When Denmark joined the European Communities (EC) on January 1, 1973, this represented the realization of a political goal that was first formulated in 1961, namely that of membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), as it was then called, together with Great Britain. Between formulation and realization of this policy lay three rounds of membership negotiations (1961-1963, 1967, and 1970-1971), the failure to create a Nordic economic union ('Nordek', 1968-1970), and after the successful conclusion of the EC negotiations an extremely extensive and heated public debate until the issue was finally decided in the referendum of October 2, 1972, when membership was supported by a 63-37 vote.

1. The Evolution of Official Policy until 1970

Prior to the 1961 decision was a long period of at first low awareness of what was going on on the Continent (roughly until 1956-1957) and then of uncertainty as to how to react to the formation of the EEC (1957-1961). The European Movement of the late 1940's evoked a rather indifferent response in Denmark as did the formation of the Council of Europe. Denmark participated neither in the negotiations over the ECSC, nor over the abortive European Army. And the negotiations on the EEC between 'the Six' were well under way before Denmark realized that they were likely to succeed, and that their success might create great difficulties for Danish foreign trade.

The main impact of European developments on Danish politics in this period was the article inserted in the Constitution of 1953 (Art. 20) that permits 'powers vested in the constitutional authorities . . . (to) be delegated to international authorities' if this delegation is either passed by a five-sixths majority in the Folketing or - in the case of only a simple majority - upheld in a popular referendum according to Art. 42 of the Constitution. This stipulates that a bill is upheld unless it is rejected by a majority constituting not less than 30 percent of the total electorate. The background of Art. 20 was undoubtedly the supranational and integrationist tenor of the European movement of the time; on the other hand, its introduction hardly signified any expectation that Denmark would take part in these efforts in the near future. Rather, it was due to the wish to avoid the intricacies of constitutional amendment in the hypothetical case of Danish involvement at a later date.

Part of the explanation of the aloofness from European affairs in the early 1950's can be found in the Danish preference for a pragmatic and intergovernmental model of international cooperation, which she shared with Britain and the other Nordic countries. Another factor was the traditional Anglo-Saxon and Nordic orientation of Danish foreign policy, which was only reinforced by the experiences of World War 11. When Danish politicians finally started to be interested in what was going on on the Continent, the motivation was economic rather than political, namely the fear of being squeezed out of traditional markets.

Denmark is traditionally heavily dependent on foreign trade, which makes up about a third of the net factor income. As shown in Table I, Danish exports in the late 1950's were about evenly divided between and heavily concentrated on the EEC and the later EFTA countries. A market split in Europe therefore seemed to threaten Danish exports however Denmark reacted to it.

This problem was especially acute for agricultural exports (48 percent of total exports

in 1958, excluding canned food), which were largely tied to two large markets, Britain and West Germany (41 and 31 percent respectively) and which were threatened by exclusion from the projected preferential agricultural system of the Six or alternatively of the gradual loss of the British market.

In these circumstances Denmark became a natural champion of a Great European Free Trade Area combining the Six and the so-called Outer Seven until negotiations on that score collapsed in 1958. After this a majority of the political parties favored membership in EFTA with only the Agrarian Liberals (whose position reflected the stated interests of agriculture) opting for membership in the EEC. From the Danish point of view EFTA (which comprised only industrial products) was mainly considered as a step toward some more comprehensive European scheme, and when in 1961 Britain decided to apply for membership in the EEC, Denmark followed suit immediately. On August 4, 1961, the Folketing voted in support of the Government decision to apply for membership together with Britain. Behind this policy stood the four so-called 'old' parties, the Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals, the Conservatives, and the Agrarian Liberals, which have since then constituted the majority coalition behind Danish market policy, while the Socialist People's Party has continued to be the backbone of parliamentary opposition. As shown in Table 11, which registers the main divisions on the EC issue in the 1961-1972 period, membership was supported by more than five-sixths of the Folketing until after the election of September 1971 when enough opponents were elected tq the parliamentary groups of the EC parties to activate the constitutional stipulations of a referendum. Still, the absence of overt internal opposition in these parties before 1971 should not be misinterpreted; in fact, there were doubts as to the wisdom of membership among Radical Liberals and Social Democrats in the early sixties. The Conservatives and especially the Agrarian Liberals were unswerving supporters all through.

