

NORWAY: THE STORTING ELECTION OF SEPTEMBER 1965

The election of representatives to the Norwegian *Storting* on 12–13, September 1965 brought about the first decisive change in the régime since 1945: the governing Labour Party lost and had to go into opposition after thirty years of near-continuous rule. However, the result was not entirely unexpected: a change in the electoral system in 1952 had lowered the threshold for the entry of splinter movements into the political arena, and the continuing transformation of social structure under the impact of economic growth had made it increasingly difficult for the Labour Party to maintain its momentum in the mobilization of support.

The marked overrepresentation of the Labour Party produced under the old d'Hondt system of multi-member PR made it very difficult to resist the pressures for a change in the electoral law after 1949. Through an interesting process of elimination the Norwegian Labour Party accepted the same alternative to d'Hondt as the Danes and the Swedes: the Sainte-Laguë procedure modified through the stipulation of a 1.4 "barrier" against party fragmentation. Tactically this was a most intriguing move: the majority party gave up the clearcut "government bonus" implicit in the d'Hondt procedure but lowered the threshold enough to discourage mergers of the non-socialist opposition parties.

Under the d'Hondt system the total number of votes cast for each party list is divided in turn by 1, 2, 3, M and the quotients rank-ordered until all the seats in the given constituency have been distributed. This means that M th seat will cost no more and no less than the first: the result will be invariably some overrepresentation of the largest party.¹

The pure Sainte-Laguë formula makes the game much tougher for the majority list. The party totals are divided by the odd numbers only: 1, 3, 5, , and so on. It costs T votes to reach the threshold of representation, the average cost of further seats up to a total number M ($M > 1$) will be $\frac{(2M-1)T + 1}{M}$. The cost of represen-

tation will increase *step by step with the size of the party*: if the "threshold seat" costs 10,000 votes, it will cost 20,001 votes to get one more and 40,001 more to get two: the average cost per seat increases from 10,000 for one to $\frac{(3 \cdot 10,000) + 1}{2} = 15,000.5$

for two and to $\frac{(5 \cdot 10,000) + 1}{3} = 16,677.3$ for three. The higher the M the closer the

average cost will approximate $2T$: in the extreme case of a large constituency and one large and one small party the average cost of the majority party seats would come close to double the cost of the first seat for the minority.

This pure odd-number procedure was generally rejected by the reformers: it invited splinter parties and produced too great a gap in the cost structure from the first to the second seat. The solution was sought in an increase in the "barrier" divisor: the higher the divisor the greater the number of votes required for representation and the less the encouragement given to new party formations. The maximum barrier value considered was 1.5: this would amount to a return to the d'Hondt formula for the first two seats and a very lenient gradient for further seats (in our simplest example: 10,000, 10,000, 11,111, 11,667). This was judged too hard on the small parties and too kind to the large. The compromise reached in Norway as well as in Denmark and Sweden was a 1.4 barrier: this was judged to offer adequate protection against fragmentation and still make for a clear-cut rise in the cost of representation for large parties. In our simplest example, the cost would rise from 10,000 for one seat to averages of 10,714 for two, 11,904 for three, and 12,500

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for four — one quarter more than for one. Under this formula, the average cost of M seats will approximate a limit $1.43 T$ as M increases: even in a nation-wide constituency the most expensive seats would not average more than one and a half times the cost of the threshold seats.³

The d'Hondt method had given the Labour Party a clear bonus in 1949: the party polled 45.7 per cent of the votes but gained a majority of 85 over 65. The Sainte-Laguë formula reduced the overrepresentation but kept the party in power in the elections of 1953 and 1957. As will be seen in Table 1 the principal loser was the

Table 1. *Effects of alternative allocation procedures on the distribution of seats by party 1953–1961*

