden Nordic vocabulary	.693	.214	-.091	.443	.731
11. Traditional Nordic special characteristics	.606	.003	-.292	.409	.620
12. Prevailing Nordic special characteristics	.509	.020	-.307	.585	.696
13. Common Nordic interest	-.072	-.516	-.367	.479	.635
15. Economic policy	-.128	-.916	.109	-.001	.867
17. General security policy	-.331	.690	-.462	-.238	.856
20. Cultural policy	.630	.155	.246	.157	.505
23. Interest groups and special groups	-.077	-.100	.731	-.044	.552
26. Existing regional cooperative organizations and attempts	.191	-.516	-.486	-.391	.693
27. Third party	-.173	.087	-.262	-.621	.492
29. Position during period under study	.674	.415	-.326	-.026	.734
****	2.927	2.558	1.649	2.572	9.707

special characteristics,' 'national interest,' and 'general security policy.' The principal component seems, interestingly, to describe the different points of departure that characterized Nordic cooperation discussions during the 1960's. Consequently the plus end of the principal component scale describes a general Nordicism, while the minus end refers to consideration of each country's special interests and characteristics. As statements diminish on one dimension, statements on the other dimension increase. The principal component is best described by the term *general Nordicism/national interest*.

On the second principal component, the variables 'national interest,' 'common Nordic interest,' 'economic policy,' 'existing regional cooperative organizations and attempts,' 'security policy,' and 'position during period under study' get noticeable loadings. The attitude dimension described by the principal component refers very clearly to the integration discussions that were held during the 1960's, in which it was desirable to ensure the 'national interest' of each Nordic country, while at the same time taking into consideration common Nordic interest. For this reason, the principal component is best described by the term *national and Nordic economic policy interest*. The fact that the last two variables have, compared to the other variables, opposite loadings, is easily explained when we recall that economic integration plans were discussed at the end of the 1960's; it is not unnatural that questions of security policy were not referred to in these discussions.

Noticeable loadings on the third principal component were calculated for the

variables 'prevailing Nordic special characteristics,' 'common Nordic interest,' 'general security policy,' 'existing regional cooperative organizations and attempts,' 'position during period under study,' and 'interest groups and special groups.' The content of the principal component refers to the discussions and initiatives about common Nordic security policy questions discussed in the Finnish political press, and so this principal component may be called *common Nordic security policy interest*. The variable with the highest loading, 'interest groups and special groups,' it is true, is positive, while the other variables used in the explanation are negative, but this only reflects the fact that the groups in question were not mentioned while discussing Nordic security policy.

The fourth and last principal component is, again, bipolar. On the positive end of the principal component scale the variables 'party,' 'direction of attitude-formation,' 'emotion-laden Nordic vocabulary,' 'traditional Nordic special characteristics,' 'prevailing Nordic special characteristics,' and 'common Nordic interest' get a significant loading. On the negative end of the scale noticeable loadings were computed for the variables 'prevailing national special characteristics,' 'existing regional cooperative organizations and attempts,' and 'third party.' The fourth principal component is very like the first, as it may also be said to describe typical points of departure for Nordic cooperation discussions of the 1960's. The negative pole clearly refers to considerations of national special circumstances when discussing Nordic cooperation, and the positive pole of the principal component describes for its part special Nordic circumstances. Consequently, a good label for this principal component would be *Nordic and national special circumstances*. This Nordic dimension differs from the first principal component's general Nordicness in the sense that here 'common interest' is a more distinct thought entity, which points to a more thorough knowledge of common circumstances than mere general Nordicness. On the other hand, the same type of thinking is not observable on the fourth principal component's nationality dimension. It seems rather to be a question of different foreign policy environments. Nevertheless, the first and fourth principal components are very similar, and both refer to basic points of departure of the Nordic cooperation discussions during the 1960's: on one hand, a certain sense of Nordic identity; on the other, simultaneous emphasis on national special characteristics and interests.

After a general examination of the above principal components, it seems clear that their attitude structure almost entirely reflects expectations that act as a framework for the actor's tendency, in regional cooperation, to function as part of a regional entity, while at the same time emphasizing the circumstances and demands caused by his special position, as well as his special nature. The contents of the first and fourth principal components refer expressly to this attitude, and the second principal component seems to definitely describe a way of thinking, in which both the regional entity's and each country's national interest should be taken into consideration so that cooperation plans may be fruitful on both the Nordic and the national levels. It thus seems as though the central features of the international system of the 1960's are reflected in the attitudes and expectations of a state's integra-

tion behavior. The assumed contextual effect has again been discovered, and we may accept our third hypothesis.