The failure of the first negotiation round in 1963 did not significantly affect official policy, which in fact underwent very few changes in the 1960'5. When new talks were initiated in 1967, the Folketing mandate repeated the 1961 formula of membership together with Britain, which was also the case in May 1970 when the Folketing voted on the mandate for the final round.

But while basic goals did not change over the decade, quite a few of its parameters underwent considerable change. Agricultural exports, while still very important as an earner of much needed foreign exchange, played a lesser role than a decade before, due to the profound structural changes of Danish society that took place in the 1960's and which made industry much the most important economic sector. Thus in 1971, industrial exports accounted for 65 percent, while agricultural exports had dropped to 21 percent of total exports. Secondly, the political motivations for membership were more conspicuous than they had been. While still preferring the pragmatic, step-wise model for European cooperation (as reflected in the very circumspect reception of the Werner Plan for an economic and monetary union or the studied acceptance of the Davignon formula for foreign policy consultations), Danish politicians were more ready than before to view the EC as a political as well as an economic community, and to point to political as well as to economic benefits from membership.

Thirdly, the negotiations of 1970-1971 took place on the ruins of the Nordek scheme for a Nordic economic union. After the breakdown of the second EC round in 1967, there was a widespread feeling in Denmark that a third round might be years off and that another passive waiting period could not be accepted. Consequently, in 1968 Denmark took the initiative to propose a Nordic economic union comprising Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. This policy, which was explicitly declared not to be a substitute for but rather a preparation for membership in the EC, was endorsed by all political parties, including the Socialist People's Party. Negotiations on Nordek started in 1968 and were successful insofar as a comprehensive treaty lay ready for signature by early 1970. By that time, however, Finland broke off negotiations, citing the Danish link between the Nordek and the EC as its motivation. As a result of the EC summit in The Hague in December 1969, the Danish Nordek reservation about eventual EC membership unexpectedly had become a live issue, and the Danish Government made no bones about its intention not to let Nordek stand in its way toward Europe, but to pursue the two policies simultaneously. Whether the Finnish motivation for breaking off negotiations was the real one, it certainly created a trauma in Danish market politics. For the first time Nordic unity had seemed to be a realistic option and consequently the issue of Nordic solidarity came to play a much more dominant role in the debate than earlier.

2. Negotiations with the EC 1970-1971

Negotiations with the EC, which started in the autumn of 1970 and ended in late 1971, were largely uncontroversial and undramatic. Denmark entered the negotiations with a wholesale acceptance of the Rome Treaty and all subsequent decisions of the EC and with only one real condition for membership, namely that of British membership. Besides that, Danish negotiators concentrated on securing special arrangements for Greenland and the Faeroes and on getting a satisfactory solution to the problem of the transition period. In general, Denmark wanted a short transition period of the same length for all products so as not to have a longer transition period for agricultural products than for other products. By and large, the Danish negotiation position was accepted by the EC, and it was characteristic of the later debate that the negotiation result was not criticized as such (as it was in Norway and in Britain); opposition has been exclusively directed at the idea - not the modalities - of membership.

3. The Decision to Have a Referendum

On May 18, 1971, the Folketing voted in due time to subject the EC Membership Bill
to a referendum, whether the bill was passed in the Folketing by a five-sixths majority

vote or not. At the time the five-sixths majority was still certain, so there was no constitutional requirement for the decision. Until then the EC parties were therefore agreed to leave the question open because of doubts over the wisdom of having the question decided by referendum and a reluctance to envisage the potentially disruptive effect of a heated referendum campaign. At the same time the bourgeois government and the Social Democrats in opposition kept a nervous eye on each other, fearful that the other part should steal the democratic thunder by accepting the opponents' insistent demands for a referendum.