Elect- ion	PR system	Thresh- old	Total repr.	Seats allocated to:							Agr./ Soc. bloc	Non- soc.
				CP	SP	Lab.	Lib.	Chr.	Cent.	Cons.		
1953	Nation-wide proportionality	.	150	7	—	70	15	16	14	28	77	73
	d'HONDT	150	2	—	83	15	14	12	24	85	65
	SAINTE-LAGUË	none	150	6	—	68	16	18	15	27	74	76
	— " —	1.4	150	3	—	77	15	14	14	27	80	70
1957	Nation-wide proportionality	.	150	5	—	73	15	15	14	28	78	72
	d'HONDT	150	—	—	88	11	11	13	27	88	62
	SAINTE-LAGUË	none	150	2	—	70	17	18	14	29	72	78
	— " —	1.4	150	1	—	78	15	12	15	29	79	71
1961	Nation-wide proportionality	.	150	5	4	70	13	14	14	30	79	71
	d'HONDT	150	—	2	84	12	10	14	28	86	64
	SAINTE-LAGUË	none	150	1	2	69	17	16	15	30	72	78
	— " —	1.4	150	—	2	74	14	15	16	29	76	74

smallest of the parties, the Communists: they were unable to reach the threshold point in the great majority of constituencies and consequently wasted most of their votes. The first signs of a change in the majority — minority balance came in 1961: quarrels over foreign and military policy within the Labour Party had triggered the formation of a new party on the left flank and this new formation proved strong enough to break through the barrier in two constituencies. The Labour lead was cut down from 49.3 per cent to 46.8 per cent. If the d'Hondt procedure had still been in force, the party would have retained its majority. The Sainte-Laguë system produced a curious deadlock. Labour lost its majority but could not be ousted from power: the non-socialist Opposition could not muster a majority either and the parliamentary equilibrium hinged on the votes of the two members for the new Socialist People's Party. The crisis during the summer of 1963 heralded a decisive change in the balance of forces in Norwegian politics: the two Left Socialists voted against the Labour Government in August but allowed it to return to power after four weeks of government by the non-socialist coalition.⁴

The election of 12–13 September, 1965, broke this deadlocked 2–74–74 constellation: the Left Socialists stayed at the 2-member level but Labour lost 6 seats to the non-socialist bloc. The changes in the actual voting strength of the two blocs were not as marked: the Socialist (CP + SP + Lab.) bloc lost 1.6 per cent of the valid votes but 4.0 per cent of the seats. The split in the Socialist ranks exerted a heavier toll in seats than in votes: an increasing number of votes were wasted on lists below the threshold of representation and the multi-seat Labour lists lost out in the fight with one-seat Opposition lists.

Table 2. Changes in the strength of the two blocs 1957-1965: by region

Election	Per cent of valid votes:				Per cent of seats:				Total seats = 100 %			
	CP*	SP*	Lab.	Socialist	Total non-socialist	CP	SP	Lab.		Socialist		
Whole country	1957	3.4	-	48.3	51.7	48.3	0.67	-	52.00	52.67	47.33	150
	1961	2.9	2.4	46.8	52.1	47.9	-	1.33	49.33	50.67	49.33	150
	1965 change 57-65	1.4	6.0	43.2	50.5	49.5	-	1.33	45.33	46.67	53.33	150
Oslofjord**	1957	-2.0	+6.0	-5.1	-1.2	+1.2	-0.67	+1.33	-6.67	-6.00	+6.00	35
	1961	3.4	-	49.1	52.5	47.5	-	-	54.29	54.29	45.71	35
	1965 change 57-65	2.6	3.9	46.6	53.1	47.0	-	2.86	51.43	54.29	45.71	35
East Inland**	1957	1.3	6.9	43.1	51.2	48.8	-	-	45.71	48.57	51.43	28
	1961	2.4	6.6	52.6	61.6	38.4	3.57	-	60.71	64.28	35.72	28
	1965 change 57-65	-2.6	+6.6	-4.4	-0.4	+0.4	-3.57	-	-3.57	-7.14	+7.14	28
South, West	1957	1.6	-	38.9	40.5	59.5	-	-	40.82	40.82	59.18	49
	1961	1.4	1.5	37.8	40.7	59.3	-	-	38.78	38.78	61.22	49
	1965 change 57-65	0.3	4.3	34.4	39.0	61.0	-	-	32.65	32.65	67.35	49
Middle, North	1957	-1.3	+4.3	-4.5	-1.5	+1.5	-	-	-8.17	-8.17	+8.17	38
	1961	4.3	-	52.7	57.0	43.0	-	-	57.89	57.89	42.11	38
	1965 change 57-65	3.8	2.1	51.2	57.0	43.0	-	2.63	55.26	57.89	42.11	38
Whole country	1957	2.0	6.5	46.6	55.1	44.9	-	-	52.63	55.26	44.74	38
	1961	-2.3	+6.5	-6.1	-1.9	+1.9	-	-	-2.63	-5.26	+2.63	38
	1965 change 57-65	-2.3	+6.5	-6.1	-1.9	+1.9	-	-	-2.63	-5.26	+2.63	38

