

## SUMMARIES IN ENGLISH

*Sven Erik Nordenbo: Science of morals, normativ ethics and metaethics*

It is the purpose of this paper to introduce the three usual ways of analysing the normative ethical phenomena, i.e. as science of morals, normativ ethics and metaethics. The paper presents in three sections the viewpoint, methods and most important theories of these three disciplines. The last section discusses some central problems concerning the relationships between the three disciplines, and it is stressed that normative ethical considerations take a fundamental position.

*Ebsen Hougaard: Some Ethical Problems in Psychotherapy*

The paper deals with some ethical problems in psychotherapy distinctively appearing from a theoretical point of view. Firstly, it is argued that conceptions of psychotherapy as a value-free enterprise are "myths". Secondly, some problems in relation to the therapist's power position in the psychotherapeutic relationship are described. Finally, the problematic scientific status of psychotherapy and its consequences for psychotherapeutic ethics are discussed.

*Sven Erik Nordenbo: The 'fundamental education story', the 'pedagogical relationship' and 'educational paternalism' – identification of a moral problem in education.*

Within the last two decades an increasing demand has grown for establishing an intimate and binding relationship between the educator/teacher and the person being educated/taught – a genuine 'pedagogical relationship'. It is claimed that this relationship hides a moral problem, and it is the purpose of the paper to identify its nature. Three theoretical approaches which discuss aspects of the 'pedagogical relationship' are considered, i.e. an approach from the narratological tradition which analyzes what here is denoted as the 'fundamental educational story', an approach from the '*Geisteswissenschaftliche*' tradition, which analyzes the phenomena '*der pädagogische Bezug*', and an approach from the analytical philosophy, which discusses the problem of paternalism. It is shown in the last section that due to the special nature of the educational relationship, a moral problem emerges from an anti-paternalistic viewpoint.

*Michael May: Morality, social cohesion, and the analysis of action*

Through a historical and theoretical discussion of the durkheimian concept of "solidarity" and the concepts of "ideology" and "terror" (as they were developed during the French Revolution), it is attempted to develop a conceptualization of the relationship between morality and "social cohesion" (in the sense of: cohesion of the society). This relationship is thus treated in connection with the constitution of sociology, as I am following the thesis, that the "sciences of social behaviour" can be seen as a "scientification" of the problems of morality. Furthermore this relationship between morality and "social cohesion" is treated in connection with the question of the political foundation of solidarity in society.

Theoretically I try to show, that the various scientific disciplines, whose subject is the social activity of man, are forced to conceive the problems of morality through a "doubling" of the concept of the subject, that is, they have to recognize subjectivity in the form of an individual subject and in the form of a collective subject. Secondly I try to show, that they are also forced to conceive the universal conditions of "social cohesion", on one side, as "inner" competences of action and, on the other side, as "outer" institutions of regulation and codification. One can put forward, that these conditions of "social cohesion" are in fact moral conditions, and that the practical realization of these conditions in social agency, – that is when we actually act as "responsible" social agents and as "normal" language-users, therefore should not be seen as an apriorical condition of the scientific understanding of social life.

*Mogens Pahuus: Philosophical Anthropology and the Basis of Morality*

This article consists of three parts. In the first part I present the three most important positions in the philosophical discussion of human nature, and I sketch the conceptions of moral life that are connected with each of these positions. The most extensively described position is the so-called person-theory, which I myself maintain. In the second part I develop the critique of the theory of needs (taken as a general theory of motivation), which was mentioned already in the first part, and I argue that the theory of motivation which is included in my person-theory (according to which part of human motivation consists of potentials, not needs) contributes to answering the normative question about man's destination, a contribution that is important for the critique of the way our type of society moulds man and human life. In the third part I give a more systematic argument to the effect that moral life cannot be grounded in a single principle, but consists of a series of irreducible types, each of which is grounded in a given type or indispensable way of acting. In other words it is my thesis, that morality – or rather the different types of morality – has an ontological foundation in the sense that each type of morality is necessarily connected with an indispensable kind of human activity.

*Boje Katzenelson: The inner side of morality*

The Fall is interpreted as the description of the rise of the division of labor and the sociality involved. Sociality is defined as the reciprocal acknowledgement of the interdependency of existence. Out of this spring the dialectics of reciprocity or the personal, i.e. the understanding that everybody has got the same properties as I myself. That applies primarily to positive qualities like love, trust, helpfulness etc. With the Danish philosopher Løgstrup these are defined as 'sovereign manifestations of life', i.e. manifestations that are given and to which we cannot freely choose to relate as it pleases us. These make up the inner side of morality. Contrary to phenomena like justice, equality and duty, which belong to the outer side of morality, the sovereign manifestations of life need no reasons or justifications. Their mode of comprehension is empathy or identification and they require the release of an analogous manifestation. Their existence is explained evolutionary as a necessity of the division of labor. From this the good can be identified as a value. Lines are drawn to charity, therapy and care. The limits and risks of the inner side of morality are demonstrated through confrontation with the outer side of morality.

Department of Psychology, University of Aarhus, 4 Asylvej, 8240 Risskov, Denmark.

*Arne Poulsen: Moral development*

A characterization of seven branches in the development of the capacity for moral behaviour, the first of which are insensitive, the later sensitive, to changing cultural demands.

*Torsten Ingemann Nielsen: Ethos, Psyche and Numen*

The title of this essay summarizes the central proposition as follows: The development of our values ("Ethos") is related to just how open – or closed – we are psychically ("Psyche") to an encounter with the sacred ("Numen").