In this situation, Per Hækkerup, former Social Democratic Foreign Minister, forced the issue in his May Day speech when he suggested that an advisory referendum be held before the final vote of the Folketing. The reasoning behind this move has never been fully disclosed, but this seems a fair reconstruction: by referring the EC issue to a referendum, it might hopefully be kept out of the impending election campaign; if not, the Social Democrats might stand to lose heavily on this issue to the Socialist People's Party and other leftist parties (in the winter of 1971 opposition to membership was visibly on the rise within the party and the trade union rank and file, which was dramatically revealed by the Gallup polls taken in April 1971; see Figure 1); finally, in the election enough opponents were likely to be elected to block a five-sixths majority anyway. Why not, therefore, defuse the issue before it exploded?

Mr. Hækkerup's initiative apparently took everyone - including his own party - by surprise, but the genie had slipped out of the bottle. On May 3 the Social Democrats, in a hurriedly convened joint meeting of their National Board and parliamentary group, demanded a decisive referendum after the final vote in the Folketing, i.e. a referendum in accordance with the constitutional stipulations whether or not the membership bill was passed by a five-sixths majority. The Radical Liberals - at that time in government together with the Conservatives and the Agrarian Liberals - who had previously been more inclined toward a referendum than the other EC parties, now joined the demand, which was then accepted somewhat reluctantly by the other government parties.

Later, the date of the referendum became an issue between supporters and opponents and among the supporters themselves. In January 1972 the government - now a Social Democratic minority government dependent upon the Socialists People's Party - decided to postpone the referendum from June, which had till then been considered the most appropriate date, arguing that Sweden's negotiations with the EC might not be terminated at that early date. This decision raised the problem of coordination with the Norwegian referendum due to take place in the autumn of 1972. In general, opponents wanted the Danish referendum to follow the Norwegian one, while supporters wanted it to precede it, both arguing on the expectation that opposition would be more prevalent in Norway and that some sort of bandwagon effect was likely to occur. After some jockeying for positions, also between the two governments, the Danish Government, however, decided for a date after the Norwegian one, much to the chagrin of the bourgeois parties and (probably) the Norwegian Government. The reason for this and the earlier decision seems mainly to have been the wish to placate the opponents (after all, a third of the government's parliamentary base consisted of opponents) and not to gjve them any opportunity to complain about foul play.*

4. Trends in Public Opinion on the EC Issue

The decision to refer the EC issue to a referendum for once gave public opinion a
central role in the making of Danish foreign policy as compared with its usually marginal
and highly indirect role.

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* In this connection the Social Democratic Party congress resolution of 1971 that 'a new situation' would arise if Norway did not become a member certainly played a major role.

* In this connection the Social Democratic Party congress resolution of 1971 that 'a new situation' would arise if Norway did not become a member certainly played a major role.

Until this decision, public opinion had largely mirrored the official position. As in the case of the policy-makers the EC had only slowly become a salient fact to the public. In the summer of 1957 only 56 percent had heard of the European Common Market¹ and a year later 64 percent had no opinion on whether it would be advantageous or not for Denmark to become a member of the EEC.²

On the other hand, when membership became official policy in 1961, the public was very much in support. Immediately after the application it was endorsed by 53 percent of the public, only 8 percent being against. As shown in Figure 1, this initial distribution of attitudes was essentially retained during the 1960'5. Between 1961 and the beginning of 1970 opposition never passed the 10 percent mark, while the supporters — apart from 1962-1963 - made up a very stable group of between 50 and 60 percent of the population, a level that was seemingly unaffected by the failures of the 1961 —1963 and 1967 negotiations. The DK group lay around the 40 percent mark during most of the decade with a slight downward trend.