The position of the different party newspaper groups in the principal components that describe Nordic attitudes may be seen from Table VIII. Examining the principal component scores, we first perceive the noticeable homogenization of the different parties' Nordic attitudes when compared to the previous periods. We also see an increase in favor toward Nordicism expressed in Table IX; even the FNDL/FCP press is for the most part favorable toward Nordic cooperation. There are no statistically significant differences in the principal component scores of the party

Table VIII. The Means of the Party Press Groups' Principal Component Scores for the Different Principal Components of the 1960's

Party	1	2	3	4
Conservative	513	492	485	467
Swedish People's	483	509	503	485
Agrarian/Center	515	510	508	473
Social Democratic	502	505	512	516
FNDL/FCP	495	447	483	694

Table IX. The Direction of the Nordic Cooperation Attitudes in the Editorials of the 1960's

Party	1. Very positive		2. Somewhat positive		3. Somewhat negative		4. Totally negative		Total	
	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%
Conservative	29	85.3	5	14.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	34	100
Swedish People's	42	87.5	6	12.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	48	100
Agrarian/Center	19	70.4	8	29.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	27	100
Social Democratic	16	61.5	10	38.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	26	100
FNDL/FCP	4	36.4	2	18.2	2	18.2	3	27.3	11	100
Total	110	75.3	31	21.2	2	1.4	3	2.1	146	100

press groups, with the exception of the fourth principal component, on which the Communist press shows a marked tendency only toward 'national special circumstances.' In all the other cases, the party newspaper groups all tend to show the effect of the international system on the attitudes described in the principal components. Consequently, the hypothesis in question may be accepted for each party. To be sure, we must make the above-mentioned reservation for the Communist press.

At the beginning of the 1960's, the Nordic attitudes of the different parties' newspapers had generally approached each other so much that we cannot separate any special attitude clusters on the basic dimension levels of the stands. This does not mean, however, that newspapers of the different parties did not have very divergent views on the special questions concerning Nordic cooperation that were brought up.

## 6. Conclusions

A theoretically interesting conclusion may be derived from the above presentation: the international system seems to have a fundamental effect on the structure of the attitudes the Finnish press has had toward Nordic cooperation. On a generalizing level we may speak of a type of international regulating system that discernibly affects the attitudes and behavior expectations of actors in international politics.

Examining the development of the Nordic attitudes of the Finnish political press from the 1930's to the 1960's, we can distinguish a clear homogenization of the basic structure of attitude formation. Simultaneously we may observe a continuous growth toward Nordicness. It must be observed, however, that parallel to an increase toward Nordicness, newspaper interest in Nordic cooperation has diminished. During the 1930's, an average of 11 percent of the editorials in the Finnish party newspapers that dealt with international affairs were about Nordic cooperation. The comparable figure for the 1960's was slightly under 6 percent.

As one of the most important characteristics of the party newspapers' Nordic attitude development, we should mention the greatly changed content attached to Nordic cooperation by the Conservative Party, and to a lesser degree by the Liberal Party's and the Agrarian Party's newspapers during the shift from the 1930's to the 1940's and the 1950's. Cooperation was formerly a way of solving Finland's security problems; after World War II it was in itself a goal worth achieving, and there was a very strong desire to identify with the Nordic entity.

### *Appendix 1. The Party Papers of the Content Analysis*

Ajan Suunta, Helsinki	(PPL)
Karjalan Suunta, Viipuri	( * )
Savon Suunta, Kuopio ja Kymenlaakson	
Suunta, Kotka	( * )
Pohjolan Suunta, Oulu	( * )
Uusi Suomi, Helsinki	(Conservative)
Aamulehti, Tampere	( * )
Savo, Kuopio	( * )
Satakunnan Kansa, Pori	( * )
Hufvudstadsbladet, Helsinki	(Swedish People's)
Västra Nyland, Tammisaari	( * )
Åbo Underrättelser, Turku	( * )
Vasabladet, Vaasa	( * )
Helsingin Sanomat, Helsinki	(Liberal)
Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, Lahti	( * )
Kaleva, Oulu	( * )
Turun Sanomat, Turku	( * )
Maakansa/Suomenmaa, Viipuri/Helsinki	(Agrarian)
Ilkka, Vaasa/Seinäjoki	( * )
Keskisuomalainen, Jyväskylä	( * )
Savon Sanomat, Kuopio	( * )
Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, Helsinki	(Social Democratic)
Kansan Lehti, Tampere	( * )
Eteenpäin, Kotka	( * )
Uusi Aika, Pori	( * )

Vapaa Sana, Helsinki, 1944–1956	(FNDL/FCP)
Työkansan Sanomat, Helsinki 1944–1956	( > > )
Kansan Uutiset, Helsinki, 1956–	( > > )
Kansan Sana, Kuopio	( > > )
Kansan Tahto, Oulu	( > > )
Hämeen Yhteistyö, Tampere	( > > )

