A Model of the Rise of Populism and Support for the Finnish Rural Party

RISTO SÄNKIAHO
University of Tampere

1. Introduction

> "Our party considers everything to be based on man and the family. Every man and every life is valuable."
>
> *Program of the Finnish Rural Party*

The great upsurge in support for Veikko Vennamo's Finnish Rural Party between 1966 and 1970 not only astonished political pundits but generated considerable scientific interest – here was a unique opportunity to study the growth of a vigorous political movement which managed to increase its electoral support from only 1 % in 1966 to over 10 % in 1970 and its number of seats in the Finnish Parliament from one to eighteen.

'Vennamoism' (Finn., 'vennamolaisuus') seemed to contain so many of the characteristic features of a populist movement that attention was focused on studies relating to populism, in particular those contained in the collection of essays resulting from the transactions of the London conference in 1967.[1] Most of the studies centered, however, on the nature of populism or the structure of the support base and failed to develop any basis for an examination of the origin of populism.

The definition of populism offered by G. Hall at the conference provides both a clear image of populism and direction for the study of the origins of such movements:

> "Populist movements are movements aimed at power for the benefit of the people as a whole which result from the reaction of those, usually intellectuals, alienated from the existing power structure, to the stresses of rapid economic, social, cultural or political change. These movements are characterized by a belief in a return to, or adaptation of, more simple and traditional forms and values emanating from the people, particularly the more archaic sections of the people who are taken to be the repository of virtue."[2]

Mention should be added to the definition of the changes causing alienation which occur within the borders of a particular country, for it is precisely this type of alienation, resulting from internal changes and the consequent inequalities, which distinguishes populism most clearly from fascist mass movements, which usually spring from international crises. Fascist movements give expression to changes in the

A Model of the Rise
of Populism and Support for
the Finnish Rural Party

RISTO SÄNKIAHO
University of Tampere

1. Introduction

> "Our party considers everything to be based on man and the family. Every man and every life is valuable."
>
> *Program of the Finnish Rural Party*

The great upsurge in support for Veikko Vennamo's Finnish Rural Party between 1966 and 1970 not only astonished political pundits but generated considerable scientific interest – here was a unique opportunity to study the growth of a vigorous political movement which managed to increase its electoral support from only 1 % in 1966 to over 10 % in 1970 and its number of seats in the Finnish Parliament from one to eighteen.

'Vennamoism' (Finn., 'vennamolaisuus') seemed to contain so many of the characteristic features of a populist movement that attention was focused on studies relating to populism, in particular those contained in the collection of essays resulting from the transactions of the London conference in 1967.[1] Most of the studies centered, however, on the nature of populism or the structure of the support base and failed to develop any basis for an examination of the origin of populism.

The definition of populism offered by G. Hall at the conference provides both a clear image of populism and direction for the study of the origins of such movements:

> "Populist movements are movements aimed at power for the benefit of the people as a whole which result from the reaction of those, usually intellectuals, alienated from the existing power structure, to the stresses of rapid economic, social, cultural or political change. These movements are characterized by a belief in a return to, or adaptation of, more simple and traditional forms and values emanating from the people, particularly the more archaic sections of the people who are taken to be the repository of virtue."[2]

Mention should be added to the definition of the changes causing alienation which occur within the borders of a particular country, for it is precisely this type of alienation, resulting from internal changes and the consequent inequalities, which distinguishes populism most clearly from fascist mass movements, which usually spring from international crises. Fascist movements give expression to changes in the

status of a nation defeated in a war or to some other external threat, usually the fear of Communism. Populist movements, on the other hand, are more expressly concerned in their propaganda with purely domestic issues.

Research has shown that many of the social and psychological characteristics of the support bases for fascist and populist movements are quite similar.[3] But they are clearly distinct with regard to the geographical cores from which they receive their impetus and spread. Movements of the fascist type have begun in developed centers (e.g., Munich or the industrial areas of northern Italy), while populist movements emanated from the more peripheral rural areas. For this reason any attempt to explain the rise of populism should also examine phenomena at the societal level where some of these distinctive features of populism may be observed.

Although the studies presented at the London conference focused primarily on the history of populist movements or on various social aspects of the support base, some sought to identify the factors giving rise to populism. One of the most distinctive factors which generates populism is general modernization and other factors related to it, such as industrialization.[4] Further, with reference to the individual level, many researchers noted the effects of alienation, which are clearly related to populist support.[5]

In his work *The Politics of Mass Society*, Kornhauser also identified the sources of proliferation of populist movements. In his opinion, the factors which pertain to the general effects of modernization are crucial, producing, along with increasing industrialization, vast differences in regional levels of development as well as differences in the structure of social norms.[6]

In several studies of populism, alienation is clearly recognized as a factor influencing populist support. For this reason it is fruitful to consider alienation as one of the main factors in explaining the rise of populism.[7]

2. Political Alienation

Studies of political alienation have involved both theoretical explanations and empirical attempts to outline the various contributing factors. The empirical studies have generally been based on factor analyses of survey data and have sought to identify the underlying aspects of alienation in the form of dimensionality. Perhaps the most noted exposition of factors contributing to a form of alienation is the classificatory scheme constructed by Melvin Seeman from literature and research which he conducted. The categories which he outlined are: powerlessness over the environment, meaninglessness of life's alternatives, normlessness of individual conduct, isolation from cultural and social institutions, and self-estrangement from one's own role.[8]

Dwight G. Dean listed slightly different types of alienation: powerlessness, normlessness, social isolation and alienation.[9] Ada W. Finifter defined political alienation as political powerlessness, political meaninglessness, anomie and political isolation, in

addition to the two empirically derived types, powerlessness and normlessness.[10] Arthur G. Neil and Salomon Retting identified the following factors in alienation from a factor analysis of attitudinal data: powerlessness, inevitability of war, political normlessness, economic normlessness, anomie, personal freedom, communal values, competitive mobility-orientation and intrinsic values.[11]

Marvin E. Olson divides alienation into two main categories – incapability and discontentment – which are subdivided into three groups. Incapability is characterized by guidelessness, powerlessness and meaninglessness, while discontentment may be termed dissimilarity, dissatisfaction and disillusionment.[12]

Many comparable features may be identified in each of the schemes attempting to typify alienation, but, as such, they do not serve as a point of departure for research which seeks to identify the factors which cause political alienation to appear.