In 1971 this picture underwent a dramatic change (see Figure 2). Opposition soared to about 30 percent (the number necessary - but not in itself sufficient - to defeat a membership bill in a referendum), where it remained relatively stable until the referendum in which 32.9 percent voted 'no.' At the same time support for membership dropped below the 40 percent level, reaching an all-time low of 35 percent in June 1971. From then on, another slightly upward trend started, which developed into a landslide immediately before the referendum, when a total of 56.7 percent supported membership, i.e. about the same level of support as in the late 1960'5. The DK group continued its slow downward trend during most of the 1971-1972 campaign until a few months before the referendum when it started to drop dramatically. And in the referendum only 10 percent stayed at home.

Reported background data for attitudes toward EC membership are very scarce. As shown in Table 111 the general trend was the same across the political parties. On the other hand, the 1971 swing toward opposition is much more pronounced among the Social Democrats than among the voters of the other EC parties.

For a long period in 1971-1972 there seems to have been a majority against membership among Social Democratic voters, which only late in the campaign was changed into a slight majority for membership. Internal disagreements also characterized the Radical Liberals, while Conservatives, Agrarian Liberals, and People's Socialists followed their official party line more closely.

Survey data, not reproduced here, also showed attitudes to membership to be correlated

with regional and ecological factors, with age (the age group below 30 having a majority against membership, while the group above 30 was in favor of membership),³ and with occupational status.⁴ In general, support was concentrated among farmers (who were conspicuously the most positive group), self-employed in trade and industry, and the upper white-collar group, while opposition was concentrated among blue-collar workers, students, and to some extent lower white-collar workers.

Due to the scarcity of data, any attempt to explain the dynamics of EC attitudes over the entire 1961-1972 period must necessarily be tentative as well as highly speculative. Table IV lists the dependent variables and a few of the feasible independent variables together with their configurations in four distinct time periods of the EC issue. Other factors, such as the new popularity of Nordic cooperation or the increased respectability of the opposing parties, especially the Socialist People's Party, could have been added.

Some of the above variables should be rather clear both as to definition and to effect, while others require some explanation. The variable 'Clarity of Situation' refers to the degree of clarity or uncertainty surrounding the membership issue. Clarity was lowest in the 1961-1962 and 1970-1971 periods, i.e. in the periods where negotiations were going on, and where the actual result of negotiations was unknown and thus also the conditions and effects of membership. On the other hand, clarity was high in the 1963-1968 period when it appeared quite clear that membership was out of the order, and again in 1972 when it was an established fact that Denmark could become a member on known conditions. The less clarity, it can be hypothesized, the greater the potential for marshaling opposition to membership by appealing to the fear of the unknown, one of the important bases for opposition in the 1970-1972 campaign. These potentialities were greatest in 1970-1971 and were gradually exhausted in the latter part of the campaign. In the final round of the campaign the pro-forces even managed to exploit this factor by presenting membership as the known and safe policy and nonmembership as unknown and unsafe in its effects.

By 'Clarity of Party Positions' is meant the degree to which the political parties presented clear, strong, and unambiguous positions to their voters. If clarity is high, the voters are more likely to be influenced by their party than when signals are ambiguous and/or weak. In the present case, where the EC parties have consistently commanded more than 85 percent of the vote, this factor will be highly correlated with support for membership: the clearer party positions are, the greater the support for membership. For most of the analyzed period, party positions have been strong and relatively unambiguous, but for one notable exception in the 1970-1971 period when for a time the

official position of the Social Democratic Party (and to a lesser extent that of the Radical Party) became less clear. This was probably due to the rising opposition in the labor movement and also to the desire to mark some distance from the governing coalition of Radical Liberals, Conservatives, and Agrarian Liberals in market policy as well as on other issues. In 1970-1971 Social Democratic spokesmen, while never casting doubt on membership as such as the official party line, criticized the government for being too ready to accept the conditions of the EC and in turn stressed the various conditions that had to be met if membership could be accepted, such as political autonomy in various fields or satisfactory solutions for the other Nordic countries. In 1972, the party's position became much more clear, if still not entirely unambiguous (there was still a sizable and vocal opposition group in the party) due to its new role as a government party and also due to greater clarity in the membership issue. In the referendum it was still possible to vote 'no' with a good Social Democratic conscience, but no one could mistake the party line.

