K.B. Madsen: Systematology: A comparative Metatheory

The first part of the paper contains: 1) the definition, 2) the systematic placement and 3) the historical evaluation of »Systematology«.

1. »Systematology« = the comparative, metatheoretical study of scientific texts (= »theories«).
2. »Systematology« is a subdiscipline of the general metascience, which produces a general metatheory.
3. »Systematology« is developed as an integration of the main schools of philosophy of science.

The second part is a concentrated exposition of the systematological taxonomy: a descriptive system for analyses and comparison of scientific texts (= »theories«). Every text may be divided into 3 levels of abstraction:

1. The Metalevel including the philosophical, metatheoretical and methodological presuppositions.
2. The Hypothetical level includes the hypotheses and explanatory models.
3. The Datalevel includes descriptions of concrete observations and more abstract, empirical generalisations.
   To each level is developed a system of classifications (see the Appendix).

The third part describes the most important systematological research-results:

2. Description of some patterns of preference or paradigms, which are frequent in psychology.
3. Application of systematology in connection with a test of Kuhn's theory on the history of psychology.

Benny Karpatschof: Psychology and the the world map

Based on a dialectic materialistic epistemology the article presents an ontology with 3 successively formed fields of objects – the cosmological, the biological and the anthropological field. The latter having 2 domains, the psychological and the sociological domain. Corresponding to these 4 domains are outmarked 4 fundamental scientific domains, that is cosmology, biology, psychology and sociology. From this external cartography the internal geography of psychology is analysed, the central area in the science of psychology being stated as the psychology of personality, and the institutional placement of this sub-discipline is then investigated in the history of psychology through 60 volumes of psychological abstract. Finally the relation between the empirical and the theoretical side of the psychological science, and the dialectics between theory and practice in psychology is discussed.
Sigmund Koch claims that psychology cannot be a coherent science. This article argues against Koch's general view on science. It concludes that psychology very well can be regarded as a science - as a natural science. Another question is if natural science is a relevant ideal for psychology when studying intentions and strategies.

Science depends on comparisons, be it between hypotheses and observations or between numerable units and different scales of measurement. The so-called comparative problem of the lifesciences - including psychology - is only different from the comparison problems of other sciences in that comparisons are here made between different animal species, their organ structures and functionel properties of organs as well as between parts of their behaviour repertoires. As is the case with exploration of the relationship between different types of psychical phenomena, such as heat, movement, electricity, comparisons between species demand a theoretical background for laying down criteria of comparison and units of measurement. Regarding the lifesciences such a background is partly to be found in the theory of evolution, which has made possible a systematization of the animal species of our planet, and partly in models for the phylogeny of specific bodily features and properties - such as evolutionary brain models, models for the gradual differentiation during evolution of motivation systems and hormones, and so on. In the course of this century, criteria have been developed from such theoretical bases concerning comparisons between animal species and between some species and Man - also with regard to behaviour and certain psychic properties. The untenable generalisations of behaviorism relating to principles of learning, found during experimentation with just a few species, may now be replaced by other and better criteria for similarity and difference between species with respect to behaviour and learning. Among these homology (structural) and analogy (functional) criteria of similarity are mentioned, along with aspects of their methodological basis, and there is mention of a number of results obtained through such comparisons: the discovery of feedback and feedforward; clarification of the nature-nurture question; functional similarities of prosemantic communication between humans and animals; archaic motivations behind human behaviour and motives for action; similarities in the social organization of primates. Finally, there is mention of P. D. MacLean's triune brain model which, along with its anatomical and functional division of the human brain into reptilian, paleomammalian, and neomammalian parts, holds promises for an overall and integrated account of the discovered similarities in behaviour and psychological reactions of landliving animals.

The scientific credibility of psychoanalysis is examined by a discussion of trends in modern philosophy of science, and empirical studies. Views presented by A. Grünbaum and A. Lorenzer are interrelated, and the conclusion is that it is possible to defend the scientific credibility of psychoanalysis by a combination of therapy and therapy-extern empirical studies.
Lars Andersen: Reflections on the use of the concept of «the unconscious» in psychoanalysis

The article deals with the problem of the unconscious. It shows that even in psychoanalysis, which has the unconscious as its «object», is »the unconscious« an inaccessible and evasive »something«. After that it goes into the logical difficulties in the attempt of Freudian theory to determine the consciousness of the subject on the basis of a psychological unconscious, which is itself un-determined. The unconscious must necessarily be an unknown. Through a discussion with Danish scholars the article concludes that we can neither have objective knowledge nor speak in a logically meaningful manner about »the unconscious« as such. It pleads for a humanistic, hermeneutic reformulation of the theoretical language of psychoanalysis, where substantiating conceptualizations such as The unconscious become superfluous.

Preben Bertelsen og Lars Hem: The clients model of the world

In the article the notion of a persons model of the world, as it more or less explicitly is formulated inside different traditions of psychotherapy, is discussed. Jerome Frank’s concept of »the assumptive world« exemplify this notion. Bandler & Grinder’s use of the concept of a persons model of the world is then delineated, and how this concept is used in understanding psychotherapy is illustrated. It is shown how Bandler & Grinder’s concept implies a distorted view of the person and of the process of psychotherapy. Their concept is at best a model of human capacities, and as such it is at odds with contemporary understanding of both human perception and activity. Through abstracting away both history and concrete events from their conceptual field, their model fails to conceptualize the central issues in psychotherapy.

Birgitte Diderichsen: Paranoia and recognition

This article is about the paranoid psychosis as described and understood in the psychiatry. The analysis are proposed to give a psychological approach to the understanding of the paranoid conditions. The thesis is that the paranoid delusion represents a defect in the process of recognition, manifested in a distorted recognition of the world and the self. To put a light on that I discuss some of the results, that the clinical research in cognition in schizophrenia and paranoia has found. Through a case history it is shown how the affective part of the recognition is necessary to understand the paranoids way of conceptualizing his world. At last a few remarks are made concerning what paranoia can tell about some general psychological phenomena.

Ole Schultz Larsen: The two-sided Eros

The article starts with a summary of Freud’s paper »On the universal tendency to debase-ment in the sphere of love« (1912). It deals with Freud’s view on the psychical impotence and the split male attitude towards love. With this in mind, Freud’s distinction between the sensitive and the sexual aspect in people is discussed. However, it is argued that Freud’s view of the sensitive aspect as a purely oedipal and sexually diverted phenomenon is not understandable. An object-relational concept facilitates the investigation of its important pre-oedipal background.