THE STUDY OF PARTY PROPAGANDA

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This implies in a double meaning an adoption of certain *aspects*, i.e. a consciously partial way of considering things. First, the actions of the parties are thus seen as *strategically conditioned:* this is naturally only one of several conceivable angles of incidence. Second, within the framework of this strategic aspect, the greatest emphasis is then laid upon propaganda. Because other strategical action variables exist for the parties, this also implies a partial way of considering things.

The article extends over a rather vast domain and detailed treatment of the individual elements is therefore impossible within this framework. The main purpose is to advance a supposedly useful concept apparatus and some simple hypotheses that can form bases for a number of relevant problems. The purely research technical problems at the study of party propaganda are only touched upon briefly at the end of the article.

In the following five points, some terms and suppositions fundamental for the article are given.

Political arenas

The party executives are regarded as *actors* in a multiparty system and act in three arenas:

    a) the parliamentary arena
    b) the electoral arena
    c) the internal arena (in the party organization)

The action variables of the parties

A party has at its disposal three main types of action variables which can function as influence means and combined are the party output:

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The action variables of the parties

A party has at its disposal three main types of action variables which can function as influence means and combined are the party output:

    a) standpoints[1]
    b) candidates for various political positions
    c) propaganda

These methods are varied in order to maximize the party's *support* in different arenas. (This is referred to more fully later.)

Bases for the changes in voter distribution among the parties

From one election to another, the change of the relative electoral distribution between various parties can be based on three conditions:

    a) transfer of voters from one party to another
    b) variations in the voting participation
    c) changes in the composition of the electorate

The content here is obvious, as distinct from the content in the two earlier points, which is partly of stipulative character.

Propaganda

The term "propaganda" denotes:

    a) techniques (methods) for influencing with the aid of words or other symbols the attitudes, opinions, and behaviour of people
    b) the content in the here used symbols

The first is in the following called "propaganda method", the second "propaganda content", whereas "propaganda" unspecified means both.[2]

The definition of "propaganda" implies a persuasive intention in the communicator. At a definition of the concept, one can not only postulate the actual effect that a certain symbol content or the manner of its presentation has upon the recipients.

The relation action variables/arenas

The various action variables can be assumed to have different degrees of effect on different arenas, chiefly owing to variations in the average knowledge of the members of different arenas. We can assume:

a) the *higher* the degree of knowledge that the members of an arena have on average about the political facts, the *more* must the parties rely on their *standpoints* as means of influence and the *less* effect their *propaganda* has, and vice versa

b) the members in the parliamentary arena have on average a high degree of knowledge about the political facts. The members in the electoral arena have on average a low degree of knowledge about the political facts. The members in the internal arena (= party members) have on average knowledge about political facts that lies far below that of the parliamentarians but above that of those voters who are not members of a political party.

c) thus the propaganda probably plays a minor role in the parliamentary arena, a large role in the electoral arena, and probably occupies a mid-position in the internal arena.

If the above reasoning is accurate, propaganda studies should be concentrated to

the electoral arena and to some extent to the internal arena. The former, however, is perhaps dominant for most problems.

Conclusions, however, could be drawn directly from the propaganda directed to the electoral arena and perhaps also to that directed to the internal arena about relations and intentions in the parliamentary arena. Actual and presumptive coalition partners probably do not attack one another to any great extent in the propaganda. A certain propaganda content perhaps can be interpreted in such a way that a party wishes to form or split up a coalition, come closer to or distance itself from another party in the parliament, etc.

Concerning the propaganda to the *internal arena,* we should distinguish between propaganda directed to

— a) the internal arena as such (when the purpose is to maximize the internal support)

— b) the internal arena (thus the party organization) for further transmission to the electoral arena. (In this case, the internal arena party organization is regarded as an instrument of influence on the electoral arena.)

The difference between these two aspects of a party organization is fundamental at the study of party propaganda.

A Paradigm for Communication Studies

An often used *paradigm*[3] for the study of communication is as follows:

a) *Who*   e) under what *circumstances*
b) says *what*   f) for what *purpose*
c) *how*   g) with what *effect?*[4]
d) to *whom*

In the text, the following terminology will mainly be used in connexion with the categories of the paradigm:

a) communicator   e) situational variables
b) communication content   f) communication purpose
c) communication channels   g) communication effect.
d) communication recipient

Effect — purpose — situational variables — channels

Some of the components in the earlier-mentioned communication paradigm will be briefly discussed here: "effect", "purpose", "under what circumstances", and "communication channels".

Effect. In an analysis of the strategic calculation of a party in a multiparty system, the effects of its communication on various influence objects cannot be studied. In order to get information about the effects of a particular communication, one would have to devote oneself to, for instance, electoral investigations or investigations of individual party members. However, it would be of interest to study in the

present context the methods a party uses to discover the receiver reactions in the presumptive influence objects to a particular output during the time the party can still change this output; for instance, between the time the output is communicated to the electors and the time the general election takes place. This is important with regard to the appraisal of the possibilities of the actors to revise their strategies.

Purpose (of the communication). In the foregoing, the parties have been presumed to vary their output with the aim of maximizing their support in the different arenas. In the following, some assumptions are made about how "support" can be interpreted in the different arenas.

— a) When a party wishes to maximize its support in the *electoral arena,* this is presumed to be synonymous with its wish *to maximize its number of votes* in the elections

— b) To the extent that propaganda occurs in the parliamentary arena, i.e. is directly aimed at the members of this arena (primarily to distinguish from "election speech in the parliament"), the object is assumed to be *to maximize the parliamentary influence of the party*

— c) The purpose of propaganda in *the internal arena* is assumed to be to maximize the rallying around certain standpoints, around a certain policy, i.e. to maximize *the party cohesion.* (Presumably this purpose should therefore be regarded as instrumental in relation to the aim of reaching vote maximization in the electoral arena.)

— A fundamental line of thought for the following discussion is that the aspirations to maximize the number of votes, to maximize parliamentary influence, and to maximize the party cohesion easily come into conflict: goal conflicts or arena conflicts easily arise.[5] This is especially evident in a multiparty system concerning points a) and b) above; in a two-party system *this* conflict hardly has any current interest.

The paradigm's *"Under what circumstances".* This can sound like a restriction of the unspecified kind which easily makes nonsense of attempts to form generalizations. Thus, the category must be defined. The problem generally concerns which *situational variables* should be taken into account in a particular type of analysis so that the possibly occurring explanations could be comprehended as satisfactory. The risk is that an oversight of certain situational variables can lead to conclusions that certainly have a high degree of generality, but suffer from the fatal defect of triviality (many *ceteris-paribus* reasonings, when the constancy of some parameters are postulated, have this character). However, if we try to consider a great number of situational variables, the variables' character of analysis variables can easily tend to be obscured and we are tempted to be satisfied with *ad-hoc* explanations which are seldom generalizable, i.e. we run the risk of the scientific activity not being cumulative.

I will mention two simple examples of situational variables. The first concerns *the time factor:* at what time in the total propaganda process does the communication take place? "When" something is said is usually a highly essential aspect at the study

of communication. At a study of party propaganda, we could, for instance, have reason to make certain period classifications of the type election year/between election years, election campaign propaganda/between election propaganda, beginning/ middle/end of the election campaign, etc.

The second possible variable in this context is the *parliamentary position* of a party: — whether the party is a government party or an opposition party, if there exist formal or informal coalitions between different parties, etc.[6]

How does the communication take place? (= *Channels*)

In the following, I have chosen to let this component in the paradigm refer only to the communication channels. This is a somewhat arbitrary limitation; under this heading, e.g., "the style–of–performance" aspect could also be included to the extent that it is not directly related to the content of the propaganda. Problems in this context would be of approximately the same type if we studied the "aura" surrounding individual communicators, whether the presentation is made in an emotional—or emotionally–neutral—way, and so on. These aspects, however, will not be discussed here.

The various *channels of communication* that can be useful for party propaganda can be tentatively classified as follows:

Communication characteristics	Channel
audible propaganda	radio
visual propaganda	posters, party symbols, etc.
audiovisual propaganda	TV, election films
written propaganda	brochures, books, newspapers, articles, advertisements, posters, etc.
spoken propaganda (= direct to the recipient)	political speeches, canvassing, etc.