The 'Intensity of the Pro- and Anti-Campaigns' should normally be highly intercorrelated and therefore should more or less cancel each other out. This was probably true for most of the period, again with 1970-1971 as an exception. In this period the anti-campaign was more intense than the pro-campaign, which was characterized by a high concentration of efforts in the final round of the campaign. This difference in tactics is very much in tune with the 'objective' mobilization potentials of the two sides referred to above and may explain why the opponents had such great successes in the early phase of the campaign, but then seemed to lose momentum, while the supporters still had a large mobilization group when the final round set in.

Finally, the 'Domestic Opposition Factor' refers to the degree to which opposition to the government affects attitudes to official market policy. This factor has apparently had little effect on the attitudes of the bourgeois and People's Socialist voters, but it may have had some effect on the Social Democrats. On the premise that for demographic, socio-economic, ideological, or other reasons support for membership is lower and less deep-seated among Social Democratic voters than among the voters of the other EC parties, it seems reasonable to expect the government/opposition role of the party to play a role. In the 1961-1968 period support for membership may have been reinforced by a general support for government policies, as was the case after October 1971, when the Social Democrats again became a government party. On the other hand, opposition to membership may very well have been reinforced in the 1969-1971 period when it functioned as one of the ways to express opposition to the then bourgeois government.

5. The Campaign

The campaign before the referendum on October 2 was undoubtedly the most extensive political campaign ever undertaken in Denmark. It was also one of the most intensive (even if its intensity fades before that of the Norwegian campaign). The supporting side was very much an 'establishment' affair. In the forefront were the four 'old' parties, though operating with varying effectiveness. The Conservatives, and still more the Agrarian Liberals, had practically no internal opposition, while the Radical Liberals had some though not very significant opposition; the Social Democratic leadership, on the other hand, had to cope with a broad and vocal opposition both in the parliamentary group and in the party rank and file. Consequently it had to tread carefully, which gave its policy a circumspect and defensive character, concentrating on economic benefits and the playing down of wider effects of membership. Membership was also supported by the organizations of agriculture, industry, trade, etc. and, by a quite narrow margin, by the LO, the top organization of organized labor. The press was overwhelmingly for

membership, which was also advocated by the so-called Committee for Danish Affiliation
with the EC (Komiteen for dansk tilslutning til EF).

In contrast, opposition to membership had many anti-establishment characters. Among the political parties this was the position of the Socialist People's Party and the other parties to the left of the Social Democrats; there were also minority groups among the Radicals and the Social Democrats. While the latter group had a separate organization, 'Social Democrats against the EC,' the other opposition groups rallied together in the 'People's Movement against the EC' (Folkebevægelsen imod EF), an organization that aimed much more directly at influencing the mass public than its counterpart. The opposing side was supported by some of the more influential trade unions, such as the General Workers and the Metal Workers, but had little other organizational support; its support in the press was also slight.

The issues raised in the campaign ranged wide and high. In many respects the campaign resembled that of 1962-1963, but it also exhibited its own traits. As ten years earlier, the supporters very much stressed the economic question. They argued that the EC was predominantly an economic community, that Denmark could not afford to be excluded from it now that Britain had become a member, and that membership would prove beneficial for individual sectors (such as agriculture) as well as for society at large. The opponents disputed the claimed benefits, especially in the long run, but tended to concentrate their attention on the political dimension of membership, which, in fact, came to be much more extensively discussed than a decade before. The main argument against was the general loss of sovereignty and self-determination entailed in membership, which would force Denmark into a progressive harmonization of policies, economic and social policy as well as foreign and defense policy. Many opponents objected to the alleged great power aspirations of the EC, to its capitalist image, and to its imperviousness to others' interests, e.g. those of the developing countries, while others followed a less ideological, more home-grown line of argument and concentrated on the dangers of the EC labor market and the risk of Denmark being literally sold to foreigners. Most opponents pointed to a free-trade agreement as a substitute for membership; their main argument, however, was that Denmark should increase her relations with the other Nordic countries and that she should never join the EC as the only Nordic country.