* Changes in the strength of the left-wing parties to some extent reflect increases or decreases in the numbers of lists presented:

	Whole country				Oslofjord			East Inland			South/West			Middle/North		
	CP	SP	Lab.	Socialist	CP	SP	Lab.	Socialist	CP	SP	Lab.	Socialist	CP	SP	Lab.	Socialist
1957	19	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
1961	19	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
1965	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1957	6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1961	6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1965	20	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4

** The commune of Skoger was transferred from the Oslofjord to the East Inland area in 1965; all figures refer to the 1965 boundaries of the two areas.

Table 2 shows the changes in the strength of the three Socialist parties and the non-socialist bloc from 1957 to 1965. The decline in the strength of the Communist Party continued throughout the period, but it can hardly explain the spectacular growth of the Left Socialists. The decline in the strength of the Labour Party from 1957 to 1965 was also marked, from 48.3 per cent to 43.2 per cent, but has to be weighed against the growth of the Left Socialists to the 6 per cent level. The total Socialist strength moved from 51.7 per cent in 1957 up to 52.1 per cent in 1961 and then back to 50.5 per cent in 1965. If there had been a system of pure nation-wide PR the three Socialist parties would still have held a majority of seats in 1965, but the two leftist parties did not reach the threshold point in more than two constituencies and in this sense wasted most of their strength. The CP has been without representation in the Storting since 1961 and the Left Socialists were only able to cross the threshold in two constituencies with the largest numbers of seats: Oslo and Nordland. As a result, more than 11 per cent of the votes cast on the Socialist side in 1965 went without representation.⁵

By contrast the non-socialist parties wasted markedly fewer votes in 1965 than in earlier elections. Three weak lists had been withdrawn under a co-operative arrangement between the Christians and the Centre Party and the remaining below-threshold lists from 1961 made a very good showing. The Liberals (*Venstre*) had seven lists below the threshold in 1961 but crossed it in four constituencies in 1965. The Centre Party, formerly the Agrarians, had three weak lists, gave up one and got in on the two others. The Conservatives (*Høyre*) were without representation in three constituencies in 1961 but made the threshold in all but one of them in 1965. The only loser in the non-socialist bloc was the Christian People's Party: it had presented unsuccessful lists in seven constituencies in 1961, withdrew two of these, but put up one new list without success and came below the threshold in one further constituency. The non-socialist parties won most of their victories on the thresholds to first seats. Four of the six Labour losses went to lists which had not reached the representation point in 1961: two to the Liberals in the Oslofjord area, one to the Conservatives in the West and one to the Center Party in the North. The other two losses were in the West: in these constituencies all the principal parties have crossed the threshold and the battle was waged over second seats. The overall gain in non-socialist representation was the result of a double movement in the electorate: the Liberals gained ground in their below-threshold constituencies in the East while the Conservatives broke through toward full representation in their traditionally weakest territories in the South and the West. To understand the processes at work in the 1965 election it is clearly essential to analyze the changes in the political balance between the regions in Norway. Table 2 gives a regional break-down of the figures for the two opposing party blocs, and Table 3 gives details about the parties in the victorious bloc of co-operating parties on the right.