In isolation, this variable, just as its differentiation above, is of little interest, but it can be set in interesting relations to other variables, for instance, as follows:

    — To what extent does the type of channel determine the degree of access to various electoral groups and the possibility of screening a particular group for "selective propaganda"?

    — What access have the various parties to different channels?

    — Do various parties appraise the effectiveness of the channels in different ways? (If that is the case, can this be due to differences in the composition of the presumptive electoral basis of each of them?)

    — To what extent is the use of different channels by the parties determined by their economic and personal resources?

    — Do big technical innovations regarding transmission techniques bring about any changes in the propaganda content itself?

    — Will changes in the proportions between centralized and decentralized channels result in changes in the party as decision structure?[7]

In the foregoing, the term "channel" referred to the technical methods of reaching various presumptive recipients with a certain message. The term, however, can sometimes have a somewhat different meaning which is more subtle or, if preferred, vague: it then refers not only to the technical possibility of reaching a particular recipient but also to the willingness of the recipient to pay attention to the message. The message is thus not presumed to fall outside "the selective perception" of the recipient.[8] When, for instance, it is indicated that a particular group forms a "communication network"[9] this means, *inter alia*, that the members of the group are supposed to be susceptible to one another's messages (at least, concerning the questions or attitudes or opinions which in some way constitute the group). In electoral studies, the term "exposure"[10] is often used, and we can in this context also use the term "access".

This is one reason why the parties often appoint as candidates persons with close connexions with organizations, popular movements, etc., which can be regarded as, *inter alia*, large communication networks. By appointing candidates who are connected to such networks, a party can more easily gain "access" to voters who otherwise perhaps would not "expose" themselves to the party propaganda. (I return to this in a later section about the communication recipient.)

General relations communicator – recipient – content

Thereby four of the seven components of the paradigm are briefly touched upon: message effect, the purpose of the message, situational variables, and communication channels. Three central components remain: communicator, recipient, and content. First, a few words about some probable general relations between these components.

A party tries to induce the voters to give their support to the party through its messages to the voters. In order for such messages to have the intended effect, the following conditions must be fulfilled:

 a) the message must arouse attention in the recipient

 b) the message must in some sense be intelligible to the recipient

 c) it must be possible for the message to be related to the recipient's own wishes or give rise to his own wishes (thus, be set in relation to his own preference system)

 d) the recipient must be able to appraise the message according to his probability calculus, which here also includes an appraisal of the communicator.[11]

These four "thresholds" in the communication process must be overcome by the communicator in order to induce in the recipient the intended behaviour as a result of the party's messages. The forcing of the four thresholds is thus a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for a positive result from the communicator's point of view.

The first threshold, "the attention threshold", is obvious, and in this context it needs no further comment.

The second threshold, "the intelligibility threshold", merely means that the recipient can in some way structure the message, identify it, and interpret it. This

can then *de facto* take place in a manner quite other than that intended by the communicator.

A technique that is sometimes used at decision analysis in to attempt to distinguish the evaluation system and the prediction system (or strategic system) of an actor.[12] We then speak of the utility-component and the probability-component underlying a decision. The evaluation system or utility-component refers to the actor's concept of the desired condition. Each decision, however, is made in a definite situation, and no actor decides omnipotently and does not have complete freedom of choice – there always exist certain limiting conditions that can be based on insufficiency in the actor's capability or in the actions or expectations of other actors. When the actor observes these limiting conditions in the calculation that precedes the choice, and therefore determines on a certain action alternative, the prediction system or probability-component is taken into account. Which action alternative, with regard to the limiting conditions of the situation, can be expected to lead to consequences that lie closest to the actor's own evaluation system (own utility–image)? – The actor makes, in other words, an utility-/probability–calculus (an U–/P–calculus).

The third and the fourth of the earlier mentioned thresholds relate to this U–/P–calculus.

A message, which can in no way be set in relation to the recipient's own wishes, can hardly have any effect on the recipient's behaviour. The message in that event leaves the recipient indifferent and unaffected, he is uninterested in "what happens". If the message is to have the intended effect, to cause the recipient to give his support to the party/communicator, it must naturally "give positive results" according to the recipient's own preference system, in his own U–calculus. If the message refers to a certain action alternative, the minimum positive effect on the recipient must be that he regards the proposal as "the least evil" of existing alternatives.

The fourth threshold thus concerns the fact that the message can be judged according to the recipient's P-calculus. If we simplify the reasoning and assume that the "support" that the communicator wishes to gain is only the vote of the recipient/voter at the impending general election, the recipient must thus make an appraisal not only of the message as such, but also of the communicator, and this in accordance with the components that must be included in a P-calculus of the messages from a party:

— the recipient must judge whether the realization of the action recommendation included in the message actually produces the intended result

— the recipient must appraise the degree of parliamentary efficacy of the communicator/party, i.e. whether the party can directly or indirectly influence the content in the authoritative decision in the matter in accordance with the action recommendation in the message[13]

— the recipient must also appraise the party's degree of credibility, i.e. whether the party will really do what it says it intends to do, thus to work to ensure that the authoritative decisions agree as far as possible with the action recommendation in the message.

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The P–calculus is, in other words, a relatively complicated matter. If it is to be well substantiated in the individual voter, a quite high degree of information is presumed. A carrying out of the P-calculus also presumed that the recipient can identify the communicator; this, on the other hand, is not necessary for carrying out the U–calculus. (In the main, a certain action recommendation can naturally be judged in relation to the voter's own preference system without his knowing which party represents the action recommendation.)

The four thresholds thus imply that the message A) is given attention, B) is intelligible, C) is subjected to U–calculus, D) is subjected to P–calculus.

With regard to these four thresholds, a message can obviously meet any of the following fates in a recipient:

1) not A
2) A but not B
3) A and B but not C and D
4) A, B, C, but not D
5) A, B, D, but not C
6) A, B, C, D

Alternatives 3–6 have the following significance:

3) the message receives attention and is intelligible (in some sense) but leaves the recipient indifferent (not C and D)

4) the message receives attention, is intelligible, and is set in relation to the recipient's preference system, but the recipient is incapable of making any P–calculus, for instance because of insufficient information about the communicator or because of his not being identified

5) the message receives attention, is intelligible, and the recipient also makes a P–calculus of the content of the message and its communicator, but the content gives "no result" in relation to the recipient's own preference system: the message is judged of no significance and lacking in interest

6) all thresholds are forced. Whether the message then results in the behaviour intended by the communicator naturally depends on a variety of circumstances: whether the reaction of the recipient has been positive or negative according to the U–calculus, how the P-calculus has turned out, the importance the recipient attributes to the content of the message, the recipient's reactions to other messages from the same source and to other message from other sources.[14]

The general relations between the various thresholds appear as follows:

— A is a necessary condition for B
— B is a necessary condition for C and D.

Naturally, it is easy to question the realism in these assumptions. For instance, it can be asked whether most voters really have a conscious preference order concerning matters of political relevancy. It can also be asked whether the U– and P–components can be distinguished: is it not only in purely utopian daydreams that a

proposal is set in relation to a preference system without the P-component being taken into account (in other words: is it not a fact that the P-component from the beginning drastically reduces the number of alternative proposals that the recipient really considers?) Furthermore, does not the U–/P–calculus give a too "rationalistic" picture of the decision process of the voter?[15]

The essential in this context, however, is what relevancy, if any, can the foregoing reasoning have for the parties in their aspirations to maximize votes, and then mainly with the aid of propaganda. It then seems as though the four demands A, B, C, and D can provide a fertile basis for the analysis of the formulation of the propaganda.

The demand for *attention* (A) leads to working with drastic formulations, conspicuous symbols, etc. Generally speaking, a special technique is required to make oneself heard in the prevailing P.R.-din. A large part of the propaganda, which is often characterized as factually devoid of content, or similar, must be seen against the background of this attention condition.

The demand for *intelligibility* (B) also explains simplifications in the presentation of standpoints and not least the relatively narrow selection of material in the content of the party propaganda. It is essential here to remember that it always indicates some trouble, loss of time, etc., for the voter to obtain information. One can, as does Downs, speak about the "information costs" of the voter as an essential factor for the party strategists to take into account.[16] The voters often reduce these information costs by working with more or less vague and more or less "correct" *party images*[17] and/or by *identification*[18] with a particular politician, a particular party, or a particular group of some kind, and then following what is interpreted as the direct or indirect voting recommendations of the identification object. This implies a kind of voting on "trust" and is, of course, a very common phenomenon.

