Introduction: Emotions and Global Challenges of Inequality

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This is a special issue in honour of Professor Juha Räikkä’s 50th birthday. It comprises this introduction and six peer-reviewed articles written by his colleagues.

Räikkä holds a full professorship of philosophy at the Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University of Turku, Finland. He is the Head of the Philosophy Unit there for the third term now. Räikkä has been a Docent in Practical Philosophy since 1994 and he completed his doctorate in 1992, both at the University of Turku. He has made a number of research visits abroad: the University of Miami (under Professor Alan Goldman’s supervision), Southwest Texas State University in Austin, the European University Institute in Florence, and the Finnish Institute for Classical Studies in Rome.

Räikkä has led several research groups in practical philosophy. Four of his most recent Academy of Finland research projects have included: “Ageing, Diminishing Autonomy, and Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Philosophical Study” (2011-2013), “Individual Autonomy, Neurosciences and Chronic Disorders of Consciousness” (2008-2011), “Genetic Democracy: Social and Ethical Implications of Genetically Modified Organisms” (2004-2007) and “Global Justice and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecies” (2005-2006). To date he has supervised nine doctoral dissertations, including the ones of the guest editors of this issue, and numerous licentiate and master’s theses. In addition of being a respected supervisor, he is an active and highly esteemed lecturer in undergraduate and graduate courses.

Räikkä’s research interests are diverse but to the core of practical philosophy, i.e. political philosophy and ethics. In the field of political philosophy, he has specialized in issues concerning justice such as minority rights, international income distribution, alternatives of population policy, and the concept of collective responsibility. In the field of ethics, he has concentrated on autonomy, conspiracy theories and privacy, on
methodological issues such as burden of proof in argumentation and the concept of feasibility, and also on questions in moral psychology, particularly the nature of guilt, self-deception, forgiveness, adaptation and remorse. In the field of applied ethics, Räikkä has expertise in bioethics, specifically ethical issues arising from neuroscience and gene technology. His published research includes 33 articles in international peer-reviewed journal, 28 other papers in English and more than 100 articles in Finnish. He has published three monographs in English, edited or co-edited seven books in English, and many more in Finnish. Räikkä is a noted member of the academic philosophy community in Finland and the editor of a Finnish philosophical journal Ajatus.

The theme “Emotions and Global Challenges of Inequality” of the special issue was chosen to combine Räikkä’s two long-term research interests: global justice and moral psychology. (Although not every paper addresses both inequality and emotions, they discuss a philosophical issue related to at least one of them.) This special issue will be a surprise for Räikkä. Thus strictly speaking, and supposing that the issue will in some way affect him, we have not followed the All-Affected Principle in proceeding with it. Yet, the principle is not forgotten, as the first paper, written by Professor Eerik Lagerspetz, is a critique of the All-Affected Principle, which roughly reads as “all who are affected by a decision should have a right to participate into making it”.

In particular, Lagerspetz compares the principle to other closely related ones and spells out its ambiguities, including the ones related to the notion of ‘affecting’. As a result, he takes Robert Goodin’s interpretation to be the least ambiguous one. According to Goodin, “we should give virtually everyone a vote on virtually everything virtually everywhere in the world”. The drawback of this interpretation, Lagerspetz notes, is that it cannot provide normative guidelines for forming the decision-making units – which was the original purpose of the All-Affected Principle. Lagerspetz spells out three further, less-discussed aspects of the principle: Firstly, it excludes from the decision-making those who are not affected by the decisions. This is important, since possible cases of over-inclusion may be just as serious as cases of under-inclusion. Secondly, since the principle is based on interests, it may be taken to question the view that those who have a right to participate should be equal in their power. Maybe the ones with strongest interests should also have more votes. Thirdly, since people’s interests are in practice largely created and shaped by political institutions, the All-affected Principle cannot provide a pre-institutional starting
point – a role it has often been given in recent discussions.