The supporters were somewhat on the defensive in the political arena, though less so than earlier. Their main argument was that while membership would undoubtedly reduce national self-determination in some areas, these areas were closely delimited and did not comprise such sensitive fields as social and economic policy. They also pointed out that the fears of the opponents in relation to land purchases and migrant labor were greatly exaggerated. Further they claimed that security policy would remain a NATO, not an EC issue, and that the ongoing foreign policy consultations among the EC powers were based on an intergovernmental, not a supranational model. They also stressed that as a member Denmark would be able to influence those community decisions vitally important for her whether she joined or not. Among the areas most frequently cited were control of the multinational enterprises and the making of a European environment policy. But typically only few supporters evinced any great enthusiasm for a higher degree of integration than the present. The Nordic issue was quite a problem to the supporters, especially among the Social Democrats (cf. the 1971 party congress resolution on Norway referred to above). Despite heavy criticism the government in 1972 came down on the position that Denmark should join, despite what Norway decided. All supporters agreed that in economic terms neither Nordic cooperation nor a free-trade agreement would be a viable substitute for membership, but that in the case of membership Nordic cooperation should continue and even be expanded.

In the early sixties the cultural aspects of membership played a prominent role in the

debate. The anti-campaign of that time had distinct xenophobic (mainly anti-German and anti-Catholic) overtones. In 1972, these aspects were much less prominent. There were some anti-German and general anti-foreign overtones, especially to the debate on land purchases and immigration of labor, but they did not significantly affect the campaign. Likewise there was almost no talk of cultural danger from membership. More in evidence on the opposition side was a pronounced Nordic identification. Another aspect was the degree to which new 'post-industrial' value norms such as democracy of active participation, the quality of life, etc. were marshaled against membership. Again, the supporters were fighting a somewhat defensive battle, trying to allay the fears of the opponents. They denied that entry was 'anti-Nordic,' and claimed that membership was a precondition for, not a hindrance to a better life for everyone. On the positive side, they also played on the theme of 'joining Europe,' indicating a vague and very general European identification.

6. The Referendum

From the very first moment when results started to be published, the two dominant traits of the referendum were apparent, namely 1) the highest turnout ever in Danish political history (90.1 percent) and 2) a ratio of yes to no votes ranging between 2: 1 and 4 : 1 in nearly all constituencies and municipalities outside the Copenhagen area. In the Greater Copenhagen area⁵ on the other hand there was a slight no majority as shown in Table V.

Even though the latest public opinion polls had clearly predicted the final result (see Figure 2), there was still some uncertainty about the result of the referendum. This was only increased by the outcome of the Norwegian referendum a week before, on September 24-25. In Norway the race between the two sides was closer and the turnout was lower than had been generally expected in Denmark.

The analysis of voting behavior in the referendum runs into some quite difficult problems at present. Thus, a detailed ecological analysis is not possible because the first national census after the Local Government Reform of April 1, 1970, has not as yet been published for sufficiently small geographical units, i.e. the communes. One is therefore referred to analyses based on larger ecological units, such as those proposed by Borre and Stehouwer,⁶ who have divided the Danish constituencies (total of 103) into 11 different types, according to such criteria as social composition, urbanization, and geography. Naturally such an analysis can only give a rough indication of the working of a few ecological factors. This is done in Tables VI and VII.

In Table VI the constituencies of the Greater Copenhagen area are divided according to their being predominantly either working class or middle class. The Table shows a significantly lower degree of support in working-class constituencies than in middle-class constituencies, and also a significantly lower rate of support in the central constituencies in comparison with those more peripheral.

The remaining 67 constituencies outside the Greater Copenhagen area have been divided into seven groups in Table VII. The three largest provincial cities are taken together. EC support is lowest here, but even in this group more than half of the voters supported Denmark's entry. The difference in support between the capital and the largest provincial cities is more than 10 percent.