When the parties are considering the third demand (C), the connexion with the *preference system* of the voters (or some voters), they are faced with the classical problem how (or to what degree) the varying preference systems of the individuals can be satisfied in collective, more or less "indivisible", decisions; it is, *inter alia*, against the background of this problem that the aggregation difficulties of the parties can be analysed.[19]

The fourth demand (D) includes among other things the subcomponent *credibility*. This credibility is highly interesting for the study of propaganda. In a society with "polycentric" propaganda, the credibility demand results in obvious limitations to the freedom of movement of the parties at the formulation of the propaganda; the manipulation scope is limited. A party cannot turn black into white in its propaganda, cannot entirely disengage the propaganda content from, for instance, its own actually adopted standpoints (or those of its opponents), or describe the social conditions in a way that markedly diverges from the concepts of the voters who are directly affected by these conditions. If a party fails to take this into account when formulating its propaganda, it risks a drastic reduction in the credibility of *all* its communication.[20]

The literature about decision analysis sometimes mentions a "subjective ratio-nality" as a principle that lies as basis when an actor makes a decision, when he per-forms an action whose realization will with the greatest possibility lead to goals he has set up *with regard to* the degree of relevant information that he possesses on the occasion for the decision.[21] It is obvious that it is this "subjective rationality" that must be taken into account at an analysis of the individual's voting decision: the information factor must thus always be considered.

The essential in this context is to find grounds for voting behaviours so formulated that they can be bases for the actions of the parties. The grounds cannot then be too complicated and detailed. An actor must often greatly simplify his reality impres-sions in a certain action sphere in order to be able to make a decision and to act. If the decision involves an influence attempt, the actor must establish some sort of model of the relation between his available action variables and his goal attainment via the behaviour of the influence objects. This does not mean, of course, that the actor should see the behaviour of the influence objects relevant in the context as conditioned solely by his own actions and by those of the competing actors within a definite system, but rather that he should try to establish to what extent and in what way his own action can influence the behaviour of the influence objects.

In the following, the foregoing reasonings about voting decision on the basis of certain calculi and voting on the basis of identification are combined, whereby the voter in both cases is supposed to try to reduce his information costs; the identifi-cation is one of the factors that conditions the selective perception. The parties are presumed in their actions to use as basis the concept that the voting decision of the voters is based on the principle concerning "subjective rationality" and this indicates the following:

- a) the voter who, on the basis of *his* information about the relevant questions, makes his own appraisal of the various parties and their outputs decides his voting with the object of maximizing the probability for the authorita-tive decisions to lie as close as possible to his own preference system
- b) the voter who does not himself appraise parties and party outputs in the relevant questions but has some form of voting relevant identification fol-lows the recommendation of the identification object
- c) the voter who lacks voting relevant identification and whose appraisal of parties and party outputs in relevant questions evokes no "response" in relation to his own preference system abstains from voting
- d) the voter who lacks voting relevant identification and whose appraisal of parties and party standpoints in relevant questions is negative in relation to his own preference system abstains from voting or votes with the party whose output seems relatively least negative[22]
- e) the voter who lacks voting relevant identification and who makes no appraisal of parties and party standpoints in relevant questions abstains from voting.

The parties are then presumed to regard the voters' appraisals of the various

candidates as a cause of identification and/or of attitudes to the party-standpoints.

The term "relevant questions" is, of course, open; various voters can have highly varied concepts of what is relevant. A party must obtain some idea of what questions various groups of voters consider relevant in order to adjust the party output accordingly, *inter alia*, to decide which questions are to be politicized.[23] At the same time, it is clear that many voters judge the degree of relevancy in various questions precisely on the basis of what the parties say and do in these questions.

Point a) in the enumberation cogers also the case where a voter considers himself able to influence the content of the authoritative decisions by abstaining from voting or "temporarily" voting for a party other than his traditional one as a protest against its standpoints.

In the enumeration, those modifications have not been considered in which an introduction of "long-term" and "short-term" judgements would result.

The Communicator

The foregoing reasoning ought to show that, for the parties, a conflict can easily arise between the attempts to satisfy the preferences of different voters and the attempts to appear credible. The preferences of the voters are varied; demands based on these preferences soon come into conflict with one another. A party that supports (or adopts) varying voter demands for vote maximizing purpose is therefore quickly faced with problems concerning its credibility.

This can be said to be the basic problem of the parties at the aggregation process. Usually, a part of the propaganda content can be seen as an attempt to try to explain away this conflict to the voters. Regard to voter preferences thus justifies a considerable spreading and/or vagueness in the party standpoints: regard to the credibility demand justifies explicit standpoint takings. The same conflict is valid at the formulation of the propaganda content.

A common method of political parties for increasing their vote maximization capacity is to make an internal *organizational differentiation,* to develop *substructures.* The formation of such substructures can be regarded as intended to fulfil certain functions and also as attempts by the parties to create structural connexions (or "communication networks") with various parts of the electorate, possibly indirectly by connexion with various subject areas. The substructures can thereby also be intended to form identification objects for different electoral groups.

Functionally, we can presume that the substructures are, *inter alia*, intended to be specialized instruments for

I. a) voter influence
    b) information collection
    c) recruitment
    d) policy preparation.

Examples of usual connexion bases for various substructures are:

II. a) age (youth associations, pensioners' associations)
     b) sex (women's associations)

    c) locality (constituency associations, local branches)

    d) occupational groups (workers, white-collar workers, farmers, etc.)

    e) voluntary groupings (religion-oriented party groups, temperance societies, etc.)

    f) political subject areas (delegations for defence, taxes, cultural matters, etc.)

    g) the press (press associations, press bureaux, etc.).

— A considerable overlapping is, of course, customary between these substructures (e.g., the occurrence of local women's associations, local youth associations).

We can also combine the functional and the structural criterion and examine the relations:

	1 a	1 b	1 c	1 d
II a				
b				
c				
d				
e				
f				
g				

The line II a, for instance, will be read: what role is a party's youth association to play (or meant to play) with regard to

    — voter influence

    — information collection

    — recruitment

    — policy preparation?

Column I c, for instance, is to be read: what role for a party's recruitment do its various substructures play in relation to II a – II g?

In other words, this organizatory differentiation indicates that a party tries to be (or appear to be) homogeneous and flexible at the same time. The party's leading structures can represent certain standpoints and its substructures can represent variances of these standpoints, without this necessarily having to appear as direct contradictions. The organizatory differentiation can thereby be regarded as, *inter alia,* an attempt by the party to adapt itself to variations in the preference system of different electoral groups.

However, it is at the same time obvious that there exist certain limitations for this flexibility if it is not to lead to difficulties with the party's credibility in the minds of the voters. Thus, we again encounter the basic problem in the aggregation attempts of the parties.

A permanent difficulty at all studies of collectives (e.g. political parties) is to appraise the degree of *representativeness* in the manifestations that emanate from the collective. An immediate problem concerns the delimitation itself of the collective.

The importance of the representativeness problem depends on the aspects one wishes to adopt: at the study of party propaganda, for instance, the representativeness is more important for a description and analysis of a party's goal-controlled actions (i.e. at a study of the party as actor) than for a study of, for instance, the effect of the propaganda.

A fundamental distinction that seems necessary here is to distinguish between
— the party propaganda, and
— propaganda for the party.

The former class of phenomena is included in the latter, but does not cover it; propaganda is practically always carried out for a party, although it does not necessarily emanate from the party, and the party executive cannot possibly control it.

The possibilities of a party executive for control seems to be a decisive factor for the appraisal of the degree of representativeness. The question "How representative is a certain substructure of a party?" could in that case be reformulated to read "What possibilities exist on the part of the party executive for the control of the substructure?"

It can then be presumed that if possibilities exist for control of a substructure, they will be utilized in those situations where the activity of the substructure is believed to threaten the credibility of the party in the minds of the voters. (Naturally, the party executive can also interpret the attempt of the substructure to connect to the preference system of certain electoral groups as strategically misdirected.) However, the normal is that some variations in standpoints etc. between main structure and substructure are tolerated and even encouraged—such variations must then be presumed to be regarded as positive in relation to the preference systems of different electoral groups, without being negative to the party's "credibility image." To establish the representativeness of a particular party output is, in other words, not necessarily the same as to establish its uniformity.