In some of the above-mentioned studies (and in some to be mentioned later) the most significant factors contributing to alienation appear to be related to social change and its associated effects. Modernization with its industrializing and bureaucratizing effects seems to be the most commonly recognized factor causing alienation.[13]

The most recent literature on the subject has virtually rejected the notion of alienation as a set of diverse psychological effects; the subjective concepts of alienation have been replaced by the more objective concept of reification whereby interpersonal relations are no longer to be conceived as social relations but as social processes.[14]

3. A Model of the Rise of Populism

The basis for a theoretical model concerning the rise of populism has not been possible from research pertaining to alienation as such, but must be constructed from theories relating to entire social systems.

One point of departure might be the fourfold structure of the levels of societal development suggested by Erik Allardt[15], while another might be based on the Parsonian paradigm of structural-functional explanation for social action.[16] Allardt's fourfold system was formed by combining Émile Durkheim's dual concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity with the two typologies of social organization 'Gesellschaft' and 'Gemeinschaft' suggested by Ferdinand Tönnies.[17]

In Allardt's table (Figure 1), the greatest amount of alienation may be found in cell 2, which he characterizes as mass society. The process of social development – a change from cell 1 (traditional society) to cell 2 (mass society) – is, in part, a form of social upheaval which many scholars consider to be associated with the rise of populism.[18]

In one of his articles, Allardt incorporated the system of four hierarchically arranged dimensions of collective action presented by Neil J. Smelser into his fourfold table. The lowest in the hierarchy is the classification which is termed

DIVISION OF LABOR

	Low	High
Strong PRESSURE TOWARD UNIFORMITY	1. Strong solidarity: situation of mechanical solidarity. Traditional or tribal society.	3. Weak solidarity: situation of coercion. Oligarchic society.
Weak	2. Weak solidarity: situation of anomie. Mass society.	4. Strong solidarity: situation of organic solidarity. Pluralistic society.

Figure 1. Fourfold Structure of the Levels of Societal Development Suggested by Erik Allardt.

situational facilities, which are affected by the mobilization into organized roles at the second level; these are in turn affected by norms which are conditioned by values at the highest level.[19] From these forms of social action, Allardt has developed a cumulative system outlining the various degrees of alienation, where "uncertainty concerning values (or goals, purposes, and so forth) may be labeled as meaninglessness, uncertainty regarding norms (or institutionalized means) as anomic alienation, uncertainty regarding roles (or motives, and so forth), as self-alienation, and uncertainty regarding situational facilities as situational alienation."[20] The forms are presented in Table I. Their combination with Allardt's table may be seen in Figure 2.[21]

This study also includes various types of alienation outlined in Parsons' AGIL system, which serves as a slightly different descriptive reference than the one mentioned by Allardt above. The cell labeled latency (L), containing pattern maintenance and tension management, may be considered to be a form of attitudinal or evaluation alienation (i. e., alienation from values and attitudes which affect the various types of social action belonging to the cell, such as the family or educational institutions).

In the cell denoting integration (I), alienation is considered to be norm alienation, while alienation derived from the cell on goal attainment (G) may be defined

Table I. Cumulative Pattern of the Different Forms of Alienation

Forms of Alienation	Uncertainty Regarding			
	Values	Norms	Roles	Situation
Meaninglessness	+	+	+	+
Anomic alienation	—	+	+	+
Self-alienation	—	—	+	+
Situational alienation	—	—	—	+
No alienation	—	—	—	—

DIVISION OF LABOR

	Low	High
High pressure toward uniformity	1. Small amount of alienation	3. Powerlessness: Alienation from the total social system but not from individuals and peers. If mobilized, individuals will strive to change the power structure
Uncertainty as regards social values social norms role expectations situational facilities	2. Uprootedness: Alienation of the following forms (a) meaningless-ness Grave (b) anomic alienation (c) self-alienation (d) situational Slight alienation	4. Small amount of alienation

Figure 2. Cumulative Pattern of the Different Forms of Alienation in Allardt's Fourfold Table.

as a type of goal alienation closely approximating evaluation alienation. From these alienation types in cells L, I and G, it is possible to describe a cumulative pattern similar to that outlined by Allardt (Table II). The individual who is goal alienated should also experience evaluation and norm alienation. The factors in Allardt's scheme (see Table I) and the theoretical and empirical forms mentioned under political alienation resemble these types of alienation to a large extent.

The type of alienation in the cell labeled adaptation (A) may be termed means alienation for the purposes of this study, but has slightly different dimensions than those of the types mentioned above. Means alienation is both a form of social alienation, whereby the individual lacks the means to function competently in the social sector, and a form of economic alienation, where the individual does not have any kind of approved or estimated means of providing for his subsistence.