The well-established contrasts between East and West in Norway came out as clearly in 1965 as in 1957. The Socialist bloc stayed well above the majority point in the East, the Middle and the North, but dropped below the 40 per cent mark in the South and West.⁶ The Socialist losses were most marked in the Northern stronghold and much smaller in the four provinces (*fylker*) of the East Inland region: in these forestry-industry areas the working class parties still polled more than 60 per cent of the valid votes cast. No detailed ecological analysis of the variations in loss rates has as yet been carried out. Our first cross-tabulations by type of commune do indicate, however, that the Labour Party lost fewer votes in the fisheries districts and the least urbanized countryside than in the industrial areas and the cities.⁷ The Left Socialists made much more headway in the urbanized communes but the net losses for the three-party bloc were nevertheless heaviest in the cities. Further analysis suggests that the Socialist bloc held its own in the still mobilizing periphery,

Table 3. Changes in the strength of the non-socialist parties 1961-65: by region

Region	Election	Per cent of valid votes*		Per cent of non-socialist votes		Per cent of total seats		Tot. repr.					
		Lib.	Chr.**	Lib.	Chr.	Lib.	Chr.						
Total	1961	8.8	9.6	18.6	20.1	19.6	41.8	9.33	10.00	10.67	19.33	150	
	1965 change 61-65	10.3	8.1	9.9	21.1	20.9	16.5	42.6	12.00	8.67	12.00	20.67	150
Oslofjord***	1961	4.9	6.7	4.6	30.8	10.4	14.3	9.7	65.6	5.71	5.71	34.29	35
	1965 change 61-65	7.3	5.0	5.1	31.4	15.0	10.2	10.4	64.3	8.57	2.86	8.57	31.43
East Inland***	1961	4.8	5.4	14.7	12.8	12.8	14.3	39.0	33.9	3.57	3.57	17.86	28
	1965 change 61-65	5.7	5.7	12.8	14.1	14.9	14.9	33.3	36.9	3.57	3.57	17.86	28
South, West	1961	17.0	16.4	10.8	15.1	28.6	27.7	18.2	25.5	20.41	18.37	10.20	49
	1965 change 61-65	17.8	14.6	11.6	17.0	29.2	23.9	19.0	27.9	20.41	18.37	10.20	49
Middle, North	1961	8.2	8.9	10.8	15.0	19.1	20.8	25.1	35.0	7.89	7.89	10.53	38
	1965 change 61-65	9.2	6.5	12.7	16.5	20.5	14.5	28.2	36.8	10.53	5.26	13.16	38
		+1.0	-2.4	+1.9	+1.5	+1.4	-6.3	+3.1	+1.8	+2.64	-2.63	+2.63	0.0

* Votes for joint non-socialist lists have been distributed among the participant parties in proportion to their strength in the preceding election.

** Variations in the strengths of the Christians and the Centre party must be judged against information about the number of lists presented:

Chr.	Whole country (tot. 20)	Oslofj. (4)	East Inl. (4)	South/W. (7)	Middle/N. (5)
61	17 (+1)	4	3	6 (+1)	4
65	16 (+1)	3	3	6 (+1)	4
Centre					
61	12 (+5)	2 (+1)	3 (+1)	4 (+2)	3 (+1)
65	15 (+1)	2 (+1)	3	6	4

Lists in parentheses refer to joint lists.

*** For boundary definitions see Table 2, note **

the communes with the most marked increases in turnout, but lost out in the already highly politicized and polarized areas.⁸ The hypothesis we hope to explore in some detail in our analysis of the survey data collected before and after the election is that most of the changers in the economically advanced communities were younger, geographically and socially mobile voters: in these groups the rates of defection from traditional Labour loyalties seem to have been quite marked, mostly, it is true, toward the radical Socialist People's Party, but often also to the Liberals. Perhaps the single most important development in 1965 was the shift in the balance of electoral strengths on the non-socialist side. The Liberals had been losing ground in the Oslofjord region for several decades but now suddenly came back in great force: the result was three new mandates for a "middle" party in the most polarized of the regions. By contrast the Conservatives made heavy inroads in the typical "middle party" districts of the South and the West: there was a marked tendency toward continued polarization in the periphery but a reversal towards differentiated politics at the centre. This double movement helped the non-socialist bloc toward a clear victory in the battle for seats: they made their most significant gains in the constituencies where the pay-off was highest. There has been much speculation about the extent to which this was the result of "strategic voting": how many non-socialists defected from their traditional party to vote for a coalition list just below the threshold point? This raises tricky issues in analysis: we hope to be able to explore this in detail in our work with the survey data.