At the appraisal of the control possibilities that exist within the party organization, it must, above all and *inter alia*, be considered that parties usually are "open" or voluntary organizations: the individual can give to or withhold from the party his support in the form of membership and/or resources, and if the support is withheld, the possibility of sanction on the part of the party executive—an essential control resource—is normally considerably limited.[24]

The control techniques can be analytically differentiated in a variety of ways. For instance, they can be "diffuse" or "specific".[25]

The diffuse control is usually based on strengthening the identification of the members with the party, with the leading role incumbents of the party (e.g., the party leader), or with the view the party is said to represent. This often demands a legitimizing of the actions of the party executive. The techniques for this legitimizing vary; a usual method is to describe to the members the action and its purpose in terms of party ideology.[26]

The specific control can, for instance, take place with the aid of the following means:

— role combinations (when members of the party executive hold roles also in one or more of the other substructures)

—constituting directives (when, for instance, the constitutions of the party indicates the substructure's relations to the party executive)

— current directives

— direct sanctions for violations (for instance, of the type withholding funds, exclusion of members, and so on).

Control is a form of power wielding in the internal arena, and every form of power wielding usually has a price, which thus must be related to cost ("costs" implies here that the methods of obtaining support in an arena reduce or render difficult the possibilities of gaining support in other arenas). Wielding of power in the internal arena can, *inter alia,* result in costs in the electoral arena (at least, if the wielding of power arouses great opposition), for instance, by making public to the voters (and chiefly to the competing parties) the lack of internal cohesion. It can result in a withdrawal of member support with accompanying reduction of the party's influence possibilities in the electoral arena. It can also lead to internal compromises regarding factual standpoints, whereby the result impedes the efforts for vote maximization in the electoral arena.

Here, we again face one of the most difficult problems of the party strategists: to join the main aspirations in different arenas, in this case in the internal arena and the electoral arena. The relation between "party cohesion" and "vote maximization" is not unambigous – "party cohesion" can be an essential condition for achieving "vote maximization" (lack of party cohesion = risk for reduced credibility), but the party cohesion can also be attained with the aid of methods that militate against the vote maximization: for instance, by leading, as mentioned, to party standpoints that produce a poorer result in U-calculi (and perhaps also P-calculi) of the party's marginal voters than other standpoints would.[27]

Nor is the relation between the control problems of the party executive and the degree of internal structural differentiation of the party unambigous. It sounds, of course, reasonable to say that "the more substructures, the greater the control problems", but it also sounds reasonable to assert that "the more substructures, the less relative influence each of them has in the party." In the latter case, however, the possibility of "coalitions" between different substructures must be taken into account at internal competition within the party concerning the content in its output.

The representativeness problem can also be seen from another angle with regard to the fact that different substructures probably exert different degrees of influence in relation to the party's leading organs when deciding the three different types of party output (standpoints, candidates, and propaganda).

"Standpoint" as here used includes the general lines of direction given in party programmes (or corresponding), as well as the, so to speak, "current standpoint

takings" which, concerning the parties, take place in the parliament, in committees, and concerning government parties, in the government (thus, in the parliamentary arena). Regarding the last mentioned type of standpoints, it is obvious that the substructures "the parliamentary group" and "the government" have the principal influence. The "centralized influence" over the formulation of party programmes (and corresponding) is, in most cases, probably not so conspicuous. On the other hand, the importance of this type of "standpoints" is often obscure, partly with reference to the function intended by the party programmes (as bases for concrete attitudes, as evidence of cohesion, as presentation material for the party in its propaganda activity, &c.) and partly with reference to the abstraction level of the programmes. How binding are *de facto* the programmatical pronouncements for the "current attitudes" of the party?

The choice of *candidates,* the second type of party output, is propably in most democratic party systems, however, rather decentralized. Substructures with local connexion here usually play the dominant role.

The third output-type, primarily discussed in this article, is *"propaganda",* by which is meant partly "propaganda content" and partly "presentation methods" for the propaganda. There are probably strong tendencies for a dominant central influence in this case, too, especially if the elections concern the the parliament. An explanation of this is that the propaganda content regularly, to a considerable extent, concerns what has been done or not done during the recent mandate period in the parliamentary arena by the parliamentary groups or by the government.[28] Another noteworthy factor is the degree of centralization in the technical communication channels. The greater the role national radio and TV plays as communication channels, for instance, the greater the role the central party contributions can probably play for the formulation of the party propaganda. The reduction of the number of daily papers probably acts in the same direction. (I return to this later, because a centralization of the technical communication channels probably also has consequences for the ability of the parties to differentiate their propaganda content with regard to various electoral groups.)

The control-problems have here been discussed in relative detail for two reasons. It can be necessary to have a picture of the control possibilities of the party executive in a party organization in order to establish the degree of representativeness in the total output of a party organization, and the various types of party output can also serve as methods for the party executive in its internal control attempts. ("Internal propaganda" can, for instance, be interpreted as an attempt at control.)

The Recipient of the Message

Because we see the propaganda from the strategic aspect of the parties, "recipient" in this context means "intended recipient". (If we wish to study the effect of propaganda, we must, however, find the "actual recipients" by investigations among the voters or among party members.)

The recipient-problem has in part been discussed in the foregoing in relation to

the reasonings about the possibility of the parties gaining "access" to various electoral groups by linkage into different "communication networks". Thus, a wish of the parties to reach as much of the electorate as possible is presumed. However, the parties can, of course, be interested in reaching a definite group with their propaganda, possibly also in trying to screen this propaganda from other electoral groups and from the competing parties. The problem again concerns the heterogeneity in the preference systems of various electoral groups, and the difficulties this causes for attempts at vote maximization. The immediately following reasonings, which are very general in character, relate to this heterogeneity problem.

The decisions in a political system, according to a frequently used model, can be described as "an authoritative distribution of values".[29]

When it concerns the determination of values, there can be reason to distinguish between at least two different types. There are those values about which no dispute arises concerning their determination. All Polity members, or at least most of them, agree that certain phenomena can be referred to as "values". But there is also another type of values concerning which the determination of what is valuable can be a problem.

The first type of values can be supposed to be characterized by, *inter alia*, its scarcity. The demands for participation in them exceeds the available supply. The other type implies, as pointed out, a dispute about the definition of "value".

This problem can be illustrated with the aid of a classification taken from Gabriel Almond. In close association with Easton's input-output-scheme, he classifies various political demands in the following way:

Demands on
- 1) goods and services
- 2) regulation of behaviour
- 3) participation in the political system
- 4) information and communication from the political system (= "symbolic output").[30]

If we disregard the demands of the third kind, the following suppositions could be made in relation to the foregoing reasoning. "Goods and services" are interpreted as valuable by the predominant part of the Polity members. The dispute about these values concerns their distribution among the various members and is based on the scarcity of such values. "Regulation of behaviour" and "symbolic output" can, on the other hand, be presumed to belong to the other type of values, the type about which disagreement exists concerning the determination of what is valuable: what behaviour is valuable (is it, on the whole, worthwhile to regulate a certain behaviour), what symbolic output is valuable?

A party's standpoint taking can be characterized as a choice by which the party, by satisfying some types of preference systems, deprives itself of the possibility of satisfying others. A standpoint taking is thereby not only a positive declaration, it is also – explicit or implicit – a repudiation.

This reasoning can serve as a basis for the analysis of the actions of the parties in relation to the voters. No party turns to *all* voters; no party can hope to appear as the most attractive to all voters. When it is sometimes said that a particular political party systematically tries to avoid giving offence to a certain electoral group, this characteristic can possibly be valid regarding the party propaganda but hardly regarding its standpoints. A political system is always characterized, more or less, by conflict. A political party which under such circumstances tries to be friendly with everybody can have difficulty in becoming friendly with anybody.[31]

The article earlier mentioned the aggregation problems of the parties; thus, their problems at the weighing between various demands in attempts to produce a more or less homogeneous system of standpoint takings; without *any* degree of uniformity, the party risks losing its credibility in the minds of the voters. How far this aggregation (or "integration") can go naturally depends on several factors. One important factor in the type of party system; the aggregation on the party plane goes further (and must so do) in a two-party system than in multiparty system.[32] Another factor – probably more important – is naturally the range of various preference systems of different voters or electoral groups in the system, thus the degree of homogeneity/heterogeneity in the demands of the voters.[33] In a homogeneous society, the integration can be presumed to be easier than in a heterogeneous society. A third factor can be the general aspect of the competence of the political system: the further this is presumed to extend, the more demands will be made upon the system and the more difficult can the aggregation process be supposed to be for the party. (However, if we make the reasonable presumption that various electoral groups have different opinions concerning the competence of the political system, this is obviously a special example of the immediately foregoing.)