Table II. Cumulative Pattern of Alienation in Social Function

Alienation in social function	Alienation in		
	Attitudes	Norms	Goals
G	+	+	+
I	+	+	—
L	+	—	—
No alienation = ---			

The AGIL system of Parsons used in this study is applied in a way different from the model proposed by Lipset and Rokkan to explain the origin of political cleavages in Western democracies. The approach outlined here and dimensions used in the Lipset and Rokkan study are similar to the extent that they are both concerned with explanations for the origins of conflicts between the functions of goal attainment and integration in the social system.[22]

When explaining the rise of populism with Parsons' scheme, various factors from different levels may be used in an explanatory model. As a point of departure for an explanation of the rise of Nazism, Parsons used the process of rationalization and rapid changes in environment and social structure. He describes their influence on the individual level with such intervening variables as widespread insecurity, anomie, debunking and denial of traditional authority, which effect such behavior as susceptibility to propaganda, moral laxity and sexualism. Through these intervening factors and the variables at the individual level, the changes at the level of the collectivity have influenced the support for Nazism.[23]

The model of the rise of populism originates from the collective level where general modernization effects the various other factors, which on the other hand may be characterized as factors effecting modernization. According to Allardt's fourfold table, this model would be located in the cell containing the types of alienation in Smelser's explanatory model (Figures 1 and 2). The factors which are entered into the model from the collective level include information (by which


Figure 3. A Model of the Rise of Populism.

is meant information occurring at the national level), migration, industrialization (which organically includes urbanization), and the political system, which deals primarily with the level of the party. Naturally, these factors also have a mutual effect on each other. The political system in particular influences these other factors.

The individual level contains the various types of alienation influenced by the collective level factors in the manner outlined above. Thus, different alienation forms have an effect on individual behavior, in this case support for populism. These effects are primarily means and goal alienation. According to the cumulative effects of the various alienation types, goal alienated individuals also experience norm and evaluation alienation.

A distinction may be made between supporters of fascist movements, which are experiencing evaluation alienation or norm alienation, and supporters of populist movements, which, on the other hand, are means and goal alienated people. First, one may note the factors at the collective level which condition support for fascist movements. Because, according to the literature, fascists feel that traditional values and the prestige of their own status is declining, persons supporting such movements may be termed evaluation or norm alienated.[24] Secondly, as a point of reference, the origin of fascist movements may be located in cell 3 of Allardt's table (Figure 1), just as the origin of populism was found in cell 2.

The model also contains a level of small group influence, which has shown itself to be important when investigating political behavior and, especially, support for populism.[25] The influence of the small group is considered in this sense to be in a key position. The influence of the collective level factors on support for populism constitutes a necessary condition, while the small group influence is a sufficient condition.

The birth of populist movements is distinct from other parties at the national level, for it needs a charismatic leader as the main ideological disseminator, a feature which is very different in many respects from the customary party leader influence.[26]

By contrast, the opinion leader is a key influential at the level of the small group, for here he has a great deal of influence as an information disseminator, especially in the periphery. It has been shown in other societies that the spread of political information occurs by means of a two-staged information process.[27] The characteristics of the periphery sustain the great influence of this type of information dissemination in areas such as these.[28]

4. The Model and the Finnish Rural Party

4.1. *The Effects of Information*

The effect of information as an alienating factor has been the focus of numerous studies. Radio and television, in particular, have been noted as alienating society.

According to Harold Wilensky, television has the greatest mass effect.[29] McLeod, Ward and Tancill found in their research that television and radio have more effect on alienation than any of the other mass media.[30] The extensive research project conducted by the Finnish Broadcasting Company in Finnish Lapland, where television was not introduced until the 1960's, showed that television has produced alienation among the population of the area. Television viewers were noticeably alienated, while those who had not watched television were no more alienated than before the extension of TV programming to the area.[31]

In Finland, information at the national level has, in part, changed rural society from that of a village to a mass society. Where information was once received solely from the local village environment, it has now begun to come from outside the local community, which, of course, weakens the pre-existent uniform normative structure.

After the Civil War, the norms of the agricultural community predominated, largely because the victorious white army was composed of farmers while the opposing reds represented the urbanized portion of the population. Until the decade of the 60's, school textbooks and films mainly reflected the views upheld by the normative structure of the farming population.[32] Television was the first communication medium to disseminate urban norms. Broadcasting activity began in Helsinki as a private experiment and, although the enterprise later came under the auspices of the state, programming was still centered on the national capital.

The urban norms transmitted by TV broadcasting generated considerable alienation in the rural areas. This took on the general form of evaluation alienation when the totally different viewpoints of the urban areas were contrasted with those of the countryside. Research has shown that the more liberal values and norms pertaining to sexual behavior have caused a great deal of concern in these areas. In the opinion of the populist, rural society embodies all that is good and worthwhile, whereas the city life is a reflection of evil and decadence.[33]

The information coming from TV about the higher standard of living in urban and southern Finland, relative to the eastern and northern regions, has contributed towards alienation to some extent.[34] This has most certainly been intensified by the advertisements on the Broadcasting Company's commercial network, because commercials are often considered to be accurate reflections of life in the richer sections of the country, not the fanciful pictures of plenty created by urban advertisers.

4. 2. *The Effects of Migration*

The influence of migration has resulted in part from the effects of information, for the children who have moved to population centers have, during visits to their former homes, brought back impressions of urban life and its normative structure, which have in turn had an influence on norm alienation in the countryside. Perhaps the greatest effect of migration has been the disintegration of family life.

In those areas where the Finnish Rural Party (FRP) received its strongest support in the 1970 parliamentary elections, family farms accounted for 90–100 % of all farmsteads, while the corresponding figures for the southern part of the country was between 30 and 50 per cent.[35] As a result of the settlement activity following the Second World War approximately 100,000 new small farms (2.5–5.0 hectares) were created, which by the 1960's were no longer able to provide sustenance for all members of the farming family. For this reason the children were forced to move to the urban centers in search of employment. This breakup of the family farm has strongly affected the outlook of the rural population, for it is those sets of attitudes relating to family life in particular which have undergone considerable change.

The decline in population resulting from migration has not only effected the farming families; its effect has been felt throughout the countryside. This decrease has resulted in a reduced level of services which could be offered to the population in the area and an increase in local taxation caused by demands on the smaller population to finance such expenditures as education, welfare and health care. The profitableness of business declined markedly as the population dwindled and many small enterprises were forced to discontinue their business. This feeling that the end of the world is at hand has even reached the non-agricultural rural middle classes, with the cumulative effect being a significant increase in these regions in the potential support group for mass movements.