The change-over to a coalition government of the four non-socialist parties prompted a great deal of speculation about the future of Norwegian politics: would the partners be able to work out an effective policy and agree on its implementation? Would they enter into closer co-operation and would two or more of them move towards full mergers? Would they even find it profitable to change the rules of the electoral game? This is not the place for a detailed discussion of trends in Norwegian politics: we shall confine ourselves to a quick review of the alternative reforms of electoral arrangements and their probable consequences for the distribution of seats among the parties.

The basic structure of Norwegian electoral law is given in the Constitution: articles 50 to 53 give the qualifications for suffrage and articles 57 and 58 give the number of representatives for the country as a whole and for each of the 20 constituencies. Any change in the territorial structure of representation must be proposed during the first three sessions of one electoral period and must receive a two-thirds majority in the *Storting* established through the next election (article 112).

The *Storting* elected in 1961 left a great variety of proposals for such changes for decision during 1965-69. Two concerns were dominant in these proposals: the preoccupation with strict nation-wide proportionality among *parties* and the claim for greater equality of representation among *constituencies*. Increases in the representation of the two central constituencies, the capital and the surrounding Akershus province, have been proposed again and again but all such initiatives have met with the old argument that the periphery deserves some overrepresentation in Parliament to offset the advantages of proximity to the decision-makers at the centre. The modest increases likely in the representation of Oslo and Akershus will not have any marked effect on the balance of forces in the *Storting*: Labour and the Conservatives will gain but the current 2-68-80 constellation will hardly be affected. The *general* proposal for the equalization of representation proposed by a Liberal leader⁹ seems likely to bring about a more pronounced polarization of the *Storting* the "middle" parties tend to be strongest in the currently overrepresented constituencies and would lose out against Labour and the Conservatives. Even more drastic changes are likely through the introduction of some form of cross-constituency representation: nation-wide members-at-large (*utjevningsmandater på rikslister*) or nation-wide

Table 4. Party representation under alternative electoral procedures: calculations for 1965

Type of PR system	Threshold criterion	Total no. of representatives	Total allocated to:						Bloccs		
			CP	SP	Lab.	Lib.	Chr.	Centre	Cons.	Soc.	Non-soc.
Nation-wide proportionality		150	2	9	65	15	13	15	31	76	74
Constituency PR: d'HONDT	Implicit	150	—	2	74	17	9	16	32	76	74
SAINTE-LAGUE	1.0	150	—	4	66	18	14	18	30	70	80
— " —	1.2	150	—	2	67	18	14	18	31	69	81
— " —	1.4	150	—	2	68	18	13	18	31	70	80
Constituency PR on SAINTE-LAGUE plus 11 seats on nation-wide lists: largest remainder method	One direct repr. or 3 per cent (SP proposal) Two direct repr. or 4 per cent (Liberal proposal)	150+11	—	9	69	18	13	18	34	78	83
Constituency PR on SAINTE-LAGUE but last seat allocated on basis of nation-wide results*	Two direct repr. or 3 per cent Three direct repr. (Cons. proposal)	158+11 150+11 158+11	—	10	73	18	14	18	36	83	86
			—	9	69	18	13	18	34	78	83
			—	10	73	18	14	18	36	83	86
		150	—	9	65	16	12	15	32	75	75
		150	—	2	70	16	13	15	34	72	78

* This proposal includes an alternative threshold for the allocation of any seat, whether regular or "last": a party with less than 3 per cent of the votes in the whole country or with only one "weak" direct seat (fewer votes than all valid votes total constituency seats) will go completely unrepresented. Calculations of the consequences of such provisions are fraught with difficulties.

proportionalization of within-constituency allocations (*utjevning ved omfordeling av sistemandater*). In both cases everything will hinge on the threshold for participation in the final round of allocation: how many votes are required or how many direct seats? Table 4 sets out the consequences of three of the proposals and their alternative threshold provisions.