Because a party output cannot be varied to an unlimited extent, a party at "the choice" of the groups it wishes to turn to must work with quite coarse criteria. Examples of such criteria have been referred to in the section concerning substructures in a party – age, sex, occupational groups (and organizations associated with and based upon these), residence, membership of large voluntary organizations. This is also the type of variables that are normally included in the electoral investigations. The party must also to a large extent take into account the probable pre-attitude to the various parties held by the different groups. The big problem lies in the combination of various criteria, in the distinguishing of the role combinations decisive for the voting decision.

To illustrate the information problems of the parties at a combination of different classification systems, three criteria are listed in the following: initial attitude to the party; and two group attributes: occupation and residence. The following coarse division is made of the variables:

A. *Initial attitude to the party*	B. *Occupation group*	C. *Residence*
1. positive	1. businessmen	1. thinly-populated area
2. neutral (undetermined)	2. farmers	2. agglomeration
3. negative	3. white-collar workers	3. big city
	4. workers	

The combination of these criteria gives a matrix with 36 cells:

	B 1			B 2			B 3			B 4		
	C1	C2	C3	C1	C2	C3	C1	C2	C3	C1	C2	C3
A 1												
A 2												
A 3												

If a further criterion is introduced, for instance income, and this variable is also divided into three, the number of cells increases to 108. Some are perhaps of no practical importance, for instance the column B2/C3 (the number of farmers in the big cities), but the arrangement nevertheless shows the practical difficulties for the parties to lay dawn a realistic foundation for appraisal.

The information problems concerning such variables are often considerable. In the examples referred to, it can be difficult to produce current and reliable figures for the variables B and C; this could to an even higher degree refer to the variable A, even if the criterion is limited to concern the vote distribution at previous elections (whereby A2 would have to indicate non-voting).

The strategically interesting aspect is naturally how many voters are included in each cell and how many of them can be presumed to utilize their franchise. With vote maximization as basis, is it profitable for a party to shape an output that relates to one particular such grouping? What gains can the party make with the aid of an output formulated for a particular group? Can such a special output result in negative effects for the party in other groups?

Let us, for the time being, disregard the variable "attitude to the party", about whose actual content it is difficult to obtain information in every special situation and which is reasonably of more uncertain constancy than other variables of socio-economic, organizational, and geographical type. Concerning variables of the type occupation, income, and residence, the parties must face the absolutely fundamental question, whether those preferences that, concerning the voters, can be associated with variables of this type, really are the factors generally *decisive for the party choice*. Can these lie as basis for the formation of the party output? Or is there a risk of drawing faulty conclusions from such criteria?

The problems of the parties in this respect can be illustrated with a particularly simplified example. We assume that a certain occupation variable, for instance farmer, is highly positively correlated with a variable that can be called "active church membership". Party A, which is ignorant of this correlation or which ignores it, can then possibly find that its standpoints favourable to the farmers – in relation to those other parties – yield no return to it in the form of votes from farmers, and that this is because it has ignored the mentioned correlation. A farmer who appraises

the agricultural policy of party A and the "church policy" of party B perhaps finds the agricultural policy of A preferable to that of B, but the church policy of B preferable to that of A; at the "weighing", this can result in the farmer in question voting for party B.

We can tentatively conclude the following from this example: a party that tries to win votes in a certain group must, when shaping its output, take into account not only the group attribute, but also the other attributes that can be highly positively correlated with it. Thereby, it is presumed that a particular group attribute is related to certain preference in questions that directly relate to the attribute. As we have seen earlier, this can indeed be a problematic supposition too.

With regard to the high degree of "overlapping membership" in a pluralistic society, this appraisal of the relevancy in group attributes and of combinations of group attributes, in respect to voting behaviour, can be extremely complicated for the party strategists. It is probable that in general they are forced to work on the basis of simple rules of thumb of the type "the socio-economic factors are in most instances dominant for voting behaviour". Such rules, however, do not stretch particularly far. Partly, there are many socio-economic factors that are not unambiguously correlated; partly, a party usually turns to voters with different socio-economic backgrounds; and partly, it is possible that the rule of thumb cannot be particularly relied upon with regard to the strategically important group "marginal voters".[34]

A number of psychological studies have shown that most people have a tendency to regard their own concepts, their attitudes, and their behaviour as in some sense well compatible, "consistent"; usually, there exists a tendency to disregard or cover everything that could be experienced as inconsistent. The decisive in the context is the existence of this tendency and its "subjective" character; whether "objective" reasons exist for such a concept in various individual instances is another matter.[35]

This tendency should be one of the mechanisms that decide a human being's perception. We observe and accept that which is experienced as compatible with our own habitual concepts that support our standpoints, that aggree with our attitudes and ordinary behaviour norms. As long as the perception functions in this manner, we are not affected by any more severe "disturbances" and thereby can permanently experience our "reality models" as confirmed.

If a person is subjected to impressions and messages that do not agree with these "reality models", one of two things can happen: either such messages and such impressions are at once rejected, are scarcely the object of attention – and this is a "selective perception" – or he cannot see himself capable of rejecting the content in such impressions and messages. This latter normally leads to a "mental stress" that can be differently expressed. The impressions and messages can be so subversive in character that the entire value scale and reference framework of the individual undergoes a drastic change. But the result can also be limited to the individual being affected by uncertainty: the normal reality models fail to function, some concepts etc. that seemed obvious are not so any longer. The individual is now the object of influences that go in different directions, i. e. he is exposed to "cross-

pressure". A not unusual reaction is then to refuse to adopt a standpoint, to try to push aside the whole set of problems. By cross-pressure, the original opinion intensity and the certainty have thus been reduced. In extreme cases, this leads to the individual refusing, on the whole, to hold any opinion in those questions that the matter is concerned with.[36]

Both phenomena are obviously of interest to the strategists in a party P. In the former case, they must first distinguish between those who (in the "initial position") have an "absolutely positive" picture of the party and those who have an "absolutely negative" picture. None of the groups are any problem from the aspect of vote maximization. The former, if they vote, unquestionably vote for party P; the latter, definitely do not. An attempt to persuade the latter group to vote for party P would demand great investments from this party and produce extremely uncertain yields; therefore the attempt can hardly be considered worth while.

To the group of voters who really can be reached and exposed to "cross-pressure" by the party's information, there is reason for party P to ask: What will the result of this cross-pressure be? Is it possible to reduce the support of other parties by getting this group to abstain from voting for its traditional parties? Is it possible even to get the group to vote for party P? What contributions would thus be demanded? What costs would probably be connected with these contributions with regard to other groups in the electoral arena, to members in the internal arena, and to the relations with actual and presumptive coalition partners in the parliamentary arena? Will the outcome result in a net profit for the party?

As already pointed out, obviously changes in the party distribution at general elections depend on three factors: transfers between the parties, variations in the voting participation, and changes in the composition of the electorate. The two big uncertainty factors for the parties are obviously *how* people vote, and *whether* they vote.

Let us further combine the two criteria "initial attitude to the parties" and "voting propensity". First, party P is presumed then to distinguish between the voters who positively use their vote and those whose voting is uncertain. Second, a distinction is made between those who positively vote for party P ($= P+$), those who positively vote for the opposing parties ($= P-$), and those whose party choice is uncertain. This results in six different groups:

		PARTY CHOICE		
		P +	uncertain	P –
VOTING	positive	I	II	III
	uncertain	IV	V	VI

The Roman figures refer to the various groups of voters. (There is probably also

a group "positively non-voting", but from vote maximization aspect, it is of no interest.)

It can now be presumed that the party strategists of party P reason in the following manner:

Group I is no problem for the party in the electoral arena. (Because this group probably includes the party members, it is decisively important, however, in the internal arena.)

Group III is not profitable to consider: it would involve mismanagement of the party resources.