Migration has also had an alienating effect on the uprooted who come under a great deal of normative cross-pressure in their new places of residence. Having been socialized into the rural normative system, they are not immediately able to accept the new urban values and norms. Several studies have suggested that these new arrivals from the countryside are more susceptible to various mass movements than are their counterparts who have grown up in an urban environment.[36]

4. 3. *The Effects of Industrialization*

Industrialization has also been considered an extremely important factor effecting support for populism.[37] Industrialization causes means alienation among the farming population which finds it increasingly difficult to earn a living in the new industrial society. The most notable consequence of industrialization has been the increase in the role of bureaucracy, which several studies have shown to cause alienation.[38] Bureaucratization generates a sense of powerlessness, which may be termed a special feature of means alienation. Under such circumstances the alienated person does not feel that he has the means to influence those matters which will effect him.

Industrialization causes many forms of centralization in an industrializing society. This tendency toward concentration of resources effects the various material and intellectual services, with the result, as Finnish studies have shown, that they become unevenly concentrated in certain areas of the country.[39] As a consequence,

the differences in the degrees of development between the regions have increased and with the spread of information have become salient to more and more people.

The efforts of the Finnish government to promote agriculture have been a subject of much controversy, for at the same time as the Settlement Board, headed by Vennamo, was creating new farmsteads, it was becoming apparent that they were economically unprofitable. In Finland, agriculture received more support as a way of life than as a way of living, a fact which permitted the Agrarian Party (later the Center Party) to maintain strong electoral support throughout the 1950's. Industrialization has resulted in a decrease in the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture in all countries and, as a consequence, in a marked decline in support for agrarian parties. The Social Democratic Party, which entered the cabinet after its strong comeback in the 1966 elections, proceeded to adopt policies more favorable to industry and yield to demands for a reduction in support for agriculture.

Between the elections of 1966 and 1970, many of the measures designed to solve the agricultural problem were carried out very clumsily, contributing to an increase in both norm alienation and means alienation among the agrarian population. Norm alienation was especially effected by the implementation of the soil bank programmes, whereby farmers received payment for leaving some of their fields fallow (for about $50 per hectare annually). The economic effects of this measure were insignificant, for only a very small share of the fields were left uncultivated and naturally only those fields which were the least productive; but the program had a great effect on norm alienation. The cultural heritage extending from the Civil War to the present had stressed farming as practically the only morally acceptable occupation, and now farmers were being paid to abstain from planting their fields! The prestige of the vocation was even further depreciated when parliament voted in the 1960's to discontinue payment to farmers for clearing forest and marsh land for cultivation. Vennamo described this effect on the system of norms when he said that crimes had been committed against agriculture. The glib response of the Social Democrats with such political slogans as "eat a cow a day" and "down with farming" had further effect on the attitudes of the agrarian population.

The agriculture tax reform, which was carried out under the supervision of the Social Democrats, had a considerable effect on the attitudes of the agrarian population. Where agricultural taxation had been a form of property tax based on the area of the farm, the new law taxed farmers on the basis of their actual income. When the reform went into effect, the tax paid by many farmers increased sharply, with the burden felt more by the smallholders than by the large landowners. A surcharge on the already onerous tax rate was collected from the farmers at the beginning of 1970 just before the elections, a situation which Vennamo turned masterfully to his own advantage by attacking the Center Party in his campaign speeches and publications as one of the instigators of the new tax measures in Parliament.

Industrialization has also resulted in Finland, as elsewhere, in the growth of

retail chains which have weakened the competitive position of the small business-man and consequently his status in society. Because there is no strongly integrating middle class movement, the representatives of this class are typical supporters of populist movements in certain crisis situations.[40]

In all societies an important aspect of industrialization is urbanization, which, through its atomization effects, generates forms of alienation.[41] Urbanization creates a completely new type of society – from a form of *Gemeinschaft* to new forms of *Gesellschaft* – where the normative structure and the functions of law are totally different from what they were in the older agrarian society. The trans-mission of these new norms – and the alienation which they produce – has already been discussed above.

4. 4. *The Effects of Political Sector*

The activities of the political parties in Finland during the 1960's had a very great effect on goal attainment, producing, as a result, forms of goal alienation among the electorate.

The decision of the Agrarian Party to change its name to Center Party in 1965 and its attempt to increase its support, not only in the countryside but in the urban centers as well, had an effect 'on its voters in the rural areas. The Center Party assumed that its supporters would remain faithful to the party. At the time there appeared to be no clear alternatives in sight, for the support for all the other parties was overwhelmingly concentrated in the population centers. With the popu-lation of the cities and towns increasing rapidly as a result of migration, the Center Party had no other choice than to compensate for the decline in its support by strengthening its base in the more populated areas of the country. In 1966, Veikko Vennamo countered by changing the name of his Smallholder's Party – founded in 1959 – to the Finnish Rural Party, thereby seeking to step into the void in the countryside left by the Center Party. The attempted move of the Center Party into the urban areas served to estrange the rural population further, because many no longer believed that this party could represent their special interests. During his political campaigns, Vennamo made special reference to these changing tactics of the Center Party and hailed the Finnish Rural Party as the only acceptable alternative for the rural population and as the only party embodying the intellectual principles of Santeri Alkio, founder of the Agrarian Party. This made it easier for voters to shift their support to the FRP; they need not consider this as a change in party allegiance, but rather as a continuation of Alkio's spiritual idealism.

When the Communist-dominated Democratic League of the People of Finland (DLPF) entered the government after the 1966 elections, the reaction was one of confusion and alienation among its supporters. For over twenty years the party had drawn voter support by being an opposition protest party which could be counted on to criticize vigorously any government whatever. But by participating in the government, the party was forced to alter its propaganda completely and thereby lost some of its influence among its supporters.

During the 1966 "protest election", the sympathy of the electorate was clearly on the side of the Social Democratic Party, which, because it had been in the opposition, managed to increase its support from 19.5 % in 1962 to 27.2 %. But after the 1966 election, these protest voters switched allegiance from SDP to the new opposition parties.