Professors Kaisa Herne and Maija Setälä examine the instrumental value of deliberative democracy in promoting justice. They start by noting that impartiality seems an appealing precondition for justice. Many understandings of impartiality emphasize rationality of the decision-maker and the evaluation of outcomes from the perspective of each relevant individual. In real-world deliberative processes impartiality requires “both collective processes of arguing and individual processes of reflection”. The latter, moreover, implies empathy towards positions of others. Herne and Setälä distinguish between affective empathy and cognitive empathy. Cognitive empathy is necessary for impartiality and deliberative democracy. The role of the affective empathy is less clear, but Herne and Setälä point out that “the acknowledgement of the necessity of affective components of empathy helps to recognize potential sources of biases which can be problematic when impartiality is considered as the goal of democratic deliberation”. Herne and Setälä present two strategies for enhancing impartial reasoning in public decision-making: Firstly, detaching decision-makers from their particular interests and, secondly, enhancing the quality of democratic deliberation and processes of empathy.

In his paper Professor Saul Smilansky analyses two challenges to egalitarianism: Derek Parfit’s “Levelling Down Objection” (LDO) and his own “Paradox of the Baseline” (POB). According to LDO, egalitarianism implies that we often must, for the sake of equality, make things worse for some people at no gain to anyone. We should, for example, as in Smilansky’s awe-inspiring real-life example, make everybody’s cup handle-less if someone has a cup without a handle. By his three examples Smilansky shows that requirements of levelling down may not be as unique to egalitarianism as has been thought. The common morality may often require it. Yet, Smilansky takes LDO to be a forceful argument against egalitarianism. POB concerns levelling up. The requirement of levelling up a certain disadvantaged group together with the view that “everyone should receive the baseline unless we can justify the person’s not receiving it” creates “odd sort of inequality” in which hard-working effective individuals end up receiving the least. Smilansky draws two lessons from his analyses: Firstly, the problem of egalitarianism is its inability to recognize (other) values beyond equality. Even though we may, in the name of equality, accept levelling down or levelling up when there are no important values at stake, equality cannot justify significant loss of other values. Secondly, we need to be sceptical about the
possibility of general theory of justice and make social improvements carefully while learning from moral paradoxes.

Professor Lars Vinx’s paper is a critical comment on Christopher Wellman’s argument that a commitment to the right to freedom of association implies that legitimate states have a right to exclude immigrants. Vinx shows that the collective right to freedom of association can be understood in two different ways. Wellman’s argument is based on an “individualist construction”, which, according to Vinx, is not justified understanding of states’ freedom of association as it conflicts with the nature of a state and would imply a state to have a right to expel individuals who are already citizens. Rather, the states’ right to freedom of association should be understood as a “political construction”. This latter understanding does not imply that states have a right to block immigration. According to Vinx, “as long as a large part of humanity is forced to live under circumstances that deprive them of the benefit of membership in an adequately functioning state, adequately functioning states have a duty to admit immigrants who suffer from that condition of quasi-statelessness”.

Professor Jón Ólafsson analyses reconciliation through two examples: attempted repayment deals and the prosecution of a former prime minister after the bankrupt in Iceland. A necessary condition for reconciliation is taken to be “that there are individuals ready to admit to their participation in wrongdoing and thus to be identified as perpetrators”. Ólafsson points out that, in the context of reconciliation, it is important to distinguish a desire to tell the truth from a desire to justify one’s actions to others. Reconciliation requires not just the perpetrator’s telling the truth, but also him/her listening to the victims. The first example discussed raises questions about the possibility of collective actors as perpetrators as well as the limits of collective responsibility in reconciliation. The second case shows how an attempt to achieve moral goals of reconciliation by legal means can backfire in unexpected ways. Ólafsson concludes that the presented two cases “suggest that moral aspirations over and above legally achievable goals may be misplaced”. According to him, in the presented cases the injustice could have only been settled through measures that went beyond what the established political and legal system could accommodate.

Professor Olli Koistinen discusses the relation between substances and modes in Spinoza’s philosophy. The question addressed arises from Spinoza’s claims that besides
substances and modes there is nothing, there is only one substance, God, and the modes are in it. How should this relation of being-in be understood? According to the so-called Curley problem, the relation cannot be understood as inherence, since it would imply that ordinary things, such as rocks and trees, are the properties of the only substance. Koistinen considers three interpretations as answers to the Curley problem: (1) Jonathan Bennett’s field metaphysics and its view of modes as property universals, (2) John Carriero, Charles Jarrett and Bennett’s later view of modes as particularized properties, and (3) Koistinen’s new theory called adverbial theory of modes. It derives from his “contention that considerations into the nature of adverbs and their ontological correlates helps to shed some light on the nature of modes in Spinoza”.