Group II is probably numerically a not too large group. Because uncertain party voters are probably exposed to cross-pressure, their voting participation would be uncertain too, i.e. the majority of uncertain party voters should be found in Group V. On the other hand, Group II can justify especially careful observation if it is presumed that its members have a high average political interest and a high average information level. The members of the group can then be important as opinion leaders outside the political parties.

Group IV members: party P must try to persuade these to utilize their franchise, in other words, the party output must to a considerable extent be shaped with this group in mind. This probably results in, *inter alia*, so-called "mobilization propaganda", whereby party P emphasizes the importance of the group members exercising their franchise and also emphasizes the risks that would arise for the group members should election successes reward the opposing parties.

Group VI: party P should obviously try to induce these members to refrain from voting: whether this is strategically possible is a particularly difficult question to answer. One possibility would be to try to restrain the voting participation by a low degree of intensity in the electoral debate, but efforts in this direction would be counteracted by consideration of mainly Groups IV and V; the intensity is, moreover, decided by the actions of the opposing parties.

Another alternative is whether it is possible for party P to shape an output that could expose the members of Group VI to cross-pressure which could perhaps given them reason to abstain from voting. Can party P adopt standpoints that to some extent attract at least some of the members of Group VI? Can party P politicize questions that result in lack of party cohesion in one or more of the opposing parties and thereby reduce the credibility of one or more of these opposing parties among the members in Group VI? Can party P by means of offensive propaganda and general party descriptions depreciate one or more of the opposing parties in the opinion of the members of Group VI so that they abstain from voting? As appears from the questions, calculations of ths kind must be particularly uncertain. It can also be risky for party P to adopt standpoints that aim at getting the members of Group VI to *abstain* from voting, because such standpoints can perhaps be associated with risks for "costs" with regard to other groups in the electoral arena, with regard to the members of party P, and with regard to the relations to factual or presumptive coalition partners in the parliamentary arena.

Group V can generally be thought to be a relatively large group; at all events,

its voting behaviour is of decisive importance for the possibilities of producing changes in the party distribution. It is probable that a considerable part of the first-time voters belong here. To this group, however, the uncertainty about the effects of the influence attempts of the parties seem most obvious.

An interesting question in this context is whether the members in the Groups II and V can be distributed according to some form of party scale, if they are position determined to certain margins between different parties.[37] A system with several parties can perhaps show that some of these voters are to be found on margins so far away from party P that this party can hardly influence them to its advantage. Or it can be shown that the voters are to be found on the margins between party P and one or more of the other parties; "party fronts" will in that case most probably be established between party P and these other parties. If the groups can be largely determined and identified, party P – similar to the competing parties – can, more-over, adjust its output with the object of trying to gain these groups by the use of certain group-related standpoints. However, there are also risks with an output so adjusted: for party P, an output adjusted with regard to margin voters in the Groups II and V can possibly cause the non-voting of Group IV in the election; for the opposing parties, the corresponding applies to Group VI.[38]

It should be emphasized that the previous reasoning is considerably simplified so that the analysis can be applied to a multiparty system. The characteristic for a multiparty system, if no party obtains its own parliamentary majority, is that a party's parliamentary strength (its parliamentary efficacy) is mainly determined by its relative position and less by the size of its parliamentary representation. The party's interest then primarily lies in the coalition possibilities that exist for it: vote or government coalitions.[39] Party P, with regard to this, has reason to interest itself not only in how large a share of the electorate it obtains at the general elections, but also how the votes are distributed on the other parties. This is the fundamental factor that can be presumed to complicate to a considerable extent the strategic deliberations for the parties in a multiparty system compared with the situation for the parties in a two-party system.

Content

Most of the foregoing reasonings point directly or indirectly to "the content of the communication". At an empirical study of propaganda process, the analysis of the content of the propaganda must come at an early stage. In several cases, for instance, this is a necessity so that we can fill in some of the categories of the paradigm, e. g., "intended recipients".

A very large number of distinctions and groupings concerning propaganda content should be possible as bases for analysis. In the following are included only four examples, which seem to be fundamental for such an analysis. The problems in the four cases are seen from different angles, and the bases of distinctions are thus varied. In the first example, propaganda is related to the other two types of party output: standpoints and candidates. In the second, "the politicization" of different

types of questions and possible distributions of sets of political questions are discussed. In the third, the formulation of the propaganda is discussed with regard to whether it is directed to the electorate in its entirety or to special groups. In the fourth, the interaction between two or more parties forms a basis.

Expressed very generally, party propaganda can be said to be a party's presentation before different audiences of its own standpoints and candidates and those of its opponents. With reference to the considerable manipulation possibilities existing here for the communicator, propaganda can be characterized as a third and independent component in the output of the parties, i. e. as a third output variable.

Besides the content categories "standpoints" and "candidates", there is at least one other category of greater importance, namely general "party descriptions". These party descriptions can be based on precisely the descriptions of standpoints and candidates, but this, in any case, is seldom an exhaustive characteristic of them. Often, the highly generalized characteristics (of one's own party and of the competing parties) are related to extra-parliamentary structures, the social composition of the parties, ideological connexions, political methods, degree of credibility, degree of parliamentary influence and the thereto connected responsibility, the relations between the various parties, etc.[40]

To what extent a communicator employs such party descriptions besides descriptions of standpoints and candidates can, *inter alia*, be supposed to be due to the appraisal of the information level of the intended recipients. To a well-informed audience, such propaganda, if isolated, could probably seldom be effective. To audiences with a low information level, it could, on the other hand, be thought to be effective.[41]

The concept *"politicization"* has already been used a few times in this article. If a question is "politicized", it is turned by the parties into a matter of dispute in the propaganda in the electoral arena[42] (to the extent that it is turned into a matter of dispute solely in the other arenas, this should be marked with a special prefix: "internal politicization" and "parliamentary politicization"). At the study of the content of the party propaganda, this should be compared with the standpoints of the various parties, with the object of clarifying which standpoints and how much of them are politicized.

"Politicization" can be set in relation to a concept that has attracted a good deal of attention in political science in recent years; namely, the concept *"cleavage"*, which has more or less the significance of "fighting line", "dividing line", or "conflict dimension".[43] Large parts of the political struggle can be described as being fought over cleavages that divide the parties (and probably also the electorate) in (usually) two (but sometimes several) opinion groups. A "cleavage" concerns a certain political subject area, or possibly a complex of subject areas. Examples of "cleavages" that occur and/or have occurred concern the attitudes to democracy/ dictatorship, general vote/graded vote, market economy/planned economy, state church/religiously neutral state, free trade/protectionism, will to defend/pacifism,

etc. (the suitability of the here used designations can, of course, be questioned). Different cleavages usually have different weight on different occasions. The time determination itself of different cleavages is always important to establish when describing a political system.[44]

A large part of a party's standpoints can now be position determined in relation to such dividing lines (for some kinds of standpoints, however, this is not possible).[45] The interesting fact for a multiparty system in that case is that such a description, if it is made "in full detail", usually results in a "pluralistic conflict pattern", i. e. the party groupings are varied for different dividing lines.[46] This is a circumstance that can have a generally conflict-levelling effect in the Polity (cf. the reasonings about the effect of "overlapping membership"), but that can also lead to difficulties for the formation of a government and of a majority if none of the parties have their own parliamentary majority.[47]

"Issue" here refers to a matter of dispute between the parties in the electoral arena. Normally, one also reads into the concept that an "issue" need not be a too insignificant matter of dispute, which only appears sporadically or incidentally in the election debate.[48] Some of these issues have obviously a close connexion with the various cleavages. As a matter of fact, these latter can to a large extent be said to constitute a pattern of different issues or potential issues. Naturally, not all the dividing lines or all the components that compose these dividing lines have lasting existence.

In relation to this terminology, there is obviously reason for the propaganda analyst to pose questions of the following type:
— what issues are related to what cleavages?
— what issues cannot be position determined in relation to different cleavages?
— what issues are current on what occasions?
— what "subject spreading" occurs in the propaganda of the parties?
— how large a part of the party standpoints is changed into issues?
— which types of standpoints are normally changed into issues?