The Liberal proposal has a great number of alternatives but none of them would keep out the smallest of the above-threshold parties from 1965: the strictest criteria are two direct seats or 4 per cent of the valid votes. The Socialist People's Party could claim 7 to 8 of the 11 additional seats to be allotted on a nation-wide basis and the non-socialist majority would be considerably reduced. The Socialist People's Party has naturally supported this move towards nation-wide proportionality but has proposed a slight lowering of the second-round threshold: one direct seat or 3 per cent of the votes.

A third proposal of some consequence has been advanced by Conservative members and represents an interesting novelty: there will be no additional seats but the allocation of the *last seat* in each of the 20 constituencies will be decided on the basis of the *nation-wide* results for the party, not the constituency results. The consequences of this procedure would again depend on the height of the barrier against minor parties. Several alternatives are offered. On the strictest criterion a party will only be allowed a share of the last seats in the twenty constituencies if it has gained three or more direct seats. This would exclude the Left Socialists from the round of "proportionalization" but nevertheless make for a tighter majority-minority constellation: 2-70-78. Under the mildest criterion only the Communists would be excluded and the Socialist People's Party would get 7 of the 20 last seats: this seems likely to bring about a 9-66-75 situation and a deadlock of the 1961 type.

In sum, none of the proposed changes in the Constitution would improve the position of the non-socialist bloc and at least one of them might endanger it. Given the 1965 results, any government move to change the 1952 procedures could hardly be motivated by expectations of great gains for the non-socialist bloc: the most plausible motive would be the interest in offering further incentives for the maintenance of the split in the Socialist ranks. This objective might also be achieved through the lowering of the Sainte-Lagué threshold: this would *not* require a change in the Constitution but a simple majority decision in the *Storting*. Table 4 shows the consequences of two moves in this direction. At the 1.2 level the only change would be the transfer of one seat from Labour to the Christians. At the 1.0 level the Left Socialists would win two seats from the largest parties, one from Labour and one from the Conservatives. Of the government parties the Conservatives would benefit least from any such move: they have only one list below the threshold and would stand to lose in all the other constituencies. The coalition parties will clearly think twice before they make a move towards electoral reform. The Norwegian case offers fascinating evidence of the difficulties of national proportionalization in a system characterized by marked regional differences in party strength and clearly deserves further study in a comparative perspective.

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² A simple example: 4 parties, 7 seats.

List	Votes (V)	Quotients				Total seats (M)	Votes per seat	
		1	3	5	7		actual $\left(\frac{V}{M}\right)$	minimum $\left(\frac{(2M-1)T}{M}\right)$
A	105,210	$\frac{105,210}{=I}$	$\frac{35,070}{=III}$	$\frac{21,042}{=IV}$	15,030	3	35,070	25,070
B	46,200	$\frac{46,200}{=II}$	$\frac{15,400}{=V}$	9,240		2	23,100	22,563
C	15,120	$\frac{15,120}{=VI}$	5,040			1	15,120	15,042
D	15,042	$\frac{15,042(T)}{=VII}$	5,014			1	15,042	15,042

Cost of one additional seat

List	In actual case	If allotted seats gained at minimum
	$(2M+1)T-V+1$	$(2M+1)T-(2M-1)T+1$
A	85	30,085
B	29,011	30,085
C	30,007	30,085
D	30,085	30,085

For any list already given one seat the next seat will cost $(2M+1)T-V+1$ votes. The closer V is to $(2M-1)T$ (the fewer the votes "wasted" in reaching M seats) the closer the increment required for one additional seat will approximate $2T+1$ (in this case $2 \cdot 15042 + 1 = 30,085$).

³ Using the 1.4 barrier the 7 seats in the detailed example in footnote 2 would be allotted as follows:

List	Votes	Quotients					Total seats	Votes per seat	
		1.4	3	5	7	9		actual	minimum
A	105,210	$\frac{75,150}{=I}$	$\frac{35,070}{=II}$	$\frac{21,042}{=IV}$	$\frac{15,030}{=VI}$	$\frac{11,690}{=VII}$	5	21,042	21,042
B	46,200	$\frac{33,000}{=III}$	$\frac{15,400}{=V}$	9,420			2	23,100	17,535
C	15,120	10,800					0	—	
D	15,042	10,744					0	—	

The 1.4 barrier thus adds two seats to the largest party: the two smallest parties would have to poll a minimum of $\frac{105,210 \cdot 1.4}{9} = 16,366$ to make the threshold. This would still be well below the average cost of the five seats allocated to party A: $\frac{105,210}{5} = 21,042$, or to party B: 23,000 in the actual case and $\frac{3 \cdot 11,690}{2} = 17,535$ at the threshold point.