In many respects, the presidential election in 1968 had a significant effect on Vennamo's popularity. Because only three candidates were running (the incumbent president, Urho Kekkonen, who ran in an electoral alliance formed by the Democratic League of the People of Finland (DLPF), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Social Democratic Union of Workers and Small Farmers (SUWS), and the Center Party (CP), and in a second alliance composed of only the Liberal People's Party (LPP); Matti Virkkunen, a bank director, who was supported by the National Coalition Party (NCP) and part of the Swedish People's Party (SPP); and the Finnish Rural Party candidate, Veikko Vennamo), Vennamo was able to appear on national radio and television as often as the other candidates and even managed to get good publicity in the other mass media.

To a certain extent the supporters of the leftist parties were forced to cast their votes for Vennamo, because these parties had failed to put up their own candidates. By endorsing Kekkonen, they created goal alienation; many parties – especially the SDP – had strongly attacked the president for many years, but now their supporters were being asked to adjust to the new political arrangements and vote for him.[42]

4. 5. *The Small Group Effects*

In the model of the origin of populism, one of the contributing factors was the effect of the small group, which is, as a rule, a significant factor in political behavior. The role of the primary group is especially important when attempting to explain the appearance of populism; the local information in particular, which circulates in small groups, has been shown to be a crucial factor in determining the support for populist movements.[43] The medium best used by the populist in disseminating his ideas is usually "face-to-face" communication. As Peter Worsley mentioned: "They did not have to 'go to the people', for if they were not of the people – as many were – they were living in their midst."[44]

In a study of the FRP support in North Karelia in the parliamentary elections of 1962, 1966 and 1970, the effects of local information can be seen very clearly. Support was concentrated, on the one hand, in areas where its candidates resided, and, on the other, in areas where local branches of the party had been founded in 1959 and 1960.[45]

The effect of the superstructure of the model (social change and its associated factors) on the psychological level – and thereby on support for populism – may be considered as being a necessary condition for such movements; but only the directed effect of the small group in this movement is a sufficient condition for

causing an individual to transfer support to this type of party or movement. In villages where the FRP received its greatest support, the local opinion leader was apparently in a key position where he could influence the opinions of the entire village. The investigation in North Karelia found that either the whole village had supported Vennamo or that, practically speaking, no one had voted for the FRP. In neighboring villages with similar social structures the proportion of the votes cast for the FRP might vary by as much as 50 per cent![46]

In cases where voters switch from one party to another, face-to-face communication is a very effective means of transmitting information, due in part to the inability of other media to reach these marginal voters.[47]

In Finland during the 1960's, there were vast changes in the countryside which explain why the former information net of the Center/Agrarian Party was not able to function with the same efficiency as it had done during the 50's. By the early 1960's, standard of living differences were beginning to be felt even in the countryside, where, despite the inequalities in land distribution, they were, at worst, latent. Gradually, however, the mechanization of agriculture and forestry changed this situation. In farming, the efficiency of the large holdings improved substantially, while, as a result of the decline in the employment opportunities in forestry before the winter season, the wage earnings of the small proprietors decreased markedly. In 1967–68, the mechanization in forestry generated a great deal of unemployment in precisely those areas with a high proportion of smallholders. A form of relative deprivation was now occurring in rural Finland as the small farmer was able to compare his own deteriorating position with the improved living standards of the large landowners. This only served to embitter him further.[48]

The network of organizational volunteers in the Center/Agrarian Party (one volunteer to every commune and one or more beneath him in every precinct, which averages about 250 voters in the countryside) was created in the agricultural society of the 1940's and 1950's, when the opinion leader had traditionally been the large landowning agrarian patriot. The change to a mass society and the effects of the great differences in standards of living on the attitudes of the smallholders caused them to be alienated from each other. The small proprietor no longer listened to the Center Party representatives, whose socio-economic status was distinctly higher than the average in the rural areas. These Center Party organizers were no longer able to speak the language of the people.[49]

Insofar as they were unable to touch on topics of interest to their constituents, all the parties, with the exception of the FRP, were removed from the people. Influenced by Johannes Virolainen, chairman of the Center Party and Minister of Education after 1968, one of the main themes of the Center Party became administrative reform in higher education, a topic which was totally foreign to the rural population and which further served to alienate former Center Party voters and cause them to transfer their support to the Rural Party. By contrast, Vennamo developed much simpler themes and used a more rustic form of speech in his campaigning than did the objects of his attacks, the so-called 'old parties'; people understood his slogans of 'seize the bandits', 'end unemployment', 'end abuse',

'oppose monopoly capitalism' and 'on behalf of the forgotten people', etc. From his correspondence and continuing contacts with the settled population, Vennamo was able to draw liberally from those messages which got through to the people.

5. The Effects of the Model

Unfortunately, no survey data have been collected which could test the model and which could be combined with ecological data for an examination of the effects of social development. For this reason, the model cannot be tested in its entirety, nor can a causal chain of the actual measured interrelationships be presented. A possible test may be carried out in a manner similar to that done by Ira S. Rohter in his explanation of the effects of personality variables on radical right-ism.[50] The correlation between traditional values and anomie which Rohter presents in his model is similar to the relationship assumed to be operating in this model: persons adhering to traditional agrarian norms are alienated when they receive information about other norm structures.[51] In the absence of testable data, the model may be compared with other models producing similar results, as in the case of the Rohter model, and thereby some partial confirmation may be achieved corresponding to reality.