#### Appendix 2. The Periods of Three Months in the Analysis

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. <i>Period</i>   | 3. September 13, 1955 – December 12, 1955 (October 28, 1955) |
| 1. October 22, 1935 – January 19, 1936 (December 5, 1935)  | 4. May 27, 1959 – August 25, 1959 (July 11, 1959)            |
| 2. May 3, 1937 – July 31, 1937 (June 17, 1937)             | 3. <i>Period</i>   |
| 3. April 5, 1938 – July 3, 1938 (May 19, 1938)             | 1. February 8, 1962 – May 8, 1962 (March 23, 1962)           |
| 4. November 23, 1938 – February 21, 1939 (January 7, 1939) | 2. April 13, 1963 – July 12, 1963 (May 28, 1963)             |
| 2. <i>Period</i>   | 3. March 8, 1968 – June 6, 1968 (April 22, 1968)             |
| 1. December 15, 1948 – March 15, 1949 (January 29, 1949)   | 4. June 2, 1969 – August 31, 1969 (July 17, 1969)            |
| 2. December 26, 1951 – March 25, 1952 (February 9, 1952)   |  |

#### Appendix 3. The Variables of the Content Analysis

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1. Party  | 14. Importance of regional cooperation                       |
| 2. Period   | 15. Economic policy  |
| 3. Time of editorial in regard to important Nordic occurrence | 16. Defense policy   |
| 4. Direction of attitude-formation                            | 17. General security policy                                  |
| 5. Emotion-laden patriotic vocabulary                         | 18. Neutrality policy  |
| 6. Traditional national special characteristics               | 19. Peace policy   |
| 7. Prevailing national special characteristics                | 20. Cultural policy  |
| 8. National interest  | 21. Social policy  |
| 9. Political independence                                     | 22. Party policy   |
| 10. Emotional-laden Nordic vocabulary                         | 23. Interest groups and special groups                       |
| 11. Traditional Nordic special characteristics                | 24. Language policy  |
| 12. Prevailing Nordic special characteristics                 | 25. West orientation   |
| 13. Common Nordic interest                                    | 26. Existing regional cooperative organizations and attempts |
|   | 27. Third party  |
|   | 28. World organization                                       |
|   | 29. Position during period under study                       |

#### NOTES

1. For a discussion of system theory in international politics, see Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*, New York: John Wiley, 1957, and Charles A. McClelland, *Theory and the International System*, New York: Macmillan, 1968.
2. See e.g. Eugene J. Meehan, *Contemporary Political Thought*, Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1967, pp. 173–174.

3. Tapani Valkonen, 'Yhteisön vaikutukset yksilöön ja niiden kvantitatiivinen tutkiminen' (The Effect of the Community on the Individual and Its Quantitative Measurement), *Politiikka 1*, 1970, pp. 17–18.
4. For a discussion of this see e.g. Yrjö Ahmavaara, *Informaatio. Tutkimus tiedotuksen logiikasta* (Information: A Study of the Logic of Communication), Helsinki: Weilin & Göös, 1969, p. 41.
5. Theodore M. Newcomb, *Social Psychology*, London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955, p. 199.
6. See e.g. Antti Eskola, *Sosiologian tutkimusmenetelmät II* (Sociological Methods Part II), Porvoo: WSOY, 1967, p. 173.
7. See David J. Singer, 'The Global System and Its Subsystems: A Developmental View,' in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Linkage Politics*, New York: The Free Press, 1969, pp. 39–40.
8. Harold D. Lasswell, 'The Climate of International Action,' in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, pp. 341–342.
9. At this juncture, we can draw comparisons with the term 'spirit of the times' as used by historians. See e.g. Crane Brinton, *Aatteet ja ihmiset* (Ideas and People), translated by Oiva Oksanen, Keuruu: Otava, 1964, p. 71.
10. Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merrit, 'The Effects of Events on National and International Images,' in Kelman, *op.cit.*, p. 134.
11. Lasswell, *op.cit.*, p. 346, and Deutsch and Merrit, *op.cit.*, p. 134.
12. See Newcomb, *op.cit.*, pp. 221–222.
13. Joseph Frankel, *International Politics*, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 39.
14. See e.g. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967, pp. 176–177, and Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 138.
15. Kaplan, *op.cit.*, pp. 9–12.
16. For this see Raymond Aron, *Peace and War*, New York: Doubleday, 1966, pp. 95–100, and Stanley H. Hoffman (ed.), *Contemporary Theory in International Relations*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960, pp. 179–182.
17. In the following discussion on states of the system we will not, for the sake of brevity, refer to any references. Furthermore, it is a question of knowledge of historical facts on a very general level.
18. Kari Sulevo, 'The Changing View of the World. Finnish Party Press and International Affairs 1935–1970,' a paper prepared for the Nordic Conference on Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 1971, pp. 16–17.
19. The reliability of the measurements was ensured by both repeat and parallel measuring. By using normal product moment correlation value as a criteria of reliability, the mean value of the reliability coefficient of the intraindividual measurement was computed as 0.8 and the mean value of the reliability coefficient of the interindividual measurement as 0.7.
20. All computing in the study was programed by the author and carried out on a Burroughs 6500 computer in Helsinki University's Computer Center.