The groups of constituencies including the smaller provincial towns support EC on a clearly higher level, and when we look at the less urbanized areas support is well above the 60 percent mark. This indicates that level of urbanization, as an indicator of social structure, may explain quite a lot of the variation in the EC support.

In the right hand column of Table VII we also find an indication of a geographical
variation. Constituencies in the eastern part of the country (i.e. closer to Copenhagen)
are more likely to have a lower degree of support than constituencies in the western part.

Two surveys concentrating on the referendum are currently being carried out at

Danish institutes of political science, but no results can be given as yet. The projects
have in common a pronounced interest in the influence of the mass media, but apart
from this they differ quite a lot.

In this situation a voting study carried out by some staff members of the Institute of Political Science at the University of Aarhus can be used. The study is a direct follow-up of the voting study carried out for the Danish State Televison in connection with the general election of September 21, 1971, described in the last volume of this yearbook.7

In 1972, as well as in 1971, local voting studies of total electorates were carried out in three different polling districts. These were Hammerum, a rural district in Jutland dominated by the Agrarian Liberals, Dalum, a suburban white-collar district on Funen with an overrepresentation of Conservatives and Radical Liberals compared to the national voting distribution, and Enghave, a working-class district in Copenhagen strongly dominated by the Social Democrats and the socialist parties. The reasons for selecting just these districts, methodological considerations, etc. can be found in the abovementioned article.

When the voters had cast their votes, they were asked by experienced interviewers to fill in a questionnaire in a room nearby.⁸ The questionnaires were filled in by the respondents themselves, but those who wanted it got help. Thus the effect of interviewing was minimized. Men received a blue questionnaire, women a red one. Questions concerned year of birth, occupation, vote in the general election of 1971, vote in the referendum, and finally the most important reason for voting that way.

Data from more than 9000 respondents were coded and processed so fast that the results could be used for the TV broadcast on election night. They have since been published in Danish.⁸ The results of the study are very close to official results from the three districts. Taken together the results from the three districts deviate only little from the overall national vote, but it should be remembered that we have no random sample either of voters or of districts.

This might, partly at least, be due to the fact that the result of the referendum was not known when the questions were answered, one of the great advantages of this design. The classical 'bandwagon' and 'underdog' effects can therefore be ruled out as far as the voting in the referendum is concerned.

Space limitations only allow for presenting a few data from the study. In all three districts there was but little difference between the degree of support from men and women. Also the variations between the age groups were smaller than was expected after the campaign, which some observers had also seen as an expression of a generation conflict. In all three districts support was higher when age was higher, but when in Hammerum 73 percent in the youngest age group (20-29 years) were in support of the EC, and the corresponding figure in Dalum is 57 percent, it is rather difficult to see the EC as a dominant issue in the generation conflict. And in Enghave it was not the youngest group, but those 30-44 years old who had most opponents, 74 percent.¹⁰

When we turn to the relation between occupational status and voting in the referendum (Table VIII), differences between the various groups become more visible. The overall picture is that employers (including farmers) were most in favor of the EC, with 92 percent in Hammerum supporting entry, 82 percent in Dalum, and 45 percent in Enghave. Then follow employees and civil servants, housewives, pensioners, workers, students, etc. This overall picture is also found for each of the three districts with only slight alterations. And the geographical variation of Table VII is also found here: each occupational group has the highest support in Hammerum, about 10 percent lower in Dalum (but still a clear majority in favor of EC), turning into a just as clear majority against the EC in the district of Enghave.

Therefore it is no surprise that the same geographical pattern is found when in Table
IX we consider the voting of the members of the five parties now represented in the

Folketing.¹¹ The three bourgeois parties in all three districts have considerable majorities behind themselves in the EC question, and the geographical variation is as could be expected. But it should be remembered that the west-east ordering of the three districts is identical with an ordering from a less to a heavily urbanized area. The Social Democrats were divided 2 : 1 in Hammerum and Dalum, but in Enghave a majority of the party's voters were against, thereby also opposing the official party line.