NOTES

¹ For detailed calculations of over-representation for different distributions of votes among parties see C.-G. Janson *Mandattildelning och regional röstfördelning*. Stockholm, Idun, 1961.

⁴ For an analysis of the political situation prior to the 1965 election see S. Rokkan "Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism" in R. A. Dahl ed. *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966.

⁵ For detailed calculations see S. Rokkan and H. Valen "Stortingsvalget 1965 i søkelyset" *Aschehougs Leksikonserie* 4(4), 1965: 170-176.

⁶ For a detailed analysis of statistics through 1961 see S. Rokkan and H. Valen "Regional Contrasts in Norwegian politics", pp. 162-238 in E. Allardt & Y. Littunen eds. *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems*. Helsinki, Westermarck Society, 1964.

⁷ S. Rokkan, H. Valen and A. Amundsen "Stortingsvalget 1965. Et første sett analyser av resultatene". *Samtiden*, 74(8) 1965: 463-480.

⁸ For a discussion of these concepts of electoral analysis, see S. Rokkan and H. Valen "The Mobilization of the Periphery" pp. 111-158 in S. Rokkan ed. *Approaches to the Study of Political Participation*. Bergen, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1962, also S. Rokkan "Electoral Mobilization, Party Competition and National Integration", to be printed in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner eds. *Political Parties and Political Development*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.

⁹ The texts of the alternative proposals are in "Grunnlovsforslag fremsatt på 108. ordentlige Storting" *Dok. nr. 15* (1963-64). Oslo, Arnesen, 1964, pp. 13 sqq.

FINLAND: DOMESTIC POLITICS DURING 1962-65

This paper is a review of Finnish internal politics since 1962, with special reference to cabinet formations and the split in both the Social Democratic Party and the trade union movement. 1962 was selected as the starting point because both presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the beginning of that year. As the Finnish parliamentary procedure presupposes the resignation of the government when a new president is elected or the ruling president is re-elected, the first quarter of 1962 also involved a change of cabinet.

The Presidential Election, February 15, 1962

The President of Finland is not directly elected by the people. The actual election is done by the Electoral College of 300 electors chosen by universal suffrage. The Electoral College that was to choose the new president a month later was elected on January 15-16, 1962. Four electoral "blocs" or alliances put up their own candidates: Urho Kekkonen (a bloc consisting of the Agrarians and non-Socialist representatives of various shades of political color), Paaavo Aitio (the Communists), Rafael Paasio (the Social Democrats) and Emil Skog (the Social Democratic Opposition). The result was a great victory for the president regnant, whose election bloc won 145 of the 300 mandates. In fact, the victory was even greater, because the 54 electors returned by the Swedish People's Party, the Finnish People's Party and the Conservatives declared that they would support the re-election of President Kekkonen or, which amounted to the same thing, that they would vote for a non-left wing candidate. When the Electoral College convened on February 15, President Kekkonen received 199 votes, while the other three candidates shared the remaining 101 votes. A glance back at the presidential elections six years earlier raises the question of how the presidential candidate who was elected in 1956 by the smallest possible majority (151-149) now enjoyed a virtual landslide. The explanation lies not in domestic politics but in foreign policy. At the negotiations with President Kekkonen in Novosibirsk, arising out of Soviet demands for military consultations under the 1948 Pact of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, Mr. Krushchev stated: "In his day, we supported Paasikivi when the object of Paasikivi's policy was peace and friendship. Our attitude to President Kekkonen's policy is the same. We set equally great store by it. . . . We trust you." The consequence was that Attorney General Olavi Honka, whose candidature for the presidency