A problem of considerable interest for strategy studies is the one already referred to: whether the parties show varying degrees of interest for different types of issues. Here, we can presume the almost trivial hypothesis that such differences are based on the parties interpreting various issue-types as producing profit or loss with regard to the vote distribution. A party always tries to politicize its supposed profit-issues and to depoliticize its supposed loss-issues.[49]

Another relevant problem concerns to what degree a specific matter of issue can, broadly speaking, be considered primarily to have its basis on differences in the social system, and in view of this, to have been politicized by the parties or by any one of them, or if the contrary prevails, to what extent the parties have primarily been creators of the matter in dispute. This should have its importance with regard to, *inter alia,* the possibilities for the parties to depoliticize the matter.

Yet another problem in this context concerns how "vote deciding" different issues are. – This problem clearly shows that the reasonings of the parties concerning this matter strategically lie very close to the question of which voter attributes should

be given the greatest importance; it concerns the same problem seen from opposite points of view.

A third classification system for analysis of propaganda content is related to the size and composition of the intended audience (the communication recipients). A very simple distinction can be made between propaganda directed towards the electorate as a whole *(undifferentiated propaganda)* and propaganda directed to some decisive part of the electorate *(selective propaganda)*. Another distinction, related to this, is based on the arena to which the propaganda can primarily be supposed to be directed: to the internal arena *(internal propaganda)* or to the electoral arena *(external propaganda)*.

Earlier, I discussed the attempt of the parties to reach special electoral groups and to differentiate their output with regard to the various electoral groups, mainly via different substructures in the party organization. These attempts at differentiation should be reflected in the propaganda content. When the parties conduct "selective propaganda", they can, with reason, ask themselves whether this can be screened partly from other recipients than the intended ones, and partly from the opposing parties. The strategic problem in this connexion, as has been pointed out, is to combine the differentiation in the party's output with regard to the varying U-calculi of the voters with the degree of uniformity necessary for the P-calculi (and included in the latter, mainly the credibility aspect). Great differences between the content of the selective and the undifferentiated propaganda result in risks for the party's credibility image in the eyes of the voters. The same thing can be valid at great differences between the content in the internal and in the external propaganda.

The possible degree of screening is largely dependent on what types of communication channels a party has at its disposal. In a political system where central technical communication channels with high degree of "coverage" and "overspread" play a dominant role for the communication of propaganda, an effective screening of the selective propaganda is difficult to ensure.[50] It is difficult for the parties to say very different things to different voters on one and the same matter during the same period. On the other hand, they can obviously adapt the choice of subject according to the intended recipient group. A limited number of big questions is then a party's "issues" in the propaganda directed to the electorate as a whole (thus, the undifferentiated propaganda) whereas the content in the selective propaganda is adapted according to the various intended groups or parts of the electorate. This latter adaptation can concern both the choice of questions and the choice of material in one and the same set of questions.

The fourth and last example to be treated in this discussion of classification systems, with reference to the content of the propaganda, presumes that propaganda is largely an interaction between the various parties in a party system. The number of interaction possibilities naturally depends on the number of parties. If we have, for instance, a party system with five parties, this gives ten direct interaction possibilities.[51]

However, still more interaction possibilities arise through the parties in a multi-party system *being grouped* in varied patterns whereby the concept actor changes conten. That occurs when, for instance, a distinction is made between government and opposition parties, centre parties and off-centre parties, socialist and non-social-ist parties, consumer parties and producer parties, idea parties and class parties: the number of possible epithets is especially large and the content in these epithets is often highly interesting at strategy studies (although many of the epithets can have a slight factual anchorage). The bases for these groupings are extremely varied, e.g., the parliamentary positions of the parties, their ideological connexions, their associa-tions with social groups in the electorate, their connexions with non-parliamentary organizations, their positions in relation to different cleavages. These groupings often implicitly presume some form of scale grading. Normally, the groupings are expressed in the form of general party descriptions.

In relation to the interaction possibilities between the parties, the following differentiation of propaganda content can be worth carrying out:

— declarative propaganda
— offensive propaganda
— defensive propaganda.

By *"declarative propaganda"* is meant a mere presentation of one's own party's standpoints and/or candidates, without mentioning the opposing parties. The content can also be a general description of one's own party (party description in the sense referred to) without comparisons with the opposing parties.

By *"offensive propaganda"* is meant attacks on other parties in the form of gen-eral party descriptions of them and/or attacks on their standpoints and/or candidates.

By *"defensive propaganda"* is meant a defence of one's own party against the offensive propaganda of other parties (or possibly other opinion formers).

"Offensive propaganda" and "defensive propaganda" are referred to by a com-mon term *"polemic"*.

The Formulation of Problems

I recapitulate briefly the main features of the article. The basic problem is: what factors determine the strategic calculations and strategic actions of the parties in a multiparty system? It was thereby presumed that the study of propaganda was one of the methods that could lie as basis for attempts to arrive at generalizations about the strategic calculations and actions of the parties. Preliminarily, some concepts fundamental to the article were given, such as the classification into three arenas and the three main types of output at the disposal of the parties: standpoints, candidates, and propaganda. As basis for the study of propaganda, the often used paradigm was chosen: Who says what, how, to whom, under what circumstances, for what purpose, with what effect? The article has thereafter essentially consisted of commenting on these categories; primarily, certain distinctions were made in the different categories. A number of more or less reasonable hypotheses were also advanced about the relations between various categories. These hypotheses either lay as basis for subclassifications or used them as basis.

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What use, if any, can we have of such a paradigm in its original or in its differentiated form?

The paradigm indicates first and foremost a general concept apparatus supposedly useful at the study of communication. Behind the specification of a paradigm of this type there lies naturally the thought that its categories are of such a degree of generality that the paradigm can apply to the study of a large number of types of communication. The differentiations made under the various main components must be adapted to the type of communication chosen for study. The original components, however, indicate general points of departure for an analysis.

Second, the paradigm suggests a certain delimitation of the analysis area. He who lets a particular paradigm form the basis for an analysis of a definite area obviously thereby presumes that the categories of the paradigm denote the phenomena most important for the area in question. On the other hand, naturally one cannot on the basis of a paradigm express an opinion on the question of whether the components can be considered *sufficient* as basis for valid generalizations.

Third, the components of the paradigm can be combined in various ways, i.e. it can serve as basis for the posing of questions. This can occur systematically, *inter alia,* because the components have been specified explicitly. It is probable that every researcher always to some extent works with certain implicit prerequisites, but the importance of these "hidden" prerequisites can at least be reduced by the use of a paradigm of this type. I will in the following dwell upon this in somewhat more detail.

In a sense, the posing of questions can naturally be said to be the first step in a scientific study. If we do not know what we are asking for, we do not know what we are to look for nor what we must answer; there must always be some form of framing questions. The risks of working on the basis of intuitive ideas about what is important and what is unimportant, however, are obvious, at least as soon as one encounters problems of a somewhat higher degree of complexity. That it is difficult to arrive at positive and highly general answers is one thing; that the answers are doubtful, however, does not necessarily mean that the questions have to be vague; naturally, precise answers can never be given to imprecise questions.

The combination possibilities that exist between the various components of the paradigm can be examined most easily by listing them in a matrix form. This will be illustrated by a very simple example in which the following components form the basis: 1. communicator, 2. (intended) recipient, 3. content, 4. communication channel, 5. time point for the communication (thus one of the conceivable situational variables). If the sequence in the various relations is assumed to be unimportant, these components can obviously be related to one another in the following way:

	2.	3.	4.	5.
1.	A	B	C	D
2.		E	F	G
3.			H	I
4.				J

The letters represent the various relations. As long as we only combine the different components two and two, we thus get ten relations:

A = communicator/recipient
B = communicator/content
C = communicator/channel
D = communicator/time point
E = recipient/content

F = recipient/channel
G = recipient/time point
H = content/channel
I = content/time point
J = channel/time point

All these relations can then be formulated in party and propaganda terms, and the matrix gives an idea about the combination possibilities that exist (thus also 3- and 4-variable combinations and, of course, the only 5-variable combination). We get ten 2-variable combinations, ten 3-variable combinations, five 4-variable combinations, and one 5-variable combination, i.e. in all, 26 combination possibilities.