If we do standardize the support for the EC in three polling districts by party, in age groups, and in situational groups, it is found that the different party compositions of the districts and the groupings mentioned do explain quite a lot of the variation in EC support among the districts and the groups. On the other hand it also becomes clear that party composition cannot explain the total variation.¹² This knowledge has been utilized in the building of causal models following the Simon-Blalock approach. The testing of these models shows clearly that the interpretation of party as the most important factor (of those analyzed here) in the decision on how to vote in the referendum can be upheld.13 The same result was found by Ole Riis in 1969 when he analyzed the results of a similar study on the referendum on the lowering of voting age from 21 to 18 years.¹⁴

The similarity of these findings indicates that voting behavior in Danish referenda depends primarily upon the 'ordinary' political affiliation of the voter. Findings by Bo Sarlvik in Sweden point in the same direction.¹⁵ If the standpoints of the political parties on the issue in question are known, voters who identify more or less with a given party will be strongly influenced by the standpoint of that party. This general perception of the influence of the political parties will be tested more strictly in connection with the above-mentioned survey in order to see whether or not it is also valid when considering Danish referenda.

7. Epilogue

Fears that the emotions evoked during the campaign would die out only slowly and thai the conflict over the EC would remain a salient issue in Danish politics for a long time in the end proved premature. The clear-cut result of the referendum undoubtedly accounted for part of this, but in part it was also due to the extraordinary event that tool place immediately after the referendum when victorious Prime Minister Krag unexpectedly stepped down to be succeeded by Anker Jørgensen, chairman of the Genera Workers' Union. The new Prime Minister had been a supporter of EC membership ir opposition to his own union. But his identification with the Social Democratic left winj and his trade union background seemed to make him eminently suited to the task ol healing the rifts within the governing party and of mending fences with the Socialisi

People's Party, on whose votes the government was dependent in domestic politics. Whatever the causes, soon after the referendum Denmark was on the way back to normalcy and characteristically enough, January 1, 1973, passed largely unnoticed by supporters as well as opponents of membership.

University of Aarhus

Nikolaj Petersen and Jørgen Elklit

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NOTES

1. Danish Gallup Institute release June 28, 1957.

2. Danish Gallup Institute release August 28, 1958.

3. Gallup average, October 1971-February 1972, in Berlingske Tidende, March 30, 1972.

4. Ibid., OBSERVA polls March 1972 and September 1972, in Aktuelt, March 27, 1972, and Jyllands-Posten, September 20, 1972.

5. The Greater Copenhagen area consists of the City of Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, and the counties of Copenhagen, Roskilde, and Frederiksborg.

6. Ole Borre and Jan Stehouwer, Fire folketingsvalg, 1960—68, Århus: Akademisk Boghandel, 1970, pp. 252 f. The original 11 groups have changed a little since the Local Government Reform.

7. Jørgen Elklit, Ole Riis, and Ole Tonsgaard, 'Local Voting Studies of Total Electorates: The Danish General Election of 1971', Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 7, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972, pp. 191-213.

8. In Hammerum 2626 voters (86.8 percent of the 3024 voting) answered the questionnaire. In Dalum 3699 (82.9 percent of the 4461 voting), and in Enghave 2881 (76.1 percent of the 3787 voting). Turnout in Hammerum was 92.8 percent, in Dalum 91.0 percent, and in Enghave 88.6 percent.

9. Ole Borre and Jørgen Elklit, 'Nogle resultater fra TVA's analyse af EF-folkeafstemnincen'. Økonomi os Politik 46 (1972), pp. 256-274.

10. See Borre and Elklit, op. cit., pp. 262 ff.

11. The voting in the referendum by the voters of the minor parties is found in Borre and Elklit, op. cit., Table 6, pp. 265 f.

12. Ibid., pp. 268 ff.

13. Ibid., pp. 271-274.

14. Ole Riis, 'Folkeafstemningen om 18 års valgret', Økonomi og Politik 43 (1969), pp. 227-230.

15. In 'Opinionsbildningen vid folkomrostningen 1957', SOU 1959:10.