In his article "Alienation, Membership, and Political Knowledge: A Comparative Study", Melvin Seeman referred to the possibility of studying the effects of the social structure on the psychological factors at the individual level and their further effect on the behavior of the individual, which is fundamental to the model under discussion.[52] Certain studies on populism and other mass movements, on the other hand, have mentioned some of the factors in the model which are causal factors of alienation at the social level. Modernization and industry are those most frequently mentioned.[53]

Research has found that under conditions of social change, certain groups are more susceptible to alienation than others. These marginal groups are the middle class and especially the independent small businessmen and small farmers of whom it is comprised.[54] Both of these groups are characterized by a low degree of internal integration, due principally to the absence of organizations which could more strongly attach them to the society and which could reinforce their sense that their group had prestige and would be consulted on decisions of social importance.[55]

These marginal groups, whose behavior is difficult to predict, create an unstable situation in the society.[56] Alienated and poorly integrated people belonging to these marginal groups find a new group in the mass movement with which they may identify through participation. For the individual, these new groups serve as a form of protection against rootlessness under alienating circumstances.[57]

Many studies done on the behavior of alienated groups and individuals have sought to explain both the validity of the model and the influence of the model on political behavior. Other works have noted how the political affiliation of

anomic people changes or how the politically passive person may be mobilized into a spontaneous mass movement.[58] According to Parsons, anomic individuals change by moving toward the right ideologically, a tendency which holds for many populist movements; both Vennamoism and Poujadism received a considerable number of voters from the traditional leftist parties.[59]

The alienated are usually mobilized into a political movement because they are against something, not because they are for anything.[60] It is precisely this characteristic of populist movements which makes them antagonistic toward certain institutions and organizations. Politically these movements oppose both the right and the left and the products of modernization, namely urbanization and industrialization.[61] In spite of their opposition to urbanization, populist movements also manage to recruit supporters from the cities, but generally from voters who have only recently moved there.[62] These movements are indeed serving the interests of the common man.[63]

Under conditions of complete alienation (i.e., means or goal alienation), a person is inclined to cling tightly to the old and lasting normative structure, such as religion. A strong stress on religiosity is a feature of populist movements of the Vennamo variety.[64]

In part, this emphasis on preserving religious values is a part of the struggle against the secular urban normative structure.[65] Perhaps the trust placed in charismatic leaders is one of the consequences of this religious aspect. Pierre Poujade, Joseph McCarthy and Veikko Vennamo, among others, are examples of such charismatic leaders in movements since the Second World War.

Religion is not the only area where populist movements attempt to preserve traditional values; the intellectual content of these movements also reflects a distinct primitivism and opposition to all modernizing tendencies. This primitivism leads to isolationism, particularly on foreign policy issues, and to a localism with respect to domestic politics.[66]

According to research done recently, FRP supporters are, with respect to both social structure and political attitudes, typical of supporters of populist movements. The FRP support group is primarily made up of small farmers and small businessmen. The party receives rather broad support in the cities, but these votes come predominantly from persons who have lived there only a short time. Only about 4 % of the FRP's support base in 1968 had lived over 15 years in an urban area.[67]

An examination was made of the attitudes of the FRP supporters using survey data collected by the Finnish Broadcasting Company in the spring of 1968 ($N = 1040$). A factor analysis of 31 attitude questions produced five factors, on which the various party support groups were placed according to the factor scores outlined in Figure 4 (the scores were computed with $\bar{x} = 500$ and $s = 100$).

The position of the Rural Party on the various factors reveals very distinctive populist features. On the most important factor, labeled radical/conservative, it is located exactly between left and right. On the tough/tender-minded factor it is clearly the most tough-minded of the support groups. Alienated individuals easily become tough-minded.[68]

```
        NC   LPP              CP    FRP            SDP              DLPF
         T    T                T     T              T                T
|_____|
400                              500                                   600
     radical                                          conservative


                                    DLPF
              FRP   CP              TSDP  NC           LPP
               T     T              | T    T            T
|_____|
400                              500                                   600
     tough-minded                                    tender-minded


                         LPP
                         NC
                         CP         FRP SDP DLPF
                          T          T   T   T
|_____|
400                              500                                   600
     cooperation                                     conflict


                              CP              NC
              FRP  DLPF TSDP          LPP
               T    T    | T           T
|_____|
400                              500                                   600
     local patriotism                                internationalism


                                    NC
              DLPF             SDP T LPP  FRP   CP
               T                T  | T     T     T
|_____|
400                              500                                   600
     modernism                                       tradition-bound
                                                     authoritarianism
```

Figure 4. Attitudes of Supporters of Main Finnish Parties on Five Different Factors According to Factor Scores (Mean of Factor Scores in Whole Sample is 500 and Distribution 100)

On the dimension internationalism/local patriotism, the FRP was located at the extreme reflecting local loyalties in true populist fashion.[69] Along the continuum tradition-bound authoritarianism/modernism, the average for the Rural Party supporters was more toward the modernism pole than was the value for the Center Party, probably resulting from the FRP getting more urban support than the Center Party.

FRP supporters were found to be more alienated than the others when private attitudes were examined. For example, with the question "one doesn't know whom to trust nowadays", 83 % of those preferring the FRP strongly agreed or agreed a little, while the corresponding values for the other main parties were NC 76 % (N = 132), SDP 75 % (N = 229), Center Party 73 % (N = 158), DLPF 70 % (N = 77), and Liberal Party 65 % (N = 49).

6. Poujadism in Light of the Model

Unfortunately, information on the rise of Poujadism in the 1956 elections to the French Assembly, which might serve as a test of the populist model, is based on the

findings of only one study.[70] Although the effect of information on the rise of populism was not outlined in Hoffman's book, television broadcasting had increased dramatically just before the impressive Poujadist election victory. Between 1951 and 1956, the number of television licenses increased from 4,000 to 442,000. Similarly, the number of licenses issued in Finland between 1960 and 1965 rose from 92,524 to 731,986. It would seem that the information transmitted by French television had an effect on general alienation – and thereby on support for Poujadism – similar to that noted in Finland.