As the example shows, a limited number of variables make possible quite a large number of combinations: at least so many that it is difficult without the aid of this type of matrix to remember to test (or to consider) them all. It is none the less obvious, as has also been shown by the foregoing text, that we have little satisfaction from so few and so coarse variables as those that the paradigm contains, if they are not differentiated further. If we set up all the subcategories mentioned above under the various components of the paradigm in the form of a matrix, the result would obviously be a matrix with a very large number of combinations. Many of these combinations would propably appear to the analyst empirically less interesting and less urgent to test, but the possibility also exists that we should find problems of high relevancy which would be easy to mislay at a more intuitively working with the formulation of the problems.

One thing must be added: of course, the indicating of the various relation possibilities does not mean that the questions thereby formulate themselves. At the formulation of the questions, we obviously must employ gradings of the type "what are the proportions between the variables such and such", or "to what extent does *this* variable determine *that* variable", etc. Probably these gradings are relatively few and relatively stereotype; if this is not the case, they should be worked into the matrix, although this means that the probable number of nonsense combinations increases. (If we arrive at a very large number of variables, we will eventually be compelled to obtain the various combination possibilities by computer.)

The mentioned method – which in itself is naturally very trivial – has not only the merit of permitting a systematical posing of questions. It can also be said to imply a thought experiment, which makes it possible preliminarily to test the theoretical suitability (mainly the generative value) of a particular concept apparatus.

Research Technique Problems

At last, some of the methodical problems connected with attempts to answer empirically questions of the mentioned type will be briefly discussed. An examination of the concept apparatus should show that some form of content analysis is necessary. Often a "measurement" of the total amount of the party's propaganda is presumed (possibly within certain time limits and also delimitation in the case of

unsure representativeness). This total amount is then divided according to varying criteria into sub-amounts which are set in relation to the total amount and to one another.

Three classical problems are usually discussed in relation to content analysis: the *conformity* of the material (is the material sufficiently homogeneous to be measured?), the *reliability* of the measured results (are the results "correct"?), and the *validity* of the measured results (do we really measure what we intend to measure?). It is obvious from these three that "validity" does not concern a purely research technical problem, but to a great extent concerns the concept apparatus and the problems. Preliminarily, the general problem is formulated thus: what types of strategic deliberations do the parties make in a multiparty system? and what types of acting do they use in their attempts to reach their strategic goals? The validity problem in the context can then be formulated: are empirical answers to questions of the indicated type a valid material for answering this general problem? (naturally, they can in the present case only be *partial* material, because "propaganda" is only one of the action variables that the parties have at their disposal. However, this does not affect the fundamental problem).

Concerning the conformity problems and the reliability problems in this context, naturally nothing decisive can be said before the material has been examined. It can then be conceived (although it is hardly likely) that these two problems will prove to be of such dimensions that questions of the kind indicated—or some of the questions—are impossible to answer with any reasonable degree of precision. If that is so, it does not necessarily mean that the questions are meaningless, merely that the content analysis, as a research method, has certain technical limitations. In that case, we must either modify our ambitions at posing questions or ponder whether other methods are available.

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NOTES

An earlier version of this article was published in Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 2–3/1967. The article was also an outline for certain sections of my later published dissertation (Sjöblom, 1968).

[1] By "standpoints" is here meant decisions in the name of the party in special political matters or about the general orientation of the content of political questions. Therefore, "standpoints" include a party's "current attitudes" in the parliamentary arena and decisions about party programmes (and similar) in the party organization. On the other hand, decisions in strategic weighing questions or in purely practical organizatory party questions are naturally not intended.

[2] As the following text indicates, the analytically and empirically complicated delimitation between "standpoints" and "propaganda content" is not quite strictly carried out in the article.

[3] Regarding the concept "paradigm", see, for instance, Merton, 1957, p. 14 ff.

[4] Cf. George, 1959, p. 107 ff.; Lasswell, Lerner and Pool, 1952, p. 12.

[5] Cf. Sjöblom, 1967, p. 217 ff.

[6] Inter alia, because responsibility questions are a frequent theme in the party propaganda.

[7] Cf. below p. 29.

[8] Cf. below p. 33.

[9] Cf. Deutsch, 1963, p. 80 f. and passim.

[10] See e. g. Lane, 1959, pp. 80–86 and passim.

[11] Cf. e. g. Schramm, ed., 1954, p. 13 ff.

[12] Cf. e. g. Downs, 1957, p. 36 ff.; March and Simon, 1958, p. 114; Singer, 1963, p. 422 ff.

[13] Cf. Downs, op. cit., pp. 49, 103 f. ("future oriented voting", reliability", "responsibility"); Molin, 1965, p. 146.

[14] Cf. Cartwright, 1965, p. 25.

[15] Because the foregoing reasoning does not presume "complete" information by the individuals who make the appraisals, it can none the less only be a question of what H. Simon calls "subjective rationality". Simon, 1957, p. 76; March and Simon, op. cit., p. 138.

[16] Downs, op. cit., p. 209 ff and passim.

[17] See e. g. Campbell et al., 1960, p. 60.

[18] Ibid., pp. 120–167 and passim. Cf. Cartwright, op. cit., p. 28 f.

[19] Regarding "aggregation", see e. g. Almond and Powell, 1966, p. 98 ff.

[20] Cf. Merton, op. cit., pp. 517–521 (the "boomerang effects" of propaganda).

[21] Cf. note [15] above.

[22] Cf. Levin and Eden, 1962, p. 53. See also Downs, op. cit., p. 47 ff.

[23] See below p. 37.

[24] Cf. e. g. Eldersveld, 1964, p. 4 ff. and passim; Duverger, 1959, passim; Schlesinger, 1958, p. 770.

[25] Cf. the use of these terms in Easton, 1965, p. 249 and passim.

[26] Thus in terms of what Easton, op. cit., p. 291, calls "partisan ideology". They can also naturally be legitimated in terms of "the ideology" prevalent for the national system. Regarding this use of the term "ideology", cf. Dahl, 1963, p. 20 ff.

[27] If party cohesion is obtained by compromise with the aid of vague and obscure formulations of standpoints, this can also have negative consequences for the credibility of the party in the mind of the voters: if decisions are formulated in this manner, possibly they give no information about how the party will appear in concrete matters.

[28] Cf. Dahl, 1956, p. 129: "The vote was more of a punishment for past action than a choice of future policy."

[29] Easton, 1953, p. 129 f.; see also Easton, 1965, p. 50.

[30] Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 25 f. Examples of symbolic outputs are "affirmation of values, displays of political symbols, statements of policies and intents" (p. 27). Cf. also Almond, 1964–65, p. 193.

[31] Cf. Riker, 1962, p. 65 f.

[32] See, for instance, Lipset, 1963, pp. 307–312.

[33] Cf. Dahl, op. cit., p. 90 ff.; Downs, op. cit., p. 114 ff.; Sartori, 1966, pp. 137–176.

[34] Cf. Sjöblom, op. cit., p. 206 ff.

[35] Cf. Rosenberg et al., 1960, passim; Festinger, 1957, passim.

[36] Cf. e. g. Lane, op. cit., p. 197 ff.

[37] See references in note [33], and Stokes, 1963, pp. 368–377.

[38] Cf. Garvey, 1966, pp. 29–38.

[39] Cf. Molin, op. cit., p. 145.

[40] Cf. Fredriksson, 1962, p. 23 ff.

[41] Cf. above p. 16 f.

[42] Cf. Molin, op. cit., p. 141 ff.

[43] Cf. e. g. Rokkan, 1966, pp. 70–115; LaPalombara and Weiner, eds., *op. cit.*, passim; Allardt and Littunen, eds., 1964, passim.

[44] Cf. e. g. Rokkan, *op. cit.*, passim; Daalder, 1966, pp. 43–77.

[45] Cf. Stokes, *op. cit.*, p. 273 ff. Stokes differentiates between "position issues" and "valence issues". Cf. the distinction between "position issues" and "style issues" in Berelson, Lazarsfeld an McPhee, 1954, p. 184 f.

[46] Cf. Dahl, 1963, p. 78 f.; Duverger, *op. cit.*, p. 232 and passim; Sartori, *op. cit.*, p. 179 f.

[47] Cf. Daalder, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

[48] Cf. e. g. Campbell et al., *op. cit.*, p. 169 ff.

[49] Cf. Polsby and Wildawsky, 1964, p. 115 ff.

[50] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 114.

[51] Cf. e. g. McClelland, 1966, p. 26 f.

unsure representativeness). This total amount is then divided according to varying criteria into sub-amounts which are set in relation to the total amount and to one another.

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