Population movements have also been shown to be an important factor in determining support for Poujadism. The new party received its greatest strength in those areas which had lagged behind in development, and from which large numbers of people had moved to industrial areas.[71]

The influence of industrialization, one of the most important variables explaining support for populist movements, also explains Poujadist support rather well. This party received its greatest voting support in areas which had apparently been left behind by the other industrializing parts of the country. In the traditional industrial areas, the Poujadists failed to receive much support; the traditional labor parties managed to retain the allegiance of their voters.[72]

In the Isère département, where industrialization had only recently occurred – and then very rapidly – the Poujadists were very successful, the apparent consequence of the alienating effects of rapid change.[73]

As a result of the effects of industrial and social centralization, the retail outlet chains expanded rapidly in France during the early part of the 1950's, placing the small shopkeepers in difficult straits.[74] The position of this group was made even more difficult by the tax reforms which were carried out. From the state's point of view, this future worsening of the economic situation through increased taxation has a great effect on the voters and causes shifts in allegiance away from the government parties, while for the populist leaders tax increases are important weapons to be used against the parties of the government. This is precisely what Poujade did in France and Vennamo in Finland.[75]

The alienating effect of the political sector in France during the early 1950's was quite evident – the international prestige of the country had been noticeably damaged by the war in Indochina and the former great power had become a second class power. It was accompanied by great changes in internal politics. During the life of the Fourth Republic, governments came and went with no long-term political coalitions being formed in the manner of the Popular Front during the Third Republic. The disappearance of Gaullism from the political picture in the 1950's gave the Poujadists the possibility of increasing their support – DeGaulle, the charismatic leader was no obstacle to the new charismatic leader.

Nothing definitive may be said about the effects of the small group in Hoffman's book, but it is probable that the local associations which were founded – and which had considerable freedom of action – had their own considerable effect on support for Poujadism.[76]

Poujadists were alienated and did not belong to any strongly integrating groups.[77]

Like other populist parties, the Poujadists pictured themselves as upholders of religious values and stressed the importance of preserving religious traditions.[78]

7. Conclusions

The model of the factors giving rise to populism should not be considered as an exhaustive explanation of support for populism, but rather as a certain point of departure for future research. In the first place, this model has been limited temporally to a certain stage of social development, although, by changing the collective level variables, the rise of other populist movements occurring prior to the 1950's and 1960's may be explained. As it is, the model cannot be used to explain the rise of populist movements in the United States at the end of the last century, although they do share many common features with the contemporary movements discussed in this paper. In the Midwest – where Populism had its start – there had been a heavy influx of people, making it difficult for the family farm to provide a source of livelihood for the increasing population. Industrialization and urbanization also partially explain the growth of populism in this area. When the country was changing at a rapid pace from an agricultural country to an industrial state, especially in the East, the effect was immediately reflected as a center-periphery conflict between monopoly capitalism in the industrial areas and the small owners in the agricultural areas.[79]

The model is further restricted to the Western cultural sphere only, for in different cultures alienation is experienced in different ways and the factors causing it are completely different than in Western cultures. Thus the growth of populist movements in the Third World – and there have been numerous examples – would have to be explained with a separate model.[80]

NOTES

[1] Chita Ionescu and Ernst Gellner, *Populism, Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.

[2] Chita Ionescu, "To Define Populism", *Government and Opposition*, 3/2, 1968, p. 179.

[3] William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, pp. 194–211.

[4] Angus Stewart, "The Social Roots", in Chita Ionescu and Ernst Gellner, *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 180, 185, 209–210.

[5] Donald MacRae, "Populism as an Ideology", in Chita Ionescu and Ernst Gellner, *op. cit.* 1969, p. 156, and Angus Stewart, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 181.

[6] William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, 1960, pp. 104–111, 130–132.

[7] William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, 1960, pp. 46–56, and Donald MacRae, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 156.

[8] Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation", *American Sociological Review*, 3/24, 1959, pp. 784–790.

[9] Dwight G. Dean, "Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement", *American Sociological Review*, 3/26, 1961, pp. 754–757.

[10] Ada W. Finifter, "Dimension of Political Alienation", *American Political Science Review*, 2/64, 1970, pp. 390–395.

[11] Arthur G. Neil and Salomon Retting, "On the Multidimensionality of Alienation", *American Sociological Review*, 1/33, 1968, pp. 56–61.

[13] Nelson A. Rockefeller, "Polity and the People", *Foreign Affairs* 2/1968, pp. 233–236. 1969, pp. 291–292.

[13] Nelson A. Rockefeller, "Polity and the People", *Foreign Affairs* 2/1968, pp. 233–236. Gene L. Mason and Dean Janos, "Alienation and Support for Demagogues", *Polity*, 4/1, 1969, pp. 480–481. Marvin E. Olson, "Alienation and Political Opinions", *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2/29, 1965, pp. 204–206.

[14] Joachim Israel, *Alienation: från Marx till modern sociologi*, Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren, 1968. pp. 204–211.

[15] Erik Allardt, "Evolutionary, Structural, and Institutional Characteristics of Societies", *Acta Sociologica*, 2/12, 1969, pp. 74–84.

[16] Talcott Parsons, *Social Theory and Modern Society*, New York: The Free Press, 1967.

[17] Erik Allardt, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 76.

[18] Angus Stewart, *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 180–185. Donald MacRae, *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 155–156.

[19] Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior*, New York: The Free Press, 1963, p. 32.

[20] Erik Allardt, "Types of Protest and Alienation", in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (ed.) *Mass Politics*, New York: The Free Press, 1970, pp. 61–62.

[21] Erik Allardt, *op. cit.*, 1970, p. 62.

[22] Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction", in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives"*, New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 9–13.

[23] Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory*, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954, pp. 104–124.

[24] Ira S. Rohter, "Social and Psychological Determinants of Radical Rightism", in Robert A. Schoenberger (ed.), *The American Right Wing*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969, pp. 205–207, 211–219.

[25] Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, pp. 17–45. Donald MacRae, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 156.
Donald MacRae, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 156.

[26] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951, p. 296.

[27] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1948, p. 151.

[28] More about communication and its effect in the periphery in Johan Galtung, "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position", *Journal of Peace Research*, 1/1964.

[29] Harold Wilensky, "Mass Society and Mass Culture: Interdependence or Independence?", *American Sociological Review*, 2/30, 1965, p. 195. Also Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, *Collective Dynamics*, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1961, pp. 425–434.

[30] Jack McLeod, Scott Ward and Karen Tancill, "Alienation and Uses of the Mass Media", *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 4/29, 1965, p. 587.

[31] Pertti Tiihonen, "Expectations or Frustration? Television and Modernization in the Light of the Lapland Study", unpublished manuscript.

[32] Kari Uusitalo, "Suomalaisen elokuvan vuosikymmenet" (Finnish Films Through the Years), Helsinki: Otava, 1965, pp. 269–276.

[33] Angus Stewart, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 192. Tapio Varis, "Television ja radion ohjelmien loukkaavuus" (The Offenses of Finnish Radio and Television Programs), Tampereen Yliopiston Tutkimuslaitoksen sarja D 30/1970, p. 37.

[34] Pertti Tiihonen, *op. cit.*

[35] Dorian Apple Sweetser, "Urbanization and the Patrilineal Transmission of Farms in Finland", *Acta Sociologica*, 4/7, 1964, pp. 217–219. The family farm was defined according to the General Census of Agriculture in 1959 as a farming unit supporting at least three generations of the same family.

[36] William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, 1960, p. 148. Angus Stewart, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 187.

[37] Kenneth Minogue, "Populism as a Political Movement" in Chita Ionescu and Ernst Gellner, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 209. Angus Stewart, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 180.

[38] Marvin E. Olson, *op. cit.*, 1965, pp. 204–206.

[39] Olavi Riihinen, "Teollistuvan yhteiskunnan alueellinen erilaistuneisuus" (The Regional Differentiation of Industrializing Society), Savon Sanomain Kirjapaino 1965. Paavo Hoikka, "Suomen kuntien sivistyshallinto" (Educational Administration of the Communes in Finland), Porvo: Werner Söderström Oy, 1969.

[40] William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, 1960, p. 66.

[41] William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, 1960, pp. 32–33.

[42] SDP:n puoluekokouksen pöytäkirjat 1966 (Minutes of the Convention of the Finnish Social-Democratic Party in 1966), pp. 100, 201–207.

[43] Peter Worsley, "The Concept of Populism", in Chita Ionescu and Ernst Gellner, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 240.

[44] Peter Worsley, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 221.

[45] Lauri Hautamäki & Risto Sänkiaho, "Suomen Maaseudun puolueen kannatus Pohjois-Karjalan vaalipiirissä vuosien 1962, 1966 ja 1970 eduskuntavaaleissa" (Support for The Finnish Rural Party in the Electoral District of North-Karelia in the Parliamentary Elections of 1962, 1966 and 1970), unpublished manuscript.

[46] Lauri Hautamäki & Risto Sänkiaho, *op. cit.*

[47] Pertti Pesonen, *An Election in Finland*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 316–318.

[48] More about relative deprivation and its effects: W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967, pp. 247–257.

[49] According to their farm size 23 % of the local representatives of the Center Party had less than 10 hectares, 69 % owned 10–19 hectares, and only 9 % 20 + hectares, compared to the figure of 70 % for all farms under 10 hectares, 5 % with 10–19 hectares and 6 % for 20 + hectares. The data are from the office of the Center Party.

[50] Ira S. Rohter, *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 193–237.

[51] Ira S. Rohter, *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 235–237.

[52] Melvin Seeman, "Alienation, Membership, and Political Knowledge: A Comparative Study", *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 3/30, 1966, p. 354.

[53] Angus Stewart, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 181. William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, 1960, p. 119.

[54] William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, 1960, pp. 202–211. Angus Stewart, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 189. Rudolf Heberle, *Social Movements*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951, p. 241.

[55] W. G. Runciman, *op. cit.*, 1967. Martin Trow, "Small Businessman, Political Tolerance and Support for McCarthy", in Lewis A. Coser (ed.), *Political Sociology*, New York: Harper & Row, 1966, p. 199.

[56] William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, 1960, p. 46.

[57] Lang and Lang, *op. cit.*, 1961, p. 342. Donald MacRae, *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 156, 162. Talcott Parsons, *op. cit.*, 1967, p. 247.

[58] Erik Allardt, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 78. William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, 1960, p. 66.

[59] Talcott Parsons, *op. cit.*, 1967, p. 247.

[60] Murray B. Levin and Murray Eden, "Political Strategy for the Alienated Voter", *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1/26, 1962, p. 50.

[61] Donald MacRae, *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 156–158. Martin Trow, *op. cit.*, 1966, pp. 190–191.

[62] William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, 1960, p. 148.

[63] Angus Stewart, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 183.

[64] Donald MacRae, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 163.

[65] Lang and Lang, *op. cit.*, 1961, p. 343.

[66] Donald MacRae, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 155–156. Peter Worsley, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 221.

[67] The data are from seasonal research of the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation (Spring 1968).

[68] Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, *Sosiologia* (Sociology), Porvoo: Werner Söderström Oy, 1964, pp. 151–154.

[69] Peter Worsley, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 221.

[70] Stanley Hoffmann, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1956.

[71] Stanley Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 1956, pp. 11–12.

[72] Stanley Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 1956, p. 196.

[73] Stanley Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 1956, p. 197.

[74] Stanley Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 1956, p. 14.

[75] Stanley Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 1956, p. 240. SMP:n vaaliaapinen (Election Handbook of the Finnish Rural Party), Porvoo, 1968.
[76] Stanley Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 1956, p. 263.
[77] Stanley Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 1956, p. 387.
[78] Stanley Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 1956, p. 236.
[79] John D. Hicks, *The Populist Revolt*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1931.
[80] Chita Ionescu and Ernst Gellner, *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 28–61, 122–151.